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This dissertation examines the spatial and built forms of Japanese power.  As it 
sought to consolidate control of new territory, the Meiji government followed a design 
forged in Tokyo as it attempted to build legitimacy through public works projects, 
namely railways, Western-style architecture, and urban improvements.   
The first half of the dissertation traces the emergence of hegemonic urban space 
in Tokyo from the initiation of the Ginza Bricktown project in 1872 to the opening of 
Tokyo Station in 1914.  Chapter II shows how popular resistance to the Ginza Bricktown 
project led to a more pragmatic urban planning system in Tokyo.  Thereafter, rather than 
imposing preformed cityscapes onto the city, Japanese urban planners would attempt to 
reduce costs and avoid popular resistance by strategically widening streets and improving 
urban infrastructure when and where possible.  Chapter III illustrates how the lessons of 
the Ginza Bricktown paved the way for the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital.  
As the discussion of Tokyo Station – the so-called “Gateway to the Imperial Capital” – 
demonstrates, it was the cooperation of government planners, architects, and local forces 
that ultimately produced imperial space at the heart of the imperial capital. 
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The second half of the dissertation demonstrates how Japanese colonizers 
attempted to establish hegemony in the colonies through manipulation of the natural and 
built environments of Taiwan and Korea.  As Chapter IV argues, Japan pursued railways 
in Korea from the mid-1890s in an effort to validate Japanese claims to Korean territory.  
Chapter V shifts the focus to consideration of the built environment in Japanese 
colonialism.  As in Meiji Tokyo, Japanese planners sought to project Japanese imperial 
power in the colonial urban built environment through programs of Urban Planning 
(Shiku Keikaku) in Taipei in the 1900s, and Urban Improvement (Shiku Kaishū) in Seoul 
over the next two decades.  Learning from the opposition such projects incited in Tokyo, 
colonial planners in Taipei and Seoul pragmatically adjusted their plans to make 
implementation more feasible.  As the case study of Seoul will demonstrate, the 
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Driving across the United States from Oregon to Maine during the summer of 
2014, I covered a lot of ground – and a lot of road.  With an itinerary traversing sixteen 
states, each state border was cause for celebration symbolizing progress on my long trip.  
While state borders were often indicated by roadside “Welcome!” signs, I quickly 
realized that these otherwise invisible lines on the map were denoted by a much more 
palpable marker: the sharp “thud” my car made as it crossed each state line, caused by 
changes in surface paving materials or by the gaps between newer and more worn road 
pavements.  Presuming that this resulted from better road surface maintenance in one 
state than another, I could not help comparing states based on how well they kept up their 
highways.  In doing so, I found myself sharing the reaction of those Japanese Meiji 
government leaders who visited the United States and Europe in 1871-1873 on the 
Iwakura Mission.  As they toured the Western world, the official travel diary of the 
mission records, the Iwakura ambassadors saw road conditions as the first indicator of the 
relative prosperity of whatever nation they were visiting, not to mention the quality of its 
government.  For the Meiji leaders on the Iwakura Mission, this observation was a lesson 
that Japan must exert as much effort on improvement of the urban built environment as it 
did on institutional and political reform if it wanted to demonstrate its modernity to the 
rest of the world.  For me, this shared reaction was the fitting culmination of a 
dissertation project that, in its own way, took the long road to arrive at its destination and 
passed a few thuds and gaps along the way. 
This project would not have been possible without the guidance of a number of 
individuals.  Jeffrey E. Hanes, my academic advisor, pushed me to not only hone my skills 
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as a modern Japanese historian, but also to broaden my topical and thematic expertise by 
taking a more comprehensive and comparative view of Japan.  Andrew E. Goble taught me 
the art of archival research and instilled within me a deep appreciation for the linguistic 
complexities of primary source materials.  Alisa Freedman urged me to explore history 
from multiple perspectives and to employ a variety of evidentiary materials.  Bryna 
Goodman inspired me to engage historical theory in my research and writing.  Carola Hein 
provided several opportunities to present my research and offered constructive criticism.  
Many other colleagues and friends influenced this project in ways they may not 
have realized or anticipated.  Brian Ladd taught a graduate seminar in which the idea for 
this project was hatched.  Rod Wilson, Jordan Sand, Ian Miller, Evelyn Schulz, André 
Sorensen, Paul Waley, and Doug Fix all gave valuable feedback at different stages.  
Takamura Masahiko and his graduate students welcomed me to their research laboratory at 
Hosei University in Tokyo for one year.  Huang Chun Ming and his graduate students at 
Chung Yuan Christian University made a research trip to Taipei highly productive.  
Gregory Pflugfelder facilitated research at Columbia University.  Dan Free and Wakuda 
Yasuo clarified details concerning Japanese railways.  My fellow graduate students in 
Oregon, especially Austin Parks, Brendan Morley, Kevin Gouge, Erik Glowark, Hillary 
Maxson, Lucas Erickson, and Breann Goosmann, engaged in lively discussions and debates 
about Japanese history.  Luis Ruiz, Feather Crawford, Amiel Angeles, Clint Sandvick, and 
Nathan Jessen made my time in graduate school much more intellectually stimulating and 
enjoyable.  Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without financial support 
from Fulbright Japan, the Kobe College Corporation, the University of Oregon Center for 
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INTRODUCTION: URBAN SPACE AND CULTURAL HEGEMONY 
Over two nights in September 2014, thousands of anxious onlookers crowded into 
the plaza fronting Tokyo Station in downtown Tokyo to watch one of six performances of 
“Tokyo Station Vision,” an elaborate 10-minute 3D light and music show projected onto 
the facade of the recently renovated station building.1  Commissioned by the JR East 
Railway Company to commemorate the completion of preservation and restoration work 
on the station, the show was meant both to evoke the past and anticipate the future of the 
site with the theme, “a trip through space-time (Jikū wo koeta tabi).”  According to 
organizers, the show would address “station, railway, people, and town,” with imagery 
and music reminiscent of different generations in the history of the station – from a 
triumphal martial fanfare, to a pop music-style re-mix of a commuter train departure 
bell.2  At the end of the light show, to the delight of the spectators, the station was fully 
illuminated, unveiling the results of over four years of renovation work to restore the 
building to its original 1914 appearance.  The restoration project was part of the larger 
“Tokyo Station City” development initiated by Governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō and 
the JR East Railway Company in 1999.  Incorporating the station building, the luxurious 
Tokyo Station Hotel, several office skyscrapers, and sprawling shopping complexes both 
underground and within the station, Tokyo Station City was designed as “the only 
                                                
1 The video is available on the internet at http://www.nhk-ep.co.jp/gekiteki/.  NHK 
Enterprises, Inc., Gekiteki, http://www.nhk-ep.co.jp/gekiteki/. 
2 East Japan Railway Company, Tōkyō Eki Marunouchi ekisha hozon, fukugen kansei 
kinen ibento ‘Tokyo Station Vision – Tōkyō Suteishon Bijon’ no kaisai ni tsuite 
[Concerning the holding of the Tokyo Station Marunouchi station building preservation 




station-city” in the world – a space “blending history, tradition, culture, art, science, 
business, and advanced technology,” in the words of organizers.3  The intricate digital 
light show was thus a fitting celebration of the urban space of downtown Tokyo: a global 
city popularly seen as hi-tech, futuristic, and a center of the world economy.   
Yet aside from the envisioned commercial function of Tokyo Station City as a 
hub of transportation and urban consumerism, the restoration of Tokyo Station and the 
surrounding space had a more symbolic purpose.  As Governor Ishihara explained to the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly in 2008, the restoration project was the centerpiece of an 
attempt to “develop the area around Tokyo Station under a comprehensive concept of 
design that befits the front gate of the capital.”4  As the project neared completion in 2012 
in the midst of Tokyo’s bid to host the 2020 Olympics, Ishihara expanded on the 
contribution the new station made in attempts to “construct a stately city suitable as the 
Japanese capital.”  “Significant progress has bee[n] made in the redevelopment of Tokyo 
Station and the surrounding Marunouchi area, which serve[s] as the gateway to the 
nation’s capital,” Ishihara addressed the assembled lawmakers.  “[Gyōkō-dōri] Avenue 
which connects Tokyo Station and the Imperial Palace has been developed into a highly 
dignified street conveying a rich history,” Ishihara continued, “and next month, the 
restoration of the section of Tokyo Station that was destroyed by air-raids in World War 
II will be completed, allowing the building to recapture its original appearance for the 
                                                
3 Tokyo Station Management Council, About TSC, 
http://www.tokyostationcity.com/en/tsc/ 
4 Ishihara Shintarō, “Policy Speech by the Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, at the 
First Regular Session of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, 2008,” February 20, 2008, 





first time in 67 years.”  According to Ishihara, the restoration of Tokyo Station and the 
redevelopment of the road linking the station to the Imperial Palace was an important 
component in “molding” Tokyo “into an elegant city in order to boost its presence as the 
capital of Japan.”5  As it seems, Tokyo Station was once again the focus of efforts to 
produce urban space in Tokyo suitable to its status as the Japanese capital.  Remarkably 
similar rhetoric was used to herald the original Tokyo Station when it opened in 1914 as 
the gateway to Tokyo.  Notably, at that time, the urban space framed by Tokyo Station 
and its station-front plaza marked the Japanese capital not as a hub of global trade and 
consumerism, but as the Imperial Capital of a colonial empire that spread to Taiwan and 
Korea.  It was a space, then, not of consumerism, but of colonialism.   
East Asia today remains littered with physical remnants of Japanese colonial rule, 
of which Tokyo Station is only the most prominent.  Across the former Japanese empire, 
the railway networks, public buildings, and urban plans completed by Japanese rulers 
during the colonial period remain intact.  Even in cases where such remnants were 
purposefully demolished – such as in Seoul, South Korea, where public sentiment led to 
the destruction of the former Japanese Governor General Headquarters building in 1995 – 
other remnants remain, such as the Japanese-constructed Seoul Railway Station and 
Seoul City Hall building.  As with Tokyo Station, these monumental projects were the 
centerpieces, and therefore the prime symbols, of Japanese colonialism.  The symbolic 
renovation of Tokyo Station and its imperial environs, added to the continued existence 
                                                
5 Ishihara Shintarō, “Policy Speech by the Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, at the 
First Regular Session of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, 2012,” February 22, 2012, 





of similar physical manifestations of the colonial experience throughout East Asia, call 
for historians to revisit the role of urban space and architecture in the Japanese empire. 
This dissertation examines Japanese assertions of power in space, particularly 
power as mediated in the built forms of railways, architecture, and urban planning.  By 
surveying Japanese public works projects in the metropole and the colonies, this 
dissertation argues that cultivation of power through the manipulation of the natural and 
built environments was a prime component of Meiji state-formation and empire building.  
As it sought to consolidate control of new territory, both domestic and foreign, the Meiji 
government attempted to build legitimacy through public works.  Railways, Western-
style architecture, and urban improvements were particularly handy tools in concretizing 
Japanese power because they served material as well as conceptual benefits: improving 
mobility for troops and trade, reinforcing Japanese claims to territorial ownership through 
cultivation and improvement of the environment, and differentiating the “modern” 
Japanese regime from its “premodern” or precolonial predecessors.  Already reifying the 
Japanese ability to manipulate the environment, these built forms of power framed spaces 
that were designed to further project Japanese power.  Space, therefore, was not only a 
product of power, but was also an agent in the production of even greater power. 
Four points can be made about Japanese assertions of power in space.  First, put 
simply, Japanese rulers in the metropole and the colony alike attempted to rule through 
modern space – in other words, spaces in both capital and countryside that had been 
refashioned to fit Meiji Japanese notions of “modernity” and “civilization.”  For early 
Meiji leaders and urban planners, “modernity” was as much a lived condition defined by 
particular accoutrements, such as locomotives, paved streets, gas lamps, sidewalks, and 
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brick buildings, as it was an ideology or temporal period.  Whether it was by laying 
tracks through the countryside, or installing sewer pipes, paving streets, and erecting 
imposing structures in the city, Japanese planners attempted to construct built forms of 
“modernity” in order to project Japanese power and culture.  Because this was done in the 
name of attaining popular subservience and garnering international recognition of Meiji 
rule, space was wielded as a tool of Japanese cultural hegemony. 
Secondly, the focus of these Japanese spatial manipulations was the capital cities 
of Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul.  Much as Japan’s 19th century leaders had striven to re-
create Tokyo as the “imperial capital” of a unified nation, its 20th century colonial leaders 
ventured to create imperial spaces in the colonial capitals.  Because each city was the 
public representative of its respective territory and the model for the surrounding 
countryside, Japanese planners in all three areas carried out programs designed to 
transform the cities into suitable capitals.  For Meiji Japanese planners, this meant cities 
that were not only “modern” in appearance, but also commercially prosperous.  It was 
only after a city boasted a “modern” cityscape and thriving commerce was it said to “live 
up to” its role as the capital.  Planners therefore focused on street improvements to 
simultaneously improve urban mobility while modernizing the aesthetics of the city.  Just 
as buildings displayed the objectives and aims of their designers, the urban built 
environment – the public face of the Japanese empire – revealed the goals and intentions 
of the Japanese government, as well as how the leadership wished Japan to be perceived 
by foreign, domestic, and colonial observers.  In both metropole and colony, planners 
were concerned with constructing the visage of a recognizable “civilized” cultural 
landscape and enforcing expectations of “civilized” public behavior. 
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Thirdly, Japanese manipulations of space in the natural and built environment of 
the Japanese landscape forged a model that guided later projects in the colonies.  The 
proximity of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea resulted in a high degree of personnel exchange 
and continuity between the metropole and the colonies, binding the Japanese empire into 
a tight-knit web of colonial public works bureaucracy.  As Japanese planners and 
engineers arrived at the colonial worksite, they responded to problems they saw in the 
natural and built environments by drawing on their experience and training in the 
metropole.  Because many of these “operatives of empire” were trained in the Japanese 
Imperial University System and held public works jobs in Japan before transferring to 
colonial positions, they embarked on their colonial jobs with a shared archive of 
engineering knowledge.  Not surprisingly, urban improvements in Taipei and Seoul 
consequently exhibited a number of conceptual and technical similarities to projects in 
Tokyo – from the rhetoric used to justify the projects, to the focus on streets and urban 
infrastructure.   
It is important to note, however, that while based on Tokyo models, urban 
improvements in Taipei and Seoul were by no means perfect copies.  Instead, the fourth 
important point of Japanese assertions of power in space was that they flexibly adapted to 
local conditions.  Even Tokyo Station – so warmly embraced when re-opened in 2012 – 
was widely ridiculed when it first opened in 1914.  It was too big and out of proportion, 
critics wailed, and it turned its back on the heart of the city located to the east.  Needless 
to say, rarely do such large projects proceed without opposition.  This was a lesson 
Japanese planners learned the hard way when they tried to impose a Western urban space 
onto the urban fabric of Tokyo in the Ginza Bricktown project following the Ginza fire of 
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1872.  This convinced Japanese planners to take a more programmatic and integrative 
approach to urban improvements.  Only by reducing costs and avoiding popular 
resistance by working from within the existing built environment could planners 
accomplish public works projects in capital and countryside. 
In making the argument that the Japanese nation-state and empire were built 
following a common design of spatial power, this dissertation seeks to make two 
contributions to the study of Japanese history: one theoretical, and one historiographical.  
First, this dissertation views urban space as both a product and a tool of power.  In this 
regard, this study benefits from the work of critical geographers and scholars of 
architecture and urbanism, particularly architectural critic Kim Dovey.  In his book 
Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form, Dovey describes how the built 
environment of the city “mediates, constructs and reproduces power relations” through 
the literal and discursive “framing” of the spaces of everyday life.  “In the literal sense,” 
Dovey writes, “everyday life ‘takes place’ within the clusters of rooms, buildings, streets 
and cities we inhabit.  Action is structured and shaped by streets, walls, doors and 
windows; it is framed by the decisions of designers.”  At the same time, “As a form of 
discourse,” Dovey continues, “built form constructs and frames meanings.”  Dovey coins 
the term “framing” to capture the way that the design of built form can both “shape” and 
“enclose” daily action, while also providing the “context” for everyday life – or, “both 
the construction of a world and of a way of seeing ourselves in it.”6  Designers and 
planners, then, attempt to frame space by designing and planning in ways that reflect and 
                                                
6 Kim Dovey, Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 1-2. 
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advance their interests, values, and worldview. 
In Meiji Japan, planners framed everyday urban space with what they identified 
as the tangible elements of urban modernity: the western architecture, sidewalks, sewers, 
roadside trees, and paved streets of the modern cityscape.  It was by wielding such 
“instruments of modernity,” as Jeffrey E. Hanes has argued, that Meiji modernizers 
crafted a frame of “modern, exploitable space” for the new Japan.7  By constructing these 
tangible forms of modernity in the city, Japanese planners hoped to demonstrate the 
power of the Meiji government while impressing the ideas of civilization and culture onto 
the population.  Modern urban sites therefore became “hegemonic spaces” – spaces that 
embodied the discursive project of modernity and transmitted power.  In Sovereignty and 
Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, Prasenjit Duara explains his 
definition of the term “the modern” as a noun as an attempt to “highlight the idea of the 
modern as a set of temporal practices and discourses that is imposed or instituted by 
modernizers.”  “As such,” Duara concludes, “it is a hegemonic project among other 
temporal practices, rather than a preconstituted period or a given condition.”8  For 
Japanese modernizers, “the modern” was indeed a hegemonic project, but it was one that 
was reified as a given (urban) condition.   
Japanese strategies of spatial power were hegemonic in two regards.  Japanese 
modernizers sought to transmit Japanese power through the production of modern urban 
space.  This meant the introduction of built forms that embodied Japanese ideas of 
                                                
7 Jeffrey E. Hanes, “Contesting Centralization? Space, Time, and Hegemony in Meiji 
Japan,” in New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan, ed. Helen Hardacre and Adam L. 
Kern (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 488, 491. 
8 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 6 n.6. 
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progress and civilization.  The Ginza Bricktown, of course, was the most famous example 
of the government’s attempt to re-create Tokyo as a “showcase” in this way.9  
Modernization of the built environment was therefore an attempt to solidify and transmit 
Japanese power by concretizing in the built form of the city what Japanese planners saw 
as an advanced Japanese culture.  City streets were especially important components in 
this project.  From the early Meiji period, Japanese modernizers and planners viewed 
streets as the basis of a triangular relationship between transportation infrastructure, 
commercial function, and international prestige.  Nowhere is this clearer than in the 
official records of the Iwakura Mission, which toured the United States and Europe over 
the years 1871-1873.  As the diary kept by scribe Kume Kunitake reveals, the Iwakura 
Mission members quickly recognized a correlation between the state of a nation’s roads 
and streets and its overall level of economic development.  As Kume reflected, “When 
you enter any country [for the first time] you can tell immediately, by looking at the road 
surfaces, whether the government is efficient or not and whether the citizens are likely to 
be rich or poor.”10  Later, writing that roads and waterways are as vital to commercial 
enterprises as are “arteries and veins to the human body,” Kume elaborated on this point 
in the volume on Western Europe.  “We found that as we traveled through a particular 
country,” Kume recorded, “the condition of its roads would reveal to us immediately 
whether the national government was vigorous or in decline and whether the industry 
                                                
9 Henry D. Smith, “Tokyo as an Idea: An Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought Until 
1945,” Journal of Japanese Studies 4, no. 1 (1978), 53. 
10 Kume Kunitake, The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-73: A True Account of the Ambassador 
Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary’s Journey of Observation Through the United States of 
America and Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 1:200. 
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and commerce were active or lethargic.”11  With this relationship between economic 
performance and road quality in mind, Kume fastidiously recorded “instructive” street 
construction techniques wherever the Mission travelled.12  In addition to frequently 
jotting down road widths, remarking on the use of sidewalks to separate vehicle and 
pedestrian traffic, and admiring the planting of roadside trees to provide shade, Kume 
described in great detail tar-macadam and woodblock paving techniques in Washington 
D.C. 13, “tile”-like closely laid stone paving in London14, gravel and cement paving in 
Paris15, and the use of sand to keep the dust down on streets in Western Switzerland.16  As 
these observations reveal, Meiji government leaders and planners recognized the 
importance of quality streets for producing cities that were both commercially vibrant and 
modern in appearance.  For this reason, street improvements became a common 
component of urban redevelopment projects throughout the Meiji period.   
But what makes city streets conduits of power?  As Dovey notes, what ties the 
practice of spatial framing to power is that “most people, most of the time, take the built 
environment for granted...The more that the structures and representations of power can 
be embedded in the framework of everyday life, the less questionable they become and 
                                                
11 Kume Kunitake, The Iwakura Embassy, 2:179.  Italics in original. 
12 Kume, The Iwakura Embassy, 5:178-179; As Kume wrote, “The careful attention paid 
to the paving and maintenance of streets is a fine custom in industrialized countries and 
instructive to contemplate...,” in Kume, The Iwakura Embassy, 1:197. 
13 Kume, The Iwakura Embassy, 1:197-198. 
14 Kume, The Iwakura Embassy, 2:41. 
15 Kume, The Iwakura Embassy, 3:34-35. 
16 Kume, The Iwakura Embassy, 5:52. 
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the more effectively they can work.”  This is truer for some elements of the built 
environment than for others.  It is hard for large edifices to hide within the city.  The 
symbolic demolition of the Japanese-built Government-General Building in Seoul in 
1995 demonstrates that certain mediations of power in the built environment can be 
deconstructed when they fail to become anonymously embedded in the urban fabric.  It is 
much easier for streets, on the other hand, to strengthen and preserve their hegemonic 
function by quietly passing into the level of the taken-for-granted.  Dovey borrows from 
Pierre Bourdieu to conclude, “It is the ‘complicitous silence’ of place as a framework to 
life that is the source of its deepest associations with power.”17  Once laid, streets form a 
framework that defines the surrounding built environment, transforms urban space, and 
directs the movement of people through the city.  Building heights are often restricted by 
the width of the street they front, roadbeds demarcate public space, and streets determine 
the route taken from point A to point B, all the while being highly regulated by traffic 
signs, stop lights, and lane markings.  Although street surfaces are frequently repaved, the 
street itself is rarely rerouted.  The clearing of new streets through the city therefore has 
the power to forever dramatically alter the make-up of the neighborhood.18  Even as the 
buildings lining the street are torn down and rebuilt, the street itself remains largely the 
same.  City streets are therefore the most insidious and lasting articulation of spatial 
power.   
                                                
17 Dovey, Framing Places, 1-2. 
18 Marshall Berman’s discussion of the impact of the construction of the Cross-Bronx 
Freeway on the neighborhoods of the South Bronx in New York City comes to mind.  
See Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), esp. 290-311.  
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Another way in which Japanese strategies of spatial power were hegemonic was 
that they attempted to garner popular consent by flexibly adapting to local conditions and 
demands.  As Antonio Gramsci theorized, the hegemony of the ruler was impossible 
without the consent of the ruled.  Gramsci wrote that the social hegemony of the ruler 
requires the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of population to the 
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group.”  For 
Gramsci, this spontaneous consent resulted from “the prestige (and consequent 
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the 
world of production.”19  As Japanese modernizers attempted to construct cultural 
hegemony, they also carefully tried to manufacture consent.  Although the built forms 
framing modern urban space – the railways, the buildings, and the streets – were rigid 
structures, they were part of a flexible model that could be fit into available spaces.  
Rather than bulldozing through existing neighborhoods to open new thoroughfares or 
clear building sites, Japanese planners slowly transformed the built environment of the 
city through gradual street improvement projects to extant streets and the construction of 
buildings on repurposed government-owned land.  On one hand, this had the pragmatic 
economic benefit of reducing costs associated with land purchase and removal of 
obstructive buildings.  On the other hand, this had the more insidious result of ensuring 
the measured success of the projects and reducing public opposition.  That is to say, 
adapting to local conditions did by no means enervate the hegemonic power of the 
                                                
19 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New 
York: International Publishers, 1971), 145; and Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the 
Theory of Hegemony,” Journal of the History of Ideas 36, no. 2 (1975): 353. 
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produced spaces, it only made the projects more surreptitious in their casting and 
distribution of Japanese power into areas it otherwise would not have reached.    
The second contribution to the study of Japanese history this dissertation seeks to 
make is historiographical.  By arguing that the Japanese nation-state and empire were 
built with the same strategy of spatial power, this study echoes not only scholars of 
Japanese history who stress the “duality” of the Meiji state, but also scholars of 
colonialism who have argued for a more integrative analysis of metropole and colony.  
Ethnologist Umesao Tadao has suggested that in Japan “the construction of a nation-state 
was indeed the building of an empire.”20  Likewise, Kurimoto Eisei has written that the 
transformation of the national army into an overseas army “was parallel with the process 
of state building that resulted in modern Japan; while the Japanese were trying to build a 
nation-state, they began to construct an empire.”21  Finally, Yamamuro Shin’ichi has 
pointed out the “duality” of the Meiji state, “namely, that it held colonial possessions 
while in the process of becoming a nation-state and itself became a colonial empire.”22  
Scholars of colonialism, likewise, have sought to break down the dichotomies of 
“metropole/colony” and “colonizers/colonized,” and instead to focus on the close 
                                                
20 Umesao Tadao, “Keynote Address: Comparative Studies of Civilization with regard to 
the Formation and Transformation of the Nation-State,” in Japanese Civilization in the 
Modern World XVI: Nation-State and Empire, ed. Umesao and others (Osaka: National 
Museum of Ethnology, 2000), 5. 
21 Kurimoto Eisei, “Nation-State, Empire, and Army: The Case of Meiji Japan,” in 
Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVI: Nation-State and Empire, ed. Umesao 
and others (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000), 106. 
22 Yamamuro Shin’ichi, “The Evolving Meiji State: It’s Dual Character as a Nation-State 
and Colonial Empire,” in Japanese Civilization in the Modern World XVI: Nation-State 
and Empire, ed. Umesao and others (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000), 11. 
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interrelationship between these groups.23  In his pointed assessment of the historiography 
of Japanese imperialism, Andre Schmid points out that “much of the literature is marked 
by a top-down, metrocentric approach that renders colonial history tangential to the main 
narratives of the modern Japanese nation and, in some instances, comes precariously 
close to reproducing versions of Japanese colonial discourse.”  Arguing further that 
studies of Japanese history and colonialism tend to reproduce the “division between home 
and abroad captured in the colonial phrases naichi (internal lands or Japan proper) and 
gaichi (external lands or outlying colonies),” Schmid writes that studies of Japanese 
imperialism have produced a “style of nation-centered history, where as the primary 
subject of the study of the past, the nation is neatly separated from the colonies and seen 
as developing independently.”24  Picking up where Andre Schmid left off, Sandra Wilson 
explicated the impact on Japanese history of recent trends in the study of imperialism.  
“There is now much greater consciousness among historians of Japan that any colonial 
relationship is a two-way affair,” Wilson writes.  She then lists three implications this 
realization has for studies of Japanese colonialism: “One implication is a greater 
recognition that the colonial relationship is shaped by the responses of the colonised as 
well as the intentions and actions of the colonisers.”  “Another,” Wilson adds, “is that life 
in the metropolis itself is seen as affected deeply by its colonies: the ‘mother’ country is 
no longer accepted as the modern, civilised nation that on the one hand imposes its will 
                                                
23 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking 
a Research Agenda,” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World 
edited by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997), 15.  
24 Andre Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern 
Japan: A Review Article,” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 4 (2000): 952, 954. 
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abroad through its colonial agents, and on the other continues along its own, independent 
historical trajectory.”  Finally, “A third implication,” Wilson concludes, “is an 
acknowledgment that mainstream studies of Japanese history should include 
consideration of the colonies as a matter of course: all or most topics in modern Japanese 
history will be relevant to the colonies, and vice versa, and colony and metropolis should 
no longer be in separate baskets.”25 
Following in the footsteps of recent scholars of colonialism, this dissertation will 
attempt to merge the narratives of Japanese state-formation and empire building by 
tracing Japanese mechanisms of spatial power from the metropole to the colonies in order 
to illustrate that, indeed, similar strategies used to construct the state were used to build 
the empire.  As such, this dissertation will survey the formation, alteration, and 
adaptation of Japanese construction projects and urban planning initiatives in order to 
illuminate ways that Japanese modernizers and colonizers attempted to harness and 
transmit power in the urban space and built forms of the city.  Colonial cities can provide 
a particularly instructive lens for illuminating power relationships, especially those 
mediated in the built environment.  According to Anthony D. King, colonial cities are 
one of the best venues for analyzing the physical and spatial arrangements of urban 
development as “unique products of a particular society and culture, operating within a 
given distribution of power.”26  Nezar AlSayyad agrees.  “Dominance is not exclusive to 
                                                
25 Sandra Wilson, “Bridging the Gaps: New Views of Japanese Colonialism, 1931-1945,” 
Japanese Studies, 25, no. 3 (2005): 288. 
26 Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and 
Environment (Boston: Routledge & Paul, 1976), xii; Anthony D. King, Urbanism, 
Colonialism, and the World-Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World 
Urban System (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
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colonial cities,” AlSayyad argues, “but the use and manifestation of dominance in the 
colonial context is particularly blunt.”  For this reason, analysis of architecture and 
urbanism in the colonial city can provide insight into the mechanisms and workings of 
power in built form.  “Analysis of the forms of dominance deployed in colonial cities 
may point the way to a better understanding of the power of architecture and urbanism in 
general,” AlSayyad writes.  “In particular, we may see that, while politics necessarily 
plays a role in architectural and urban form through the choice of goals, styles and 
techniques, it is not the specifics but the implementation of such a program that is all 
important.”27  That is to say, close examination of the execution of public works projects 
can illuminate the “tactics and strategies of power” at work.  
The survey of Japanese assertions of power in space unfolds over four chapters in 
the dissertation, first examining the development of Japanese strategies of spatial control 
in the metropole before shifting focus to the colonies to demonstrate how this model was 
deployed overseas in order to integrate new territory into the expanding empire.  Chapters 
II and III trace the emergence of imperial space in the imperial capital – that is, the 
production of hegemonic urban space in Tokyo from the initiation of the Ginza 
Bricktown (Ginza Rengagai) project in 1872 to the opening of Tokyo Station in 1914.  
Chapter II introduces the urban space of 1870s Tokyo as a performative space where the 
political conflicts of the early Meiji period were acted out in the built environment.  
Following the Ginza fire of 1872, the Meiji government saw an opportunity to reconstruct 
Tokyo as a modern capital that would demonstrate Japan’s newfound modernity, 
                                                
27 Nezar AlSayyad, “Urbanism and the Dominance Equation: Reflections on Colonialism 
and National Identity,” in Forms of Dominance: On the Architecture and Urbanism of the 
Colonial Enterprise, ed. Nezar AlSayyad (Brookfield: Avebury, 1992), 5. 
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consolidate political rule of the emerging nation, and concretize the power of the Meiji 
state.  The Meiji government therefore responded to the fire by imposing a Western-style 
modern urban space from above with the Ginza Bricktown project.  This meant the 
construction of a modern streetscape, including straight, paved streets, sidewalks, 
roadside trees, and western-style buildings.  But these central government attempts to 
impose urban space on the city were vehemently resisted and redirected by other groups 
expressing politics in space: the Tokyo municipal government and the residents of Ginza, 
whose combined efforts forced the central government to scale back and then cancel the 
project.  Japanese urban planners responded to the failure of Ginza Bricktown by 
developing a more pragmatic approach to urban improvements.  Rather than trying to 
impose preformed cityscapes onto the city, planners thereafter attempted to reduce costs 
and avoid popular resistance by strategically widening streets and improving urban 
infrastructure whenever and wherever possible.  In this way, the tenuous political 
situation of the early Meiji Period not only shaped the urban space of Meiji Tokyo, but 
also defined Japanese urban planning policy. 
Chapter III illustrates how the lessons of the Ginza Bricktown paved the way for 
the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital.  Focusing on the planning and 
construction of Tokyo Station as a case study, the chapter will chart changing perceptions 
of the role of Tokyo and the collective production of imperial space by government 
planners, architects, and local officials.  Following the failure of Ginza Bricktown, 
Japanese planners focused on street improvements in order to produce the economic 
prosperity necessary to transform Tokyo into the “greatest capital in Asia” – prestigious 
not for its urban aesthetics, but for its commercial function.  Perceiving a triangular 
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relationship between the city’s infrastructure, commercial prosperity, and international 
status, Tokyo planners in the Home Ministry initiated the Tokyo Urban Improvement 
(Shiku Kaisei) projects of the late 1880s, calling for railway extensions and citywide 
street improvements.  Yet, as a discussion of planning rhetoric will demonstrate, planners 
began to call for more comprehensive improvements over the course of the 1880s as 
more planners became involved in the planning process.  Finally, following victories in 
war over China and Russia, and the acquisition of Taiwan as a colony, Tokyo planners 
and residents alike sought to produce spaces suitable for the emerging empire.  As the 
discussion of Tokyo Station – the so-called “Gateway to the Imperial Capital” – will 
demonstrate, it was the cooperation of government planners, architects, and local forces 
that ultimately produced imperial space at the heart of the imperial capital. 
The second half of the dissertation shifts the analytical lens from the metropole to 
the colonial periphery in order to examine Japanese efforts to cultivate cultural hegemony 
in the colonies by manipulating natural and built environments.  When Japanese defense 
strategists perceived a threat of Western encroachment, Japanese diplomats schemed to 
seize control of peripheral territories by initiating public works projects.  This started 
with railways.  As Chapter IV shows, Japanese efforts to spread imperial influence into 
the peninsula by constructing railways in Korea dated back to the mid-1890s.  In the 
minds of Japanese diplomats and businessmen, ownership and operation of railways in 
Korea would not only facilitate Japanese economic advancement, it would also validate 
Japanese territorial claims.  That is to say, Japanese leaders believed that “enlightened 
exploitation” of the natural environment entitled the cultivator to ownership of territory 
and justified claims to cultural superiority.  Railway construction was therefore perhaps 
19 
 
the most significant means of solidifying territorial rule through cultivation of the natural 
environment.   
Finally, Chapter V pairs development of the natural environment with 
improvement of the built environment in Japanese attempts to assert colonial rule.  As in 
Meiji Tokyo, Japanese planners sought to project Japanese imperial power in the colonial 
urban built environment through programs of Urban Planning (Shiku Keikaku) in Taipei 
in the 1900s, and Urban Improvement (Shiku Kaishū) in Seoul over the next two decades.  
Whereas colonial planners in Taiwan emphasized culture, those in Korea stressed 
economic development.  Nevertheless, projects in both cities were based on the 
production of modern urban space through the improvement of city streets and urban 
infrastructure.  Learning from the opposition such projects incited in Tokyo, colonial 
planners in Taipei and Seoul pragmatically adjusted their plans to make implementation 
more feasible.  In this regard, colonial urban improvements should be seen as part of 
what colonial planner Gotō Shimpei called “military preparation in the guise of 
civilization,” or “bunsō bubi.”  In this light, Gotō’s celebrated “scientific colonialism” 
was an attempt to secure local consent while asserting Japanese cultural hegemony.  
Colonial planners in both cities, meanwhile, strategically adjusted their plans to more 
closely reflect local demands, topographical conditions, and the existing built 
environment, in order to secure consent and achieve successful implementation.  In this 
way, modification of plans did not weaken or undermine the power of imperial space, 
rather alteration made that power more responsive and flexible.  As the case study of 
Seoul will demonstrate, finally, the centerpieces of these colonial urban networks of 
power was the production of imperial space. 
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As this dissertation will attempt to show, Japanese rulers cultivated control of new 
territory by deploying a flexible model of spatial manipulation designed in Tokyo.  In the 
final analysis, Japanese state-formation and empire building were driven by the same 
fears and motivating ideologies, championed by a small group of government leaders, 
built by civil engineers with the same training, and constructed with the same design.   
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CHAPTER II  
POLITICS IN SPACE: RUPTURE AND RESISTANCE IN GINZA BRICKTOWN 
The half-mile from Kyōbashi to Shimbashi is known 
locally as the  “Brick Street” because all the buildings are 
constructed in brick.  According to one person, “this area 
must be indeed just like some Western country!”…There is 
no place other than Ginza Street where one can truly 
understand Tokyo's prosperity at first glance.   
   – Shinsen Tōkyō Jitchi Annai, 18931 
 
On the afternoon of the 26th day of the second month (Wednesday, April 3), 1872, 
a great fire erupted in Japan’s new capital, Tokyo.2  Carried by strong winds, the fire 
quickly spread southeast from its starting point in the army barracks located in the former 
Aizu compound outside the Wadakura Gate of the Imperial Palace.  It then jumped the 
outer moat of the palace in central Tokyo before blazing over 230 acres through 
Kyōbashi, Sukiyabashi, Owarimachi, Ginza, Kobikichō and all the way to Tsukiji on its 
way to displacing over 20,000 residents.  Counted among the over 5,000 buildings 
destroyed by the fire were the compound of the Governor of Tokyo, Yuri Kimimasa, and 
the famous Tsukiji Hotel.3   
                                                
1 KDL: Kunshidō, ed., Shinsen Tōkyō Jicchi Annai [New practical guide to Tokyo] 
(Tokyo: Kunshindō, 1893), 29. 
2 The date of the Ginza Fire was 1872.2.26 in the lunar calendar.  Japan switched to the 
Gregorian calendar starting in 1873, when 1872.12.2 was followed by January 1, 1873.   
3 Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu: Shiku Kaisei no Tansho [Construction of 
Ginza Bricktown: the beginning of urban improvement] (Tokyo: Tōkyō-to, 1955), 17; 
Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed., Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi [Records of Tokyo Roads] (Tokyo: Tōkyō 
Shiyakusho, 1939), 288; Ishida Yorifusa, Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen [100 
Years of Japanese Modern Urban Planning] (Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 1987), 33; 
Noguchi Kōichi, Ginza Rengagai to Shuto Minken [Ginza Bricktown and popular rights 
in the capital] (Yūshisha, 1992), 24; Ogi Shinzou, Tōkyō Shomin Seikatsushi Kenkyū 
[History of the daily life of the common people of Tokyo] (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan 
Kyōkai, 1979), 93; Hiyamuta Junji and Kawakami Hidemitsu, “Meiji 5-nen taika-go no 
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With visions of London and Paris in mind, a group of progressive Japanese 
government leaders including Ōkuma Shigenobu, Inoue Kaoru, and Shibusawa Eiichi 
quickly set about unilaterally reconstructing the area from the ground up.  Bemoaning 
traditional building forms as outmoded, conducive to fires, and detrimental to wealth and 
prosperity, government leaders called for the reconstruction of “fireproof” buildings in 
brick and the widening of streets as firebreaks.  These improvements, together with 
prohibition of fire-prone traditional buildings in the burnt areas, promised to make the 
district more resistant to the disastrous fires that frequently swept through the city.  Yet 
the introduction of entirely new modern, Western building forms and improved street 
infrastructure had a second, much more political purpose.  As André Sorensen describes, 
Ginza was rebuilt as “an impressive and fire-resistance district suitable for the imperial 
capital.”4  To this end, the central government hired a foreign architect to design the new 
buildings, and improved the streets of Ginza with the most up-to-date engineering and 
paving techniques.  The resulting district came to be known as Ginza Bricktown.5  With 
macadamized street surfaces, brick-paved sidewalks, enclosed stone sewers, roadside 
trees, and even gas streetlamps, Bricktown formed a modern urban space comparable to 
                                                                                                                                            
Ginza Rengagai no kensetsu jigyō ni tsuite” [Concerning the construction of Ginza 
Bricktown after the great fire of 1872], Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Ronbun Hōkokushū 54 
(October, 1956): 661.  More detailed first-hand accounts of the damage caused by the fire 
can be found in the April 6, 1872 and April 13, 1872 issues of the Japan Daily Mail.  
Amazingly, there were only 8 fatalities.   
4 André Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the 
Twenty-First Century, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 61. 
5 It is worth noting that “Bricktown” was merely a popular moniker, and government 
documents consistently refer to the district not as the “Bricktown” but as “The Burnt 
Areas South of Kyōbashi,” as in “Regarding the construction of brick buildings and the 
widening of roads in the burnt areas south of Kyōbashi...” 
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Regent Street in London or the Rue de Rivoli in Paris.  Situated adjacent to Shimbashi 
Station and designed in recognition of its relation to the imperial palace, moreover, the 
Ginza Bricktown took on imperial significance as a spatial link between two symbols of 
Meiji state-formation: the railway network and the emperor system.  In this way, the 
Ginza Bricktown synthesized railways, Western architecture, and urban planning to 
produce an imperial space at the heart of the new imperial capital.   
As an imperial space designed to project Japanese power and modernity, the 
Ginza Bricktown denoted a sharp rupture in the urban planning of Tokyo.  From this 
point forward, Japanese planners would devise improvements in the city in accordance 
with Tokyo’s role as the herald of the new imperial regime, and the new Japan.  Just as 
Henri LeFebvre wrote that ideology requires spaces to which it can refer and therefore 
creates the spaces that guarantee it will endure, “modern” Japan needed spaces that would 
define and characterize it as a modern nation.6  The imperial capital was that space, and 
the Ginza Bricktown was the first project in producing it.  It was as if the burnt areas of 
Ginza provided the Meiji leaders with a blank canvas on which to paint the model of a 
modern imperial capital. 
Of course Ginza was not a blank canvas, and local residents, not surprisingly, 
were not so happy with the disruptions caused by the government’s project.  Those 
residents whose plastered warehouses had survived the flames had to watch as their 
houses were later razed or moved at the hands of government planners to make way for 
new brick buildings.  Other residents were forcibly relocated as street-front property was 
                                                
6 Henri LeFebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1991), 44.  LeFebvre poignantly illustrates this point by 
rhetorically asking, “What would remain of the Church if there were no churches?” 
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expropriated to accommodate the widened roads.  As a result, the central government’s 
attempt to unilaterally refashion the space of the city met stiff local opposition, which 
redirected these attempts to impose an imperial space onto the capital.  As the planners of 
the Bricktown quickly found out, strong-armed imposition of urban space provoked an 
equally tenacious reaction from a municipal government and local residents who were 
already antipathetic towards the Meiji regime.  Firstly, not only did Tokyo Governor Yuri 
protest the expensive brick buildings on behalf of Tokyo residents, the Tokyo 
government used what political power it possessed to alleviate the financial burdens of 
Bricktown by petitioning for allowances in building regulations, rent deferrals, and tax 
reprieves.  Secondly, local residents voted with their feet, erecting makeshift shelters in 
the wake of the fire that interfered with planned construction.  Then, as the new brick 
buildings were completed, Tokyo-ites made no attempt to hide their contempt for the 
unfamiliar structures.  Although the powerful early Meiji government was able to dictate 
the construction of Bricktown, it certainly could not compel the residents of Tokyo to 
inhabit it.  Occupation of the uncomfortable new buildings was therefore slow, forcing 
the government to compromise by approving several “vacant house counter-measures” 
(akiya taisaku) to attract tenants, including the allowance of traditional houses on 
backstreets, rent deferrals, and tax exemptions.  Even this last concession, which 
undermined the political message of the entire project, was not enough to ensure that 
Ginza Bricktown would be completed.   
In the end, because the government was unable, or unwilling, to reconcile 
conflicts, Ginza Bricktown was scaled back dramatically just one year after construction 
commenced.  Central government attempts to unilaterally produce the urban space of 
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Tokyo through the wholesale imposition of a modern Western built environment onto the 
existing city, then, were effectively countered and undermined by local political 
maneuvering and popular disinterest.  In the end, Japanese government leaders and city 
planners had little choice but to change how they planned urban improvements.  Only by 
incorporating these lessons of the Ginza Bricktown would it be possible to move forward 
with the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital. 
This chapter will examine the Ginza Bricktown as a venue where the larger 
political contests and power struggles that characterized the early Meiji period were 
performed in the urban space of Tokyo.  By tracing the conflicts over the production of 
Ginza Bricktown, this chapter will outline the uneven power relationships that shaped the 
built form of the capital.  Part 1 of the chapter views the Bricktown from the perspective 
of central government planners, arguing that these elite officials approached the project 
as a point of rupture as they sought to produce an imperial capital that would announce 
the arrival of the new Japan.  Following a review of the threefold significance of the 
Bricktown in international, domestic, and “internal” government politics, the chapter 
surveys the location, architecture, and street layout of the Ginza Bricktown to chart how 
it constituted an “imperial space.”   
Part 2 then turns to the local perspective of the municipal government and district 
residents, examining how Bricktown became a battlefield for proxy political wars 
between factions of the ruling elite, their allies in the municipal government, and 
independent-minded local residents.  First, Tokyo municipal government opposition to 
Bricktown will be interpreted as the local extension of a widening rift in the Meiji 
regime.  Secondly, analysis of several series of government petitions and inquiries will 
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illustrate how local residents – already disgruntled for a number of reasons with the new 
government – were able to hamper the execution of the Bricktown project, and ultimately 
cause its early termination.  Finally, the conclusion to the chapter will appraise the central 
government’s response to these local efforts and trace the legacy of the Ginza Bricktown 
in the urban planning of city and the re-creation of Tokyo as the imperial capital, Teito. 
 
Part1: Ginza Bricktown as Rupture: Imperial Space from Above 
The central government moved quickly after the Ginza fire to direct the reconstruction of 
the district.  While the ruins smoldered the day after the fire, the Tokyo government 
suspended the reconstruction of houses in the district.7  Two days after the fire, the Public 
Works ministry began surveying the burnt areas in preparation to widen streets in the 
district.  Three days later, on the 30th, the Council of State (Dajōkan) of the central 
government declared that buildings in Tokyo “shall all be gradually rebuilt in brick.”8  
Going on to order that this should be carried out with the cooperation of the Finance 
Ministry, the Dajōkan made clear that the reconstruction of Tokyo was not just a 
                                                
7 NAJ, “Kōbushō Kyōbashi i’nan shōshitsu sokuryō ni tsuki ruishō machimachi zanji 
kasaku wo tomu” [Temporary ban on housing construction in burnt neighborhoods for the 
purpose of Public Works Ministry survey of burnt areas south of Kyōbashi].  This entire 
document is reprinted with the heading “Sekizōgai kenchiku kettei” [Decision to construct 
brick houses] in Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Shikō Shigai-hen [Manuscripts of Tokyo 
history: the urban area], vol. 52 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1962), 838-841.  Fujimori 
Terunobu argues that the delay in the decision to rebuild the area in brick indicates that, 
while there was agreement on widening roads in the area, there was considerably more 
debate on fireproof construction.  See: Fujimori Terunobu, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku 
[Urban Planning of Meiji Tokyo] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), 5. 
8 NAJ, “Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu” [Decision to construct 
houses in brick].  The Dajōkan order to the Tokyo government is reproduced in Tōkyō-to, 
ed. Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 29. 
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municipal issue.  Rather, the planning and implementation of Ginza Bricktown would be 
carried out on the national level by the central government.   
The reason for central government intervention in the urban space of Tokyo was 
explained to residents in the Brick Construction Decree (Renga Kenchiku Rei) on the 2nd 
day of the third month, six days after the fire.  “To begin with,” this pronouncement 
declared, “the Tokyo of today has changed; it has become the Home of the Emperor 
(renkoku no moto).”  Therefore, the decree went on, “in the recently burned areas, the 
roads shall be widened, and construction of all buildings in brick shall commence 
immediately.”9  As this pronouncement indicated, the Ginza Bricktown (Ginza Rengagai) 
marked a distinct turning point in Tokyo urban planning: for the first time, improvements 
were carried out in recognition of the city’s new role as the home of the emperor, the 
Imperial Capital.10  Certainly, Tokyo continued to exhibit the identifiable markings of 
indelible Edo urban legacies – including land usage patterns, traditional construction 
techniques, and plot layouts.11  Nevertheless, the Bricktown project represented a 
concerted attempt to renew and transform the built environment of Tokyo.  If there was 
any question as to the goals of the project, a clear answer was provided by Vice-Minister 
of Finance Inoue Kaoru.  The “grand project” of the Ginza Bricktown, Inoue proclaimed, 
                                                
9 NAJ, “Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.”  TSS, vol. 52 (Tokyo: 
Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1962), 841-845 and Tōkyō-to, ed. Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 62, 
also contain the full text of the Decree. 
10 Referring to the same portions of the announcement, Matsuyama Megumi makes a 
similar argument in Matsuyama Megumi, “Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshi 
Shi-teki Kenkyū” [Urban history of Edo Tokyo during the modern transition], Chapter 3. 
11 Much work has been done in both Japanese and English on the continuities between 
Edo and Tokyo.  See, for example, Jinnai Hidenobu, Tokyo: A Spatial Anthropology.   
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was nothing other than a “shortcut (shōkei) to civilization and enlightenment (kaimei).”12  
With this in mind, planners imposed what Carola Hein has referred to as a “unified 
cityscape” of Western urban forms and improved streets into the urban fabric of Tokyo.13  
Symbolically united with railways, the Ginza Bricktown framed imperial space.      
This quick reaction by the central government raises several questions, especially 
since the great fire that destroyed Ginza at the end of the 2nd month, 1872 was not the first 
in Tokyo following the Meiji Restoration – nor even the first in Ginza.  Prior to 1872, 
over three-dozen fires had devastated different parts of the city, destroying an average of 
just over 3,000 houses per year from 1868.14  In 1872 alone, three major fires had already 
razed over 500 houses, the latest conflagration coming just over one month earlier when 
77 houses were destroyed in the adjacent Kyōbashi District neighborhood of Hiyoshichō 
on 1.14.15  Yet none of these numerous fires saw the same kind of dramatic reconstruction 
that occasioned the Ginza fire.  From a financial perspective, furthermore, the timing was 
not ideal for such a large project.  Central government coffers, already strained by the 
Bōshin War, were emptied out by the decision to have the new regime cover the stipends 
of the increasingly frustrated former samurai.  So why would the government choose this 
                                                
12 Tōkyō-to, ed. Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 34.  The wording of the petition in this 
source is slightly different in TSS, vol. 52, 820-822.  The petition can also be found in 
Matsuyama, “Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshishi-teki Kenkyū,” 83. 
13 Carola Hein, “Shaping Tokyo: Land Development and Planning Practice in the Early 
Modern Japanese Metropolis,” Journal of Urban History 36, no. 4 (2010): 461. 
14 Average calculated from statistics reproduced in Ogi, Tōkyō Shomin Seikatsushi 
Kenkyū, 91. 
15 Ogi, Tōkyō Shomin Seikatsushi Kenkyū, 93. 
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particular fire to embark on such a massive rebuilding campaign?  In other words, why 
now?  Why Ginza?  Why this design?  And why such a top-down project? 
Answering these questions requires first examining the political context of the 
Bricktown project.  Such an investigation reveals that the political situation of the early 
Meiji period conditioned the timing, location, design, and force of the project.  In the end, 
the Ginza Bricktown was a product of the right group of politicians being in the right 
position at the right time to take advantage of a fortuitous opportunity to produce a space 
suited to their goals.  In this way, the politics of the early Meiji period influenced the 
planning of the Ginza Bricktown and therefore shaped the urban space of Tokyo.  
Examination of 1) the geographic location of Ginza; 2) the architectural style of the 
Ginza Bricktown, and 3) the technical details and layout of the new improved street 
network will show how central government planners attempted to craft Ginza into an 
imperial space.  Each of these contributed one element of imperial space: railways, 
architecture, and urban planning.  Finally, this section will conclude with a discussion of 
reasons for the government’s forceful imposition of the project, setting up a discussion of 
the popular response in Part 2 of the chapter. 
 
Space in Politics: The Context and Meaning of Bricktown 
When Meiji leaders surveyed the damage of the Ginza fire in early 1872, they had been 
in power for fewer than five years.  As they strove to consolidate central political control 
of the emerging modern Japanese nation, the Meiji government still faced the threat of 
foreign interference.  Consequently, planners of the Ginza Bricktown saw in the project 
much more than merely an opportunity to fireproof the built environment of Tokyo.  The 
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project represented the Meiji leaders’ attempt to present the capital of Tokyo, and by 
extension the Meiji government and Japan as a whole, as a modern nation.  Eventually 
consuming nearly 4% of the national budget, the Ginza Bricktown took on an importance 
far larger than that befitting a local fire reconstruction effort.16  Instead, as Noguchi 
Kōichi points out, the Ginza Bricktown was “a neighborhood of Meiji Government 
national policy” – a project carried out in a complicated political context that ultimately 
shaped the timing, location, and design of the district.17  The political context of the 
Bricktown can be visualized as three concentric rings.  Proceeding centripetally from the 
outermost ring, the Ginza Bricktown was simultaneously influenced by politics at the 
international, domestic, and “internal” levels.   
Firstly, on the international level, the destruction of Ginza occurred at a time 
when Meiji government leaders were beginning to realize a need to create a suitable 
capital for the new Japanese nation that would “showcase” Japanese modernity to the rest 
of the world.18  Emerging onto the world stage in 1868 after being “opened” to the West 
by an American naval mission led by Commodore Mathew Perry in 1853, Meiji Japan 
found itself in the midst of the age of New Imperialism of the late 19th century.  Not only 
were European imperialist powers competing over colonies in Africa and Asia, these 
imperialists were embroiled in an intense rivalry to create the most splendid imperial 
                                                
16 Hiroshi Watanabe, The Architecture of Tokyo (Stuttgart: Axel Menges, 2001), 59. 
17 Noguchi, Ginza Rengagai to Shutominken, v.  Noguchi goes on to point out that, as the 
home of newspapers and other organizations such as the Aikokusha-affiliated Kōfuku 
Anzen Sha, Ginza later became the center of the anti-government Popular Rights 
Movement.   
18 Henry D. Smith, “Tokyo as an Idea: An Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought until 
1945,” Journal of Japanese Studies 4, no. 1 (1978): 53-54. 
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metropoles.  According to Evelyn Schulz, monumental capital cities were the “physical 
representations of the power and wealth of the nation-states then competing with each 
other.”19  “In the age of imperialism,” Schulz adds, “capital cities were regarded as 
symbols of the progress of mankind and as the embodiment of modern civilization.”20  As 
Takashi Fujitani observes, “in that age of rising nation-states a sort of international 
rivalry in the display of national power and prestige through urban architecture and space 
swept through Paris, Madrid, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and Washington.”21  
Finally, as famously described by Carl Schorske, liberals in fin-de-siècle Vienna 
fashioned the Ringstrasse in order to demonstrate their values in “stone and space.”22  As 
Schorske argues, such abrupt modernization of urban space was one example of the 
disruptive “a-historical” cultural transformations and rejections of past forms that marked 
the advent of modernity.23 
Tokyo was suddenly thrust into this international competition of modern capital 
cities when it was designated the home of the emperor and the new seat of government 
several months after the beginning of the Meiji Restoration in 1868.  At that time, an 
imperial decree entitled “Decree Renaming Edo as Tokyo and Moving the Capital” 
                                                
19 Evelyn Schulz, “The Past in Tokyo’s Future: Kōda Rohan’s Thoughts on Urban 
Reform and the New Citizen in Ikkoku no Shuto (One Nation’s Capital),” in Japanese 
Capitals in Historical Perspective: Place, Power, and Memory in Kyoto, Edo and Tokyo, 
ed. Nicolas Fiévé and Paul Waley (London: Routledge, 2003), 286. 
20 Schulz, “The Past in Tokyo’s Future,” 286. 
21 Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 32. 
22 Carl E. Schorske, Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1981), 24, 62. 
23 Schorske, Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture, xviii. 
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ambiguously announced, “...the place known as Edo will henceforth be [the “Eastern 
Capital”] Tokyo.”24  Even before the establishment of the Meiji government in 1868, 
several government leaders, especially Ōkubo Toshimichi, felt it was necessary to move 
the capital in order to extract the emperor from Kyoto and the undue influence of court 
aristocrats.  Ōkubo’s first choice was the port city of Osaka.25  Others, such as Etō 
Shimpei, however, preferred Edo.  “Since Edo is the center of the nation,” Etō argued, “it 
should become established as the permanent national capital in the future.”26  Edo had 
several benefits as a site for the capital: first, it was located in the middle of the country; 
second, the estates of the Tokugawa bureaucracy and supports could be seized for the use 
of the new government ministries and officials; and finally, the former shogun’s castle 
could be repurposed as the Imperial Palace.27   
The renaming of Edo as the “Eastern Capital,” Tokyo, gave new urgency to its 
urban condition.  Not only was Tokyo now the home of the emperor and the seat of the 
Meiji Government, but it was also designated as a treaty port, meaning it would host 
large numbers of foreign ambassadors, dignitaries, and traders.  As the modern capital of 
a modern nation, Tokyo was expected to demonstrate Japan’s modernization and 
Westernization, and, as Toshio Watanabe argues, show that Japan was a modern nation 
                                                
24 Translated in Edward Seidensticker, Low City, High City: Tokyo from Edo to the 
Earthquake (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 26. 
25 Masakazu Iwata, Ōkubo Toshimichi: The Bismarck of Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1964), 117-118.   
26 Quoted in M. William Steele, Alternative Narratives in Modern Japan (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 79. 
27 Iwata, Ōkubo Toshimichi, 118-119.  For more on the transition of Tokugawa lands 
under the Meiji regime see Kanaya Masataka, “Edo kara Tōkyō ni okeru Tenkanki no 
Kenkyū” [The transition from Edo to Tokyo], MA Thesis, Hōsei University, 2012.  
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“worthy of being treated as an equal among other developed nations.”28  Or, as William 
H. Coaldrake writes, Tokyo was expected to garner Japan “international recognition and 
acceptance as a modern nation.”29  This required modernizing the built form of the capital 
in order to produce spaces that Westerners would recognize as “modern” and “civilized.”  
The Bricktown marked the first major attempt to produce a capital that would announce 
the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji and Japan’s arrival at world modernity. 
Concretizing the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji in the built form of the 
imperial capital had a second, domestic significance, as central government leaders 
attempted to politically consolidate and ideologically unite the nation.  In addition to 
international pressure, several domestic troubles faced the fledgling Meiji regime in 
1872.  The last of the Tokugawa holdouts from the Bōshin War had only recently been 
defeated in mid-1869, and the abolition of old domains and establishment of new 
prefectures (Haihan Chiken) had occurred only several months earlier in the summer of 
1871.  The bureaucratic structure of the central government, furthermore, was in flux as 
factions within the Meiji elite vied for control.  In this context, the re-creation of Tokyo 
as a national capital was one of several major projects, along with construction of the 
national railway network, undertaken by the nascent Meiji state in the process of 
centralizing and standardizing the emerging nation-state.30  By reconstructing Edo into a 
                                                
28 Toshio Watanabe, “Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan,” Art Journal 55, no. 3, Japan 1868-
1945: Art, Architecture, and National Identity (1996): 22. 
29 William H. Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority in Japan (London: Routledge, 
1996), 208-209. 
30 For more on this, see Tristan R. Grunow, “Tracks to Teito: The Tokyo Train Network 
and the Meiji Quest for Domestic Hegemony and International Recognition,” MA Thesis, 
University of Oregon, 2008. 
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visibly modern Tokyo, the Meiji regime could unmistakably distance itself from its 
Tokugawa predecessors.  The Ginza Bricktown would become the first step in this effort.  
As Ishizuka Hiromichi argues:   
The new government, at the time the sole ruler representing Japan 
internationally, was in the process of becoming the sole unified ruler 
domestically as well.  As such, the first undertaking in the project of 
establishing an imperial capital suitable for a centrally unified nation was 
the construction of Ginza Bricktown.31 
 
In addition to the importance of political consolidation, ideological unity was an 
essential element of Meiji state-formation.  As Gavin Shatkin has argued, the first 
political function of capital cities is to “present an ‘argument’ for the legitimacy of [the 
national government’s] policies and programmes [sic] by presenting the capital as a 
symbol of progress that represents a template for the rest of the nation to follow.”32  In 
this regard, the quick action taken by the government to halt the traditional pattern of 
reconstruction before it could begin suggests that government leaders saw an opportunity 
to rebuild the district as a symbol of “civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kaika) for 
the capital, and the nation beyond.  Indeed, as Fujimori Terunobu writes, for the Japanese 
government, “the door to bunmei was in Ginza.”33  In a similar vein, David Howell has 
argued that behind central government attempts to drive out common “uncivilized” 
public practices, such as public urination and mixed bathing, lay “a more profound effort 
                                                
31 Ishizuka Hiromichi, “Meiji-ki ni okeru toshi keikaku – Tōkyō ni tsuite,” in Toshi-kōzō 
to Toshi-keikaku, ed. Tōkyō-toritsu Daigaku Toshi Kenkyūkai-hen (Tokyo: Tōkyō 
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1968), 486. 
32 Gavin Shatkin, “Colonial Capital, Modernist Capital, Global Capital: The Changing 
Political Symbolism of Urban Space in Metro Manila, the Philippines,” Pacific Affairs 78 
(2005-2006): 579. 
33 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 3. 
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to encourage the Japanese people to internalize new notions of civilization while at the 
same time preventing them from moving in uncontrollable directions.”34  This attitude 
towards “uncivilized” habits was echoed in the government’s criticism of fire-prone 
traditional housing practices following the 1872 Ginza fire.35  In this way, the 
introduction of a westernized urban space in the Ginza Bricktown was part of the larger 
centralization and westernization policies initiated by a central government intent on 
driving out the “evil customs” of the past and uniting the nation under the banner of 
“civilization and enlightenment.” 
Lastly, at the internal government level, the Ginza Bricktown served as an arena 
where competing factions jostling for political power within the central government 
waged their battles.  As works by Michio Umegaki, David Howell, and Mark Ramseyer 
and Frances Rosenbluth point out, despite being like-minded members of a political elite 
loathe to letting power slip from their hands, the Meiji oligarchs were by no means 
monolithically united in their political views or even their visions for the direction of the 
new country.36  Umegaki, for example, writes that after the Restoration the activists 
“continued their mutual and often debilitating suspicion and jealousy in addition to 
competing among themselves on policy issues.”  “Their earlier engagement in the 
common cause of creating the emperor’s government,” he adds, “had not made them a 
                                                
34 David Howell, “Visions of the Future in Meiji Japan,” in Historical Perspectives on 
Contemporary East Asia, ed. Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 95. 
35 See NAJ, “Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.” 
36 Michio Umegaki, After the Restoration: The Beginning of Japan’s Modern State (New 
York: New York University Press, 1988); Howell, “Visions of the Future in Meiji 
Japan”; Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: 
Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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community of the equally committed.”37  Instead, differences of opinion, factionalism, 
suspicions of power-grabbing, and simple pragmatic trial-and-error left the early Meiji 
regime in a state of administrative flux with frequent shifting of bureaucratic jurisdictions 
and personnel.38  The Three Offices (San Shoku) of government established on the day of 
the Meiji coup d’état in the first month of 1868 were quickly replaced by the Seven 
Departments (Shichi Ka) one month later and the Eight Bureaus (Hachi Kyoku) in turn 
two weeks after that, before the quasi-constitutional Seitasho system was established in 
mid-1868.  This too was short-lived and was replaced by the Council of State (Dajōkan) 
system in August 1869.   
In the midst of this political jockeying for power, the Finance Ministry 
(Ōkurashō) emerged as the strongest organ of government in the first few years of the 
Meiji period.  At first charged with reversing the rapid inflation caused by Yuri 
Kimimasa’s ill-advised attempt to stimulate local manufacturing by circulating 
irredeemable paper currency known as Dajōkansatsu, the bureaucratic reach of the 
Finance Ministry increased greatly in the government restructuring of August 1869.  
Subsuming the Bureau for Trade and Commerce from the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
(Gaimushō), the Finance Ministry was also given jurisdictional control over the affairs of 
the Civil Affairs Ministry (Minbushō), effectively combining the two.  As a result, the 
two ministries shared ministers, vice-ministers, and deputy vice ministers.  The Finance 
Ministry grew so powerful that Umegaki has termed the ministry at this time a 
                                                
37 Umegaki, After the Restoration, 109. 
38 The most detailed account of these administrative changes is Robert Arden Wilson, 
Genesis of the Meiji Government in Japan, 1868-1871 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1957). 
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“government within the government.”39  Although Matsudaira Yoshinaga and then Date 
Munenari held titular leadership of the Finance Ministry, real power was wielded by the 
energetic Vice-Minister of Finance and Civil Affairs, Ōkuma Shigenobu, and his Kido 
Takayoshi-supported allies, Deputy Vice-Minister Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru.   
Under Ōkuma’s strong leadership, the Finance Ministry quickly became the 
center for aggressive modernization and reform projects.  As Sakata Yoshio explains, 
these reforms were mainly intended to consolidate political rule of the country.  “It was 
among these bureaucrats in the Finance Ministry that allegiance to one’s own domain 
(jihan ishiki) was first overcome by national consciousness (kokka ishiki),” Sakata notes, 
“therefore they shared the goal of making Japan a modern, centralized nation in the 
image of the Western countries.”40  Umegaki agrees, writing that the reforms carried out 
by these progressives “were inspired by the need to protect the fragile Imperial 
government as a whole, particularly against any doubt of its legitimacy by the foreign 
powers.”41  Gathering progressives into the Reform Office (Kaisei Kakari), chaired by 
Shibusawa Eiichi, Ōkuma and Itō sponsored a number of reforms meant to consolidate 
Meiji rule by standardizing nationwide coinage and trade.  More importantly, the Finance 
Ministry followed up these efforts to centralize monetary policy with major construction 
projects that would spur the production of private capital while modernizing the nation, 
                                                
39 Umegaki, After the Restoration, 114. 
40 Sakata, “Nihon ni okeru Kindai Kanryō no Hassei” [Origins of Modern Bureaucracy in 
Japan], Jinbun Gakuhō 3 (1953): 6. 
41 Umegaki, After the Restoration, 113. 
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including the construction of lighthouses, telegraphs, model factories, a mint, and finally 
the Tokyo-Yokohama railway.42   
But these aggressive reforms came at a cost.  “The new cadre of intellectuals [in 
the Reform Office] constituted the most progressive group in the government,” 
Motoyama Yukihiko writes, “Not even the Dajōkan could restrain them in their zeal to 
built a methodical foundation for their vision of a ‘prosperous country’; and they 
themselves paid no heed to the conflict they provoked with those in other ministries or 
regional administrations who held more realistic or conservative views.”43  Not 
surprisingly, the radical reforms and bureaucratic power of Ōkuma, Itō, and Inoue in the 
Finance Ministry quickly upset other members of the Meiji regime.44  Conservatives, and 
those who sought to retain a clear divide in the decision-making and administrative 
functions of government between the Dajōkan and the ministerial bureaucracy, were 
especially concerned.  An overly active ministry threatened to blur the separation of 
administrative powers.  As Albert Craig sums up the situation, “[the Finance Ministry] 
was too progressive for mossbacks from Satsuma, and it had too much power...The 
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Education in the Meiji Era (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 143. 
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details are complicated, but the main story line is one of clique struggles and 
disagreements over goals.”45   
Starting in the summer of 1870, Ōkubo Toshimichi and Iwakura Tomomi worked 
together to limit the power of Ōkuma and the reformers in the Finance Ministry.  
Eventually a compromise was found that would assuage both conservatives and those 
who feared that the ministries had usurped the authority of the Dajōkan.  The Civil 
Affairs Ministry was detached from Finance in August 1870, placed under Ōkubo’s ally 
Ōki Takato, and given control of railways, telegraphs, lighthouses, and iron manufacture.  
In exchange, Ōkuma was promoted to Councilor (sangi) in the Dajōkan a month later in 
September.  Although proposed by Kido, Ōkubo acquiesced to this idea in the hopes that 
it would weaken the Finance Ministry and restore the balance of power between the 
Dajōkan and the ministries.  What followed next was a confusing back-and-forth of 
shifting jurisdictions as Ōkubo and Kido competed for influence while Kido went to 
work, slowly stripping the newly re-established Civil Affairs Ministry of its 
responsibilities.  When Ōkubo took office as Minister of Civil Affairs in September 1870, 
Kido managed to have jurisdictional control of commerce transferred from Civil Affairs 
back to the Finance Ministry.  Then in December, Kido maneuvered to have the Public 
Works Ministry (Kōbushō) created under Gotō Shōjirō and Itō Hirobumi, taking over 
control of many of the responsibilities of Civil Affairs, including railways, telegraphy, 
lighthouses, iron manufacturing, and mining.  Greatly weakened, the Civil Affairs 
Ministry was abolished the next year in September 1871 and its remaining 
                                                
45 Albert M. Craig, “The Central Government,” in Japan in Transition:  From Tokugawa 
to Meiji, ed. Marius B. Jansen, and Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), 56. 
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responsibilities passed once again to Finance.  Not to be outdone, Ōkubo in turn put 
himself in the best position possible to control the power of the Finance Ministry, that of 
Finance Minister, in August 1871.46 
It was in the context of these international, domestic, and internal political factors 
that Meiji government leaders responded to the destruction of Ginza in 1872.  As 
Japanese government leaders surveyed the damaged areas, they sensed a need and an 
opportunity to immediately construct a new capital that would project the modernity and 
power of the new regime both internationally and domestically.  Yet this still does not 
explain the timing or force of the project.  While this political context conditioned the 
Meiji leaders response to the fire, ultimately it was the timing of the fire that determined 
the final form of Ginza Bricktown. 
 
Space of Politics: Why Now?  Ginza Bricktown as Political Expedience 
When the Ginza fire broke out at the end of the second month of 1872, nearly three 
months had passed since half of the ruling Meiji elite had left the country as part of the 
Iwakura Mission to the West.  As Iwakura Tomomi, Ōkubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi, 
and Itō Hirobumi travelled overseas, guidance of the government was entrusted for the 
time being to the so-called “Caretaker Government,” made up of conservatives Saigō, 
                                                
46 This discussion is based on Wilson, Genesis of the Meiji Government in Japan, 78; 
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Itagaki, and progressives Ōkuma and Vice-Minister of Finance Inoue Kaoru.  With the 
absence of Iwakura and Ōkubo, in particular, Ōkuma and Inoue saw an opportunity to 
push reforms, including the reconstruction of Ginza. 
Ōkuma’s opponents had badly miscalculated in 1870 when they assumed that 
naming him Councilor would weaken his influence.  While they had succeeded in 
temporarily restoring the balance of power between the Dajōkan and the ministries, they 
ironically elevated Ōkuma to a position where he would have even more ability to 
influence policy and institute reforms.  When the central government underwent further 
reshuffling in August 1871, following the resignation en masse of the Dajōkan upon 
completion of the “dissolution of domains and placement of prefecture” (Haihan Chiken) 
program, Ōkuma’s was named one of only 4 Councilors in the new Dajōkan.  Under the 
new system, the Dajōkan was reformed into a three-chamber system presided over by the 
Central Chamber (Sei’in), a six-person assembly made up of the prime minister 
(Dajōdaijin), the minister of the right (Udaijin), and four councilors (Sangi).  In an 
attempt to retain a consensus, these positions were split between conservatives and 
progressives.  Sanjō, who had supported Kido’s bid to name Ōkuma councilor, kept his 
position as prime minister.  Iwakura stayed as minister of the right.  Saigō Takamori and 
Itagaki Taisuke, meanwhile, joined Kido and Ōkuma as councilors, balancing the “Big 
Four” domains of Satsuma, Tosa, Chōshū, and Hizen, respectively.47   
In his position as Councilor, Ōkuma had a hand in the planning and 
implementation of two major projects that were crucial to the centralization and 
modernization of the Japanese nation.  The first was the “dissolution of domains and 
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placement of prefectures” (Haihan Chiken) in August 1871.  Although the program was 
originally planned by Kido Takayoshi, Ōkuma was instrumental in bringing his native 
domain of Hizen into the fold.  The second was the Iwakura Mission.  It was Ōkuma 
whom the government ordered in May 1871 to investigate the feasibility of sending a 
mission to the West to pursue treaty revision.48  The idea had apparently come from 
Guido Verbeck, the famous instructor of Western law who counted among his pupils 
Ōkuma, Ōkubo, Itō, and Soejima Taneomi.  Ōkuma’s official biographer concludes that 
Ōkuma latched onto the idea as a convenient way to send conservatives in the 
government as far away from Japan as possible where they would be unable to block his 
reform efforts.   
While it is questionable whether Ōkuma orchestrated the Iwakura Mission for this 
purpose, it is undeniable that the departure of the Mission granted him a level of power in 
the central government that he had not possessed since 1870.  The absence of Iwakura 
and Kido left Sanjō Sanetomi, Saigō Takamori, Itagaki Taisuke and Ōkuma as the only 
present members of the Central Chamber of the Dajōkan.  Of these four, Ōkuma quickly 
emerged as the main decision-maker.  As Ōkuma later recalled, the other members took 
little interest in their official duties:   
Those who constituted the core of the central government were Sanjō, 
Saigō, Itagaki and I.   Of them, Sanjō stayed in the government simply 
because of his fame and status; in practice, he was merely another number 
in the government.  Saigō and Itagaki had won their distinction at the time 
of the Restoration.  However, they had secluded themselves in their home 
domains for most of the years since then and rarely involved themselves in 
central administration.49 
                                                
48 Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), 206. 




Ōkuma also noted that Saigō and Itagaki were largely absent from deliberations: 
 
Saigō and Itagaki, when the lunch break came, would hurriedly retreat to 
the anteroom [for cabinet members].  Thereafter, they would pass the time 
engrossing themselves in nonsensical conversation and never return to the 
cabinet meeting.  Rarely would they show up again when someone was 
sent to call them back for the meeting.  What they invariably conversed 
about were stories of battle, which always fascinated both men, or of sumo 
wrestling, or else of hunting and fishing...They would spend the rest of the 
day simple indulging themselves unconcernedly in such tête-à-tête 
chatting.50 
 
Finally, as Umegaki notes, after Haihan Chiken, government leaders who had previously 
relied on the support of their domainal troops for political influence – most notably Saigō 
and Itagaki – suddenly found themselves on the outside looking in at government 
decision-making.51  This in effect gave Ōkuma and Inoue a free hand in central 
government decision-making.  As they later recalled, they did “70 to 80 percent of the 
business of the administration” during this time.52  
Ōkuma and Inoue lost little time in reinstating the program of progressive reform 
projects to modernize and centralize the nation under Meiji rule that had been interrupted 
two years earlier when power was wrested from their hands with the dissolution of the 
Civil Affairs-Finance Ministry.  Although the caretaker government had signed a written 
pledge prior to the departure of the Iwakura Mission not to make any drastic changes in 
policy, they still managed to implement several far-reaching reforms and major laws.  As 
Joyce C. Lebra catalogues, reforms enacted by the Caretaker government included: “legal 
abolition of the eta (pariah caste), legal abolition of prostitution, prohibition of wearing 
                                                
50 Quoted in Umegaki, After the Restoration, 166. 
51 Umegaki, After the Restoration, 122. 
52 Quoted in Umegaki, After the Restoration, 122. 
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swords, liquidation of han [domain] debts, exchange of han currencies for a national 
currency, and plans for amortisation [sic] of samurai pensions through bonds and cash 
payments.”53  Add to this list new laws on national banks, compulsory education, military 
conscription, and a new land tax, in addition to a series of sumptuary reforms on 
hairstyles, clothing, and the calendar.54  Many of these reforms were passed over the 
objections of conservatives in the government, and without seeking the permission of the 
vacant Iwakura ambassadors.  As Ōkuma proclaimed, “We can reform everything 
without consulting them because world civilization is known everywhere.”55 
Another major project that should be included in the list of reforms enacted by 
Ōkuma and Inoue in the absence of the Iwakura Mission is Ginza Bricktown.  Seeing a 
chance to create the imperial capital they had in mind, with the blessing of councilor 
Ōkuma, Finance Ministry officials Inoue and Shibusawa commandeered the 
reconstruction of Ginza from the Tokyo municipal government.  In the immediate wake 
of the fire, Tokyo Governor Yuri Kimimasa had followed the typical protocol for 
reconstruction in case of fires in Edo: widen streets to create firebreaks.  This explains the 
prohibition of housing construction on the 27th and orders for the Public Works ministry 
to survey the burnt areas on the 28th in preparation for street widening.  At this point, 
progressives in the Finance Ministry stepped in to take over the reconstruction of Ginza.  
Three days after the fire on the 29th, Finance Ministry official Shibusawa Eiichi went 
                                                
53 Joyce Lebra, Ōkuma Shigenobu: Statesman of Japan (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1973), 23. 
54 Marlene J. Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 31:4 (1972): 794. 
55 Quoted in Lebra, Ōkuma Shigenobu: Statesman of Japan, 23. 
45 
 
before the Dajōkan and urged them to take this opportunity to reconstruct buildings in the 
district in brick.  “To prevent sorrowful conflagrations such as this,” Shibusawa pleaded, 
“we must act quickly to widen streets and rebuild all the houses in the capital in brick so 
that they may saved from fires.”56  Because this would be extraordinarily expensive, 
Shibusawa – ever the businessman – proposed the establishment of a private company to 
construct and manage the buildings on behalf of the central government.  Shibusawa also 
indicated that he had discussed these plans with Tokyo Vice-Councilor (gonsanji) 
Mishima Michitsune the previous evening and had found him to be entirely in agreement.  
As will be discussed further in the next chapter, Yuri, however, was not so easily swayed.  
When approached by Shibusawa and Mishima, Yuri countered by arguing that brick 
buildings would be too expensive for local residents and that the government should 
follow the traditional protocol of widening streets and leaving building reconstruction to 
landowners.57  For now, Ōkuma, Inoue, and Shibusawa would use the power of the 
Dajōkan to overrule Governor Yuri’s objections to brick buildings as they endeavored to 
construct a modern urban space in Tokyo.  On the 30th, the day after Shibusawa’s visit, 
the Dajōkan ordered the Tokyo municipal government to rebuild the destroyed in brick in 
cooperation with the Finance Ministry.  
By going before the Dajōkan, Shibusawa was putting into action a plan already 
concocted by Ōkuma, Inoue, Itō, and himself.  As Inoue later recalled, the idea for Ginza 
Bricktown had been hatched during a meeting at Ōkuma’s compound in the Tsukiji 
                                                
56 NAJ, “Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.” 
57 The topics discussed during Shibusawa’s visit to the Dajōkan are summarized in a 
Finance Ministry report included with the Dajōkan’s order for brick construction.  The 
report can be found in: NAJ, “Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu.” 
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district.  As an influential member of the Meiji ruling elite, Ōkuma often hosted like-
minded reformers, including Inoue, Itō, and Shibusawa.  According to politician Ozaki 
Yukio, Inoue even lived in a house on Ōkuma’s estate at one time.  As Ozaki noted, 
because of the frequent meetings between Ōkuma and younger officials in the Finance 
Ministry, Ōkuma’s residence came to be known as the Tsukiji Ryōzanpaku – named after 
the legendary Chinese bandit hideout, Liang Shan Po.58  It was at one of these meetings 
that the group decided to take the opportunity to widen roads in the district since Ginza 
was certain to thrive in the future because of its location.59  This collusion is evident in 
two nearly identical funding petitions filed by Inoue and Shibusawa on consecutive days 
the week after the fire.  While Inoue petitioned the Central Board of the Dajōkan, 
Shibusawa sent his to the Tokyo government.60  According to Shibusawa’s diary, he had 
discussed the project finances with Inoue, and then filed this petition and received 
approval from the Central Chamber (Sei’in) “in Inoue’s name.”61  With Ōkuma’s 
strengthened position on the Central Chamber of the Council of State, there was little 
doubt that the Bricktown scheme would succeed when put into action after the Ginza fire.  
As Inoue wrote in his petition, “Fortunately...the view of the Central Chamber is that the 
                                                
58 Ozaki Yukio, The Autobiography of Ozaki Yukio: The Struggle for Constitutional 
Government in Japan, trans. Fujiko Hara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 
47.  In Japanese, the term Ryōzanpaku denotes a place where extraordinary men gather.   
59 Tōkyō-to, ed. Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 28.  In Inoue’s telling, the plan was 
discussed by Ōkuma, Itō, and himself.  Itō, however, was not in Japan at the time of the 
Ginza fire, arriving for a temporary stay in the fifth month before travelling back to the 
United States to rejoin the Iwakura Mission.  
60 The two petitions can be found in TSS, vol. 52, 820-822. 
61 Shibusawa Seien Kinen Zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed. Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō 
[Documents from the life of Shibusawa Eiichi] (Tokyo: Shibusawa Seien Kinen Zaidan 
Ryūmonsha, 1955), 3:323-326. 
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layout of districts affected by this recent fire should be fixed and residences should be 
rebuilt in brick.” 62  Clearly Ōkuma, who believed in the universality of a “world 
civilization” that was known everywhere, saw the Ginza fire as an opportunity to bring 
modernity home to Japan.  
That this would have been the view of the Central Chamber had the Iwakura 
Mission members been present was not guaranteed.  Although he became a proponent of 
Westernization upon returning from the Iwakura Mission, Ōkubo had, Sidney D. Brown 
notes, “displayed annoyance at, and sometime opposed outright, the innovations of the 
young clique of Westernizing bureaucrats assembled by Ōkuma Shigenobu in the 
Finance Ministry in 1870 and 1871,” before going overseas.63  Other members of the 
Iwakura Mission, even Kido, meanwhile, expressed displeasure upon hearing of what 
they saw as superficial reforms passed behind their backs by the Caretaker Government.  
Returning to Japan in 1873, for example, Iwakura Tomomi lamented to British 
ambassador Harry Parkes what he saw as reckless attempts at modernization: 
The changes are not to my mind satisfactory.  Much is said about progress 
but I find our progress is more superficial than real and that our recent 
administration is wanting in earnestness and permanence.  Our measures 
must be better adapted to the actual condition of our people.  It is a 
mistake to think that Japan is as present fitted to take rank with the nations 
of England and America.64 
 
                                                
62 Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 34.  The wording of the petition in this 
source slightly different in TSS, vol. 52, 820-822.  The petition can also be found in 
Matsuyama, “Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshi Shi-teki Kenkyū,” 83. 
63 Sidney Devere Brown, “Ōkubo Toshimichi: His Political and Economic Policies in 
Early Meiji Japan,” The Journal of Asian Studies 21, no. 2 (1962): 189.  
64 Quoted in Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873,” 795-796. 
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Such criticisms raise doubt about whether or not the Ginza Bricktown project would have 
been undertaken had these elder statesmen been running the show.   
The timing of the Ginza Bricktown, therefore, can be explained as the right group 
of political leaders being in power at the right time.  When provided with the perfect 
geographical setting, progressives in the Finance Ministry quickly and forcefully took 
advantage of the opportunity to impose a modern urban space that satisfied several 
political goals.  In this way, Ginza Bricktown was planned as the first step in re-creating 
Tokyo as an imperial capital that would simultaneously: 1) facilitate treaty revision; 2) 
concretize the political hegemony of the Meiji regime; 3) and solidify the bureaucratic 
power of the Finance Ministry.  To accomplish each of these goals, Meiji leaders needed 
an imperial space marking the arrival of Japanese modernity.  This would require a 
modern urban space that would symbolically unite the symbolic power of railways, 
architecture, and urban planning.  Ginza provided the perfect setting.  
 
Space as Politics: Why Ginza?  Shimbashi Station and the Gateway to the Capital 
For planners looking to design an imperial capital that would satisfy multiple 
international and domestic political goals, there could have been no better setting than 
Ginza.  As scholars have frequently noted, Ginza was bordered by the new Shimbashi 
railway station adjacent to the south, the Imperial Palace to the west, and the foreign 
settlement in Tsukiji to the east.  This meant that visitors making their way to Tokyo 
from Yokohama via railway would emerge from Shimbashi Station directly into the 
Ginza Bricktown.  For foreign visitors, especially, this meant that they would walk 
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through the Bricktown on their way to their lodgings in the Tsukiji Foreign Settlement or 
to various ministry buildings located near the imperial palace.65   
The proximity of Ginza to Shimbashi Station was especially beneficial for 
politicians intent on creating an imperial space to project the modernity and power of the 
Meiji regime.  Constructed adjacent to Japan’s first railway station, the Ginza Bricktown 
was symbolically linked to the railway network and the national integration it 
represented.  Indeed, the flames of the Ginza fire would have been visible to the laborers 
just across the Shiodome River driving the last stakes on the Tokyo-Yokohama railway 
line, or putting the finishing touches on the Station.  Planned by Ōkuma Shigenobu and 
Itō Hirobumi in 1869 at the height of the Finance Ministry’s power, this line was 
constructed as the first leg of an envisioned national railway network.  Despite military 
concerns that such a line would allow invading foreign troops quick access to the capital, 
this route was constructed first because of the potential trade benefits it promised by 
connecting the Tokyo market to the Yokohama port.  Such considerations also went into 
the placing of stations at either end of the line.  Ultimately, Shimbashi was chosen for the 
Tokyo terminus, with the terminus in Yokohama located at Noge Kaigan.  Both sites 
were chosen because they were close enough to the urban areas and foreign settlements to 
facilitate trade, yet distant enough from the city center to make land prices cheaper and 
                                                
65 Similar points are found in Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 61; Smith, “Tokyo 
as an Idea,” 54; Tōkyō-to, ed. Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 30; and Ishida, Nihon Kindai 
Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen, 32. 
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limit the range of perambulating foreigners.66  As a result, Shimbashi was to become the 
new entryway into the capital. 
To design suitable terminal stations on both ends of the line, the government hired 
R.P. Bridgens, a freelance American architect.  Bridgens’ design for both stations – two 
large French neo-Renaissance-inspired two-story balustraded pavilions flanking a 
smaller, one-story pedimented offset central pavilion – owed a debt to the larger Gare de 
l’Est in Paris, as architectural historian Dallas Finn has noted.67  Construction of 
Shimbashi terminal proceeded in the third month of 1871 from the outer stone walls of 
the flanking pavilions, with the metal roof and glass fanlight of the central pavilion 
finished by the fourth month of the next year.  The painting of the train platform’s metal 
roof and pillars in the sixth month of 1872 marked the completion of the entire station 
building.68  The opening ceremony for the station and the new railway line was then held 
in the presence of the Meiji Emperor and assorted foreign diplomats and dignitaries 
during the ninth month of 1872.69  “We earnestly pray (koinegau),” the Meiji Emperor 
intoned at the ceremony, “that this enterprise [of railways] will expand, and this line will 
                                                
66 Aoki Eiichi, “The Dawn of Japanese Railroads,” Japan Railway & Transport Review 1 
(1994): 28; Harada Katsumasa, “Railroads,” section of Chapter 2, “Transportation in 
Transition (1868-1891),” in Technological Innovation and the Development of 
Transportation in Japan, ed. Hirofumi Yamamoto (Tokyo: United Nations University 
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67 Dallas Finn, Meiji Revisited: The Sites of Victorian Japan (New York: Weatherhill, 
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68 Tetsudōryō, “Tōkyō-shimbashi kara Yokohama Nogeura ni itaru Tetsudō shokenchiku 
kasho-wake hiyō kōmoku” [Details of expenses for construction of the railway from 
Shimbashi Tokyo to Nogeura Yokohama], Kenchiku Zasshi 230 (1906): 93-105. 
69 TSS, vol. 53 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1963), 459-485. 
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spread like a vine (manpu) across the whole country.”70  As the national railway network 
grew over the ensuing decades, Shimbashi became the symbolic heart of a railway 
network consolidating central control over the periphery.  Anchored by the soon to be 
completed Shimbashi station as the point of disembarkation, Ginza provided the perfect 
setting for the Meiji government to construct a new Western-style gateway to the city, 
one that would impress visitors, both foreign and domestic, with the modernity of the 
new Japan.   
Because Shimbashi Station would bring a large number of foreign and domestic 
visitors to the city, Tokyo city officials had recognized the need for an impressive 
gateway to the city located in the Ginza area even before the 1872 fire.  Just after 
construction commenced on Shimbashi Station in mid-1871, the Tokyo government 
proposed street improvements aimed at impressing foreign visitors to the Shimbashi, 
Ginza, and Tsukiji areas – or as the proposal described, “roads where foreigners generally 
pass” (gaikokujin ōyoso tsūkō michi).71  The proposal, entitled “Inquiry Regarding the 
Repairing of Roads in the Capital” (Fuka Dōro Shūzen no Gi ni tsuku Ukagaisho), 
anticipated later road improvement projects in Tokyo by decrying the dangerous and 
inefficient conditions of road traffic in the city caused by narrow roads and uneven 
surfaces, and by suggesting the separation of sidewalks and carriageways as a solution.72  
                                                
70 Hara Takeshi, “Minto” Osaka tai “Teito” Tōkyō: Shisō toshite Kansai Shitetsu (Tokyo: 
Kōdansha, 1998), 20.   
71 Ishizuka, “Meiji-ki ni okeru toshi keikaku – Tōkyō ni tsuite,” 486; Ishizuka Hiromichi, 
Nihon Kindai Toshiron – Tōkyō: 1868-1923 [Modern Japanese Cities, Tokyo: 1868-
1923] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigakku Shuppankai, 1991), 41.  The full text of the proposal can 
be found in Tōkyō-to, ed. Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 11-12. 
72 Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 11-12, 13.  
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Although the project was not carried out, this proposal confirms that planners recognized 
a link between railways and streets as elements of modern urban space.  The government 
now turned its attention to the built form of the district. 
 
“Buildings Like London”: The Architecture of Ginza Bricktown 
The introduction of Western architecture was a clear signal that the Bricktown was meant 
to convey a political meaning.  As William H. Coaldrake proclaims, “Architecture was 
charged with a mission of the highest national significance: proclaiming loudly on every 
city block and street corner Japan’s assurance and authority as a modern state.”73  The 
adoption of western architecture also demonstrated a sharp break from both traditional 
built forms and existing political institutions.  As Toshio Watanabe argues, western 
buildings embodied the “authority of a central government that aimed to rule far more 
directly than did the previous Tokugawa government.”74  Watanabe continues: 
Large, imposing modern edifices would impress upon the Japanese people 
the power and stability of the new regime.  Western styles were clearly 
different from anything Edo culture could offer and, above all, provided 
an image of modernity.  The public could see for itself that the new 
government was progressive rather than retrogressive like the old one.  By 
using Western styles the governmental patrons of such buildings could 
make their political intentions visible.  Additionally, Western-style 
buildings looked grand and imposing, a rare quality in Edo-period 
architecture.  Multistory stone or brick buildings gave the impression of 
solidity, permanence, and authority, all qualities the young Meiji 
government was striving for.  The Western style fit the bill perfectly.75 
 
                                                
73 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 209-210. 
74 Watanabe, “Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan,” 22-23. 
75 Watanabe, “Josiah Conder’s Rokumeikan,” 23. 
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As Watanabe’s description suggests, Western architecture was the perfect medium for the 
deployment of what David Harvey calls the “myth of a radical break.”76  In this vein, 
Meiji officials introduced Western building forms in an attempt to affirm the transition 
between Edo and Tokyo, Tokugawa and Meiji, or traditional and “modern” Japan.77   
In order to achieve the desired Western cityscape, the central government 
surveyed no fewer than 5 foreign architects and civil engineers either already in the 
employ of various government ministries or working privately in Japan at the time.  
Among those solicited for opinions on the future district were Louis Felix Florent, John 
Smedley, Richard Henry Brunton, and Colin Alexander McVean.78  The central 
government eventually hired Irish engineer Thomas J. Waters to design the brick 
buildings and supervise construction of the new district.79  The Japan Weekly Mail 
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77 Carol Gluck describes how an invented conception of traditional Japan, which came to 
be encapsulated under the name “Edo,” became a “mirror of modernity” utilized by the 
Meiji government to distinguish and differentiate itself from its Tokugawa predecessor, 
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79 These advisors were Louis Felix Florent, John Smedley, Colin Alexander McVean, and 
Richard Henry Brunton.  More will be said about them in the next section.  Waters was 
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reported 6 weeks later that Inoue had “arranged with MR. WATERS for rebuilding the 
houses and laying out fresh streets” as early as the day after the fire.80  As the Weekly 
Mail report suggests, the choice of Waters probably owed to his close personal 
acquaintances with Ōkuma, Inoue, and Itō.  Waters, after all, was already retained by the 
Finance Ministry to design the Osaka Mint and its Tokyo branch location, as well as the 
Takebashi barracks.81   
Waters’ main responsibility was to draw up building designs (Kaoku Kenchiku 
Hōhō; lit. Housing Construction Procedures) and construction rules (Rengaseki Kenchiku 
Hōhō; lit. Brick Construction Procedures) for the buildings.82  When released to the 
public just over two weeks after the fire on 1872.3.13, Waters’ designs satisfied 
government leaders who had hoped to replicate a modern, Western-style cityscape in 
Tokyo, although on a much-reduced scale.  Waters proposed 4 classes of structures.  First 
class buildings facing the widest streets would be three-stories tall and rise as high as 40 
feet, with building heights decreasing for each lower class structure.  Waters also 
                                                                                                                                            
hired effective 1872.3.24, or May 1, 1872 in the Gregorian calendar.  Strangely, this was 
11 days after Waters’ building designs were released to the public on the 13th.  At Waters’ 
behest, two more advisors were hired: his brother, Albert Waters, and E. Shillingford.  
Other stipulations in the contract included a monthly salary of ¥350, one month of 
vacation per year, two months of sick time, and free housing.  As Governor Yuri 
informed Inoue, these two additional advisors were employed effective 1872.4.27.  See: 
Tōkyō-to, ed. Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 30; and TSS, vol. 52, 905. 
80 The Japan Weekly Mail, May 18, 1872, 1.  May 18, 1872 was 1872.4.11 in the lunar 
calendar. 
81 Ishida, Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen, 35; Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō 
Keikaku, 7-9.   
82 Matsuyama Megumi raises a similar question, pointing out the discrepancies between 
Waters’ plans and for individually massed buildings and the completed row houses in 
Matsuyama, “Kindai ikōki no Edo Tōkyō ni kan-suru Toshi Shi-teki Kenkyū,” 85. 
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suggested parapets to protect the eaves of the buildings.83  Architectural historian 
Fujimori Terunobu has described Waters’ design for Bricktown buildings as the “King 
George” style, typified by Tuscan columns, pediments, and symmetrical designs.  As this 
particular style was popular at the time in London, Fujimori surmises that Waters’ design 
for the buildings was inspired by his “nostalgia for the fatherland.”84  Because 
construction would be carried out by Japanese craftsmen unfamiliar with bricks as a 
building material or with western architecture in general, Waters’ designs included 
detailed diagrams of brick patterns for walls, wall foundations, and roof joints for each 
class of building.  Beyond these basic requirements, the exterior design of the building 
was left to each owner.  Knowing this, Waters attempted to ensure design uniformity and 
quality control, advising the Tokyo government to stipulate: “All persons wishing to erect 
brick buildings must first submit their plans to the Tokiofu [the Tokyo government] 
board of Works and receive its stamp otherwise the building cannot be proceeded with.”85 
 Despite Waters’ attempts to maintain uniformity, period images and artistic 
depictions of the completed district reveal differences between Waters’ designs and the 
finished buildings.  For the most part, these changes depended on whether the structure in 
question was financed and constructed by the government, or by private individuals.  
First, whereas Waters intended for first class buildings along the main streets to be three 
stories, upon construction they were lowered to only two.  While the reason for this is not 
                                                
83 For Waters’ building plans, including heights and description, see Tōkyō-to, ed. Ginza 
Rengagai no Kensetsu, 70-71.  For “built cheaply as possible,” see Waters’ handwritten 
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clear, it is notable that foreign experts Florent, Brunton, and Smedley all recommended 
that buildings should be limited to only 2 stories because of the frequent earthquakes in 
Tokyo.86  Secondly, although Waters’ planned for buildings to be individually massed, 
they were instead constructed in a row to provide an unbroken streetscape.  As Tokyo 
public works official Takaishi explained to Inoue 1872.4.3, this was because “even with 
the designs presented by Waters, [whether] the houses are stand-alone machiya or row-
houses (ren’ya) is up to the financier.”87  Again, this may have been influenced by one of 
the foreign advisors, Richard Henry Brunton, who suggested row houses.  Thirdly, not all 
buildings had the planned pedestrian arcades: some featured individual details on 
windows, parapets, and entrances, such as the Westernized karahafu typical of early 
Meiji-period giyōfū (Western-“style”) architecture; some were stuccoed; and others were 
left in naked brick.  Since final say in building design was left to the owners, and 
construction was carried out by Japanese craftsmen, these stylistic changes can be 
reasonably explained as rearticulations of Waters’ designs into more familiar vernacular 
forms.  Buildings constructed by the central government, notably, stayed closest to 
Waters’ original designs.88   
Despite these slight alterations, the Ginza Bricktown fulfilled the Finance 
Ministry’s hopes for a beacon of Japan’s progress and modernity.  As one contemporary 
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observer declared, “Here one feels as if one were in a foreign country for a while.”89  
Hattori Bushō, author of the New Tales of Tokyo Prosperity (Tōkyō Shin Hanjōki) 
published between 1874-1876, points to the “Kyōbashi Brick District,” as he calls the 
Ginza Bricktown, as one of the symbols of civilization and enlightenment in the city.  
“To lift the darkness and spread knowledge,” Hattori writes, “there is nothing like 
showing the actual scene with the real thing.”90  Another Tokyo resident lyrically praised 
the Bricktown, putting Tokyo on a par with more famous European capitals: “The tall 
two-story buildings, towering into the blue sky one after the other as high as mountains; 
its grandeur is such that it completely imitates Western buildings!…The stone buildings, 
in other words, are like those of London, the English capital; the streets are like those in 
Paris, the French capital.”91   
 
“Streets like Paris”: Street Improvements in Ginza Bricktown 
As the poetic Tokyo-ite quoted above reminds us, the new brick buildings were only one 
part of Ginza Bricktown.  While the district came to be known foremost for its fireproof 
Western-style brick buildings, an equally important part of the project was the improving 
of the existing street infrastructure.  Not only would widened streets act as firebreaks to 
help prevent the spread of future conflagrations, improved street infrastructure – with 
paved street surfaces and sidewalks, gutters, and roadside trees – was necessary to create 
                                                
89 Julia Meech-Pekarkik, The World of the Meiji Print Print: Impressions of a New 
Civilization (New York: Weatherhill, 1986), 92. 
90 Quoted in Maeda Ai, Text and the City: Essays on Japanese Modernity (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 80-81; Smith, “Tokyo as an Idea,” 54. 
91 Quoted in Tōkyō-to, ed. Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 148. 
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a modern urban space.  As early plans to improve streets in the Ginza area confirm, 
government leaders were concerned about how the appearance of the Tokyo streetscape 
would reflect on the entire nation of Japan.  For this reason, planners supplemented their 
Western-style buildings with improved streets by seeking out the advice of foreign 
engineers active in Japan, setting the width of Ginza streets based on Western examples, 
and then introducing amenities seen in the West – sidewalks, gutters, roadside trees, and 
modern paving.  With Western-influenced buildings and streets, this “unified cityscape,” 
as Carola Hein has aptly termed it, produced the modern urban space the Meiji leaders 
hoped for.92  Because the layout of the entire district was based on the imperial palace, 
moreover, this space was intended to project imperial symbolism.  In this way, improved 
streets provided the final element for producing imperial space.   
At the same time Waters was sketching his designs for the brick buildings, the 
Public Works Bureau set about planning the new street network for Ginza Bricktown.  
The foreign architects and engineers solicited for advice on the reconstruction of the 
district also had plenty to say about streets in the city.  The message from all of these 
“experts” was resoundingly clear: Tokyo’s streets were too narrow and excessively 
winding.  Florent, for example, advised that the most important things to be done were: 1) 
the straightening of blocks and the widening of roads, and 2) the setting of building 
                                                
92 Hein, “Shaping Tokyo,” 461. 
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codes.93  McVean, meanwhile, recommended a road network consisting of 5 classes of 
streets, the widest with roadways of 60 feet and sidewalks of 12 feet on both sides.94 
Japanese planners also looked to examples of street widths in the West to plan the 
streets of Ginza.  According to the recollections of Tokyo Governor Yuri, the widths of 
the widest roads in London (25-ken, ~150ft.), New York City (24-ken, ~140ft.), and 
Washington DC (24-ken, ~140ft.) were brought up for consideration in discussions about 
the appropriate street width for the new district.95  Inoue, however, later revealed that 
                                                
93 TSS, vol. 52, 882; translations of the plans submitted by each architect can be found in 
Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 48-58; and TSS, vol. 52, 882-904. 
94 As Ishida Yorifusa convincingly demonstrates, McVean was most likely involved with 
the surveying of the burnt districts following the Ginza fire.  See: Ishida Yorifusa, Nihon 
Kingendai Toshi Keikaku no Tenkai: 1868-2003 [Development of modern and 
contemporary Japanese urban planning, 1868-2003] (Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 2004), 
25.  For McVean’s recommendations for Ginza, see: TSS, vol. 52, 897.  Not surprisingly 
these were the exact widths recommended by famous fellow Scottish engineer William 
John Macquorn Rankine in both the 1862 and 1871 edition of his A Manual of Civil 
Engineering.  Although he cautions “no general rule can be laid down” for street widths 
in populous areas, Rankine adds that where “the traffic is greatest, the width of 
carriageway is about 50 feet, with a pair of footways, each from 10 to 15 wide” (William 
John Macquorn Rankine, A Manual of Civil Engineering [London: Griffith, Bohn, and 
Company, 1862], 625).  Rankine’s Manual would later become a central part of the core 
civil engineering curriculum at the Imperial College of Engineering (Kōbu Daigakkō), 
and its successor, Tokyo University, under the direction of headmaster Henry Dyer, a 
student of Rankine’s at Glasgow University.  See: “An Engineering College in Japan,” 
Nature 7 (1873): 430.  Incidentally, a search of the University of Tokyo’s library catalog 
reveals four editions of Rankin’s A Manual on Civil Engineering, from 1871, 1877, 1885, 
and 1900, in addition to a fascinating Japanese translation from 1880, Rankin-shi 
Doboku-gaku.  For more on Henry Dyer, see Graeme J.N. Gooday and Morris Low, 
“Technology Transfer and Cultural Exchange: Western Scientists and Engineers 
Encounter Tokugawa and Meiji Japan” Osiris: 2nd Series 13 (1998): 99-128; W.H. Brock, 
“The Japanese Connexion: Engineering in Tokyo, London, and Glasgow at the End of the 
Nineteenth Century Presidential Address, 1980),” The British Journal for the History of 
Science 14:3 (1981): 227-244”; and David Allsobrook and Gordon Mitchell, “Henry 
Dyer: Engineer and Educational Innovator” Paedagogica Historica: International 
Journal of the History of Education 33, no. 2 (1997): 433-457. 
95 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 11.  One ken is 1.818 meters. 
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Yuri had scoffed at such widths, saying “Why the hell would we make the roads so wide 
(Anna baka-na hiroi machi wo tsukutte dō suru tsumori ka)?!?”96  Inoue’s recollections of 
Yuri’s pessimism are corroborated by Mishima Michitsune – second in charge in the 
Tokyo government as Chief Advisor (Kensanji) at the time – who recalled in 1885 that 
Governor Yuri had initially argued for roads only 8-ken wide, typical for streets during 
the Edo period.  Yet, “Around that time,” Mishima explained, “we received a report from 
a person staying overseas on the actual conditions of roads in foreign countries, 
explaining that their width is almost always more than 25-ken.  As a result, it was argued 
that the width of Shimbashi Road [Ginza Main Street] should be made 20-ken, but it 
ended up being only 15-ken.”97 
With the width of the axial main street determined, the plan for the future road 
network was completed on the 17th day of the 3rd month, just 4 days after Waters’ 
building plans were announced.  Although the Ginza area already had a grid street 
network, the new plan called for 4 classes of widened roads to distinguish thoroughfares, 
                                                
96 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 12. 
97 TTKSS, (Meiji Taishō hen)[Collection of Tokyo urban planning documents (the Meiji 
and Taisho periods)] (Tokyo: Hon no Tomosha, 1988), 31:21 back-22 front.  While the 
specifics of this report or the identity of its sender are yet to be determined, it is worth 
remembering that the Ginza fire and subsequent planning for the Bricktown project 
coincided with the Iwakura Mission’s sojourn in Washington D.C.  Moreover, after 
spending over one month in Washington, D.C., Ōkubo Toshimichi and Itō Hirobumi had 
temporarily left the Mission, having departed before the Ginza fire and arriving back in 
Japan in the midst of Bricktown planning on 1872.3.24.  The reason for Ōkubo and Itō’s 
brief return to Japan was to receive the official plenipotentiary powers necessary to 
negotiate for treaty revision.  The rest of the Mission had arrived in Washington, D.C. on 
1872.1.21 (February 29, 1872), from where Ōkubo and Itō departed on 1872.2.12 and 13 
(March 20, and 21) respectively, arriving in Japan on 1872.3.24.  Ōkubo and Itō left 
Japan on 1872.5.17 (June 22), and rejoined the Mission in Washington, D.C. one month 
later on 6.17 (July 22).  Fujimori Terunobu surmises that this figure of 15-ken (~90 ft.) 




feeders, and local access streets, as well as sidewalks to separate vehicle and pedestrian 
lanes.  As agreed, the width of the axial main street would be widened to 15-ken, with 8-
ken (~50ft.) of dedicated traffic lanes and 3.5-ken (~20ft.) set aside on both sides for 
pedestrian sidewalks.98  At these widths, vehicles such as ox carts, rickshaws, horse-
drawn carriages, and later even horse-drawn street trolleys, would be able to pass each 
other two abreast with room to spare.99  The main east-west cross street, meanwhile, was 
designated as a second-class road, with a roadbed of 10-ken (~60ft.) and sidewalks of 
2.5-ken (~15ft.).  The rest of the grid was made up of third-, and fourth-class streets, with 
roadbeds of 8-ken (~50ft.) and 3-ken (~20ft.), respectively, and sidewalks of 2-ken 
(~12ft.) on the third-class roads.100  Surveys to mark off new road widths for the main 
street were completed by the 27th, one month after the fire.101   
Widening streets and laying sidewalks was only the groundwork; creating a 
presentable modern urban space required amenities to beautify the roadside environment.  
This included introducing modern street surface and sidewalk paving techniques, planting 
roadside trees, and erecting gas lamps to make the district more comfortable and 
aesthetically pleasurable for the large number of anticipated users.  In order to provide a 
sturdy surface for the expected carts, rickshaws, and carriages, the street surface of Ginza 
Main Street was paved using the most up-to-date techniques.  Using a simplified 
                                                
98 Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 287. 
99 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 12. 
100 Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 287; Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 11; 
Ishida, Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen, 38.   
101 TSS, vol. 52, 876-877 indicates that street surveys would commence the following day 
on the 19th.  See also Ishida, Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen, 35, 37; Tōkyō-to, 
ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 68, 132. 
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macadam-style paving, workers first removed the old road base down to the subgrade and 
then piled a new base to give the road surface a crown of 1 shaku (1 ft.) in order to drain 
rainwater away to the gutters on either side of the road.  Gravel (sareki) was then spread 
on top and rolled flat with a stone roller to harden the surface.102  To provide firm footing 
for pedestrians, sidewalks were paved in one of two ways: either with paving stones 
(ita’ishi); or with bricks laid rowlock (kobadate) – laid horizontally on the longer edge – 
on top of 1 sun (~2.4in.) of sand with more sand as mortar between the bricks.  Not only 
was this the first example of brick paving in Japan, it was the first time sidewalks had 
been seen in the capital.103  So new was this feature that the Tokyo government felt it 
necessary to publicize the rules of the road when the main street was fully opened to the 
public on February 2, 1874, nearly two years after the Ginza fire.  “Vehicles and 
pedestrians have been completely separated with vehicles in the center and pedestrians on 
the sides,” the government cautioned sightseers, “This must be absolutely understood so 
                                                
102 Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 290; Ishii Ichirō, Nihon ni okeru dōro gijutsu 
no hattatsu [Development of Road Technology in Japan] (Tokyo: Kokusai Rengō 
Daigaku, 1979), 19; Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 151.  One shaku is 
30.3cm.  There has been some confusion in the English scholarship as to the composition 
of road surfaces in the Ginza Bricktown.  The most technically precise descriptions of 
road surface construction in the Bricktown are those found in Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. 
Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 290, and Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 151.  Tōkyō-
shi Dōro-shi, in turn cites an unknown source described as Volume 4 of Tōkyō Chiri 
Shiryō [Documents of Tokyo Geography].  The above description updates a statement 
previously made in Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State-Formation in Meiji 
Japan,” in Trains, Culture, and Mobility: Riding the Rails, ed. Benjamin Fraser and 
Steven D. Spalding (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 244.  The road surfaces 
were not in fact paved in brick originally, rather, it was only some sidewalks that were 
paved in brick. 
103 Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 287.   
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that there are no accidents henceforth.”104  The separation of vehicles and pedestrians was 
reinforced by gutters and “visual walls” of trees planted in the roadbeds: pines on all four 
corners of each intersection, and maple and sakura cherry trees spaced every 40 feet in-
between.  In addition to improving safety, these roadside trees formed a canopy that 
shaded the commuters and crowds of curious onlookers below while enhancing the 
aesthetic environment of the district.105  So that Ginza Bricktown could be enjoyed even 
after dark, gas lamps spaced every 165 feet along the main street illuminated the district 
starting in 1879.106 
Yet Ginza Bricktown was designed to be more than a comfortable place to take a 
leisurely stroll.  It was designed to project imperial authority and power in space and built 
form.  The symbolic connection between the urban space of Ginza Bricktown and the 
imperial system was concretized in the layout of the street network.  “Considering that it 
has been decided to at this time gradually improve all roads and regulate all dwellings in 
the city, starting with the areas burned recently,” the Tokyo government explained the 
                                                
104 This announcement was made on February 2, 1874, when the Tokyo government 
announced the opening of the new road.  See: TSS, vol. 56 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho 
1965), 180; and Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 151. 
105 For street trees as “visual walls” and the multifarious benefits of roadside trees, see: 
Dan Burden, “22 Benefits of Urban Street Trees,” Walkable Communities, 8-9.  By the 
time the main street was fully opened to the public on February 2, 1874, 148 trees had 
been planted.  As Amano Kōichi and Shinohara Susumu note, possibly because of 
hindrances the trees posed to horses, the pine and maple trees were replaced with sakura 
cherry trees as they died starting in 1875.  Even these sakura trees did not blossom, 
however, and all trees were replaced with willows in 1877.  See: Amano Kōichi and 
Shinohara Susumu, “Ginza Dōri ni okeru Gairo Keikan no Hensen” [Changes in the 
street scenery of Ginza Main Street], Nihon Dobokushi Kenkyū Happyōkai Ronbunshū 2 
(1982): 76. 
106 Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 287; Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no 
Kensetsu, 68, 150-152; Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 24.   
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planning of the street layout to the Dajōkan on 3.17, “With the goal of the general 
implementation at a later date, the location of roads large and small is being determined 
with the imperial palace as the origin (moto).”107  Although the former Shogun’s palace 
had been occupied by the emperor upon arrived in the new capital in 1869, the central 
government had still not declared exactly what constituted the “imperial palace.”  Nor 
had it determined a permanent residence for the organs of the central government.  The 
emergence of Ginza Bricktown, however, made this a high priority.  “The old keep (moto 
honmaru), Ninomaru remains, and first Nishimaru Fukiage gardens [of Edo Castle] have 
been designated as the Imperial Palace (kōkyo),” the Dajōkan proclaimed twelve days 
later on 3.29, “As for the areas outside Nishimaru (Nishimaru-shita) [Marunouchi], it has 
been decided to construct the Dajōkan and other various government and ministry 
buildings here.108  Given Ōkuma Shigenobu’s elevated influence in the Dajōkan and his 
central role in the planning and execution of the Ginza Bricktown project, it is hard to see 
this as mere coincidence.  Either way, it is clear that the layout of Ginza Bricktown was 
no accident.  It was designed in the context of the location of the imperial palace and 
politico-geographical planning of the imperial capital. 
What this meant on the ground is less straightforward.  The Tokyo government 
had plainly stated that the road network was planned “with the imperial capital as the 
origin,” but examination of a series of maps of the Ginza neighborhood before and after 
the fire (Figures 1-5) reveals only very minor changes (see the Appendix for all figures).  
                                                
107 NAJ, “Shōshitsu-ato Dōro no Ichi wo Sadamu ni tsuki Dōchi Kai-age narabini Renga-
ishi Kenchiku Hōhō,” Call#: honkan-2A-009-00.tai00336100.  This portion of the 
document is reprinted under the heading “Dōro Kaisei” in TSS, vol. 52, 876). 
108 Dajōkan, ed., Dajōkan Nisshi, Meiji 5-nen, Dai 1-18 gō.  Entry dated 3.29.  Accessed 
through KDL, Doc.#000000440339, Slide #130.  Reprinted in TSS, vol. 52, 926. 
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As Carola Hein summarizes the differences, “it appears that the government’s actual 
urban planning intervention concentrated on block and lot reduction, the creation of new 
streets, and street widening while using public land alongside the moats for partial 
compensation.”109  Indeed, as visible in Figure 1, the district in 1871 already had a grid-
like block system built on the frame of the Tōkaidō highway running north-south through 
the district and bisected by a crooked east-west street that connected Hitotsunohashi 
bridge on the east side and the Yamashita gate on the west.  As with the road leading to 
the Sukiyabashi Gate, the irregularities in the rigid grid can be explained by the location 
of bridges.  As Hein notes, this “slight asymmetry in the grid and the orientation of the 
streets toward the bridges reflected practical needs.”110   
As noticeable in Figure 2 of the new Bricktown street layout, however, planners 
subordinated the practical need for bridge access to the maintenance of a rigid grid 
structure.  Also evident by comparing the two Figures is that, more than just straightening 
and widening the streets and making the blocks uniform, the Bricktown road plan 
changed the east-west cross street that formed the backbone of the grid along with the 
Ginza Main Street, as that section of the Tōkaidō highway was called.  Whereas the focal 
point of the major cross street before was the Yamashita gate, in the Bricktown plan the 
main east-west thoroughfare would now focus on the Sukiyabashi Gate.  Certainly, 
although this street existed before, its elevated status in the Bricktown plan as the new 
crosstown street is apparent in that it was designated as Class 2, and widened to 10-ken, 
while the old route to the Yamashita Gate was only a Class 3, or 8-ken road.   
                                                
109 Carola Hein, “Shaping Tokyo,” 462-463. 
110 Carola Hein, “Shaping Tokyo,” 465. 
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As the most direct access from Ginza to the Imperial Palace was via the 
Sukiyabashi Gate, this urban design of a perpendicular axial alignment of the Imperial 
Palace, the Ginza Main Street, and Shimbashi Station, is what was meant by using the 
Imperial Palace as the “origin” for the district layout.  This perpendicular axial layout 
focusing on the Sukiyabashi Gate can be seen in Figures 3 and 4.  The spatial 
significance of the intersection of these axes, moreover, was emphasized by its octagonal 
shape, which resulted from the beveling of the four surrounding block corners.111  In 
figure 6, especially, it is easy to envision a visiting foreign diplomat or dignitary 
disembarking the train at Shimbashi station and being directed towards the Shimbashi 
Bridge by the landscaping in front of the station.  Crossing the Shimbashi Bridge into the 
Ginza Bricktown, the visitor would make their way down the Ginza Main Street to the 
central intersection of the Bricktown before turning towards the Imperial Palace or 
government ministry offices located in Marunouchi.   
Once the modern space had been created, it was necessary to ensure that it would 
remain presentable.  For that reason, shortly after the completion of the Ginza Main 
Street in late 1872, the Dajōkan bewailed the neglect of street sweeping in Tokyo, 
ordering that roads must be swept at least once every three months and especially after 
heavy winds or rain, and that trees uprooted by wind or snow should be cleared 
immediately so as not to impede traffic.112  The Tokyo Government, meanwhile, ordered 
in January 1874 that snow should be plowed to the gutters and not piled in the center of 
                                                
111 Waters appears to have had a hand in this beveling.  See: Tokyo Metropolitan 
Archives, Doc.#: 604.B2.04, “Kyōbashi inan ruishō ikken” [Matters relating to the burnt 
areas south of Kyōbashi slide], slide 129.  
112 TSS, vol. 53, 678-679. 
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the street.113  Later that year, the Tokyo government once again admonished District 
mayors to redouble efforts to perform regular street sweeping and weed removal, 
particularly on roads used for imperial progressions and foreign diplomatic visits to the 
palace.114  Such efforts to keep roads clear were also supported and carried out by private 
sector groups.  One reason was that the Tokyo government relied on the participation of 
residents to maintain streets, as announced in February 1874.  With the central half of the 
road repaired by the government using vehicle taxes, landowners of street-front property 
were responsible for repairing the remaining ¼ of the road on either side with money 
provided by the government.115  Yet another reason for this cooperation was that local 
residents also appreciated quality streets.  Because of the detriment damaged roads could 
have on business, in late 1873, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce financed the hiring of 
several dozen “poor people” per District to patrol the streets, buckets of gravel in hand, 
removing debris and repairing potholes were necessary.116  Yet not all residents of the 
city were eager to cooperate with the project.   
 
Part 2: Ginza Bricktown as a Performative Space of Resistance 
The central government’s imposition of Ginza Bricktown from above was vehemently 
resisted from below.  From the beginning of project, central government plans were 
challenged and redirected by the Tokyo municipal government and local residents.  
                                                
113 TSS, vol. 56, 22. 
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Analyzing this opposition reveals how social contestation influenced the production of 
Ginza Bricktown – and, more specifically, how the elite/non-elite and center/periphery 
power relationships of early Meiji were mediated in the urban space of Meiji Tokyo.   
The municipal government and local residents voiced their opposition by their 
own means.  Tokyo Governor Yuri Kimimasa argued against brick houses because they 
would be too expensive for Tokyo residents, and then attempted to find a method for 
funding the project that would limit the financial burden on residents.  The residents of 
Ginza, meanwhile, resisted the central government’s Bricktown plans by ignoring 
injunctions against housing construction, openly criticizing and refusing to inhabit the 
new brick buildings, and calling for rent deferrals.  In each case, deeper political 
motivations lay beneath the surface of these protestations.  While Yuri’s reluctance to 
impose financial difficulties on local residents was by no means disingenuous, his 
resistance to Finance Ministry plans was intensified by political factors.  Likewise, the 
reluctance on the part of local residents to embrace Bricktown derived from a more 
general disaffection for Meiji rule.  This opposition eventually forced the central 
government to alter its plans for Ginza Bricktown, and yield to Tokyo municipal 
government attempts to alleviate pressure on residents.  In the end, the Meiji government 
was forced to adopt a hardline exit strategy to ensure even the measured success of the 
project.  In this way, the urban space of Tokyo was a stage on which the political dramas 
of the Meiji state were played out.   
This part of the chapter will chart how political contestation shaped the 
production of the built environment of the Ginza Bricktown.  First, Yuri’s opposition to 
Ginza Bricktown will be traced back to a series of political disputes that were personified 
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in his conflict with Vice-Minister of Finance Inoue Kaoru.  The second section will chart 
how this background led to the contested implementation of the Ginza Bricktown as Yuri 
actively resisted the Finance Ministry’s plans for the project until he was removed from 
office.  The third section will survey the response of local residents to the Bricktown, 
finding that popular reactions to the project were informed by discontentment with Meiji 
rule.  Finally, the last section will discuss how these two forces joined together to 
rearticulate central government intentions for the Bricktown into a space that was more 
livable for local residents, and ultimately forced the cancellation of the project altogether.  
 
The Caretaker Government, Seikanron, and the Inoue/Yuri Conflict 
Before the flames of the Ginza fire had even been extinguished, implementation of the 
Ginza Bricktown project was hindered by a smoldering antagonism between Inoue Kaoru 
and Yuri Kimimasa.117  This mutual dislike stemmed from several political factors.  First, 
the conflict between Yuri and Inoue was but one skirmish in a larger battle between 
prefectural governments and the Finance Ministry over local autonomy.  Secondly, this 
conflict manifested at the municipal level when Inoue and Yuri clashed over banking 
policy.  Finally, the disagreement between the two was the local extension of a partisan 
dispute within the ruling elite over factional control of the central government that 
threatened to tear apart the new regime.  This complicated political background 
conditioned Yuri’s response to the Ginza fire in 1872 and his reaction to the Bricktown 
plans of Inoue and the Finance Ministry. 
                                                
117 The background of the conflict between Inoue and Yuri is also explored in Tōkyō-to, 
ed., Ginza Rengagai no Kensetsu, 106-118. 
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The friction between Inoue and Yuri was representative of a widening factional 
schism within the Meiji regime in the early 1870s.  As a former samurai from Chōshū, 
Inoue belonged to a small group of mainly Satsuma and Chōshū samurai who held the 
reins of government in the early Meiji Period, including Ōkubo Toshimichi (Satsuma), 
Kido Takayoshi (Chōshū), Itō Hirobumi (Chōshū), and the outlier Ōkuma Shigenobu 
(Hizen).  Hailing from Echizen, on the other hand, Yuri had been one of the few non-
Satsuma or Chōshū samurai to be included in the inner circle of conspirators who carried 
out the Meiji Restoration in 1868.  As a student of influential intellectual Yokoi Shōnan, 
Yuri had not only played a leading role in the drafting of the Charter Oath, but was also 
responsible for establishing the economic and financial policy of the early Meiji state as 
head of the Bureau of Commerce (Shōhōshi), the forerunner to the Finance Ministry.118  
As Wenkai He describes, after being forced to resign in March 1869 as a result of the 
rampant inflation caused by his unsuccessful attempt to issue paper currency known as 
Dajōkansatsu, Yuri was replaced by Ōkuma Shigenobu.119  Because of Yuri’s 
ignominious past experiences with government finances, moreover, Inoue actively 
opposed attempts by Yuri’s patron, Saigō Takamori, to place him in the Finance 
Ministry.120  Yuri therefore gravitated towards a second group of elites, including Itagaki 
                                                
118 Harry D. Harootunian, Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Conscioussness 
in Tokugawa Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 325-326; W.G. 
Beasley, “Councillors of Samurai Origin in the Early Meiji Government,” Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 20, no. 1/3 (1957): 101-
102; Wenkai He, Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State: England, Japan, and China 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 84; Umegaki, After the Restoration, 111. 
119 He, Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State, 84. 
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Taisuke (Tosa), Gotō Shojirō (Tosa), and Etō Shimpei (Hizen), who feared Satsuma and 
Chōshū (Sat-chō) domination of the government and exclusion of non-Sat-chō voices.   
The growing hostility between these two groups came to a head in the famous 
Seikanron, or “Punish Korea,” debates of 1873, which pitted the conservative “Seikan” or 
“War” party of Saigō Takamori, Itagaki, Gotō, and Etō, against the more progressive 
“Peace Party” of Iwakura, Ōkubo, Kido, Itō, Ōkuma, and Inoue.121  While the immediate 
point of argument was whether or not to send a punitive mission to Korea as revenge for 
a perceived Korean slight to the new Meiji emperor, this debate was a proxy for a number 
of other serious issues confronting the early Meiji state: samurai disgruntlement, 
discontentment with radical reforms and Westernization, fear of Western encroachment 
in East Asia, and suspicions of Sat-chō oligarchic nepotism and exclusion of non-Satchō 
voices from government.  Not surprisingly, the two parties were split for the most part 
along Satchō and “non-Sat-chō” lines, with the exception of Saigō.  Although from 
Satsuma, Saigō was dissatisfied with what he saw as an increasingly intrusive central 
government, loss of samurai status and virtue, and public moral decline as a result of 
reckless Westernization.122  The defeat of the War Party in 1873, following the return of 
Iwakura, Kido, and Ōkubo from the Iwakura Mission, ultimately led to the resignation of 
many of its members, including Saigō, Itagaki, Gotō, and Etō.  The latter three joined 
                                                
121 For more on the Seikanron, see Nobutaka Ike, “Triumph of the Peace Party in 1873,” 
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122 Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy,” 811-812.  For 
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with Itagaki, Soejima Sanetomi, Furusawa Uruō, and Komuro Shinobu the following year 
to form the Patriotic Party (Aikoku kōtō).  Together, they petitioned the government for 
more inclusive representation and an elected national assembly as an attempt to curtail 
the expanding administrative control of the Kido-Ōkuma-Itō faction.123  This group grew 
into the Patriotic Society (Aikokusha), which attracted disaffected samurai from all over 
the country.  By the late 1870s, the Patriotic Society had emerged into a force for popular 
rights and more inclusive government.124  As Stephen Vlastos writes, despite being 
rejected, the 1874 Patriotic Party petition “raised for the first time a liberal challenge to 
the incumbent leadership and signaled the opening round of what became a decade long 
campaign by a socially and political diverse coalition known as the ‘People’s Rights 
Movement’ (Jiyū Minken Undō).”125  Among the founding members of the Patriotic Party 
and signers of the petition sparking the People’s Rights Movement in 1874 was none 
other than Yuri Kimimasa.126 
With powerful Satchō faction leaders Iwakura, Ōkubo, Kido, and Itō out of the 
country on the Iwakura Mission, this “non-Satchō” faction saw an opportunity to expand 
their influence as keepers of the “caretaker government.”  At the same time as Ōkuma 
and Inoue pursued their own progressive reform program, conservatives in the caretaker 
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government promoted new Councilors (Sangi) and even began considering sending Saigō 
as an ambassador to Korea to either diffuse the diplomatic tension or ignite hostilities in 
the event he was killed.  This controversial promotion of Councilors was a response by 
the Non-Satchō faction to the actions of Inoue Kaoru.  As acting head of the Finance 
Ministry in 1872 in the absence of Minister Ōkubo, Vice-Minister Inoue was charged 
with keeping the Meiji government financially solvent as it was burdened by the samurai 
stipends taken on with the dissolution of the domains.  For this reason, on top of the 
Caretaker Government’s pledge, Inoue strongly resisted proposals by Justice Minister Etō 
to institute a new civil code and court system, and by Education Minister, and Etō 
protégé, Ōki Takato to establish a universal elementary education system with 50,000 
new schools.  Not only did Inoue denounce these proposals, he sought to cut the budgets 
for both the Justice and Education Ministries by almost half in late 1872.127  As an 
attempt to counteract what was seen as the increasing power of Inoue, the Finance 
Ministry, and the Satchō faction in general, Etō and Ōki were promoted to Councilor in 
late 1873.128    
Named Governor of Tokyo in 1871, Yuri was positioned to come head to head 
with Inoue over the Ginza Bricktown.  As Fujimori Terunobu describes, the rivalry 
between the zealous younger Inoue and the veteran statesman Yuri and was a product of 
the longer rivalry between the two dating back to differing political views on financial 
policy when Yuri was a member of the Dajōkan.129  Yet because Yuri was a member of 
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what, for lack of a better term, can be called the “People’s Rights” faction, his conflict 
with establishment-member Inoue took on an added level of political significance.  In this 
way, the Ginza Bricktown can be seen as an allegorical space for the performance of one 
the most heated political debates of the early Meiji period.   
 
Politics in Space: The Contested Implementation of Ginza Bricktown 
From the beginning of the project, Yuri’s political disinclination towards Inoue 
manifested in opposition to the Finance Ministry’s plans for Ginza Bricktown.  Yuri 
voiced his opposition to the project in a number of ways: 1) by opposing plans for brick 
buildings; 2) by challenging Finance Ministry attempts to redirect money donated to 
assist survivors of the fire to convert to brick construction; 3) by resisting Inoue and 
Shibusawa’s plans to establish a private company to administer the project; and 4) by 
maneuvering to secure concessions from the central government designed to alleviate the 
disruptions caused by the Ginza Bricktown.  Ultimately, Yuri was removed from office 
when he became too much of a problem, allowing the Finance Ministry to take complete 
control of the Ginza Bricktown.  But, as they soon found out, eliminating one performer 
from the stage only created room for others to walk on.   
As Governor of Tokyo, it was Yuri’s responsibility to lead the relief and 
reconstruction efforts immediately following the Ginza fire.  Yuri later took credit for the 
Ginza Bricktown project, recounting “rebuilding the burnt houses in either wood or brick 
would have been fine, but I wanted brick houses no matter what...so I exaggerated by 
saying I wanted everybody’s help in building the Imperial Capital (renkoku no 
moto)...that’s when even the Dajōkan said, ‘That sounds great.  Do it!’ (soreha 
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omoshiroi, yare yare)...and that is when I came up with what is called ‘Urban 
Improvement’ (shiku kaisei).”130  Despite Yuri’s boasting, it is clear that he anticipated a 
reconstruction effort more in line with traditional practices and resisted attempts to make 
the district overly Western.  Indeed, he responded to the fire with reconstruction 
protocols long practiced in Edo under the Tokugawa: food relief and street widening to 
clear firebreaks.  Losing his own house to the flames, Yuri “made a personal inspection 
of the scene of the fire, congratulating those who had escaped and condoling with those 
who were homeless,” the Japan Daily Mail reported.131  As a demonstration of 
benevolent rule, the Tokyo government distributed 50 koku (~2,400 gallons, or ~17,400 
pounds) of rice daily to aid the more than 20,000 survivors burnt out of their houses.132  
Yuri also began planning for the widening of streets, placing a temporary hold on 
housing reconstruction and authorizing surveys of the burnt areas in the following days.  
When he was approached two days after the fire by Shibusawa Eiichi and Tokyo Deputy 
Councilor (gon sanji) Mishima Michitsune, Yuri expressed reservations about their 
visions for the reconstruction of the district.  While initially agreeing with the need to 
widen streets to act as firebreaks, he later scoffed at the idea of making them the same 
width as streets in Western cities.  Moreover, he adamantly opposed the idea of brick 
construction.  Requirements to rebuild houses in brick, he told Shibusawa, would limit 
residents’ “freedom” and impose unnecessary difficulties.  Instead, the government 
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should follow past precedent and allow residents to freely rebuild their houses.133  Despite 
his efforts on behalf of local residents, Yuri’s objections were overruled by the Dajōkan 
when they announced on 2.30 that Ginza would be rebuilt in brick.  Despite this setback, 
Yuri did not give up his efforts to redirect the Finance Ministry’s attempt to impose a 
preformed urban space onto the city on behalf of residents.   
Unable to block the order to rebuild houses in brick, Yuri attempted to make sure 
the more than ¥30,000 donated for disaster relief found its way into the hands of people 
who needed it most.  Private donations, both foreign and domestic, had started flowing in 
soon after the fire.  An opportune meeting at Ōkuma’s estate three days after the fire 
between Shibusawa, and William Cargill and Joseph Russell of the Oriental Bank of 
Yokohama (Tōyō Ginkō), had led to a grant of 1,000 Mexican dollars (about ¥1,000 at the 
time) to assist the victims of the disaster and finance the reconstruction efforts.134  
Another foreign resident who had donated a large sum of money – just over ¥500 – was 
William Elliot Griffis, a famous instructor at the Daigaku Nankō, the forerunner to the 
University of Tokyo.135  Inoue also expected the Americans in Yokohama to reciprocate 
Japan’s $5,000 donation to Chicago recently delivered by the Iwakura Mission to assist 
the rebuilding from the Great Chicago Fire of 1871.136  As he noted to the Central 
                                                
133 The topics discussed during Shibusawa’s visit to the Finance Ministry are summarized 
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Chamber in a report on 3.4, “I have heard that even among the foreigners of all countries 
living in Yokohama, there is a desire to give assistance to each of the areas affected by 
the recent fire, just as in the case of the Chicago fire.”137  The foreign residents of the 
Yokohama settlement, however, were not as forthcoming as Inoue had hoped.  Despite 
forming a committee to discuss such assistance – which the Japan Weekly Mail described 
as “the natural fruit of that kindly sympathy which distinguishes European races, and 
does their civilization so much honor” – the foreign residents concluded that the fire was 
not damaging enough to warrant any aid.  The Japan Weekly Mail reported the next 
week,  “In view of the above facts the Committee do not think it necessary to take further 
steps, but again wish to express their deepest sympathy with the authorities and with the 
sufferers in Yedo from this calamity, which happily on more careful enquiries has proved 
to be of a less serious nature than at first represented.”138   
Fortunately, Japanese sources were more generous with funds.  Not to be outdone 
by the American bankers, a group of Japanese merchants in Yokohama pooled together 
the substantial sum of ¥3,000 to contribute to the cause.139  Shibusawa himself donated 
¥100 as a private resident.  Other Japanese entities, including the imperial court, 
government offices, and private companies all pitched in.  The Meiji Emperor and 
Empress contributed ¥2,000 and ¥1,000, respectively, while all central government 
officials – except those who lost property in the fire – chipped in according to their court 
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rank: ranging from ¥200 for 2nd rank officials to ¥2 for those of the 15th rank.140  Other 
sizeable contributions from various Japanese sources included: ¥2,000 from the Mitsui 
bank, nearly ¥2,000 from the Hokkaidō Development Commission (Kaitakushi), 
approximately ¥2,000 from the Central Chamber, almost ¥2,000 from the Justice 
Ministry, and about ¥1,500 from the Tokyo Government.  Finally, appropriate to their 
leading role in the project, the two largest donations were provided by organizations with 
close ties to Ōkuma and Inoue.  The Tokyo Exchange Bank (Kawase Kaisha), organized 
under Ōkuma’s leadership at the Finance Ministry, donated ¥5,000, while the Finance 
Ministry made the largest single donation of ¥6,289.  As a result, the grand total of 
donations including all sums was just over ¥30,000.141  For comparison, the daily wage of 
a day laborer later hired to pave Ginza Main Street was 20 sen, or ¥0.2.142   
Disagreements soon broke out between the Finance Ministry and Tokyo 
government over the allocation of this ¥30,000 in relief money.  Despite being earmarked 
for “relief of the poor,” Inoue and Shibusawa wanted to use the donated monies to fund 
the planned brick buildings in an attempt to limit the financial burden on the already 
cash-strapped central government.  As Inoue and Shibusawa were well aware, the Meiji 
government was already saddled with debt from the Bōshin War and from taking over 
samurai stipends – not to mention other reforms and large public works projects initiated 
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by the Finance Ministry.143  As Inoue explained his reasoning to the Dajōkan, “not all of 
the burned-out residents are truly destitute (kasai no shimin nokorazu kinkyū no mono 
nomi ni kore naki).  Besides, if we just distributed money to anybody, then naturally they 
would waste it all on drinking parties (shushoku, lit. “liquor and food”).”144  Instead the 
best way to console the survivors, Inoue and Shibusawa believed, was to build new brick 
houses for them.  Yuri and the Tokyo government, on the other hand, wanted the money 
to be personally distributed to survivors in cash.  As they appealed to the Sei’in on 4.18, 
using the donation money for brick houses would not serve its intended purpose of aiding 
the survivors of the fire.  Some residents, they noted, had found it more convenient to 
move elsewhere.  Moreover, there was no guarantee that the people who would 
eventually move into the new brick houses had actually suffered losses from the fire in 
the first place.145  The Finance Ministry was unswayed, replying on 5.7: “Those burnt out 
residents who move elsewhere and do not return to live in the new houses clearly do not 
understand the benefits of the brick construction, and will make the mistake of missing 
out on the so-called progress of civilization.”146  In the end, Yuri was unable to prevent 
the Finance Ministry from misappropriating relief money to finance construction of 
Ginza Bricktown.  
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Although unsuccessful in his first two attempts to deflect the Finance Ministry’s 
imposition of the Bricktown, Yuri’s luck began to turn when it came to questions of how 
construction and financial responsibilities would be divided.  While the ¥30,000 of 
disaster relief donations was enough to get the project off the ground, it was a far cry 
from what would be needed to finance the Ginza Bricktown.  According to a ledger for 
the entire project calculated by the Tokyo municipal government in the fifth month of 
1872, the Bricktown as planned would cost over ¥1.8 million yen, or nearly 4% of the 
entire national budget.  By far the largest portion of this amount, ¥1.7 million, would go 
just to the construction of the brick buildings.  Also included in this cost was over ¥8,000 
for purchasing necessary lands, and nearly ¥60,000 to remove surviving plastered 
warehouses (dozō).147  In order to finance construction after all this relief money was used 
up, Inoue and Shibusawa proposed the establishment of a private company called the 
“Rental House Construction Company” (Shakuya Zōei Kaisha) that would erect the brick 
buildings after acquiring a loan from the central government for half the cost of the 
construction.  The loan would then be repaid over 15 years through rents collected from 
tenants.148  Ideally, construction would spread beyond Ginza and continue on to the rest 
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of the capital beyond.  Planning for the company proceeded as far as the writing up of 
provisional articles of incorporation and a charter delineating rental procedures.149 
Yuri enlisted the support of wealthy merchants in the Town Council (machi 
kaisho) to quash the Finance Ministry’s plans to establish the Rental House Construction 
Company.  Also referred to as the “city savings association,” the Council had been set up 
to provide welfare for the poor in 1792 in response to a series of severe riots in Edo in the 
1780s.150  With money and stocks of rice from the so-called “seventy-percent reserve 
fund” (shichibu tsumikin), the Council provided disaster relief and social welfare 
throughout the Edo period.  By the beginning of the Meiji period, the Council had grown 
into a formidable social force in the city.  As Sheldon Garon documents, in 1868 alone, 
the Council provided relief for 941,686 Tokyo residents, or nearly 20% of the city’s 
population.151  It was a significant blow to the Finance Ministry, therefore, when the 
Town Council came out against the ministry’s plan for the Rental House Construction 
Company.  As the Council explained, they opposed the plan because it would cause even 
more unnecessary complications in the already delayed relief efforts.  “It is already 30 
days since the fire, with the surveying of the district taking a lot of time;” the Council 
lamented on 3.28, “now people have erected temporary dwellings and reluctantly gone 
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150 Takashi Katō, “Governing Edo,” in Edo and Paris: Urban Life and the State in the 
Early Modern Era, ed. James L. McClain and others (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), 62. 
151 Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 30, 35.  As Garon notes, the Council became so 
popular that the Tokyo government finally shut it down, fearing that “they could not hope 
to compete for the ‘loyalty’ of the people if the ‘wealthy merchants of the city’ continued 
to oversee the provision of poor relief,” (Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, 35). 
82 
 
back to work, exposing old and young alike to the wind and the rain and making it 
difficult even for those in their prime to carry on their household business on sunny 
days.”  “It is truly the most distressful situation imaginable,” the Council concluded.152   
With the Town Council on his side, Yuri saw an opportunity to force the Finance 
Ministry to alter its plans for the Bricktown.  The prohibition on housing construction had 
been issued, the order for reconstruction in brick given, the burnt areas surveyed, Waters’ 
designs for the brick buildings released, the layout of the new street network drawn up, 
and the purchasing of necessary lands carried out.  But no ground could be broken on the 
brick buildings as long as the company was still up in the air.  As Yuri understood, the 
longer the project was delayed, the more pressure there would be on Inoue to start 
construction or face the failure of the project altogether.  Yuri saw an opening.  With the 
added support of the Town Council, Yuri would now urge the immediate implementation 
of the project.  One day after the Town Council announced their opposition, Yuri 
petitioned Inoue complaining about the delays.  Echoing the concerns of the Council, 
Yuri sounded a note of caution concerning the success of the project:  “More than 30 
days have already passed since the fire, but without any compensation for bricks or 
timber the people have begun to lose interest.”  “Until the Housing agency is 
established,” Yuri concluded, “the Tokyo Government will pay for bricks and other 
necessary materials with donated money and will transfer them to the Housing Agency 
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later.”153  To drive their point home, four days later on 4.3 the Tokyo government 
requested ¥50,000 to begin construction on nearly 4,700 buildings in Ginza.154   
By taking a more assertive role in the implementation of the Ginza Bricktown, 
Yuri and the Tokyo municipal government were able to manipulate the Finance Ministry 
into making two concessions designed to make the project more palatable for local 
residents: 1) financing the reconstruction through central government funds; and 2) 
allowing traditional structures on the backstreets of Ginza.  First, in his petition to Inoue 
on 3.29, Yuri proposed a new division of the financial burden of construction.  While the 
Tokyo government borrowed money from the central government to start construction on 
buildings, the central government would pay for land purchases and building removal.  
This caught Inoue in a bit of a tight spot.  Limited finances were not the only problem 
facing the Finance Ministry.  Time was also a factor, as the Iwakura Mission members 
would return to Japan before long.  As leader of the project, Inoue therefore had to find a 
way to produce the Bricktown as cheaply and as quickly as possible.  When responding 
to Yuri two weeks later, Inoue indicated that he was willing to compromise on the issue 
of the Company in the name of speedy implementation of the Bricktown.  “Wasting all 
our time on empty buildings and delays will cause us to lose the support of the public and 
will lead to serious troubles,” Inoue conceded.  Agreeing to Yuri’s offer of a 
compromise, Inoue requested “a detailed report delineating the division of expenses for 
publicly-financed road improvements and for...privately-financed building 
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construction.”155  The Tokyo government delivered the requested breakdown the next 
day.  Public funds would be used to finance all aspects of the street improvements: 
purchasing lands for widened roadbeds, removing obstructing buildings, constructing 
new bridges, installing gutters and drains, and paving the road surface.  The building of 
houses, meanwhile, would be completely financed with private money.156  As a result, 
Yuri was successful in compelling the Finance Ministry to give up its plans for the Rental 
Housing Construction Company so that the project could move forward.   
Once building construction was placed solely into the hands of private financiers, 
Yuri saw a chance to secure allowance of vernacular building types.  At the end of the 4th 
month, the Tokyo government submitted a new plan for the Bricktown to the Dajōkan.157  
After “consulting with Waters” and considering the “current status of the townspeople” 
the Tokyo government proposed a compromise.  Only brick buildings would be permitted 
fronting Ginza Main Street, but financiers of the buildings would have final say on 
designs and methods on all other streets.  Specifically, fireproofed traditional structures – 
such as “storefront-style” warehouses (misekura)158 and “winged” warehouses (sode 
dozō)159 – that had survived the fire would be allowed on all streets other than the Ginza 
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Main Street, and new ones could be erected on streets less than 3-ken.160  In effect, the 
Tokyo offered to accommodate the central government’s desire to create a modern 
streetscape on the Ginza Main Street in exchange for allowing less expensive traditional 
fireproof buildings on backstreets.  Only two changes were made before this new plan 
was announced.  First, the final plan clarified that financiers had final say in design and 
methods provided they privately financed and constructed the houses, rather than having 
the government construct it on their behalf.  The second change was even more telling.  
Whereas the first plan proposed the allowance of traditional structures on all roads other 
than Ginza Main Street, the final version required that buildings fronting both the Main 
Street and 10-ken streets would be made of brick.161  Recalling the street layout for the 
new Bricktown, this was a significant change.  As it was a 10-ken road that bisected the 
Ginza Bricktown as the main cross-street providing the most direct route between the 
government district and imperial palace, and the Tsukiji foreign settlement, this change 
ensured that the building frontage along this route would be Western in appearance.  As 
seen in Figure 5 of Bricktown progress as of 1875, construction proceeded first along 
these routes. 
This new protocol was retained when the Finance Ministry took over bureaucratic 
responsibility for the construction from the Tokyo government on 1872.7.9.  “For dozō 
warehouses on roads of 8-ken or more, it was announced in 1872 that there shall be 
absolutely no warehouses moved in from other locations or no newly reconstructed 
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houses,” the Construction Board noted on February 5, 1873162, before the first buildings 
were completed.  “But at this time, upon consideration,” the Board decided, “it has been 
now decided that other than the Main Street and roads 10-ken and wider, buildings are 
not limited to brick, and existing dozō warehouses and self-financed brick architecture 
will be allowed as long as it will withstand fires.”163  Inoue begrudgingly forwarded this 
to the Tokyo government, putting a paternalist spin on things.  These new allowances 
were made, Inoue explained, because “the number of destitute people south of Kyōbashi 
who cannot withstand repeated fires on their own is by no means small.”164 
Yuri scored a political victory by successfully compelling Inoue and the Finance 
Ministry planners to alter their visions for the district not even two months after the 
Ginza fire.  But he paid for this with his job.  Just two weeks after the compromise plan 
was announced, Yuri was rewarded for his efforts by effectively being removed from 
office when the Dajōkan dispatched him to Europe to join the Iwakura Mission on 
1872.5.2.  In Europe, Yuri would have an opportunity to realize firsthand the benefits of 
brick housing in Paris and London before being unceremoniously relieved of his position 
as Governor of Tokyo two months later.165  With Yuri out of the way, Inoue and the 
Finance Ministry thought they had cleared all obstacles hindering the success of the 
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Ginza Bricktown.  Just two months after Yuri was removed, the Finance Ministry 
assumed responsibility for building construction from the Tokyo government in the 7th 
month of 1872.  In doing so, the Finance Ministry placed itself in charge of both building 
construction and street improvements.  With the Tokyo Government left to handle public 
relations and rent collection, Inoue and the Finance Ministry would have total control of 
the Ginza Bricktown project from here on out.166  Or so they thought, at least.  As it 
turned out, the show was just getting started. 
 
The Edokko Response to Ginza Bricktown 
Disgruntled residents began to demonstrate their displeasure with the Ginza Bricktown 
even as surveyors were still at work demarcating building plots in preparation for 
construction.  Lacking representation in the central government or involvement in the 
planning process, the residents of Ginza resisted the imposition of the Bricktown by 
whatever means they could.  Ignoring injunctions against housing construction, openly 
criticizing and refusing to inhabit the new brick buildings, and calling for rent deferrals, 
the residents of Ginza voiced their opposition to not only the central government’s 
Bricktown, but also to the autocratic Meiji regime in general.  In this way, the Ginza 
Bricktown served as an outlet for popular frustrations with the new government.  As 
such, the conflict over the Bricktown can be seen as a proxy for the center/periphery 
power struggles in the early Meiji period, as documented in works by James Baxter, 
                                                
166 For transfer of construction to the Finance Ministry, see TSS, vol. 53, 144; for division 




Philip C. Brown, Michael Lewis, Brian Platt, Neil Waters, and Kären Wigen.167  What is 
especially notable about local resistance to the Ginza Bricktown is that it suggests Meiji 
policies were no more popular or ungrudgingly received at the center than they were on 
the periphery.   
Following the Ginza fire in the 2nd month, the residents of the district attempted to 
move on with their lives as the dispute between Inoue and Yuri delayed the start of 
housing construction.  With nowhere else to go for shelter, residents inevitably ignored 
the injunction on housing construction in the burnt districts and erected temporary homes 
amidst the brick buildings under construction.  The obstructions posed by these makeshift 
dwellings forced the Finance Ministry Construction Board to plead to the Tokyo 
Government on 1872.9.29 to prevent such hindrances.  Despite the order to suspend 
housing construction, the Board protested, “the number of people who...have erected 
houses in these areas is not small.”  The Board even subtly threatened that impeding 
houses would be torn down, hinting “tearing down a house that required many expenses 
to build, so that a brick house may be erected, is extremely pitiable.”  But at this point, 
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they had no recourse other than requesting the Tokyo government to issue a second 
prohibition of housing construction.168   
The problem of structures impeding roadways was especially acute when 
construction work began on streets to the east of the Sanjūkenbori River (today, Shōwa 
Dōri) more than a year and a half after the Ginza fire.  With that much time between the 
fire and the start of construction work, it was inevitable that the area would have been 
rebuilt before long.  As the Public Works Bureau head Ono Gishi reproached Tokyo 
Governor Ōkubo on November 9, 1873: “If the unburned buildings and warehouses 
impeding the roads are not immediately vacated, this will cause serious problems in the 
project.”  “Houses have gradually been rebuilt impeding the roads, and many repairs have 
been made on houses that are to be removed, causing great inconveniences,” a frustrated 
Ono complained, “We hereby intervene to request that you resolutely stop this.”169  This 
was followed by a more forceful notification the next February, sternly ordering that 
“dozō and houses impeding roads should be immediately removed.”170  When the Tokyo 
government dragged its feet in executing evictions and tearing down impeding structures, 
the central government stepped in to set a deadline for residents to vacate their houses 
and to put an end to any insubordination.  Writing in early May, 1874, the central 
government ordered that impeding houses “must be withdrawn by the 20th of this month,” 
                                                
168 TSS, vol. 54, 818. 
169 TSS, vol. 55, 661. 
170 TSS, vol. 56, 215. 
90 
 
adding: “In addition to the above, any flexibility in housing demolitions granted out of 
kindness shall furthermore be arranged with us.”171 
 Residents of Ginza performed their opposition to the Bricktown not only with 
their feet, but also with their voices.  After the announcement of the Bricktown plans, 
district residents were quick to vocalize their opposition by publicly criticizing the 
proposed buildings and spreading rumors demeaning the project.  The Tokyo 
Government was assigned public relations control in response to such resident 
complaints.  As instructed by the Finance Ministry, it was the Tokyo Government’s 
responsibility to “ensure compliance by explaining the particulars of the motives of the 
improvements and the benefits of the new houses.”172  The Tokyo Government had their 
hands full with this job, as indicated by an announcement just two months after the fire 
on the 20th day of the 4th month.  This proclamation went so far as threaten “strict 
treatment” (genjū no shochi) of “those who, clinging to old customs, recklessly ridicule 
the newly regulated construction, and spread groundless rumors to incite the people.”  
The decree even invoked imperial loyalty, admonishing residents to “reverently and 
humbly respect the imperial government’s wishes and carry them out with absolutely no 
misunderstandings.”173 
After the first buildings were completed in May 1873, district residents found 
little reason to embrace the project, as the buildings did not inspire great confidence.  Not 
only were the brick buildings unfamiliar, they were unsuited to the Japanese climate and 
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consequently not a very pleasant place in which to live.  As Edward Seidensticker 
explains: “They were found to be damp, stuffy, vulnerable to mildew, and otherwise ill 
adapted to the Japanese climate, and the solid walls ran wholly against the Japanese 
notion of a place to live in.”174  Even worse, as the Shimbun Zasshi reported the next 
month in June, the construction standards left much to be desired and even posed 
potential losses to the shops inside: 
Several days of continuous rain has caused the roofs of the brick houses in 
Ginza to spring leaks and the plaster to run down the walls, causing 
enormous losses to business merchandise…Was not the construction of 
the brick houses not merely for sprucing up the appearance of the city, but 
also to prevent the damages from rainwater and fires?  Despite the large 
sums of government money expended on construction, the houses will 
certainly receive a reputation that they cannot even withstand 4 or 5 days 
of rain if government officials are not careful about skimping in 
construction…To lose the trust of the common people because of such 
stories would be extremely regrettable.175 
 
While unfamiliar design, uncomfortable interiors, and shoddy construction were 
all certainly understandable reasons to criticize the project, the tenacity of popular 
opposition to the Ginza Bricktown suggests that underneath these protestations and 
complaints lay a more political motive.  Residents were no doubt disgruntled by delays in 
the rebuilding of the area and the forced demolition or relocation of traditional structures 
that survived the fire.  Yet local resistance to the Ginza Bricktown was fueled by general 
antipathy the residents of Tokyo had held towards the new Meiji regime since its 
founding less the five years earlier.  As M. William Steele documents, the residents of 
Tokyo, at the time known as Edo, had expressed anti-imperialist sentiments from even 
before the Meiji Restoration.  As the imperialist armies advanced on the Shogun’s capital 
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in early 1868, Steele describes, one cartoon lampooned the imperialist Satsuma and 
Chōshū forces by sardonically ascribing their victory over the Tokugawa army at Toba-
Fushimi “to superior farting power.”176  Not that “Edokko,” or “children of Edo,” were 
necessarily pro-Tokugawa, they were just none too excited about their city being overrun 
by people they saw as uncouth “country-bumpkin” samurai from the western provinces 
who spoke a rough-language.177  Certainly some within the city were sympathetic towards 
the Tokugawa, such as newspaperman Fukuchi Gen’ichirō, but many inhabitants simply 
resented any form of established authority.  Following the Restoration and the change in 
reign name to “Enlightened Rule,” (Meiji), for example, the Edokko showed the new 
imperial regime the same deference they had accorded their previous Tokugawa 
overlords.  “Those bums from Kyoto (Kamigata Zeiroku-domo) came and made Edo into 
this ‘Tokyo,’” quipped a popular joke from the early Meiji period, “From above, they talk 
about things like ‘Enlightened Rule’ (Meiji), but from below, we read it as ‘ungoverned 
by anybody’ (osamarumei).”178  Likewise, Ogi Shinzou points out that following the 
move of the capital to Tokyo and the renaming of Edo, recalcitrant residents intentionally 
mispronounced the name of the city as “Tōkei” out of contempt for the Meiji government 
and its far-reaching reforms.179  This extended even to confusion in the kanji characters 
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used to write the name “Tokyo,” resulting in 4 different variations in the pronunciation 
and orthography for the name of Japan’s new “Eastern Capital.”180  In this way, the new 
Meiji regime was not able to compel full compliance even at its very center. 
With this negative publicity and popular contempt for rulers, it is not surprising 
that residents of Ginza were hesitant to embrace a project imposed upon them by the 
central government.  They simply refused to move into the new brick buildings.  A Public 
Works department report dated 1872.11.28, for example, gave the status of 324 planned 
buildings: future tenants had been secured for only 84 of the buildings under 
construction, another 49 buildings would sit empty after completion, and the remaining 
191 were vacant houses waiting to be constructed.181  Even from the time of the very first 
“handing over” of 2 finished buildings on May 9, 1873, an additional 7 buildings lay 
empty.182  These vacancies were not entirely unexpected, however, as planners preferred 
to knowingly construct buildings that would sit empty upon completion rather than delay 
the project too for fear that they would lose the support of an increasingly frustrated 
public.  “The Ginza Bricktown is not something that can be built all at once,” cautioned 
Public Works department head Ono Gishi while reporting the completion of the first 
buildings, “it is something that must be completed by steadfastly continuing construction 
sequentially one area after the next, without concern for vacant houses.”183  Nevertheless, 
the financial problems caused by a lack of occupants forced the central government to 
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reconsider its plans for the district, and, in order to salvage the project, to permit certain 
concessions proposed by the Tokyo municipal government intended to lessen the 
financial burden on district residents.  
 
Countermeasures, Concessions, and Cancellation of Ginza Bricktown 
Facing pressure from below on two fronts, the Finance Ministry was eventually forced to 
curtail the Ginza Bricktown project.  Separately these two acts of resistance were not 
enough to completely deter the central government.  The central government had 
permitted the retention of traditional building types on the backstreets the Bricktown, but 
Governor Yuri was conveniently sent overseas when he posed too much of a hindrance to 
the project.  Residents, too, were forcibly pushed aside when their temporary dwellings 
impeded brick buildings and their houses torn down when they obstructed street 
improvements.  It was not until these two forces created a united front against the Finance 
Ministry that they were able to force the central government to yield to Tokyo municipal 
government attempts to alleviate pressure on residents.  Armed with petitions submitted 
by the residents of Ginza, the Tokyo municipal government deployed its bureaucratic 
influence to enact a series of “vacant house counter-measures” (akiya taisaku).  First, the 
Tokyo government maneuvered to arrange 12-month rent deferrals for residents moving 
into brick buildings.  Secondly, it followed up on this success by orchestrating tax 
exemptions for residents of the Bricktown.  These countermeasures worked because they 
were advantageous for all parties interested: residents secured cheaper housing through 
the good offices of the Tokyo government, and the Finance Ministry was able to fill 
empty houses with residents, ensuring the measured success of the project.  In the end, 
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the central government was unable to prevent the premature cancellation of the 
Bricktown. 
Shortly before the first buildings were completed, the Tokyo government was 
given the responsibility of collecting payments from tenants occupying government-
owned buildings.184  Taking over this responsibility from the Public Works Bureau 
Construction Department, the Tokyo government saw another opportunity to alleviate the 
financial burdens on those residents who moved into the new brick houses.  Quickly 
putting this new power to work, the municipal government unilaterally granted rent 
deferrals, countermanding Finance Ministry directives in the process.  In June 1873, the 
Tokyo government proposed payment deferrals of 10 of 12 months as a way to help 
residents “having trouble paying their rents” while also encouraging tenants to move into 
the Bricktown.”185  The Construction Board responded several months later in September, 
indicating that they had no objections to this idea, with the exception of those who had 
already occupied houses.186  The Tokyo government instead announced a universal 12-
month rent deferral for residents moving into brick houses in September 1873.  
Disregarding the objection of the Construction Board, the government noted, “for those 
already moved in...if they are truly having trouble with their payments, then depending 
on the circumstances, the same will apply to them.”187 
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This breach of protocol was put to the test a few months later in December when 
the Tokyo government again petitioned the Construction Board, this time forwarding a 
memorial submitted by several residents of the Bricktown, including Anzai Jūbei of the 
famous Ginza Daikokuya: 
Anzai Jūbei of the Owarichō Shinchi neighborhood and 7 other people 
have submitted the following petition for delaying the payment of rents for 
houses that have been occupied, as forwarded by the above District 
manager.  While such things have quite naturally been heard, and each 
application has its own context, none of the people concerned have been 
granted the rent deferral until December of next year.  Consequently, 
based on the order from this September, while we are considering 
instructing a 12 month postponement from the time each purchase is 
completed and that payments should be made in cash, because it concerns 
people to whom the Construction Board has also issued orders, we are 
checking with you just in case.  If there is no disagreement, upon 
notification, we intend to issue a directive to the applicants along the 
above lines.  We request an answer as to whether this is approved or not.   
       December 4, 1873188 
 
The Construction Board responded several days later, indicating that they would have to 
forward the petition up the chain of command to the Finance Ministry.189  Seeking to 
hasten the process, Tokyo Governor Ōkubo Tadahiro (Ichiō) personally appealed to new 
Finance Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu one week later in mid-December, lamenting the 
“considerable difficulty and hindrances in conducting business” that residents had 
encountered upon moving into the houses as a result of street improvement work outside.  
Adding that the Construction Bureau had not responded to its inquiry regarding the 12-
month rent deferral, Governor Ōkubo requested Ōkuma’s “speedy instruction.”190  With 
his hands tied by the Tokyo Government’s earlier unilateral action, Finance Minister 
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Ōkuma was forced to reluctantly affirm the 12-month payment deferrals for district 
residents.  Responding to Ōkubo at the end of December, Ōkuma had no choice but to 
acquiesce: “because this has already been granted by the Tokyo government to applicants 
who have taken receipt of houses, a 12-month postponement will be generally allowed 
for all residents upon occupation.”  “Beyond this,” he admonished Governor Ōkubo, 
“collection of payments should be made with no further delays.”191 
Having securing rent deferrals for residents moving into the brick buildings, the 
Tokyo government further lessened the financial burden on landowners by arranging tax 
exemptions for 4 months.  In some ways financial problems were even tougher for 
private landowners than they were for residents of government-owned brick buildings, 
Tokyo Governor Ōkubo explained to Ōkuma in a letter dated November 10, 1873.  For 
example, “there have been complaints about a lack of renters since the fire of last spring;” 
moreover, “Now that construction is about to start, negating all rents when residents have 
to move out, it will be difficult [for landowners] to pay land taxes and other District fees 
(Ku’nyūhi)192.”193  In order to help out landowners, Ōkubo proposed two courses of action.  
One option was for the temporary purchase of all necessary lands at the prohibitive price 
of ¥363,265 for all of the required plots in the two “Small Districts” (Shō-ku)194 that 
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comprised the Ginza Bricktown.  It is hard to imagine that Governor Ōkubo actually 
believed that the Finance Minister would accept such an expensive proposal.  In this 
regard, it appears that Ōkubo’s goal was to encourage Ōkuma to choose his alternative 
plan.  “If the purchasing of land plots as described in the document is difficult,” Ōkubo 
offered as a second option, “then we request that land taxes be exempted during 
construction and District fees covered.”195  Just as Ōkubo had hoped, Ōkuma decided 
relieving landowners of both land taxes and their obligations to pay residence fees was 
the more prudent course of action.  “It is difficult to arrange the purchase of private 
estates for the construction of brick buildings as in the forwarded document,” Ōkuma 
responded matter-of-factly two months later.  Instead, “Landowners will be exempt from 
paying property taxes for four months from the time of building construction and District 
fees will be waived.”196 
It is difficult to believe that the veteran politician Ōkuma would have been taken 
in by such a thinly veiled political trick.  Rather, Ōkuma had his own reasons for agreeing 
to the rent and tax concessions proposed by the Tokyo government.  By the end of 1873, 
the combined pressure of the Tokyo municipal government and the residents of Ginza 
forced the Finance Ministry to scale back the Ginza Bricktown.  Ōkuma placed the blame 
                                                                                                                                            
Yūrakuchō, including the imperial palace outer gardens, continuing north through 
Ōtemachi and Kanda to the Kanda River as the western border; following the Kanda 
River to the east as the northern border; and finally the Sumida River as the eastern 
border, including Shinkawa and the beginnings of Tsukishima.  Number 8 Small Ku was 
the northern end of the Bricktown, which corresponds roughly to today’s Ginza 1 through 
4-chōme; #9 Small Ku was the southern half, which was made up of Owarichō Shinchi 
(today Ginza 5-chōme), Owarichō 1-2-chōme (Ginza 5-6-chōme), Takegawachō (Ginza 
7-chōme), and Izumochō and Minami-Kinrokuchō (Ginza 8-chōme). 
195 TSS, vol. 55, 775. 
196 TSS, vol. 55, 773-774. 
99 
 
squarely on the recalcitrance of Tokyo residents, rationalizing that the new brick 
buildings were “completely unsuited to a popular sentiment that steadfastly adheres to the 
ways of the past (shujū197 kochaku no minshin),” and expressing frustration that “people 
grow weary that the costs at hand so far exceed those of the old [housing] regulations, 
resulting in various incidents delaying construction.”198  As a result, construction of brick 
buildings was suspended to the east of Kobikichō.  The improvement of canals and 
streets, however, continued as planned for the time being.  Ōkuma’s petition to cancel the 
Bricktown project was approved by the Dajōkan on December 25th, 1873.  Not 
surprisingly, Ōkuma withheld his earlier defamation of Ginza residents when informing 
the Tokyo government of this development.199   
As Ōkuma indicated, the protestations of the Tokyo residents and the agitations of 
the Tokyo Government succeeded in forcing the central government to reconsider the 
Bricktown.  Realizing the entire project was moribund, the central government 
abandoned aspirations of gradually fireproofing the entire city of Tokyo and redoubled 
efforts to produce the modern urban space they had set out to create in the first place. 
 
Leaving Ginza 
Continuing to face major financial crises on the national level as a result of subsuming 
former samurai stipends, the central government was looking for a way to exit the Ginza 
Bricktown.  Attempting to salvage the project, the government had approved several 
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“vacant house measures” to attract new tenants, including allowance of traditional 
structures, rent deferrals, and tax exemptions.  But at the same time, they wanted to make 
sure that the district would satisfy their goal of creating an imperial space in Tokyo.  The 
solution for the central government was to more stringently require brick construction on 
the main streets of Ginza proper.  Once this was complete, the central government could 
withdraw from the project, satisfied with the space produced. 
 This more hardline exit-strategy adopted by the central government is evidenced 
in its response to yet another series of petitions filed by the Tokyo municipal government 
on behalf of local citizens.  Perhaps seeking to capitalize on their earlier successes or 
maybe buttressed by earlier central government concessions, the Tokyo Government 
submitted an ambitious revision plan authored by the two district mangers of the Ginza 
Bricktown regarding the construction of buildings in the backstreets of the district.200  
Although the District managers had delivered their plan on December 14th, the Tokyo 
Government did not forward it to the central government until December 25th – the same 
day that building construction east of Kobikichō was cancelled.  The managers appealed: 
While there have been repeated instructions for people to move out of 
their houses for this reason, there are many people of low social status in 
the areas in which construction is about to begin.  So even if brick 
buildings are built, or if they want to reside elsewhere, it is hard for them 
to do so on their own.  If it unavoidably comes to the point where they 
have to live elsewhere, then there will naturally be repeated delays. 
 
The managers proposed several measures designed to assist people who could not 
afford to relocate or construct brick houses.  First, for houses on the 10-ken streets, they 
suggested that the government pay for construction, and that rents would be deferred for 
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2 years and reduced to 1/5 of the normal price.  Houses on 8-ken roads, meanwhile, 
would receive the same 2-year deferral, while rent payments for houses on 3-ken roads 
would be deferred for 3 years.  “If such lenient measures are granted,” the managers 
appealed, “then even the people of low social standing will not have to disperse.  If they 
are able to live on their former property in peace, they will be overcome with gratefulness, 
complaints will cease, and the process of construction and moving out will proceed 
smoothly.”201 Ōkuma had already affirmed the 12-month rent deferrals already granted 
by the Tokyo Government, but now the district managers were attempting to double or 
even triple that number in addition to requesting that the central government construct all 
of the buildings at no cost to the residents.   
These were concessions that Ōkuma was not inclined to agree to, especially after 
the central government was forced to scale back the Bricktown project.  Ōkuma’s lack of 
a response compelled Tokyo Governor Ōkubo to push the issue by sending him a 
reminder the following February, including copies of all of the original paperwork.  To 
this second petition, Tokyo Governor attached a plea relaying the frustrating bureaucratic 
runaround that had stifled the original proposal.  While this runaround can be partly 
explained by confusion resulting from the recent replacement of the Public Works 
Ministry by the Home Ministry, the cold shoulder shown to Tokyo Governor Ōkubo can 
be perhaps also explained by central government planners’ changed attitude towards the 
Ginza Bricktown.  Facing the real possibility of the Ginza Bricktown being nothing more 
than a total waste of money with only a few brick buildings to show for it, the central 
government was reluctant to allow further concessions from the original plan.  This new 
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stance is evident in the directive finally handed down by the Finance Ministry in May 
1874 in response to Ōkubo’s entreaties.  Responding with cold rationale, the Finance 
Ministry explained that it was not a matter of sympathy.  “While we understand the 
situations of the emotional appeals and the desires of the Tokyo government,” the 
Finance Ministry explained, “from the time that decision was made, resources and 
materials for the construction of 2nd and 3rd class houses have all already been gathered 
and stored and some houses have even already been started here and there.  Furthermore, 
with the 3rd class houses there are no extreme differences just from a small change in 
housing price as there is with dozō warehouses.”  Rather, it was a matter of pragmatic 
cost-effectiveness: “changing regulations now will not only cause various problems in the 
process, it will also leave many of the materials and the empty lands unused,” the 
ministry rationalized, “For that reason they would be wasted expenses, and we cannot 
possibly afford such vast losses.”  Emphasizing that “rapidly completing things in the 
current form is what would be the most expedient for the peaceful lives of the common 
people,” the ministry flatly concluded, “There must be absolutely no revision to the plan.”  
As for housing payments, rent deferments would be kept at the previously agreed 12 
months, but rents would be reduced for both the 2nd and 3rd class houses.202 
As this directive suggests, now that the Bricktown plan would be limited to Ginza 
proper, the central government decided to cut its losses by focusing on brick construction 
wherever possible.  Yet renters continued to have trouble paying for their new dwellings, 
and the buildings continued to be difficult to fill.  Some tenants who moved into the 
houses found themselves falling several months behind in their rent payments and having 
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no choice but to request that their contracts be cancelled.  Finance Minister Ōkuma 
ordered that these requests should be granted so that new tenants who could actually pay 
their rents could be brought in.203 As a result of these continued difficulties, the central 
government suspended all government-funded construction on March 27, 1875, blaming 
“residents of the district [who] do not understand the plan.”204   
Attached to this announcement was the map reproduced as Figure 5, which 
depicts the status of the Bricktown at the time of this announcement.  As visible in this 
map, having at least ensured that the streetscapes fronting the main thoroughfares would 
form a modern urban space, the central government withdrew from the Ginza Bricktown.   
 
Conclusion: The Bricktown Legacy 
Over the course of the arduous Ginza Bricktown project, planners realized that unilateral 
attempts to impose new urban space on an existing city were bound to provoke resistance 
at the local level.  Although the Bricktown was built – replete with modern urban 
amenities and infrastructure, such as fireproof dwellings, roadside trees, paved sidewalks, 
and improved roads and water systems – the project failed to attract tenants.  In fact, only 
about a third of the planned buildings were completed by the time the entire Bricktown 
project was declared finished on May 28, 1877.205  The project also failed as a model to 
inspire an organic grassroots modernization of the city by private individuals: while 
nearly 1,000 Western-style buildings were eventually constructed in the Kyōbashi 
                                                
203 TSS, vol. 56, 997. 
204 TSS, vol. 57 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1965), 346. 
205 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 22; Ishida, Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no 
Hyakunen, 43; Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 59. 
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District, which included Ginza, there were fewer than twenty brick buildings in the rest of 
the city by the time the project was finished.206 
So what, then, was the legacy of the Ginza Bricktown, and what influence did it 
have on later urban improvement projects?  Firstly, the Ginza Bricktown project 
established a standard procedure for rebuilding areas destroyed by fire that would be 
followed over the next decade, and that would ultimately contribute to the development 
of a wider-scale master plan to guide urban improvements.  On one hand, the failure of 
the project convinced planners that Government-led attempts to immediately transform 
the city by installing urban spaces entirely from the top down were not feasible.  As 
Carola Hein points out, the Ginza Bricktown was “the first and last attempt to transform 
Tokyo into a metropolis that aesthetically resembled major European cities.”207  Indeed, 
the Ginza Bricktown was the Meiji Government’s first – and only – attempt to construct a 
preform modern urban space in Tokyo.  In other words, the Ginza Bricktown was an 
attempt by the Meiji government to reproduce the axiomatic “if you build it, they will 
come” approach to urban development that the Iwakura Mission had observed in San 
Francisco.  Yet the people did not “naturally come and settle.”  Not only were the 
financial demands of the brick buildings of the Ginza Bricktown unsustainable, the 
people of Tokyo – as intrigued as they were by the Western building forms – proved 
unwilling to reside in them.   
                                                
206 Seidensticker, Low City, High City, 59. 
207 Carola Hein, “The Transformation of Planning Ideas in Japan and its Colonies,” in 
Urbanism: Imported or Exported?: Native Aspirations and Foreign Plans, edited by Joe 
Nasr and Mercedes Volait (London: Wiley-Academy, 2003), 57. 
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On the other hand, government officials in Tokyo did not by any means give up 
on efforts to fireproof the city.  Rather, the small-scale government purchasing of lands to 
widen streets and enact building construction guidelines (kenchiku seigen) requiring such 
non-flammable materials was frequently carried out following major fires.  One such 
example was the response to the devastating Kanda Kuromonchō fire that broke out on 
the evening of March 17th, 1878.  Destroying over 4,300 buildings from Kuromonchō 
(just south of the Kanda River) down to Kanda Kajichō (near today’s JR Kanda Station), 
this conflagration was even larger and more costly than the 1872 Ginza fire that led to the 
development of the Bricktown.  Demarcating several “important places to be protected 
from future conflagrations208,” Tokyo Governor Kusumoto Masatoshi requested that the 
Home Ministry “temporarily purchase these areas, enact housing construction 
regulations, and instruct (kyōyu) each landowner to use the money from the sale as capital 
for the construction of brick, stone, or dozō inflammable buildings.”209  As a result of 
Kusumoto’s proposal, Home Minister Ōkubo Toshimichi authorized the lending of over 
¥32,000 for the construction of brick houses, and in the meantime the new construction 
regulations were announced to the residents of the affected areas.210  As this shows, the 
Bricktown procedure of temporarily purchasing the burnt areas in order to implement 
fireproofing was continued in the case of the Kanda Kuromonchō fire.  Moreover, instead 
of imposing a preformed space onto the city, planners instead allowed residents to choose 
                                                
208 The locations indicated were the Kanda neighborhoods of Kajichō, Mastudachō (today 
Kanda Kajichō 2-chōme), Tomiyamachō, Nishi-Fukudachō, and Higashi-Imagawachō 
(today Kanda Iwamotochō 1-chōme). 
209 TSS, vol. 61 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1969), 69-71. 
210 TSS, vol. 61, 71-75. 
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their own building forms.  While not ideal, this piecemeal approach to urban reform – 
taking advantage of areas destroyed by opportune fires in order to implement 
improvements – was the only option open to government planners for the time being.  
The result, however, was that the urban area would become an uneven patchwork of 
isolated islands of planned districts amongst a sea of unplanned traditional 
neighborhoods.  Moreover, lacking a master plan, even these improved urban islands 
would be unsystematic and non-standardized in comparison to one another.  
Secondly, while short-term reconstruction and fireproofing projects such as that in 
Kanda Kuromonchō continued for the time being, urban planning officials mainly 
connected to the Home Ministry searched for a more pragmatic approach to long-term 
urban planning.  Learning from the experience of the Ginza Bricktown, planners from 
now on would focus on street improvements carried out gradually in order to lay the 
framework for lasting urban redevelopment rather than hasty wholesale transformation of 
the entire built environment.  In fact, this strategy worked well in the long run in Ginza.  
For example, “Strolling the Ginza” (“Ginbura”) became a trendy pastime, especially 
after gas lamps were installed on the Main Street in 1879.211  Moreover, by the 1880s, the 
Ginza area had become the commercial and intellectual center of Tokyo.  In this way, 
what at first was simply an exit strategy from a moribund project ultimately provided an 
effective modus operandi for future projects.  Although it may have happened slower 
than the planners of the Bricktown had hoped, all the government had to do in the future 
was to provide the built frame of urban infrastructure and wait for the private sector to fill 
                                                
211 Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 287; Tōkyō-to, ed., Ginza Rengagai no 
Kensetsu, 68, 150-152; Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 24. 
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it in.  Because quality streets were something that even local groups could support, 
focusing on street improvements with this more pragmatic and piecemeal approach 
would allow planners to avoid the limitations of lukewarm public support while 
modernizing the built environment of the city. 
Thirdly, the Ginza Bricktown set a pattern that would be followed in later urban 
improvement projects in Tokyo, and even colonial programs in Taipei and Seoul: that is, 
the deployment of the built environment – particularly railways, architecture, and urban 
planning – to produce imperial space.  Onto this framework of improved streets, planners 
would strategically place monumental buildings in order to create modern urban spaces.  
Of course, the brick building architecture of the Ginza district is well known, but the 
urban planning element of the plan, in the form of street improvements, should not be 
overlooked.  Nor should it be forgotten that the Bricktown was purposely located 
adjacent to the railway gateway to the city, Shimbashi Station – also Western in design.  
In this regard, it is telling to recall that the first plans to improve streets in the Ginza area, 
the Inquiry Regarding the Repairing of Roads in the Capital from the fourth month of 
1871, was proposed just one month after construction began on Shimbashi Station.  
Furthermore, this early street improvement proposal illustrates an early recognition of the 
relationship between streets, urban appearance, and international prestige, not to mention 
commercial activity and economic prosperity.  This focus on streets as conveyors of 
prosperity and prestige would continue to inform urban improvement projects throughout 
the 1880s.  In this way, the lessons learned from the Ginza Bricktown would be applied 
as planners in the Home Ministry promoted a series of urban plans emphasizing 
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improvements to transportation infrastructure as the basis for refashioning Tokyo as “the 





POLITICS OF SPACE: TOKYO STATION, URBAN IMPROVEMENTS, AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF IMPERIAL SPACE 
Tokyo Station – Located in Marunouchi, Kōjimachi 
District, and towering like a mountain over the 
Mitsubishi field, it goes without saying that this large 
building is the greatest railway station in all of Asia.  It 
is an ideal train station whose beauty and form in both 
its interior and exterior cannot be found even in foreign 
countries. 
 – Saishin Tōkyō Meishō Annai, 19181 
 
In this way, our Imperial Capital Tokyo symbolizes Our 
Empire as a modern and strong nation, perfectly 
representing the status of Our Empire in the world, and 
is surely to only become more and more developed and 
prosperous over the years. 
– Seinen Gakkō Kyōkasho, 19362  
 
“The grand spectacle of the opening, the brilliance of a triumphant return!” the 
Tokyo Asahi newspaper trumpeted on the morning of December 19, 1914.  The event 
that occasioned such an exclamation was none other than the opening ceremony of Tokyo 
Station – “the largest station in Asia,” as the Asahi pointed out.  Yet it was not only the 
opening of the station that was celebrated that day.  With the countries of Europe 
distracted by World War I, Japan used its alliance with England to justify occupying 
German possessions on the Shandong peninsula in China, including the colony of 
Qingdao (Kiaochow).  As the Asahi reported, a day earlier nearly 1,500 revelers gathered 
into the plaza in front of Tokyo Station to “welcome back to the Imperial Capital after 
                                                
1 KDL: Kyō Toyokichi, ed., Saishin Tōkyō Meishō Annai [Latest guide to the sights of 
Tokyo](Tokyo: Kōshūdō, 1918), 16. 
2 KDL: Teikoku Seinen Kyōiku Kenkyūkai, ed., Seinen Gakkō Kyōkasho [Youth school 
textbook](Tokyo: Seikabō, 1936), 97. 
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their grand and triumphant military expedition” the “triumphant generals” (gaisen 
shōgun) of the Shandong occupying force, Army General Kamio Mitsuomi and Navy 
Admiral Katō Sadakichi.  Arriving on the ceremonial first train into the new “Gateway to 
the Imperial Capital,” General Kamio and Admiral Kato were paraded through the 
celebratory “Great Green Arch” and “Green Pyramidal Towers” erected in front of the 
station on their way to the Imperial Palace to report their victories to the Emperor.  The 
assembled crowd in the plaza and lining the appropriately named “Triumphal Return 
Boulevard” (Gaisen Dōro) hailed the commanders with rising sun flags and a resounding 
chorus of “Banzai!” as fireworks exploded overhead.3  As William Coaldrake has noted, 
this orchestrated arrival of the triumphal military figures indicated a “clear connection in 
the public mind between Tokyo Station and the growing Japanese empire.”4  To put it 
another way, the opening ceremony of Tokyo Station doubled as a celebration of 
Japanese empire.   
Tokyo Station occupied an important place in Tokyo.  Located just to the east of 
the imperial palace, the station’s setting had both geographic and symbolic significance.  
Built adjacent to the “One Block London” Mitsubishi business district and nearby Hibiya 
                                                
3 Harada Katsumasa, Nihon no Kokutetsu [Japanese government railways](Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1984), 59-61; Tōkyō Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, ed., Tōkyō-Eki Eki-
shi [History of Tokyo Station](Tokyo: Tōkyō Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, 1973), 30-
31: 34; Tōkyō Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, ed., Tōkyō Hyakunenshi [100 years of Tokyo 
history](Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1979), 4:738-739; Nakagawa and others, Tōkyō-Eki Tanken 
[Exploring Tokyo Station](Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1987), 96-103.  Newspaper quotes are 
from Uchikawa Yoshimi and Matsushima Eiichi, ed., Taishō Nyu-su Jiten, vol., 1, Taishō 
1-nen – Taishō 3-nen [Encyclopedia of Taishō News, Vol. 1, 1912-1914](Tokyo: Maichi 
Komyunike-shonzu, 1986), 563; translation is from William H. Coaldrake, Architecture 
and Authority in Japan (London: Routledge, 1996), 230. 
4 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 230. 
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Park and Ginza Bricktown, Tokyo Station capped the latest of several sites in the city 
center framed by western built forms.  With its western-style design, the station building 
mediated “civilization and enlightenment” and projected Japanese progress and 
modernity; as a rail depot, the station symbolized the national integration conveyed by 
the railway network; as the personal station of the emperor, it embodied the ideological 
unification manifested in the emperor system.5  Situated at the focus of the city’s road 
and rail transportation system, moreover, the central station tied the urban space of the 
city to the national rail network – a symbolic coupling of capital and countryside.  In this 
sense, Tokyo Station was the capstone of Meiji efforts of state-formation.  But it was also 
more than that; it was a building of empire to concretize Japanese empire-building, an 
empire-building to celebrate the building of empire as rail lines carried Japanese imperial 
influence from Tokyo via rail ferry to Korea, Manchuria, and beyond.  Tokyo Mayor 
Sakatani Yoshirō reflected on these multiple roles of the station in his celebratory address 
at the opening ceremony in 1914: “With such a magnificent scale and being the most 
grand of all the splendid buildings in the city, while still presenting an artistic effect of 
solemnly prostrating itself to the nearby imperial palace, Tokyo Station does not only live 
up to being the center of the national railways, but it is also Japan’s link to the world 
transportation network.”  “It is more than sufficient,” Sakatani proclaimed, “for being the 
                                                
5 This role of Tokyo Station in the state-formation of Tokyo is further explained in 
Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State Formation in Meiji Japan,” in Trains, 
Culture, and Mobility: Riding the Rails, ed. Benjamin Fraser and Steven D. Spalding 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 235-262.   
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pride of the imperial capital.”6  In saying this, Sakatani was only reaffirming what the 
crowds at the celebration already knew: Tokyo Station marked a space of empire.  
Like Tokyo Station itself, imperial space took several decades over the course of 
the Meiji Period to gradually emerge in the Imperial Capital.  Plans for an axial rail line 
through the city center connecting Tokyo’s northern and southern rail termini to a new 
“central station” had been a focal point of city-wide transportation infrastructure 
improvements first proposed in 1884.  But, at first glance, the lack in these early plans of 
any overt imperial symbolism like that seen at the opening ceremony thirty years later is 
striking; in fact, no mention is ever made of the central station being the main point of 
embarkation for the emperor or of the station containing a special entrance reserved for 
the imperial family.  Instead, the plans focused on the practical industrial and commercial 
benefits such a rail link and station would provide: allowing unimpeded rail transit and 
shipping between the two termini, and accelerating the movement of goods and materials 
from areas of manufacture in the north to merchants in the bustling Tokyo market and 
foreign traders in the port of Yokohama to the south.  Intentionally placed close to the 
prosperous commercial areas of Nihombashi, Kabutochō, and Kyōbashi to its east, the 
central station was originally intended to serve as a convenient loading and unloading 
point for the merchandise of the area’s storekeepers.  Because it was designed as a 
through station and not a terminal, it was hoped, the station could quickly service the 
trains and then let them continue on their way to destinations in the north or the south.   
                                                
6 Tokyo Metropolitan Archives, Doc.# 301.E4.9, Shi Dai 3-29(545-993), “Tōkyō 
Teishajō Kaijōshiki.  Kamio Katō ryōshōgun Kangeikai,” Slide 267. 
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Popular conceptions of both Tokyo Station and the urban space it framed, 
however, changed dramatically by the time of the opening ceremony of the station in 
1914.  The same can be said about the urban space of Tokyo.  Although planners had 
recognized Tokyo as the “Home of the Emperor” (Renkoku no Moto) as early as the 1872 
Ginza Bricktown project, there was less agreement on how this symbolic role of Tokyo 
should be mediated in the built form of the city.  Over the course of the 1880s, planners’ 
views of the imperial capital shifted from a functional space of streets and commercial 
prosperity, to a more monumental space of imperial power.  This chapter will chart the 
emergence of this imperial space in the imperial capital by examining how urban 
planners’ conceptions of public space changed over the course of the Meiji period 
through the lens of the evolving relationship between Tokyo Station and successive urban 
improvement plans.  This gradual shift is most visible in a series of competing urban 
improvement plans released over the decade of the 1880s that culminated in the 1888 
Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei), which produced the 
most significant urban reforms in the capital prior to the Imperial Capital Reconstruction 
Plan (Teito Fukkō Keikaku) following the massive 1923 Kantō Earthquake.  Close 
examination of these plans reveals three themes of Meiji-era Tokyo capital city planning.  
Firstly, there was a constant recognition after 1868 of Tokyo’s new role as the home of 
the emperor; that is to say, Tokyo’s new role consistently informed urban planning 
initiatives as planners called for improvements to the built form of the city in the name of 
its role as the Imperial Capital.  Secondly, the impact this recognition had on urban space 
changed over the course of the Meiji period, as the rhetoric of city planners’ views of the 
city changed.  What resulted was a symbiotic relationship between the gradually 
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elevating rhetoric that planners used to describe the city and the steadily increasing 
monumentality of their plans.  At first, planners in Tokyo during the 1880s considered 
commercial prosperity and economic function to be the requirements for international 
prestige.  As a result, they focused on street improvements, believing that quality streets 
would necessarily bring commerce and wealth.  Later, planners turned their attention to 
producing monumental spaces to project Japanese imperial power.  The third theme of 
Meiji-era planning was of the fluid relationship between the status of Tokyo on the 
national scale, and the involvement of Tokyo officials and residents in the planning of 
their own city.  As the rhetoric of Tokyo as the imperial capital elevated, the planning of 
the city passed from the more public local level to the national level, where it was 
dominated by central government planning committees.  Yet as more participants became 
involved in the planning process, it became clear that for any planning system to be 
effective it would have to respond to local needs while it advanced national goals. 
 The chapter will explicate these themes over 4 sections.  The first section 
discusses how and why urban planners in Tokyo in the 1880s saw streets in particular as 
the necessary groundwork for transforming Tokyo into a world-renowned Imperial 
Capital.  Not only would street improvements produce pleasant urban spaces to convey 
Japanese modernity, they would facilitate the mobility of people and products required 
for commercial prosperity and concomitant international prestige.  The second section 
deconstructs the planning discourse of the 1880s to demonstrate how planners gradually 
expanded their improvement gaze beyond streets to the city as a whole as they came to 
read the urban space of the capital in increasingly symbolic terms.  The third section 
traces the organic co-production of a more pragmatic and flexible planning system 
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emerging from a complicated mix of competing visions of Tokyo urban space and 
impulses for reform at both the national and local levels.  Finally, the fourth section 
closely examines Tokyo Station as a case study tangibly illustrating how each of these 
themes shaped the built environment of Imperial Capital Tokyo to frame imperial space.   
 
Infrastructure, Prosperity, and Prestige: Street Improvements in Meiji Tokyo 
One of the most common refrains among historians of urban planning in Japan is that 
mid-Meiji planning initiatives lacked “imperial symbolism” or a desire to make Tokyo 
into a capital suitable for empire.  Discussing a plan presented by Tokyo Governor 
Matsuda Michiyuki in 1880, for example, André Sorensen pointedly argues, “One final 
aspect of these early plans for the new capital that should be noted is that they displayed a 
revealing lack of concern for the symbolic project of creating a great imperial capital.”7  
What scholars see instead are transportation and infrastructure improvement programs 
focusing on economic growth and commercial function while disregarding the 
monumental urban aesthetics they would expect to see in European-style grand imperial 
capitals.  Shun’ichi J. Watanabe, for example, downplays the symbolism of the plans 
proposed in the 1880s, writing of the 1888 Tokyo Urban Planning Ordinance: “Japanese 
planners tend to consider this programme as Japan’s first modern planning, but it was 
only a large-scale, fairly systematic public works programme in the national’s capital.”8  
                                                
7 André Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the 
Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2002), 65. 
8 Shun’ichi J. Watanabe, “Planning History in Japan,” Urban History 7 (1980): 65.  A 
similar statement is made in Shun’ichi Watanabe, “Metropolitanism as a Way of Life: the 
Case of Tokyo, 1868-1930,” in Metropolis, 1890-1940, ed. by Anthony Sutcliffe 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 411. 
116 
 
In this vein, even the symbolic importance of the Ginza Bricktown has been belittled by 
scholars.  Takashi Fujitani, for instance, notes: “Yet Matsuda and those who had earlier 
directed the Ginza project had completely ignored the idea that the regime’s power 
should be represented on the face of the city, either by an imperial palace or other 
government buildings.  To be sure, the Ginza project had created a modern shopping 
district at the city’s gateway; but it stopped there.  And the core area in Matsuda’s plan – 
made up of Kanda, Nihombashi, Kyōbashi, and Shiba Wards along with a section of 
Asakusa Ward – was the center of the city’s economy, not of the national polity.”9  
Fujitani concludes by calling into question not only the foresight of Tokyo planners, but 
also their emphasis on infrastructure.  “Nevertheless, officials of Tokyo’s prefectural 
government acted as if they were unaware of how urgent the city’s reconstruction was; 
and they still had no concrete designs,” Fujitani writes, “Instead, they set about 
constructing waterways, gas lines, railways, and bridges in a piecemeal fashion with no 
overall plan.”10 
 Such criticism of the lack of monumentality in early plans for Tokyo overlooks an 
important point about urban planning in the mid-Meiji period.  Tokyo planners from as 
early as 1872 did indeed consistently speak in terms of Tokyo’s role as the imperial 
capital as the main reason for implementing urban reforms; the difference was that these 
planners did not believe entirely that a “regime’s power should be represented on the face 
of the city, either by an imperial palace or other government buildings” as Fujitani 
maintains.  Instead, based on their observations of the western capital cities during the 
                                                
9 Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 72. 
10 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 72. 
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Iwakura Mission, urban planners during the mid-Meiji steadfastly believed that a 
“regime’s power” would be represented not only by an imperial palace or government 
buildings, but by its commercial prosperity.  Visiting capitals such Paris, London, and 
Washington D.C. from 1871 to 1873, Meiji government leaders learned firsthand that 
what made Western capitals “grand” was not only their aesthetics but also their economic 
function.  The diary of the Mission kept by scribe Kume Kunitake, reveals that the 
Mission members quickly recognized a triangular relationship between the built 
environment, economic function, and international prestige of the city.  “Paris is thus the 
market-place for all the countries of Europe,” Kume transcribed, “it is revered far and 
wide as the pinnacle of urban elegance...France has always been held in respect 
throughout Europe with Paris as the hub of civilisation [sic].”11 
 Aware of this connection between streets, prosperity, and prestige, Tokyo 
planners throughout the late 1870s and 1880s emphasized street improvements as the 
main component of increasingly comprehensive urban reforms.  For them, Tokyo as the 
“greatest capital in Asia” did not mean a grandiose capital with wide-open plazas, 
lavishly opulent public architecture, or grand urban design; it meant a bustling city that 
was commercially vibrant and economically prosperous.  They believed international 
prestige would directly derive from and immediately follow the economic prosperity 
generated by improved transportation and infrastructure.  
                                                
11 Kume Kunitake, The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-1873: A True Account of the 
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary's Journey of Observation Through the 
United States of America and Europe, ed. Graham Healey and Chūshiki Tzuzuki 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 3:42. 
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Perhaps the best example of how this conceptual link between transportation 
infrastructure, economic function, and international prestige shaped urban planning 
thought in mid-Meiji Tokyo was the 1884 Urban Improvement Statement presented by 
Tokyo Governor Yoshikawa.12  Commissioned by Governor Yoshikawa and drawn up by 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute-trained civil engineer Haraguchi Kaname13, this so-
                                                
12 The entire plan is reproduced in Fujimori Terunobu, ed., Tōkyō Toshi Keikaku Shiryō 
Shūsei (Meiji Taishō hen)[Collection of Tokyo urban planning documents (the Meiji and 
Taisho periods)], vol. 30 (Tokyo: Hon no Tomosha, 1988), and with annotations in 
Fujimori Terunobu, ed., Toshi Kenchiku [Cities and architecture](Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1990), 60-85. 
13 Born in 1851 in Nagasaki, Haraguchi had entered the Daigaku Nankō – a forerunner of 
the University of Tokyo – in 1870 to study English, before being selected as one of 
several promising students to pursue an education overseas.  Both Fujimori and Mikuriya 
mistakenly identify Haraguchi’s school in the United States as “Troy University.”  See: 
Fujimori Terunobu, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku [Urban Planning of Meiji Tokyo](Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1982), 121; and Mikuriya Takashi, Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru (Tokyo: 
Fujiwara Shoten, 2007), 337.  In actuality, Haraguchi entered Rensselaer in 1875 along 
with Hirai Seijirō (later Railway Bureau Chief) and Matsumoto Sōichirō (later railway 
engineer).  A history of Rensselaer notes: “There were also three Japanese students, all in 
the class of 1876, although only one, Souichiro Matsmoto [sic] of Ogaki, actually 
graduated in 1876, at twenty-five years of age, the first of his nationality to do so. Two 
other Japanese students, Haraguchi and Hirai [Seijiro], graduated in the class of 1878, 
from among others who dropped out.”  See: Samuel Rezneck, Education for a 
Technological Society: A Sesquicentennial History of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
(Troy, NY: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1968), 179-180.   
Upon graduating with a civil engineering degree in June 1878 after submitting his 
graduation thesis, “Review of the Pumping Engines and boilers of the Albany City Water 
Works for raising water from the Hudson River to Bleeker Reservoir,” Haraguchi led a 
distinguished career as a civil engineer employed in bridge and railway construction.  
Haraguchi apprenticed on a water system improvement project in Troy, NY, a sewer 
reconstruction project in New Haven, CT, and the construction of the Brooklyn Bridge in 
New York City, NY.  Perhaps because of his work on the Brooklyn Bridge, Haraguchi 
was hired as an assistant engineer by the Delaware Bridge Company in New York in 
September 1878, where he was said to have been involved in the designing of almost 30 
bridges.  Haraguchi was then transferred to the company’s steelworks in Pittsburgh, PA 
where he oversaw steel production for several bridges of his own design.  While in 
Pittsburg, Haraguchi caught the attention of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, who 
hired him away from the Delaware Bridge Company in September 1879 to direct the 
surveying and construction of an extension of the company’s West Chester Branch.  US 
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Census records for 1880 find one 23-year old civil engineer named Haraguchi Kaname 
here, registered in Tredyffrin, Chester, Pennsylvania in the house of Daniel J. Lucas, also 
listed as a civil engineer in the same census records.  Incidentally, an 18-year old civil 
engineer named “Taro Ishigro” [sic] is listed in the same 1880 census in Tredyffrin, but at 
a different household.  An “Ishigro Taro” [sic] also graduated with a civil engineering 
degree from Rensselaer in 1881.  Resigning in June 1880 following the completion of the 
West Chester Branch line, Haraguchi embarked on a four-month survey of England, the 
Netherlands, France, and Germany.  Haraguchi then returned to Tokyo in October 1880, 
where, according to an 1887 official history of Rensselaer alumni, he was named “city 
engineer of Tokio, Japan, in charge of general public works of the metropolis and its 
suburbs” in November 1880.  He was then promoted to chairman of the Investigation 
Board in 1883, where he spent the next two years “for the purposes of investigating 
improvements, surveying [the city] in extreme detail and drafting a plan demarcating the 
positioning of the urban areas,” in addition to sounding the harbor, planning road, river, 
and canal improvements, and designing new bridges.  Reflecting the importance of his 
role in drafting plans for the city, by May 1883, Haraguchi was promoted to a “consulting 
engineer” for the city of Tokyo, a position he held while simultaneously serving as 
Railway Bureau “assistant commissioner and civil engineer” in charge of the Tokyo-
Yokohama trunk line.  Later, in August 1884, Haraguchi was again promoted to “general 
superintendent of public works” for Tokyo, and was awarded the ceremonial Junior Sixth 
Court Rank (Jūrokui).  Moreover, his efforts garnered a “reward for services rendered” 
(irōkin) of ¥200-worth of chirimen kimono silk crepe, nominated by then-Tokyo 
Governor Takasaki Goroku in May 1886.  In his endorsement of the reward, Home 
Minister Yamagata poetically lauded Haraguchi especially for “braving the wind and the 
waves, undeterred by neither cold nor heat” in surveying the harbor. 
This short biography of Haraguchi is compiled from a number of sources: KDL: 
Hanabusa Yoshitarō and Yamamoto Genta, Nihon Hakushi Zenden (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 
1892), 267-268; J.M. Rhoads, Stepping Forth Into the World: The Chinese Education 
Mission to the United States, 1872-81 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 
128; and Henry B. Nason, ed., Biographical Record of the Officers and Graduates of the 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1824-1886 (Troy, NY: William H. Young, 1887), 485-
486.  Finally, an 1881 directory lists Haraguchi, along with fellow engineer and future 
Railway Minister Sengoku Mitsugu, amongst the “Official Appointees, Associate Junior 
Officials” (Goyō-gakari Jun-hannin).  See: KDL: Tōkyō-fu, Tōkyō-fu Shokuinroku, Meiji 
14-nen 1-gatsu kaisei [Tokyo municipal government personnel directory, revised January 
1881](Tokyo: Tōkyō-fu, 1895), 18-19.  Nason lists the date of Haraguchi’s promotion as 
May 1883, while NDL “Tetsudō Shōgichō Haraguchi Kaname” records April.  A May 
1883 directory reflects the promotion, listing Haraguchi as a Goyō-gakari with the title 
“Vice-Chief Engineer of the Public Works Ministry” (Kōbu Shōgichō) on the first page 
for the first time, rather than among a longer list towards the back of the directory.  The 
May 1883 directory is also the first to include the recently appointed Governor 
Yoshikawa.  See: KDL: Tōkyō-fu, Tōkyō-fu Shokuinroku, Meiji 16-nen 5-gatsu kaisei 
[Tokyo municipal government personnel directory, revised May 1883](Tokyo: Tōkyō-fu, 
1895), 1.  Haraguchi’s new court ranking is included for the first time in the April 1884, 
Tokyo personnel directory.  See: JACAR, Ref.#: A09054357200, “Shokuinroku Meiji 
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called Yoshikawa Plan was informed by dissatisfaction with the existing transportation 
system resulting from the urban legacy of Edo and the premature cancellation of the 
Ginza Bricktown.  Because the forerunner of Tokyo, Edo, had been originally designed 
as the Tokugawa Shogun’s castle town, Yoshikawa described in the plan, “most places 
[in the city] became points of defense.”  “As for the planning of the urban areas,” he 
continued, “other than certain individual places, this was neglected as if it was not been 
paid any attention at all.  For this reason, the urban blocks were narrow and the roads 
meandering, making the passage of vehicles inconvenient.  At the time, this made for a 
strategic location, but those things that were called benefits [at the time] have all today 
become disadvantages and inconveniences.”14  This situation was exacerbated, 
Yoshikawa explained, by the coming of Western civilization.  “As Western civilization 
has recently gradually spread eastwards, reaching a today where carriages, rickshaws, 
telegraphs, and horse-powered trolleys travel in abundance,” Yoshikawa argued, “the 
previously existing roads have already become unbearably narrow and crowded; the 
passing pedestrians only exacerbate the extreme danger, tripping this way and that, likely 
                                                                                                                                            
Jūnana-nen Shi-gatsu Shokuinroku Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; April 
1884; revised personnel directory (Tokyo municipal government)].  For awards for 
Haraguchi, see NAJ, “Tetsudō Shōgichō Haraguchi Kaname Tōkyō-fu Goyō-gakari 
kenmu-chū doboku kōji wo kantoku shi shiku torishirabe iinchō to nari koto-ni 
Shinagawa chikkō ni jūji benrei ni tsuki irōhin wo kashi su” [Rewards to be bestowed 
upon assistant railway engineer Haraguchi Kaname for supervising public construction 
projects while appointed to the Tokyo municipal government and especially for diligent 
service concerning the Shingawa port as chairperson of the urban improvement board].  
Call #: honkan-2A-011-00; rui00254100; Doc.# 15; Microfilm reel #003400; slides 
#0888-0891). 
14 Yoshikasa made these statements in the first meeting of the Tokyo Urban Improvement 
Committee.  See TTKSS, 1:1 back-2 front. 
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to be trampled under foot by a horse carriage.”15  Planners had attempted to alleviate 
these problems in the Ginza Bricktown, Yoshikawa noted, but the project’s termination 
meant that problems remained.  The Ginza Bricktown was the “starting point (kōshi) of 
street improvements in the capital,” Yoshikawa acknowledged, but “because it just 
addressed temporary local needs and did not come from a plan extended to the entire city, 
the roads are still uneven, winding, and confusing.”  Yoshikawa furthermore criticized 
the piecemeal fire reconstruction efforts seen after the Bricktown as “makeshift” and 
“nothing more than sectionalized construction projects (ikkyokubu no kōji ni tomari).”  
What was needed Yoshikawa concluded, was a plan “to improve the city as a whole.”16 
With this dissatisfaction in mind, Yoshikawa’s first priority in the Urban Planning 
Statement was to develop a systematic program for improving the city’s entire 
transportation network in order to facilitate mobility in the capital for both goods and 
people.17  To accomplish this, the Yoshikawa Plan proposed wide-scale street 
improvements along with the digging of 15 new rivers and canals, the building of 4 new 
bridges, the laying of a new railway through the city center from Shimbashi to Ueno, and 
the construction of a new central railway station.  Of these, street improvements were by 
far the biggest component.  To alleviate traffic problems, the Plan called for the widening 
                                                
15 TTKSS, 30:1 front-1 back.  For “sprouting” comment, see TTKSS, 1, 2 front. 
16 TTKSS, 30:1 back, 3 back. 
17 As Yoshikawa later explained, “I quickly realized that there was not a single day to 
neglect for [carrying out] these reforms, and I immediately ordered subordinates to first 
start with a survey of the highs and lows of the city’s topography and then to finally draft 
an Urban Planning Statement,” (TTKSS, 30, 1 back-2 front).  As Fujimori Terunobu 
notes, this “subordinates” appears to be referring to Harguchi Kaname (Fujimori, ed., 
Toshi Kenchiku, 61).  But as will be discussed later, based on statements made during 
later committee meetings, it appears that Tokyo municipal engineer Itō Masanobu played 
a substantial role in the development of at least the road plans. 
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and straightening, or occasional clearing, of at least 42 roads (lower class roads were said 
to be “too numerous to list each individually”) for a total of 956,843.81 tsubo or about 
780 acres of new street surfaces.18  Routes of 5 different classes – with class 1 roads split 
into type-1 and type-2 – formed a network comprised of streets with widths of 90, 72, 60,  
48, 36, and 24 feet (See Table 1).   
 
As Haraguchi described, the basis for the widest of these roads was the Ginza 
Main Street, improved during the Ginza Bricktown project.19  In order to prevent traffic 
accidents, all but the two narrowest classes of roads would be outfitted with sidewalks 
dividing the uses of the street between vehicles and pedestrians.  Whereas wider 
sidewalks and trees planted directly in the roadbed impeded vehicle lanes on Ginza Main 
Street, Haraguchi and Tokyo public works official Itō Masanobu20 explained, in the 
                                                
18 TTKSS, 30:16 back; also 41-front for calculations.  One tsubo is equivalent is 3.31 
square meters, or 3.95 square yards. 
19 TTKSS, 31:24 back. 
20 Itō was a rising star in the Tokyo municipal government.  His name first appears in 
archival records as a mid-level kendaizoku official of the Tokyo government from the 
fourth month of 1872, shortly after the Ginza fire.  See: JACAR, Ref.#: A09054279200, 
“Shokuinroku Meiji go-nen roku-gatsu kan’in zenshokai [Tōkyō-fu]” [Personel 
directories; June 1872; all personnel directories revised].  As seen in succeeding Tokyo 
government directories, Itō rose steadily through the ranks of Tokyo officials, achieving 
Ninth Class (kyūtōzoku) by 1876, Third Class (santōzoku) by 1877, Second Class 
(nitōzoku) by 1879, and First Class (ittōzoku) by 1881, a position he held until 1885.  See 
Table 1: Street Widths Proposed in the Yoshikawa Plan 
Class Street Width Vehicle Lane Width Sidewalk Width # of Routes 
1A 15 ken (~90 ft.) 9 ken (~54 ft.) 3 ken (~18 ft.) 1 
1B 12 ken (~72 ft.) 7 ken (~42 ft.) 2.5 ken (~15ft.) 9 
2 10 ken (~60ft) 6 ken (~36ft.) 2 ken (~12ft.) 22 
3 8 ken (~48ft) 5 ken (~30ft.) 1.5 ken (~9ft.) 10 
4 6 ken (~36ft.) 6 ken (~36ft.) N/A ??? 
5 4 ken (~24ft.) 4 ken (~24ft.) N/A ??? 
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Yoshikawa Plan vehicle lanes would be widened and given precedence in the name of 
mobility.21  Additionally, rails for horse-powered trolleys (basha tetsudō) could be laid on 
roads of 48 feet or wider, with double tracking permitted on streets of at least 72 feet.   
                                                                                                                                            
personnel directores for 1876 (JACAR A09054289500); for 1877 (JACAR 
A09054292200); for 1878 (JACAR A09054299200); for 1879 (JACAR A09054305400); 
for 1880 (JACAR A09054315000); for 1881 (JACAR A09054326400); for 1882 
(JACAR A09054336800); for 1883 (JACAR A09054345400); and for 1884 (JACAR 
A09054357200).  While the directories do not indicate the position held by each official, 
it is clear that Itō was head of the Tokyo government Public Works Department (Doboku-
ka) during the time the Asakusa Kuramae road improvement projects were carried out in 
1883 from a discussion in the Urban Improvement Committee in which Yoshikawa 
deferred to “the head of the Public Works Department at that time, namely [committee 
member] #18 [Itō],” (See TTKSS, 1:36 front).  Perhaps it was this position he held when 
brought in as a special guest (bangai) on the Tokyo Fifteen Ward Assembly Special 
Committee (Tōkyō Jūgo-ku Rinji Iinkai) convened by Governor Matsuda in 1881 to 
discuss improvements to Kanda Hashimotochō, one of Tokyo’s most notorious slums 
during the Meiji period, after it had been destroyed by fire in January 1881.  The 
transcript from the first meeting of this special committee indicates that Itō was often 
called upon to provide information on the intent of the plan and to provide detailed 
information on the physical conditions of the affected area (The transcript for this 
meeting is reproduced in Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 7-36).  By January 1883, Itō also 
served as Executive Secretary (kanji) of the Fire Prevention Architecture Survey Board 
(Bōka Kenchiku Chōsa Iinkyoku) formed by Governor Yoshikawa in September 1881 
(For the establishment of this Board, see: TSS, vol. 65 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1973), 
518-519; for the final report from the Board listing Itō as kanji, see TSS, vol.  67 (Tokyo: 
Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1975), 144-145).  As a result of his long career in the Tokyo 
government and involvement in these planning efforts, Itō was eventually promoted to 
president of Nihombashi Ward, and served in that role from August 1885 until November 
1891.  See: Tōkyō Nihombashi Kuyakusho, ed., Shinshū Nihombashi Kushi [Revised 
History of Nihombashi Ward](Tokyo: Tōkyō-shi Nihombashiku, 1937), 2:50.  
Meanwhile, Itō sat on the Examination Committee in 1885 as a municipal government 
official before being named Nihombashi president later that year.  While on the 
Examination Committee, the committee often looked to Haraguchi, Itō, and fellow Tokyo 
public works engineer Watanabe Takashi, to provide descriptions and explanations for 
the details of the Yoshikawa plan. 
21 As Itō explained:  
It is extremely desirable for roads to be wide, and so from the beginning 
the roads were planned to be as wide as possible.  But for financing 
purposes, finally the current Ginza Main Street was made the basis.  
However, as we all know, because the Ginza Main Street today has wide 
sidewalks, the vehicle lane is even narrower, so in this plan the sidewalks 
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By eliminating the traffic congestion strangling the economy through these street 
improvements, Yoshikawa believed, Tokyo would freely grow into a commercially 
prosperous capital.  “Before we know it,” he explained in his 1884 plan, “we can expect 
[Tokyo] to exhibit a magnificent and splendid sight...one where the urban areas are 
organized and the streets are flat so that pedestrians going and vehicles coming do not run 
into each other, so that horses galloping and cows running do not injure each other, and 
where thousands of customers gather and hundreds of kinds of goods converge.”  In other 
words, he concluded, “[a Tokyo] that will become the greatest capital in Asia.”22 
Following the Yoshikawa Plan, Tokyo planners not only continued to focus on 
street improvements as the main component of urban planning, they subsequently 
expanded Yoshikawa’s envisioned network.  Taking up the issue in 1885, the Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Examination Committee (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Shinsakai) increased 
both the number of routes improved and the width of each road class after a debate that 
saw support for wider streets from aesthetic, military, and hygienic perspectives.  
Arguing for Western-style aesthetics, for example, Kusaka Yoshio recalled from his time 
in Europe as a member of the Iwakura Mission, “Roads in Berlin are 65 meters, which is 
equivalent to 36-ken, 1-shaku...Even if we do not make them exactly like in London or 
                                                                                                                                            
will be changed to 3-ken making the vehicle lane 9-ken...Actually, we 
tried to make all Class 1 roads 15 ken wide, but considering the sound 
produced in the back streets, and considering actual implementation, we 
made Class 1.2 12-ken, and Class 2 10-ken.  When it came to rejection or 
adoption in the end we leaned towards frugality. 
To this, Haraguchi added: “Currently the trees are planted in the roadways, but now the 
idea is to put them in the sidewalks, so the roads will be 6-shaku (6 feet) wider,” (TTKSS, 
31:26 front). 
22 TTKSS, 30:9 back. 
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Paris, as long as we are improving roads we must make their scale as large as possible.”23  
Enthusiastically agreeing with this idea was Mishima Michitsune, the former Tokyo 
Chief Councilor (Kensanji) who had played an integral role in the Ginza Bricktown.  
Now head of the Home Ministry Public Works Bureau (Doboku-kyoku), Mishima 
seconded the idea for widening streets in Tokyo, because “today we all feel the 
narrowness of [Ginza Main Street].”  As Mishima suggested, Tokyo’s streets should be 
widened to a scale “like those in London and Paris.”24  Army gunnery colonel Kuroda 
Hisataka, meanwhile, noted that wider roads would make it easier for the military to 
move artillery through the streets.25  Home Ministry secretary Sakurai Tsutomu added, 
“As our Japan gradually advances in civilization, making improvements in all sorts of 
things – such as hygiene and military – having wider roads has many conveniences.”26  
Iwakura Mission member and German-trained hygiene expert Nagayo Sensai concurred, 
confirming Sakurai’s point about hygiene.  Arguing that wider streets would lead to the 
elimination of back-alley tenements, Nagayo pleaded: “it would be terrible for the 
backstreets to become full of small tinderbox (hiuchi bako) houses that act as factories of 
infectious diseases after the urban improvements, just like with the Brick Street.”27  The 
only opposition to the idea was voiced by the practical Shibusawa Eiichi, who cautioned, 
“not wanting [Tokyo] to be inferior to London or Paris is completely natural, but not 
                                                
23 TTKSS, 31:21 front. 
24 TTKSS, 31:22 front. 
25 TTKSS, 31:25 front-25 back. 
26 TTKSS, 31:27 back. 
27 TTKSS, 31:28 front. 
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everything can be exactly like in those countries.”28  Despite Shibusawa’s objections, the 
Committee voted29 to increase street widths to 120, 90, 72, 60, 48, and 36 feet.  In order 
to keep the vehicle lanes as wide as possible, sidewalks all retained their previous widths.  
Whereas the Yoshikawa Plan had listed 37 routes for improvement, the Examination 
Committee specified 148 (See Table 2). 
 
The number of routes in the improved street network was increased even further 
under the auspices of the 1888 Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance.  Released by the 
Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee the next year in 1889, the so-called “Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Plans” (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Sekkei) outlined the building or 
widening of 316 streets along with a number of other infrastructural improvements such 
as the digging or improving of 30 canals and rivers, the connection of the northern and 
southern rail termini, and the construction of a “central station” as called for in 
Yoshikawa’s original plan (Figure 7).  When increasing financial difficulties threatened 
                                                
28 TTKSS, 31:23 front. 
29 All Committee decisions were made by simple majority vote.  Mishima’s proposal to 
widen roads passed 7 votes to 6, with Masuda presumably casting the deciding vote.  The 
records do not indicate who voted which direction.  Inoue, Yamazaki, and Sawa were 
absent from the Second Meeting and so did not tally a vote.  Yoshikawa, as Chairman, 
did not cast a vote.  Based on their statements, it can be surmised that those approving 
Mishima’s proposal included: Mishima, Kusaka, Nagayo, Sakurai, Itō, Kuroda, and 
Masuda.  This would leave Ozawa, Shinagawa, Onoda, Watanabe, Haraguchi, and 
Shibusawa as the naysayers.   
Table 2: Street Widths Proposed in the Examination Committee Plan 
Class Street Width Vehicle Lane Width Sidewalk Width # of Routes 
1A 20 ken (~120ft.) 14 ken (~84 ft.) 3 ken (~18 ft.) 9 
1B 15 ken (~90ft.) 10 ken (~60ft.) 2.5 ken (~15ft.) 19 
2 12 ken (~72ft.) 8 ken (~48ft.) 2 ken (~12ft.) 21 
3 10 ken (~60ft.) 7 ken (~42 ft.) 1.5 ken (~9ft.) 61 
4 8 ken (~48ft.) 5 ken (~30ft.) 1.5 ken (~9ft.) 38 
5 6 ken (~36ft.) 6 ken (~36ft.) N/A ??? 
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to disrupt the projects, the Improvement Committee responded by identifying the 
improvements requiring immediate completion in the “New Tokyo Urban Improvement 
Plans (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Shin-sekkei)” announced in 1903 (Figure 8).  In effect, this 
New Plan was a dramatic scaling-back of the Old Plans meant to expedite new projects.  
As a result, the number of roads designated for improvements was reduced from 316 in 
the Old Plans to 86 in the New; river and moat improvements from 30 to only 7; and 
parks from 49 to 22, while the overall land area of markets, crematoriums, and cemeteries 
changed only slightly.  Later, 37 more routes were added, raising the number marked for 
improvements to 123.30   
Implementation of street improvements had commenced in the meantime in 1888, 
working from areas that saw the most traffic jams or that had been destroyed by fire 
while trying to fit in as much construction work as the annual budget would allow.  As a 
result of these constraints, the order of projects was necessarily opportunistic and 
unsystematic, and did not appear to follow any consistent or designated policy.  
Nevertheless, perusal of construction records shows that projects were at first mainly 
focused around the more crowded, northeastern “Shitamachi” neighborhoods of the city, 
especially Kanda, Ueno, and Asakusa, before later rotating counter-clockwise around the 
imperial palace to the upland “Yamanote” areas of Ushigome, Yotsuya, and Akasaka.31  
Projects for the most part consisted of the widening and straightening of existing streets 
according to their designated class in order to alleviate traffic and improve commercial 
circulation by making streetlines more uniform, eliminating traffic bottlenecks, and 
                                                
30 TTKSS, 33:1-2, 103-112. 




clearing access to bridgeheads (See examples in Figures 9-10).  This entailed the 
expropriation of necessary street-front properties and the removal of obstructing 
buildings in order to clear land for the new roadbeds.  Procedures for the acquisition of 
private property were set by law in 1889, designating the Home Minister as final arbiter 
of purchase price in case of disagreements between the landowner and the Tokyo 
government.  As Suzuki and Ishida have demonstrated, this law was based on the 1852 
décret that cleared rights-of-way for Haussmann’s famous Parisian boulevards.32   
Once rights-of-way had been secured, construction of the modern streetscape 
could begin.  The attention planners paid to improving both the function and aesthetics of 
the street indicates that street improvements were not meant merely as a public works 
program.  Rather, by producing streetscapes that were functionally efficacious and 
aesthetically pleasing, planners sought to improve both the commercial activity and 
outward appearance of the capital.  As Chairman Yoshikawa reminded Home Minister 
Yamagata in an 1890 petition for placing electrical wires underground, “While it goes 
without saying that the main purpose of the urban improvement projects is to facilitate 
shipping and transportation, the projects must at the same time garnish the beauty of the 
                                                
32 This law was the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Land and Building Disposition 
Codes (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Tochi Tatemono Shobun Kisoku).  See: JACAR, Ref.#: 
A03020033999, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji nijūni nen, Chokurei dai go-gō, Tōkyō Shiku 
Kaisei Tochi Tatemono Shobun Kisoku” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1889, 
Imperial Ordinance No.5, Tokyo Urban Improvement Land and Building Disposition 
Regulations].  For background and analysis of this law, see: Suzuki Eiki and Ishida 
Yorifusa, “Tōkyō Shikukaisei Tochi Tatemono Shobun Kisoku no Seiritsu ni tsuite” 
[Concerning the establishment Tokyo Urban Improvement Land and Building 




central capital (chūō tofu) with ornamentation.”33  Because the built environment was 
seen as the most immediate indicator of civilization, it was not enough to merely widen 
and straighten urban streets.  Instead, it was important that streets convey progress and 
modernity equally through their quality, orderliness, and appearance.  This added new 
importance to the otherwise taken-for-granted peripheral structures and fixtures of the 
street – surface pavement, sidewalks, roadside trees, curbs, gutters, sewers, manholes, 
streetlights, electric and gas poles, telephone and telegraph wires – all of which were 
accordingly placed under the planning purview of the Tokyo Urban Improvement 
Committee.34  In constructing the street surface, for example, after laying subterranean 
sewer, water, and electrical pipes where called for, workers paved street surfaces either in 
crushed stone (saiseki) using an adaption of the Telford and Macadam paving techniques, 
or in “normal gravel” depending on road class.35  Tests carried out on Babasakimon Street 
in 1883 had determined this macadamized “crushed stone” paving material to provide the 
hardest, most durable, and most pleasant street surface.  This method was adopted as the 
standard pavement for improved streets in Tokyo until the Taisho Period, when the city 
                                                
33 TTKSS, 3:76 back. 
34 For example, the Police Bureau had retained jurisdiction over street use, including 
construction and fixtures, since the Tokyo urban street regulations (gairo torishimari 
kisoku) were codified in 1878.  Upon petition by the Tokyo Urban Improvement 
Committee in 1890, the Police Bureau agreed that any requests to erect electric poles 
should be negotiated with the Urban Improvement Committee (For Committee discussion 
of electric poles see TTKSS, 3:65 front-66 back; for Police Bureau response see TTKSS, 
3:101 front-101 back). 
35 Itō Masanobu, mayor (ku-chō) of Nihombashi Ward at the time and former head of the 
Tokyo Public Works (Doboku) Department, explained road construction techniques in 
the second meeting of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee on October 8th, 1888.  
In response to a question concerning the different costs associated with each class of 
road, Itō explained that the cost differential was because the classes had different 
construction methods (TTKSS, 1:28 back). 
130 
 
undertook another series of paving projects to convert crushed stone into more modern 
paving materials, such as concrete, wood blocks, brick, and asphalt.36  Only after the 
                                                
36 The Tokyo city government had used central government funds to conduct surface 
paving tests ten years before the completion of the Mitsubishi Ichigō-kan and the start of 
the famous “One Block London” in the same area.  The city tested several different 
paving materials and techniques: concrete, gravel mixed with cement or lime, and 
crushed stone.  Results showed that macadamized crushed stone provided the hardest and 
most sturdy surface, and was also the simplest technique.  Crushed stone was then 
adopted for surface improvements to be carried out in 1885 on all streets designated as 
“main routes.”  A survey to determine which route should be paved first settled on 
Asakusa Kuramae Street, from the foot of the Suga Bridge (Sugabashi) to Hachimanchō 
(Kuramae 1-chōme today), because the road averaged a width of 12 ken, lacked sewers, 
and would be the easier project.  Before construction, engineers travelled to Yokohama to 
observe the macadamized Bashamichi Road constructed in the Foreign Settlement.  A 
Tokyo Public Works Department summary of the Asakusa project summarized the 
lessons learned from the observation of Bashamichi Road: “The so-called “macadamized 
street” is a perfect [paving] method, yet the quality of the stones (produced in Zushū 
[Izu]) is not what would be called ‘hard’.  As a result, while it is convenient for making 
for a pleasant walk, in places where vehicular traffic is extremely busy there is much 
wear and tear, making the economic advantages and disadvantages irreconcilable,” (TSS, 
vol. 69 [Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1977], 453).  Applying these observations to the 
crushed stone technique tested at Babasakimon, engineers constructed the Asakusa 
Kuramae Street road surface by laying a foundation of 3 sun (~15cm.) of broken stone 
(wariguri-ishi), hardening it with iron rollers, then laying 2 sun (~6cm.) of broken stone 
on top and hardening it once more with iron rollers.  See: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. Tōkyō-
shi Dōro-shi [Records of Tokyo Roads](Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1939), 290-291.  
Because components for the necessary steamrollers were not available in Japan, they had 
to be procured from the United States at great expense (TSS, vol. 70 [Tokyo: Tōkyō 
Shiyakusho, 1977], 504).  Some sources record that the road surface was a total of 6 sun, 
of which 5 sun was hard stone, and the top 1 sun was loosely spread crushed stone 
manufactured by prison labor at the Ishikawajima Prison.  For more on this prison, 
including information on inmate labor, see Daniel Botsman, Punishment and Power in 
the Making of Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).  Sewers were 
also installed in between the pedestrian sidewalks and vehicle lanes (TSS, vol. 69, 453).  
This technique was made the standard for all new or repaired state roads by the 1886 
Home Ministry Road Construction Guidelines (Home Ministry Instructions #13, 
5/8/1886).  See: Ishii Ichirō, Nihon ni okeru dōro gijutsu no hattatsu [Development of 
road technology in Japan](Tokyo: Kokusai Rengō Daigaku, 1979), 20; Tōkyō 
Shiyakusho, ed. Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 30-31; Nihon Dōro Kyōkai, Nihon Dōro-shi 
[History of Japanese roads](Tokyo: Nihon Dōro Kyōkai, 1977), 342, 354, 1072.  
Presumably, this same method was then used to construct and pave the road surfaces for 
at least the first class roads of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Projects.  Most roads in the 
city, however, remained gravel.  It was not until 1910 that the city undertook surface 
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street surface had been completed would sidewalks, stone curbs, drainage ditches, and 
roadside trees be installed as stipulated in the plans.37  Overall, all 123 streets slated for 
improvements were completed, for a total of approximately 109 miles.38  In addition, 
nearly 50 miles of sidewalks and 6,448 roadside sakura cherry, willow, maple, oak, 
paulownia trees to “garnish the beauty of the city” were installed by 1905.39  
With this emphasis on streets over the course of the Meiji period, it is not 
surprising that expenses for urban improvements over the 30 years of the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement projects from 1888 to 1918 were dominated by costs associated with street 
improvement costs.  According to the calculations of Ishida Yorifusa, of the approximate 
total 42.1 million yen spent on the projects, street improvements accounted for nearly 26 
million (61.7%) of all expenses.  Of this amount, 24.5 million yen went to the purchase of 
land and the removal of existing structures, with the remaining 1.5 million yen funding 
                                                                                                                                            
improvement projects to convert gravel roads to more durable broken stone.  Even then, 
not until the mid Taisho-period did Tokyo start to see widespread paving in concrete, 
wood blocks, asphalt, and brick; eventually, 3/5ths of the city had been paved with such 
materials by 1939 (Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 149, 292-293). 
37 As stipulated in the plans, brick-paved sidewalks lined all streets in Classes 1-3, and 
stone sewers were installed in the gutters between the vehicle lanes and the sidewalks.  
Class 4 and 5 roads had sidewalks only if the local topography permitted.  See: TTKSS, 
1:28-back; and Tōkyō-shi, ed., Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 149, 292-293. 
38 TTKSS, 32:1 front-back; Tōkyō-shi, ed. Tōkyō-shi Dōro-shi, 141. 
39 The 1899 “Bylaws for the Planting of Roadside Trees” (Tokyo City Council Resolution 
#14341) stipulated that only sakura cherry, willow, maple, oak, paulownia, and other 
trees that “garnish the beauty of the city” (shigai no bikan wo soeru)” would be allowed 
along streets.  Bylaws specified that trees should be spaced every 3 to 5 ken (~20-50ft.), 
planted using city funds on sidewalks over 2 ken (~12ft.), and placed in the gutters of the 
sidewalks.  With these bylaws in place, by 1905, 6,448 sakura cherry, willow, maple, 
pine and other trees had been planted in Tokyo.  See: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, ed. Tōkyō-shi 
Dōro-shi, 453-455; and Nihon Dōro Kyōkai, Nihon Dōro-shi, 359. 
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actual construction.40  The rest of the outlay was split among the fresh water system 
(22.7%), sewer system (6.8%), canals (4.5%), rivers and moats (3.6%), bridges (0.6%), 
and finally parks (0.1%).41  From these statistics, Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa 
concur that the emphasis on street improvements system was for purely political 
purposes, namely “for improving the urban area in Tokyo into the Imperial Capital 
appropriate to the Meiji State.”42   
As Yoshikawa’s aspirations for the city suggest, despite their focus on systematic 
transportation improvements, planners in no way disregarded Tokyo’s imperial 
significance.  Instead, it was through transportation improvements that they attempted to 
make Tokyo into a capital appropriate for nation and emperor.  To reiterate, Japanese 
visitors to Paris on the Iwakura Mission had been just as impressed with its commercial 
function as the “market-place of Europe1” and “hub of civilization” as they had been 
with the aesthetics of its famous urban visages.  Therefore, when planners in the mid-
Meiji period imagined imperial capital Tokyo, they envisioned a city that was renowned 
first and foremost for its commercial prosperity and only secondly for its monumentality.  
Street improvements in particular were seen as an efficient way to accomplish both, as 
improved street infrastructure would expedite circulation while also beautifying the city.   
 
 
                                                
40 TTKSS, 33, page 5 of prefatory “Tōkyō-shikukaisei Jigyō Seiseki Gaiyō,” and 132-133. 
41 Ishida Yorifusa, Nihon Kingendai Toshi Keikaku no Tenkai: 1868-2003 [Development 
of Modern Japanese Urban Planning] (Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 2004), 64. 
42 Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa, “Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan and Its Urban 
Development,” in Tokyo: Urban Growth and Planning, 1868-1988, ed. the Center for 
Urban Studies (Tokyo: Center for Urban Studies, 1988), 13. 
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A City by Any Other Name: Discourse and Nomenclature in Tokyo Planning 
Tokyo was a city known by many names during the Meiji period.  Even after the initial 
confusion of the pronunciation of the two characters assigned for its new name, “Eastern 
Capital,” had been cleared up, a number of colloquial monikers were still used to signify 
the city.  Whether it was “national capital” (tofu/shufu/shuto), “home of the emperor” 
(renkoku no moto), “imperial capital” (Teito), or “capital of the emperor’s realm,” 
(kōkoku no hōki),” each appellation for the city reaffirmed its importance in relation to 
the rest of the nation.  The names became even more meaningful after the acquisition of 
empire.  But while there was acknowledgement of Tokyo’s role as the capital, what 
exactly it was the capital of in the popular consciousness, and the frequency of these 
denominations shifted over time.  How this recognition affected the urban space of 
Tokyo, moreover, also gradually changed over the course Meiji period.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, already in 1872, planners had referred to Tokyo as the “Home of the 
Emperor” (renkoku no moto) in justifying the Ginza Bricktown project.  Yet, as capital 
city planning steadily passed from the hands of local leaders to those of central 
government officials after 1880, a symbiotic relationship emerged between the 
heightening rhetoric used to describe Tokyo – not only in nomenclature but also 
regarding the city’s status and role in the nation – and the increasing comprehensiveness 
and monumentality of urban improvement plans.  By no means did one name for the city 
come to dominate the discourse, nor did certain appellations replace others entirely.  
Frequently, speakers and writers would alternate their nomenclature and use different 
words for “capital” in the same paragraph, if only to reduce rhetorical redundancy and 
increase word variation.  The only name that appears to have lost fashion was “renkoku 
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no moto,” which seemed to phase out by the 1890s as the comparable “Teito” ascended in 
popular usage.  Nevertheless, there is an appreciable increase in the frequency that terms 
with imperial resonance are used by planners, commensurate to the expanding reach and 
magnified monumentality of the plans those planners produced.  Examining the 
relationship between the language used to describe capital city Tokyo and the 
improvements proposed in plans produced over the half-decade between 1879 and 1885 
reveals how this discourse framed planners’ views of urban space in Tokyo, and 
ultimately shaped the built form and space of the city. 
But first, what is in a name?  Each of the aforementioned terms is laden with 
differing levels of imperial symbolism.  None of the first three terms, “Tofu,” “Shufu,” or 
“Shuto,” have much association with the imperial presence, and therefore could be said to 
contain only minimal imperial symbolism.  Instead, they designate the geographical place 
of the political administration.  “Shuto,” or “head-capital,” Evelyn Schulz writes, was 
introduced during the Meiji period and reflected an ideological shift in the West whereby 
“the brain was now regarded as the most important part of the body and it became a 
central metaphor in social and political thought.”43  In contrast to these terms, the 
unfamiliar 18th-century compound “Renkoku no Moto,” translates literally as “beneath the 
imperial palanquin” and therefore signifies the “home of the emperor.”  Despite the 
reference to the palanquin, by no means did this term imply a “mobile” capital, one that 
would follow the emperor whenever he set out on an imperial progression.  Rather, it 
                                                
43 Evelyn Schulz, “The Past in Tokyo’s Future: Kōda Rohan’s Thoughts on Urban 
Reform and the New Citizen in Ikkoku no Shuto (One Nation’s Capital),” in Japanese 
Capitals in Historical Perspective: Place, Power, and Memory in Kyoto, Edo and Tokyo, 
ed. Nicolas Fiévé and Paul Waley (London: Routledge, 2003), 293-294. 
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referred to the city where the emperor’s permanent residence was located.  Likewise, the 
name “Teito” was a classical term from the Nara period indicating the same.  As Henry 
D. Smith has explained, “Teito” became popular around the time of promulgation of the 
imperial constitution in 1889, and represented a Tokyo “viewed less as a city than as a 
symbol of the nation” and thus “far more saturated with political than with cultural 
connotations.”44  Despite its early origins, Tokyo as “Teito” was certainly most 
ubiquitous from the 1920s through the end of World War II, at a time when Japan’s 
formal empire in Taiwan and Korea made Tokyo the “imperial capital” in both name and 
reality.  Perhaps the most well known usage of Tokyo as “Teito” was the so-called 
“Imperial Capital Reconstruction Plan” (Teito Fukkō Jigyō) championed by Gotō 
Shimpei to rebuild the city following the 1923 Kantō Earthquake, but it is notable that 
references to the city as “Teito” appear in the urban planning discourse as early as 1884.  
The last name, “kōkoku no hōki,” translates most literally as “the capital region of the 
country ruled by the emperor.”  It could be said that the changing usage of these terms 
represented evolving popular conceptions of the role of the capital.  Analyzing what 
terms government-level planners used to refer to Tokyo in their urban plans will reveal 
how this changing conception of the capital was reflected in urban planning thought.  
 Tokyo Governor Kusumoto Masataka set the tone for later official urban 
improvement discourse in the capital in 1879.  After serving in the Tokyo metropolitan 
government from 1875 and as governor since 1877, Kusumoto was set to retire in 1879.45  
Before leaving office, however, he left detailed instructions for his successor.  “Among 
                                                
44 Henry D. Smith, “Tokyo as an Idea: An Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought until 
1945,” Journal of Japanese Studies 4, no. 1 (1978): 55. 
45 TSS, vol. 57, 814. 
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the 15 urban districts, 6 counties, and 7 islands [that make up Tokyo],” Kusumoto 
emphasized to the next governor, “the 15 urban districts are where the government (seifu) 
is located, and where people from all places come to gather.  It is the foremost capital city 
in the entire nation (zenkoku dai-ichi no tofu).”46  Kusumoto’s view of Tokyo as the 
capital, then, was noticeably provincial.  The city was important because it was the 
location of the national government, but it was not the “national” capital.  Instead 
Kusumoto delimited the reach of Tokyo’s importance to its administrative boundaries, 
and even rhetorically left open the possibility of there being other capital cities in Japan 
at a time when Kyoto would have still been seen as the traditional center of Japanese 
culture.  As he explained in the “instructions” left for his successor, Kusumoto had 
initiated three local administrative reform and urban planning initiatives during his tenure 
in office that the next governor should continue.47  While the first of these had been 
                                                
46 Kusumoto uses the term “seifu” to refer to the central government.  While “seifu” 
generically means “government” and the term “chūō seifu” would more properly indicate 
the “central government,” it is believed that Kusumoto had the central government in 
mind because references to the Tokyo municipal government more commonly utilized 
the metonym “fuchō,” a term close to “city hall.”  For Kusumoto quote, see: Tokyo 
Metropolitan Archives, Doc.#: 610.B5.16, “Jimu hiki-tsugi ruisho (Kusumoto Masataka 
yori, Matsuda Michiyuki ni tsugu, 1-gō yori 19-gō ni itaru) Meiji 12-nen 12-gatsu” 
[Documents of continuing government business (Kusumoto Masataka followed by 
Matsuda Michiyuki, #1-19), December, 1879], 140; and Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 3. 
47 TMA, “Jimu hiki-tsugi ruisho,” 139-142.  Kusumoto’s instructions are reproduced in 
TSS, vol. 63 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1971), 106-109; Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō 
Keikaku, 83; and with annotations in Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 3-6.  TMA, Doc.#: 
604.B3.16, “Kukaku Kaisei ni Kan-suru Shitashirabe Shorui (Kukaku Kaisei Iin)” 
[Documents relating to urban district revision investigations (District Revision 
Committee)], 337.  For administrative reforms, Kusumoto commissioned a District 
Revision Committee in 1876 to reorganize the city’s municipal boundaries and replace 
the “Big-Ku/Small-Ku System.”  The plan produced by the Committee in early April 
1878 was called the “Tokyo District Revision Plan” (Tōkyō Fuka Kukaku Kaisei An) and 
called for areas under the administration of the Tokyo government to be revised into two 
zones, designated “urban” (kakunai) and “rural” (kakugai).  The urban area was then 
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related to the raising of local capital, the remaining two dealt with urban reforms: 1) 
upgrades to the fresh water supply system48; and 2) block realignment, and road and canal 
infrastructure improvements.49  Kusumoto counseled the digging of canals in order to 
improve transportation as well as delineate the “Outer City” (Gaichō) from the “Inner 
City” (Naichō), where gas lamps would be installed to encourage commercial activity.  
Kusumoto then emphasized urgency in the setting of a plan for these and other projects: 
For Tokyo urban improvement projects (shigai kairyō no jigyō), lasting 
success cannot be expected unless a plan is first established.  As for the 
projects – starting with the demarcation of the Inner City and Outer City, 
whether it is new canals to be dug or modified, new roads to be opened or 
altered, areas where water systems are to be extended, where gas lines are 
                                                                                                                                            
divided further into four “near districts” (kinku) and twelve “far districts” (enku) for the 
purposes of determining the order of implementing improvements and administrative 
measures when necessary.  Not surprisingly, the “near districts” were comprised of the 
most populous urban areas east of the palace including Ginza, Kyōbashi, Nihombashi, 
and Asakusa.  The “near districts” are listed as: Kita-Shiba, Yushima, Soto-Kanda, and 
Minami-Asakusa; the “far districts” are listed as: Minami-Shiba, Azabu, Akasaka, 
Yotsuya, Koishikawa, Komagome, Shitaya, Kita-Asakusa, Honjo, Mukōjima, Kami-
Fukagawa, and Shimo-Fukagawa.  Kusumoto identifies sixteen of the total 21 districts.  
The status of the five missing districts is unknown. 
48 Kusumoto established the Tokyo Water System Improvement Committee (Tōkyō Suidō 
Kaisei Iinkai) in 1877, consisting of several planners who would later play significant 
roles in Tokyo urban improvement planning, including Matsumoto Sōichirō, Itō Tōru, 
and Watanabe Takashi.  The committee released a report entitled “Summary of Tokyo 
Water System Repairs” (Tōkyō Suidō Kaisetsu no Gairyaku) in August 1877.  See: 
Tōkyō-fu Suidō Kaisei Iinkai, ed., Tōkyō Suidō Kaisetsu no Gairyaku [Summary of 
Tokyo water system repairs](Tokyo: Tōkyō-fu, 1877). 
49 TMA, “Jimu hiki-tsugi ruisho,” 140-141; Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 83.  
According to Kusumoto, the upland “Yamanote” area of Tokyo was suited more for 
government buildings, schools, hospitals, or villas for the nobility than it was for shops or 
merchants because of the transportation inconveniences.  Likewise, the areas east of the 
Sumida River were more suited for wholesale markets, warehouses, and factories than 
residency because transportation was convenient and the land low and damp and the well 
water dirty.  As a result, the areas most appropriate for a commercial district were the so-
called “Shitamachi” areas earlier identified as the “near districts”: Nihombashi, 




to be installed, where fire-prevention lines are to be established, or where 
shorelines are to be filled in and wharfs constructed – while they cannot of 
course be designed overnight, if they are not planned in advance then 
projects carried out first could become obstacles later.  Then if the course 
of later projects loses direction, we will have certainly lost our chance to 
succeed.50    
 
The language of a link between the built environment and international prestige of 
the imperial capital was amplified by the next governor of Tokyo, Matsuda Michiyuki.  
Putting Kusumoto’s advice into action soon after taking office as governor on December 
12, 1879, Matsuda ordered several officials within the Tokyo government to investigate 
potential urban improvements and port construction.51  Matsuda seems to have been 
                                                
50 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 86; Fujimori, Toshi Kenchiku, 4-5. 
51 Tōkyō-to, ed., Shikukaisei to Hinkai Chikkō Keikaku [Urban improvement and the 
Shinagawa port construction plans](Tokyo: Tōkyō-to, 1976), 12; Mikuriya Takashi, Meiji 
no Kokka wo Tsukuru [Constructing the Meiji state](Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2007), 326.  
In the course of their research, the Board borrowed materials on roads and building 
regulations from the Home Ministry library on February 28th and for blueprints from the 
Tokugawa Shogunate’s earlier aborted plan to construct a harbor at Tsukudajima in 
Tokyo Bay on March 3rd from the Home Ministry Public Works Bureau.  See Tōkyō 
Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Shikō Kōwan-hen [Manuscripts of Tokyo history, ports] vol. 3 
(Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1926)), 912-914.  For a more detailed discussion of the 
drafting, contents, and various historical interpretations of the Matsuda plan, see Ishida 
Yorifusa, “‘Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei no Mondai’ ni tsuite” [On the “Tokyo Central 
District Demarcation Issues”], Sōgō Toshi Kenkyū 7 (1979): 15-34.  The officials 
dispatched by Matsuda appear to have been former Public Works Office (doboku kakari) 
head Watanabe Takashi, later Geography Department (chiri-ka) head Kodama Harufusa, 
and Kawade Ryōji.  According to Tokyo government organization charts available on the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Archives website, Watanabe was Public Works Office head in 1877, 
and Kodama was Geography Department head in 1885.  The involvement of these three 
individuals is evident from a drafting note – cited in Ishida – signed by Itō Tōru and three 
members of a so-called “Urban Improvement Committee” (Shiku Kaisei Iin), dated May 
21, 1880, and attached to this May 21st version of the Matsuda plan.  Ishida writes that the 
signatures appear to be those of Watanabe, Kodama, and Kawade (Ishida, “‘Tōkyō Chūō 
Shiku Kakutei,” 30, n.12).  Curiously, there is no committee of that name listed in the 
official Tokyo government organization directory for 1880.  Furthermore, as reproduced 
in Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Shikō Kōwan-hen, vol. 3, 912-913, the 1880.3.3 request 
from the Tokyo government for information from the Home Ministry Public Works 
Bureau on the Tsukudajima harbor project is signed by Itō (Tōru?) and four other 
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spurred to action by the particularly large December 26th, 1879, Nihombashi Hakuchō 
fire, which destroyed 10,613 houses.  Fires, of course, had been a major urban planning 
problem for the city ever since the Edo period, when they were referred to as the 
“Flowers of Edo.”  As discussed in Chapter 1, it was a large fire in 1872, after all, that 
had led to the first major urban improvement project in Tokyo in the Meiji period, the 
Ginza Bricktown.  Matsuda would also see several more large fires while in office: 
particularly the December 30th, 1880, Kanda Kajichō fire, which razed 2,188 houses, and 
the Kanda Matsuedachō on January 26th, 1881, which, consuming most of Kanda before 
jumping the Sumida river to burn through Honjō and Fukagawa on its way to incinerating 
10,637 houses, was the most devastating of all Meiji Tokyo fires.52  The winter of 1880-
1881 was a particularly costly fire season as hearth and cooking fires in the bitter cold of 
the winter set off a series of conflagrations, with first the Kajichō and Matsuedachō fires 
in December and January, respectively, and then the Kanda Yanagichochō fire destroying 
another 7,751 homes on February 11th and another fire on the 21st burning another 1,499 
homes in the western suburb of Yotsuya.53  Despite the passage of ordinances delineating 
fireproofing zones and establishing nonflammable roofing construction restrictions 
following these fires, these were limited to the most-heavily populated central areas of 
Kanda, Nihombashi, and Kyōbashi, meaning fires continued to be a problem during the 
                                                                                                                                            
members of a Urban District “Management” Committee (Shiku Tori-shimari Iin).  See 
also, Tōkyō-to, ed., Shikukaisei to Hinkai Chikkō Keikaku, 15; and Mikuriya, Meiji no 
Kokka wo Tsukuru, 326.   
52 Tōkyō-to, ed., Shikukaisei to Hinkai chikkō keikaku, 13. 
53 Tōkyō-to, ed., Shikukaisei to Hinkai chikkō keikaku, 13-14; Ishida Yorifusa, Nihon 
Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen [100 Years of Japanese Modern Urban 
Planning](Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 1987), 53-54. 
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mid-to-late 1880s.54  It was perhaps because of the continuing problem of large fires in 
the city that Matsuda felt compelled to elevate his rhetoric.      
In any case, Matsuda presented his urban improvement plan, called the “Tokyo 
Central District Demarcation Issues” (Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei no Mondai), to the 
members of the Tokyo Prefectural Assembly in early November 1880.55  Whereas his 
predecessor had waivered on Tokyo’s national role, Matsuda unequivocally and 
emphatically declared at the beginning of the plan: “The land of Tokyo is where the 
central government (chūō seifu) is located, it is where people of all classes, foreign and 
domestic, come to gather; in other words, it is the capital of the entire nation (zenkoku no 
                                                
54 Ishida, Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen, 58-59. 
55 After several months of research, Matsuda’s committee produced a draft entitled 
“Reasons for Tokyo Central District Realignment” (Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kaikaku no 
Gen’yū) on May 21, 1880.  As Ishida Yorifusa explains, this draft plan underwent two 
rounds of revisions, presumably by either or both Governor Matsuda and/or Tokyo 
Assistant-Secretary (Shō Shokikan) Tanuma Ken, before being arriving at its final form 
as the “Tokyo Central District Demarcation Issues” (Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei no 
Mondai).  At this time, there were two “secretaries” immediately below the Tokyo 
governor differentiated as either “dai shokikan” or “shō shokikan.”  Rather than 
translating these titles literally as “large” or “small,” Chief-Secretary and Assistant-
Secretary are more appropriate.  In 1880, Senda was Chief Secretary while Tanuma Ken 
was Assistant-Secretary.  Senda transferred to Hiroshima in April 1880 where he was 
later involved in the planning of the Ujina port in Hiroshima Prefecture in 1884.  
Governor Matsuda delivered these so-called “Demarcation Issues” first to the Police 
Bureau on October 30 before distributing them to important businesses and the assembly.  
As Ishida Yorifusa describes, one major difference between the plans as a result of the 
revisions was “the wide scale deletion and simplification of the sections expressing the 
necessity of a port and concerning a specific ‘image’ of the port,” (Ishida, “Tōkyō Chūō 
Shiku Kakutei,” 18).  As a result, Ishida concludes, “the port was weakened from ‘port 
plans’ in the planner’s first draft (kisōsha sōan) into ‘port location’ related to the location 
of central urban districts in the published ‘Demarcation Issues’,” (Ishida, “Tōkyō Chūō 
Shiku Kakutei,” 18-19).  Ishida furthermore explains that, after editing, the report was 
ready by June of 1880, but other matters, such as tensions over the budget of fire 
prevention, prevented its distribution until November. 
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shufu).”56  After explaining how the population of Tokyo had decreased dramatically after 
the end of the Edo period leaving the city empty and inactive economically, and how the 
remaining residents suffered the problems of recurring fires, outbreaks of contagious 
diseases, and the mixing of the rich and the poor (hinpi zakkyo), Matsuda repeated:  
The so-called Tokyo is where the central government is located; it is 
where people of all classes, foreign and domestic, come to gather.  If we 
do not act now to make the improvement of this [city] an objective, then it 
will have a great effect on the reputation (taimen) of our entire nation.57   
 
As Matsuda made clear, not only were improvements to the built form of the city 
necessary because of the city’s role as the national capital, they were vital since the 
appearance of the city was directly tied to Japan’s international prestige.  The number and 
reach of urban reforms that Matsuda proposed echoed his elevated description of the 
city’s importance.  First, with outward appearances in mind, Matsuda proposed 
delineating a central district into which the successful businesses and wealthy landowners 
of the city should be concentrated, while the urban blight of poorer residents would be 
removed.58  Continuing Kusumoto’s focus on urban infrastructure, Matsuda then called 
                                                
56 TTKSS, 29:1 front.  The reprinted volume retains the original genkōyōshi page 
numbering of counting the front and back of each folded sheet as one page, referenced 
pages will therefore abe cited including the sheet number and either “front” or “back.”  
Matsuda’s plan is also reproduced in several locations, including: TSS, vol. 64, 210-213; 
Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 85-86; and Ishida, “Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei.”  See 
Ishida, “Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei” for an extended discussion of the different versions 
of the statement available in different sources. 
57 TTKSS, 29:1 back-2 front. 
58 Not surprisingly, these “central districts” were roughly the same areas earlier identified 
by Matsuda’s predecessor, Kusumoto Masataka, in his 1878 “Tokyo District Revision 
Plan.”  Matsuda described the demarcations of the “central districts” as: the outer moat at 
Kajibashisuji on the west, the Kanda river to the north, or perhaps including one part of 
Asakusa, Ōgawasuji (the Sumida) to the east, and to Shimbashi or Kanesugigawa 
(Hamamatsuchō) in the south; or eliminate part of the northwest, making Nihombashi the 
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for planning for installation of new water systems, gas lines, roads, bridges, and rivers.  
Finally, despite stating that there were “a countless number of things to be reformed, too 
many to be listed individually,” Matsuda enumerated almost 50 separate items for 
consideration, including placement of government buildings, post offices, and other 
municipal facilities; the enactment of fire prevention measures, house building codes, and 
fire insurance rate zones; the zoning of various factories, warehouses and markets; and at 
last the construction of major port facilities to promote city commerce and trade, allowing 
“countless profits and the central districts to become a gathering place for wealthy 
merchants (gōshō fukusō).”59  “By doing such things,” Matsuda concluded, “[Tokyo] will 
assuredly for the first time live up to being [lit. not be embarrassing as] the capital of the 
entire nation (zenkoku no shufu).”60 
 The Matsuda plan marks the high point of local Tokyo involvement in Tokyo 
capital city planning.  Matsuda had been a career bureaucrat in the Home Ministry, even 
leading the integration of Okinawa as governor of the newly created prefecture, but he 
had resigned his spot in the central bureaucracy when he took office as governor of 
Tokyo.  While in office in Tokyo, Matsuda ensured that the planning of Tokyo would be 
as open to the public, and involve as much local input, as possible.  First, in order to 
stimulate popular support for the projects, Matsuda distributed copies of the “Tokyo 
                                                                                                                                            
boundary, and extending to Shiba Tamachi in the southeast depending on the location of 
the port.  TTKSS, 29:3 front-3 back.   
59 TTKSS, 29:2 front-2 back; Ishida, “Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei,” 22-23.  The term 
fukusō combines the ideograms for “wheel spokes” and “gather,” and carries a literal 
meaning of either “convergence” or “overcrowding” and “congestion.”  I have tried to 
imply both by translating it as “gathering.” 
60 TTKSS, 29:2 back. 
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Central District Demarcation Issues” report to major newspapers, and even took out an 
advertisement on November 9th announcing the establishment of a special committee to 
investigate the plans and soliciting public responses.  “A number of intelligent citizens 
and government officials have been made committee members for the sole purpose of 
carrying out surveys,” the advertisement announced before adding, “We welcome those 
with opinions concerning this project in general to personally come to the bureau to 
present their opinion, or to submit it in on paper.”61  Secondly, the mix of 12 government 
officials, military officers, and prominent businessmen Matsuda appointed to the Tokyo 
Urban Area Investigation Board (Tōkyō Shiku Torishirabe Iinkyoku) were mostly 
longtime residents of Edo/Tokyo.  Ōtori Keisuke, for example, was a former Tokugawa 
official who had led the Tokugawa holdouts in the Battle of Hakodate, Hida Hamagorō62 
                                                
61 The text of the announcement reads in whole:  
Recently the Tokyo government distributed a provisional map of the central 
districts of Tokyo along with a related plan – as seen in various newspapers.  
While the plan was presented only in order to finally stir up public opinion, 
nevertheless, a real plan cannot be achieved without taking into consideration the 
current topography and without making the goals as far-reaching as possible.  For 
this reason a special investigation bureau has been created in the Tokyo 
government, and a number of intelligent citizens and government officials have 
been made committee members for the sole purpose of carrying out surveys.  We 
welcome those with opinions concerning this project in general to personally 
come to the bureau to present their opinion, or to submit it in on paper.  The 
above is advertised.  November 9, 1880.  Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board. 
Ishida, “Tōkyō Chūō Shiku Kakutei,” 18; the newspaper advertisement is reproduced on 
page 23.  This newspaper advertisement is also reproduced as part of a notification to the 
same effect to the offices of each ward and county in Tokyo Prefecture made the next day 
on the 10th in TSS, vol. 64, 208-209. 
62 Hida was a shipbuilder and former Tokugawa and Meiji government official who had 
devised the aforementioned Tsukudajima port plans for the Shogunate, and then notably 
traveled to the United States along with Fukuzawa Yukichi on the 1860 Embassy and 
also participated in the Iwakura Mission.  After rising to the rank of Chief of Estates 
Bureau in the Imperial Household Ministry, Hida suffered a fatal accident when he 
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had designed the aborted Tsukudajima port facilities for the Tokugawa, and Fukuchi 
Gen’ichirō had been a well-known newspaperman in Edo.  Shibusawa Eiichi, Hirano 
Tomiji, and Eda Heigorō, meanwhile, were all prominent businessmen in the city.63  To 
provide engineering and planning expertise, the Investigation Board also included the 
Rensselaer-trained engineer Haraguchi Kaname, who had just returned to Japan after his 
work in the United States.64   
With this strong local influence the Board understandably determined to focus on 
improvements deemed most important by residents of the city, and quickly decided to 
                                                                                                                                            
unsuccessfully attempted to jump aboard a departing train at Fujieda station on the 
Tōkaidō line after he had disembarked to use the restroom.  As the Japan Weekly Mail 
reported on May 4, 1889: “It is scarcely necessary to observe that this sad event 
emphasizes a point to which we drew attention in the autumn of 1887, namely, the 
insufficiency of the accomodation at stations on Japanese railways.  Since that time great 
improvements have been effected, and we believe that the Authorities intend to run 
carriages with closets on all lines of any length.  It is an essential measure, not alone in 
the cause of public decency, but also because, with things as there are now, such 
accidents as that recorded above are liable to happen at any moment.  Despite the great 
care usually exercised by the railway officials, passengers will rush to catch a train in 
motion when, like Mr. Hida, having been obliged to alight at a by-station, they see 
themselves in danger of being left behind,” (The Japan Daily Mail, volume 12, 422; 
GoogleBooks, 1/12/2013). 
63 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 96-97.  Ōtori would later become ambassador to 
Korea in the 1890s.  The 12 members were: Matsuda Michiyuki, Haraguchi Kaname 
(Home Ministry), Ōtori Keisuke (Public Works Ministry), Akamatsu Noriyoshi (Navy), 
Arai Yūnosuke (Home Ministry), Hida Hamagorō (Navy), Asai Michihiro (Army), 
Shibusawa Eiichi, Eda Heigorō (Mitsubishi), Hirano Tomiji (Ishikawajima Boat 
Company), Nonaka Mansuke (Tokyo Rice Exchange), and Fukuchi Ōchi (aka 
Genichirō). 
64 Hanabusa Yoshitarō and Yamamoto Genta, Nihon Hakushi Zenden [Catalogue of 
Japanese PhDs](Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta-, 1990), 267-268; multiple sources indicate 
that Haraguchi joined the Board to fulfill a “promise” to Matsuda, without divulging 
further detail; while this may have been simply a personal agreement between Haraguchi 
and Matsuda, perhaps obligatory employment in the Tokyo municipal government upon 




redirect the emphasis of the plans at the first meeting.65  Noting that focusing 
improvements in the central districts was too narrow of a goal, they decided to expand 
plans to the entire city.  The discussion then turned to whether or not defensive 
preparations should be considered in the planning of the city, “as in the urban areas of 
Paris,” but the Board ultimately decided to plan Tokyo as an “entirely commercial city.”  
Because of the influence of Shibusawa, Hida, and representatives from the navy, the 
Board decided to revive the issue of port construction.  Only then would the urban area 
be considered.  Planning for the new port proceeded to the point where the Dutch Home 
Ministry foreign advisor Anthonie Thomas Muldor was hired to conduct a survey and 
design a port.66  Yet the port project, and the planning mission of the Tokyo Urban Area 
Investigation Board, ended abruptly when Governor Matsuda died suddenly from illness 
at age 44 on July 6, 1882, leaving improvements to his successor, Yoshikawa Akimasa. 
 The unexpected death of Matsuda not only prompted the premature cancellation 
of the port project, but also marked the beginning of increasing central government 
control over Tokyo capital city planning under Governor Yoshikawa.  Whereas the 
                                                
65 The limited available minutes of the meeting are reproduced in Fujimori, Meiji no 
Tōkyō Keikaku, 97; a description of Matsuda’s urban improvement activities delivered by 
the board to newly appointed Governor Yoshikawa can be found in TSS, vol. 66, 495-
498.  Similar accounts of the meeting can also be found in TSS, vol. 66, 499-504; TSS, 
vol. 64, 213; and TSS, vol. 64, 388.  TSS, vol. 64, 388 curiously names the Board the 
Tōkyō-shikukaisei Iinkyoku.  This appears to be mistaken for two reasons: 1) earlier in the 
same source document – although omitted from this particular segment – the board is 
referred to as the Shiku Tori-shirabe Kyoku; and 2) it appears that no body with the exact 
name Tōkyō-shikukaisei Iinkyoku ever existed.  
66 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 100.  Muldor prepared two separate designs: one for 
a “shallow” port located on the banks of the Sumida River, and the other for a “deep sea” 
port located off the coast of Shinagawa.  Muldor’s plans were later adopted by Governor 




previous governors, Kusumoto and Matsuda, had been former Home Ministry officials 
who resigned when they took office as governor, Yoshikawa was the first sitting 
governor to simultaneously hold a position as an active Home Ministry official.  As 
political historian Mikuriya Takashi points out, in contrast to the previous local 
government experience of his two predecessors, Yoshikawa was a “technocrat” who had 
made his career entirely in the central government.67  Working in these ministries, 
Yoshikawa developed personal ties with powerful oligarchs Itō Hirobumi and Inoue 
Kaoru, with whom he would maintain personal correspondence throughout his life.  His 
simultaneous appointment as Tokyo Governor and Assistant-Vice Minister of the Home 
Ministry in July 1882 was the first time he held a position in the Home Ministry.  As 
Mikuriya argues, this concurrent appointment as Tokyo Governor and Home Ministry 
official was meant to overcome Yoshikawa’s lack of governing experience, while also 
allowing him to powerfully guide the Tokyo government with the background support of 
the Home Ministry.68  Another way to read this dual appointment is that, through the 
person of Yoshikawa Akimasa, the Home Ministry was attempting to take control of 
                                                
67 Born in 1842 in Tokushima domain, Yoshikawa’s first major position was in the 
Printing Bureau of the Finance Ministry in 1871, rising to become its head by the next 
year.  Promoted to fourth in charge (daijō) of the Public Works Ministry (Kōbushō) and 
named head of the telegraph bureau in 1874, Yoshikawa was sent to London for two 
years starting in 1878 to represent Japan at the 1879 London International Telegraph 
Conference.  Returning to Japan in 1880, Yoshikawa was named Assistance Vice-
Minister (shōfu) first of the Foreign Ministry, and then of the Public Works Ministry 
(Kōbushō) the next year.  See TSS, vol. 66, 387-390 for a timeline of Yoshikawa’s 
appointments. 
68 Mikuriya, Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru, 344n. 2, 337-338.  Mikuriya further interprets the 
nomination of Yoshikawa as Governor of Tokyo by Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru and 
Sanji’in President Yamagata Aritomo as part of a political move to strengthen the 
position of the Home Ministry vis-à-vis the prefectural assemblies (Mikuriya, Meiji 
Kokka wo Tsukuru, 336-338). 
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Tokyo capital city planning.  With Yoshikawa presiding over two successive urban 
improvement committees in the 1880s, the Home Ministry was undoubtedly the most 
powerful force behind urban reform initiatives in the city during the Meiji period.  During 
his tenure as governor until 1885, and then as Vice-Home Minister, Yoshikawa oversaw 
the production of no less than four successive urban plans that laid the framework for 
major improvements in Tokyo for over three decades years from 1884 to 1919, starting 
with his 1884 Urban Planning Statement.69 
 In any event, Yoshikawa’s appointment as governor abruptly changed the 
direction of Tokyo urban planning, starting a trend whereby planning rhetoric, 
monumentality, and central government involvement intertwined in an upwards spiral.  
Soon after taking office, Yoshikawa disregarded the recommendations of Matsuda’s 
Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board, and instead refocused efforts on transportation 
and infrastructure improvements.  In the detailed summary report of their actions 
presented to Yoshikawa, the Board had suggested “first set[ting] plans for port 
construction and then afterwards moving on to the urban areas.”  Notably, the Board 
repeated Kusumoto and Matsuda’s language of Tokyo’s role as national as the reason for 
improvements.  “The land of Tokyo” the report parroted, “is the location of the central 
government, it is where people of all classes, foreign and domestic, come to gather.  In 
                                                
69 The four plans devised under Yoshikawa are: 1) 1884 “Urban Improvement Statement” 
(Shiku Kaisei Ikensho), often called the “Yoshikawa Plan”; 2) the 1885 “Report on 
Matters Concerning the Construction of a Port in Shinagawa” (Hinkai Chikkō no Gi ni 
Tsuku Jōshin); 3) the 1885 “Revised Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan” (Tōkyō-
shikukaisei Shūsei-an), often called the “Examination Committee Plan” (Shinsa-Kai An); 
and finally 4) the 1889 “Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee Decisions Report” 
(Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Iinkai Ketsugi Fukushin) – also known as the “Committee Plan” 
(Iinkai-an), which formed the basis for the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan (Tōkyō 
Shiku Kaisei Sekkei). 
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other words it is the capital of the entire nation (zenkoku no shufu).”  In this vein, the 
Board named the construction of a port as the most pressing future project.  Considering 
Tokyo’s ideal location situated in the center of the country, indeed the center of the entire 
Pacific, the report argued, “with such disorganized urban areas, and without the 
construction of a quality port, how can we ever promote our national commercial rights?”  
“If we do not immediately establish a grand plan for urban improvements, or determine a 
master plan for a new port,” the Board proclaimed, “it will not only have a great affect on 
the reputation (taimen) of this one capital, but it will also have a great impact on the 
interests of the entire country.”70  These remonstrations fell on deaf ears. 
While in office as governor, Yoshikawa commissioned two influential urban 
improvement plans.  First, after dispatching Haraguchi to conduct an updated study of 
urban conditions as a first step in devising a master plan, Yoshikawa submitted his 
“Urban Improvement Statement” (Shiku Kaisei Ikensho) to Home Minister Yamagata 
Aritomo on November 14th, 1884, just over two years after taking office.71  As discussed 
                                                
70 This report can be located in TSS, vol. 66, 495-498.  Because Matsuda was of course 
already deceased, Tokyo government official Tanuma Ken compiled relevant reports to 
provide Governor Yoshikawa.  Incidentally, Tanuma would later go on to serve as 
governor of Yamanashi Prefecture, a position previously held by Yamazaki Naotane 
(1887.3-1888.6), and later by Sakurai Tsutomu (1896.8-1897.5), and Onoda Motohiro 
(1898.6-1899.8), all of whom were members of the Tokyo Urban Improvement 
Examination Committee).   
71 The original document included an introductory “Report Concerning Matters of Urban 
Improvements” (Shiku Kaisei no Gi ni Tsuku Jōshin) signed by Governor Yoshikawa, 
along with an “Urban Improvement Statement” (Shiku Kaisei Ikensho), six illustrative 
maps, eight statistical graphs, a detailed speculative budget, and an “Urban Improvement 
Statement Appendix” summarizing the contents of the entire plan.  Because the 
schematics were prepared on the orders of the governor, both are accredited to 
Yoshikawa.  This first set of reports has come to be commonly referred to collectively 
simply as the “Yoshikawa Plan” (Yoshikawa-an).  While the reports may have actually 
been written by subordinates such as Haraguchi Kaname, because the reports were 
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in the previous section, in describing the dramatic effect street improvements would have 
on the city, Yoshikawa argued that Tokyo would become “the greatest capital in Asia” 
(tōyō no ichi-dai tofu).72  This plan has received much criticism because of Yoshikawa’s 
focus on transportation to the detriment of other desperately needed projects, such as 
water and sewer system improvements.  These objections apparently arose from the 
language Yoshikawa used to delineate the sequential order in which improvements were 
to be implemented.  Explaining why water and sewer systems were not included in his 
first plan, Yoshikawa argued that “roads, bridges, and canals are the beginning (hon 
nari); water systems, houses, and sewers are the end (matsu nari).”  “Once the plans for 
the foundational (konpon taru) roads, bridges, and canals have been determined,” he 
clarified, “it will be possible to decide the others with natural ease.”73  What Yoshikawa 
                                                                                                                                            
submitted in Yoshikawa’s name, analysis of the texts will assume the author’s voice is 
that of Yoshikawa. 
72 TTKSS, 30:9 back. 
73 TTKSS, 30:9 front.  The statement that “roads, bridges, and canals are the beginning, 
and water systems, houses, and sewers are the end” has sparked much debate on 
Yoshikawa’s intentions.  On one hand, the statement has been interpreted to suggest that 
Yoshikawa was placing the importance of transportation and commerce over the 
concerns of urban social issues.  The strongest proponent of this interpretation has been 
Ishizuka Hiromichi, who has argued that Yoshikawa’s focus on the transportation 
network revealed a primary concern for military preparedness and the flow of 
commercial goods while ignoring social problems such as water-borne disease and fires.  
See: Ishizuka Hiromichi, Nihon Kindai Toshiron – Tōkyō: 1868-1923 [Modern Japanese 
Cities, Tokyo: 1868-1923](Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigakku Shuppankai, 1991), 43-48; and 
Ishizuka Hiromichi, “19-seiki kōhan ni okeru Tōkyō toshi kaizōron to chikkō mondai ni 
tsuite” [Tokyo urban reform debates and the port construction issue in the latter half of 
the 19th century], in Toshi Kankyō Seibi Kenkyū Hōkoku 6: Toshi no Seiritsu to sono 
Rekishi-teki Tenkai, ed. Tōkyō Toritsu Daigaku Toshi Kenkyū Iinkai (Tokyo: Tōkyō 
Toritsu Daigaku Toshi Kenkyū Iinkai, 1972), 14-19.  Ishida Yorifusa and Fujimori 
Terunobu, on the other hand, see the statement as merely indicating the procedural order 
of the projects.  Ishida, for example, focuses on the sentence following the 
“beginning…end” proclamation, pointing out that since building heights are limited by 
road widths, the roads would have to have been planned before any building codes could 
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meant was that only after the framework of streets had been determined could subsidiary 
projects, such as sewers and water lines be planned.  Thus, Yoshikawa’s preference for 
transportation at the expense of social problems was the result of a pragmatic attempt to 
set a feasible order of projects rather than of a complete disregard for social problems. 
Indeed, Yoshikawa was aware of the limitations of his plan and attempted to 
rectify them in a second plan submitted in February 1885.  This second plan called for the 
construction of a major commercial port along with the improvements that had been 
excluded from his first plan.74  Noting that cities prospered from a combination of politics 
and commerce, Yoshikawa lamented in the plan, “while there are bays [in Tokyo], 
because they are extremely shallow, they are insufficient for large ships; while there is 
canal transport, it merely serves the northeastern areas.”75  Posing a rhetorical question 
for emphasis – “does that mean then that even if Tokyo were, for example, to get rid of 
                                                                                                                                            
be set (Ishida, Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no Hyakunen, 92-93).  Mikuriya Takashi, 
meanwhile, has taken a more compromise position, arguing that while Yoshikawa may 
have meant the statement as merely setting the procedural order, as Ishida and Fujimori 
maintain, the political context suggests that the Yoshikawa plan was actually part of a 
larger Home Ministry and Public Works Ministry attempt to place Tokyo at the center of 
the growing national transportation infrastructure network (Mikuriya, Meiji Kokka wo 
Tsukuru, 364). 
74 The actual titles of these reports are: “Report on Matters Concerning the Construction 
of a Port in Shinagawa” (Hinkai Chikkō no Gi ni Tsuku Jōshin) and “Port Construction 
Explanation” (Chikkō Kōji Kaisetsusho) 
75 The Port Plan begins with a revealing comment on the source of urban propserity: 
Upon consideration, what makes a city prosper, more or less, derives from two 
things: politics and commerce (tsūshō).  Those [cities] that rely on the first 
experience extreme ups and downs (eiko) based on the gathering and distribution 
(shūsan) of political power (seiken).  Those that arise from the second are related 
solely to the thriving of foreign trade (bōeki), and it is not surprising, then, that 
they too should be influenced by the gathering and distribution of political power 
(TTKSS, 30:62 front) 
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its maritime transportation it would be nothing more than a political capital, and [the city] 
could not possibly become a commercial capital?  I say ‘No!’ (iwaku iya)” – Yoshikawa 
then painted his broader picture for the city, making the role of Tokyo as capital of the 
entire nation as clear as possible: 
Tokyo is the capital (shufu) of all the lands of our great country (waga 
ōyashima), it is not merely the capital (shufu) of Musashi province76; not 
to mention that it has even been designated as a place for trade with 
foreign countries.  For this reason, as much as possible, we must facilitate 
the coming and going of ships by dredging and deepening (shunsaku) the 
rivers and harbors, allow the free passage of vehicles by improving roads, 
advance the health of the people by updating water and sewer systems, 
prevent damages from disastrous fires (shukuyū) by rebuilding dwellings, 
and comfort the spirits and please the eyes and ears by improving 
entertainment districts and installing parks…[by doing these things] it will 
be possible for Tokyo to become an increasingly prosperous region not 
just through the power of political policy but through a combination with 
commercial benefits.77 
 
As he did with the earlier Urban Improvement Statement, Yoshikawa concluded by 
arguing that carrying out such improvements on both land and sea would “combine the 
benefits of both politics and commerce,” allowing Tokyo to be forever “the greatest 
capital in Asia (Tōyō no ichi-dai tofu).”78 
At this point, there was a noticeable shift in the nomenclature used to refer to 
Tokyo.  Up to now, the planners signified “the capital” using terms arguably devoid of 
imperial resonance.  Certainly there was an appreciable increase in the rhetoric regarding 
                                                
76 Yoshikawa uses two older geographical terms: 1) for Japan, Yoshikawa uses 
“ōyashima,” which is a reference to “Ōyashima-no-kuni”, the name by which Japan was 
called in the Kojiki; and 2) for the geographic region surrounding Tokyo, Yoshikawa 
uses “Musashi-no-kuni.”  As part of the “haihan-chiken” reform, Musashi province was 
split into Tokyo-fu and the prefectures of Saitama and Kanagawa in 1868. 
77 TTKSS, 30:63 back-64 front. 
78 TTKSS, 30:65 front. 
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the national role of Tokyo – from being “the foremost capital city in the entire nation” for 
Kusumoto, to having a “great effect on the reputation of our entire nation” according to 
Matsuda, and finally to becoming “the greatest capital in Asia” in the eyes of Yoshikawa.  
And, to be sure, there was a commensurate broadening of the breadth and scale of 
improvements proposed in each of the plans – from infrastructure improvements and 
wharf construction for Kusumoto, port construction and a “countless number” of reforms 
for Matsuda, to Yoshikawa’s call for urban facilities designed to “comfort the spirits and 
please the eyes and ears” of residents of a fireproof capital that combined political and 
commercial benefits.  Nevertheless, each of these planners all used neutral terms such as 
“Shufu” and “Tofu” to name the capital.    
This shift in the planning discourse of Tokyo is most evident in the endorsement 
that Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo made to the central government Council of State 
on behalf of Tokyo Governor Yoshikawa’s transportation and port plans.  Although these 
endorsements were generally nothing more than brief summaries of the attached 
proposals, the language Yamagata used to support the plans was revealing.  First 
endorsing Yoshikawa’s Urban Improvement Statement in November 1884, Home 
Minister Yamagata echoed Yoshikawa’s language tying transportation to the commercial 
prosperity and prestige of the city.  Yet whereas Yoshikawa used the term “Tofu” to 
indicate the capital, Yamagata expressly changed this appellation to one with more 
imperial significance.  Urging the approval of the Yoshikawa Plan, for example, 
Yamagata stressed that the “welfare of Tokyo and its politics are greatly felt on the 
national scale (dai ni zenkoku no kibo ni kan-shi),” because of its status as “the residence 
of the Emperor (renkoku no moto) and the capital of the entire country” (kaidai no shufu).  
153 
 
By adopting such a plan for future projects, Yamagata continued, “we can look forward 
to the limitless prosperity of both national strength (kokusei) and the Imperial Capital 
(Teito).”79  Yamagata used similar language when later endorsing Yoshikawa’s port plans 
in February 1885: “As Tokyo is the residence of the emperor (renkoku no moto), the 
capital of the entire country (kaidai no shufu), and because it is furthermore the location 
for trade with foreign countries and the place where goods of all kinds converge,” 
Yamagata appealed, “the convenience of imports and exports is well worth special 
consideration.”  “By planning a policy of such improvements at this time,” he repeated, 
“we can look forward to the limitless prosperity of the Imperial Capital (Teito).80   
 How to explain this steady elevation in rhetoric regarding the role of Tokyo and 
the commensurate expansion in the improvements envisioned?  Certainly, one 
explanation could be that the Tokyo governors were shrewd politicians looking for a way 
to secure national financial support for their projects.  More improvements meant more 
costs, and if they could convince the central government that the urban improvement of 
Tokyo was a matter of national concern, and therefore a program to be undertaken and 
funded by the central government, then they could defray the financial burden placed on 
Tokyo itself.  In this view, language of Tokyo as the “imperial capital” was more a 
cynical ploy to access the imperial coffers.  While this was undoubtedly one factor, it 
does not seem to be the whole story.  Governor Matsuda, after all, had used similar 
language to justify urban improvements in 1880 even while firmly locating his planning 
system at the local level.  Another explanation could be that over the years between 1878 
                                                
79 TTKSS, 30:53 front-53 back. 
80 TTKSS, 30:84. 
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and 1884, the view of Tokyo as the undisputable imperial capital became universal.  This 
would be in line with the transition of Tokyo from “Temporary Court to Imperial Capital,” 
described by Takashi Fujitani, whereby the Meiji government came to view the city of 
Tokyo as a permanent “symbolic and ritual center,” as represented by the construction of 
a new imperial palace starting in 1884.81  While certain government leaders had 
recognized Tokyo’s role as the national capital and home of the emperor as the reason for 
improvements as early as the 1872 Ginza Bricktown plan, by 1884 this recognition 
solidified in the minds of the central politicians and local planners alike.  After 1885, 
moreover, this view of Tokyo space became concretized in the built form of the city as 
planners at the national level began to see Imperial Capital Tokyo in competition with 
grand capital cities worldwide.  
 
Local to National, and Back Again: The Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans 
Once Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo’s endorsed the Yoshikawa Plan to the central 
government, the capital city planning of Tokyo officially passed from the local level to 
the national level.  As seen in earlier the Ginza Bricktown project, the rebuilding of the 
imperial capital was too important to leave to municipal forces.  Of course, on the flip 
side, this meant that planning would reflect imperial needs and goals, rather than 
municipal ones.  Still, even at the national level, planners remained deeply divided over 
exactly what those needs and goals were.  This is most evident in the tortuous 
development of the 1888 Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance and the 1889 Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Plans.  The half-decade following the submission of the Yoshikawa 
                                                
81 Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 68, 82. 
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Plan in 1884 saw the production of rival urban plans by two separate government-level 
planning entities, the Home Ministry’s Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination 
Committee (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Shinsakai) and the Foreign Ministry’s Special 
Architecture Bureau (Rinji Kenchiku Kyoku).  While both of these entities sought to make 
Tokyo into a suitable imperial capital, it is easy to see their approaches to capital city 
planning as mutually incompatible.  Planners associated with the Home Ministry can be 
described as “Functionalists” because of their attempts to gradually improve the 
commercial function of the city through transportation and infrastructure improvements 
in order to garner international recognition and prestige.  In contrast, Foreign Ministry 
planners can be categorized as “Europeanizationists” because they envisioned immediate 
transformations of the built form of Tokyo in order to produce a built environment that 
would mimic the grand European capitals.82  But these were not the only participants 
involved in Tokyo capital city planning.  Further complicating the planning process were 
the “commercialist” desires of non-governmental business elites involved in planning 
decisions, and the “populist” demands of non-governmental, non-elite local Tokyo 
residents.  Yet, rather than irreconcilable views of the city, each of these groups 
represented impulses that framed the discourse of Tokyo capital city planning.  At a time 
when the profession of town planning worldwide was still emergent, “planners” in Tokyo 
in the late 1880s were often civil or railway engineers, architects, and more frequently 
career bureaucrats who had spent a good amount of time overseas.  For this reason, as 
more individuals became involved in the planning of Tokyo as the capital city, plans 
changed in response to the collective designs, desires, and demands of disparate groups 
                                                
82 Watanabe, “Metropolitanism as a Way of Life,” 408. 
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of people, whether they be engineers, politicians, businessmen, or local residents.  What 
eventually materialized was a pragmatic planning system designed to strategically react 
as much as possible to the wants and needs of these groups.  In other words, even as 
Tokyo planning became a national issue, local concerns could not be ignored.  As the 
following section will demonstrate, although codified at the elite national level, Tokyo 
capital city planning was nevertheless by no means the unilateral product of a monolithic 
planning entity.  Instead, debates within, rivalries between, and outside forces acting 
upon competing planning entities shaped the urban space of Tokyo as Functionalist, 
Europeanizationist, commercialist, and populist inputs coalesced to form the 1889 Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Plan.  A closer look at these two competing planning entities – the 
Home Ministry’s Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee and the Foreign 
Ministry’s Special Architecture Bureau – will show how central government attempts to 
standardize the planning process instead led to more variation as new participants became 
involved and introduced new elements to the discourse.  Examining these negotiations 
over the purpose of urban improvements, we can see how differing conceptualizations of 
the city merged to charge the urban space of the imperial capital with political meaning.  
As Tokyo capital city planning passed to the national level, the central 
government attempted to dominate the planning process.  Looking at the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Examination Committee established in 1885 to review the Yoshikawa Plan, 
two ways the central government tried to assert central control of planning stand out.  
First, the central government ordered that urban improvement plans for the capital be 
drawn up by a committee located in the national bureaucracy, not the local Tokyo 
government.  To be sure, in his endorsement of the Yoshikawa Plan, Home Minister 
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Yamagata had used rhetoric stressing Tokyo’s importance to the rest of the nation.  But in 
this petition, when requesting an examination committee to deliberate the plan, Yamagata 
imagined that any such committee would be located at the municipal level.  Indeed, 
Yamagata recommended that the committee members be comprised of “appropriate 
officials” (tōgai kanri) – which admittedly could indicate either municipal officials or 
central bureaucrats.  More importantly, the Tokyo governor would be made chairman, 
and the committee itself would be established “within the Tokyo government” (fuchō ni 
oite), placing it under the jurisdiction of the Tokyo municipal government.83  Regardless, 
the central government had different ideas.  In its approval of the petition, the central 
government ordered that, rather than being established within the Tokyo government, the 
new committee would be placed “in the Home Ministry” (sono shō ni oite), locating it 
firmly at the national level.84   
 Secondly, the central government stocked the committee with central government 
bureaucrats.  As Prime Minister Sanjō Sanetomi ordered, four members of the committee 
would come from the Home Ministry, while the Public Works Ministry, the Agriculture 
and Commerce Ministry, the Army Ministry, and the Police Bureau would each send 2 
members of their own.85  Two additional members were later added from the Navy 
Ministry in order to discuss port construction plans.86  In all, of the 19 members sitting on 
                                                
83 Keeping in mind that the Tokyo governor at the time, Yoshikawa Akimasa, was also a 
standing Home Ministry official, it could arguably be said that Home Minister Yamagata 
had no intention of the committee being a municipal body.    
84 TTKSS, 30:53 front-54 front. 
85 TTKSS, 30:54 front, 57 front. 
86 TTKSS, 30:88 front. 
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the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee, only 4 represented local Tokyo 
interests, and this was only after committee chairman Yoshikawa awkwardly wrote to the 
Governor of Tokyo – himself – formally requesting the inclusion of two members from 
the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce (Tōkyō Shōkōkai) in order to secure the support of the 
influential chamber.87 
Several significant characteristics stand out about the members of the committee.  
First, the presence of a number of significant names among the list of committee 
members reaffirmed the importance of Tokyo capital city planning.  Counted among the 
members were such prominent individuals as Nagayo Sensai, Home Ministry Public 
Works Bureau chief and later Police Bureau Chief Mishima Michitsune, Public Works 
Vice-Minister and Railway Bureau Chief Inoue Masaru, local businessmen Shibusawa 
Eiichi and Masuda Takashi, the Rensselaer-trained engineer Haraguchi Kaname, and 
even later Governor-General of Taiwan Rear Admiral Kabayama Sukenori.  Secondly, 
the committee membership underlined the drastic departure from the earlier planning 
efforts of Governor Matsuda, whose municipal-level Tokyo Urban Area Investigation 
Board was comprised of several longtime residents of Tokyo.  Not only were Shibusawa 
and Haraguchi the only members retained from the earlier Tokyo Urban Area 
Investigation Board, only one of the 15 central government bureaucrats on the committee, 
Navy representative Yanagi Narayoshi, was even from Tokyo.88  A third point that stands 
                                                
87 Mikuriya Takashi argues that Yoshikawa’s inclusion of Masuda and Shibusawa was an 
attempt to secure the support of the Chamber of Commerce (See: Mikuriya, Meiji Kokka 
wo Tsukuru, 348). 
88 The complete list of committee members, with their bureaucratic affiliation and place 
of birth in parentheses, is listed alphabetically as follows: Haraguchi Kaname (Public 
Works, Hizen), Inoue Masaru (Public Works, Yamaguchi), Itō Masanobu (Tokyo, 
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out when examining the list of committee members more carefully is that many shared 
one trait: experience in the West.  Of the 19 members, 11 had visited the West, either as 
part of the Iwakura Mission (Nagayo Sensai, Yamazaki Naotane, and Kusaka Yoshio), as 
students (Inoue Masaru and Haraguchi Kaname), or as members of other official 
embassies or inspection tours (Yoshikawa Akimasa, Sawa Tadashi, Onoda Motohiro, 
Ozawa Takeo, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Masuda Takashi).     
Despite central government efforts to guide the planning process, the Examination 
Committee was in no way an entirely monolithic assembly of like-minded individuals 
sharing a unanimous vision of the city.  Instead, from the very first meeting, committee 
members drew on their knowledge of Western cities to push the Home Ministry plans 
beyond their original Functionalist focus on transportation to include more 
comprehensive urban facilities designed to refashion Tokyo as a monumental imperial 
capital.  In addition to Mishima Michitsune’s proposal to widen streets, Yamazaki 
Naotane argued that Tokyo should be rebuilt like Paris, Nagayo Sensai urged the 
inclusion of parks and squares to improve city sanitation and hygiene, and Shibusawa 
Eiichi insisted on adding markets and a stock exchange.  Because of these differing 
viewpoints, Fujimori Terunobu has described the deliberations of the Examination 
Committee meetings as a competition between two visions of the city – Tokyo as an 
                                                                                                                                            
Tokyo), Kabayama Sukenori (Navy, Kagoshima), Kuroda Hisataka (Army, Shizuoka), 
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“Imperial Capital” (Teito) championed by Yamazaki Naotane, versus Tokyo as a 
“Commercial Capital” (Shōto) advocated by Shibusawa Eiichi and Masuda Takashi – in 
which the “Imperial Capital” side won.89  Rather than one view trumping the other, in the 
end these differing ideas merged together to produce an increasingly monumental urban 
improvement plan for Tokyo. 
Members of the Examination Committee challenged the Home Ministry’s 
singular emphasis on transportation from the very first meeting in February 1885.  
Calling the committee to order, Chairman Yoshikawa attempted to focus the discussion 
on the general outline of the plans.  Pointing out that the basic idea was to “follow actual 
conditions on the ground and ‘the old’ as much as possible, while changing as little of 
that form as necessary,” he reminded the assembled committee members, “after all, it is 
not as if we are constructing a new capital in the middle of an empty field!”90  Other 
committee members had other ideas, however, and quickly made their voices heard.  The 
member who spoke out most forcefully was Home Ministry Accounting Bureau 
(Kaikeikyoku) Chief Secretary Yamazaki Naotane.91  Taking the floor, Yamazaki belittled 
the limited scope of the Yoshikawa plan, remarking, “this ‘urban improvement’ (shiku 
kaisei) is really just a ‘road-widening’ argument...I feel that the things that we are here 
                                                
89 Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 145.  Mikuriya Takashi calls into question the 
accuracy of Fujimori’s “Imperial Capital” versus “Commercial Capital” structure, 
arguing instead that various impulses were unified in the final plans.  See: Mikuriya, 
Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru, 384. 
90 TTKSS, 31:1 front-1 back; Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 88. 
91 Yamazaki held a number of concurrent official posts: Home Ministry Accounting 
Bureau Chief Secretary, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Finance Ministry Chief Secretary.  
See: JACAR, Ref.#: A09054350400, “Shokuinroku, Meiji Jū-nana nen ni, hachigatsu, 
shokuinroku (Naimusho) aratame” [Personnel directories; February, August 1884; 
revised personnel directory (Home Ministry)], slide 46. 
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discussing today are narrow in scope, as they are nothing more than rerouting streets, and 
digging new canals.”  Because “it would not be an exaggeration to call Shiku Kaisei the 
improvement of Tokyo,” Yamazaki observed, “building construction, water system 
improvements, sewer flows, and especially the construction of a port” should all be 
concluded in future plans.  “Even if roads are constructed, if the water system is 
incomplete and houses are not fireproof, then there is no benefit.”   
After criticizing the Home Ministry’s limited focus on transportation, Yamazaki, 
who had studied in Paris nearly two decades earlier, argued that Tokyo should be rebuilt 
as a European-style capital.92  Receiving Chairman Yoshikawa’s permission, Yamazaki 
presented a prepared statement quoting a translated selection on the history of Paris from 
the French history textbook Historie de la France, 1867 authored by prolific scholar and 
one-time Ministry of Education advisor Gustave Ducoudray.93  Then harking back to his 
time as a student in Paris in the 1870s and as a participant of an official mission to France 
in 1882, Yamazaki regaled the Committee with vivid examples of what he had in mind: 
the streets could be remade like the well-known Parisian boulevards, Asakusa and Shiba 
parks would be rebuilt like Park Monseau, the Honganji temple should be reconstructed 
like the San Jacques Cathedral, and the areas around the imperial palace might be 
remodeled like the Louvre.  If Paris was not enough, in a later meeting Yamazaki even 
suggested that the entire outer moat of the old Edo Castle could be widened and 
                                                
92 Fujimori Terunobu notes that Yamazaki had spent much time in Paris as a member of 
the Iwakura Mission in 1871 in Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 93.  Yamazaki also 
traveled to Europe in 1880 along with Itō Hirobumi on an official mission to study 
European poilitcal systems. 
93 Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 94. 
162 
 
converted into a park comparable to Vienna’s famous Ringstrasse.94  For Yamazaki, the 
reason for such a dramatic transformation of the built form of Tokyo was the city’s role 
as the imperial capital.  “Our Tokyo, the Imperial Capital (Teito) of the entire country,” 
Yamazaki reminded the Committee, “is the seat of the government.”  “As Tokyo is the 
home of the Emperor (Renkoku no Moto), the seat of the national government, and the 
center of and the center of institutions, culture, and development,” Yamazaki continued, 
“the urban improvements of Tokyo are the model (mohan) for all cities in the empire, 
large and small, and truly a project for the advancement of our civilization and 
enlightenment.”95 
Yamazaki’s grandiloquent descriptions elicited delighted approval from the 
assembled Committee members.  Mishima Michitsune expressed his agreement saying he 
hoped for a capital that “without being overly ostentatious, would surpass even London 
and Paris in its aesthetic beauty.”96  Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce official 
Shinagawa Tadamichi added, “For me, too, as a long-time resident of Tokyo and as a 
Japanese person, making our capital in no way inferior to London or Paris is a desire that 
I am unable to suppress.”97  Encouraged to provide more concrete examples, Yamazaki 
again took the floor to lay out the specific plans he had in mind:   
First, various government buildings should be gathered into one place, all 
should have the same design and built in gorgeous Western architectural 
styles...Walls should be erected around the estates of banks, companies, 
                                                
94 Yamazaki made this suggestion during the third meeting of the committee on March 
10, 1885.  TTKSS, 31:46 back. 
95 TTKSS, 31:8 back-9 front; Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 96-97. 
96 TTKSS, 31:10 front; Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 98. 
97 TTKSS, 31:11 back; Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 99. 
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and wealthy individuals, and only proper architecture – no ugly small 
houses (koya) or restored traditional row houses (nagaya) – would be 
permitted inside.  As for a theater, if was one was to be eventually built 
beside the Rokumeikan, then it should be built in beautiful architecture.  
And as for hotels, they will be allowed if they are built along the lines of 
the “Grand Hotel” [in Paris].98 
 
As a result of his rousing speech, Yamazaki was put in charge of drawing up plans for a 
theater to be built in central Tokyo.  Without fail, Yamazaki argued for the construction 
of a theater along the lines of the famous Parisian “Opera,” noting “In all the countries of 
Europe and America, be they empires, monarchies, or republics, they all have a 
‘imperial,’ ‘royal,’ or ‘national’ ‘theater’ where the emperor, the empress, and all the 
officials and gentlemen come face to face.”99  Following the example of “civilized 
countries” (bunmei shokoku) of the West, the final Examination Committee Plan 
proposed, a theater should be located in a “suitable, central” site of Tokyo and 
constructed in a manner appropriate to being the theater of the Japanese capital.  Doing 
so, the Plan concluded, would “complete the aesthetic beauty of the imperial capital (teito 
no bikan wo mattō seshimuru ni ari).”100 
Yamazaki’s soliloquy inspired the committee to further push the parameters of the 
original Yoshikawa Plan by introducing their own designs for the capital.  Next to speak 
up was physician and Home Ministry Hygiene Bureau Chief Nagayo Sensai, who argued 
for the inclusion of parks.101  Staying on in Berlin after the Iwakura Mission, Nagayo had 
                                                
98 TTKSS, 31:14 front-14 back; Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 102-103. 
99 TTKSS, 31:176 back; Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku, 136. 
100 TTKSS, 30:93 front. 
101 For a more detailed analysis of the development of park plans in the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement plans, along with Nagayo’s activities in the Examination Committee, see 
Ryōhei Ono, “Meijiki Tōkyō ni okeru Kōkyō Zōen Kūkan no Keikaku Shisō,” Tōkyō 
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been perfectly situated to have his finger on the pulse of Western medical trends, 
including the most up-to-date German ideas of “public health.”  As Ann Bowman 
Jannetta explains, “This concept reached far beyond the traditional practice of medicine, 
with its focus on the individual relationship between doctor and patient, into the realm of 
public works, which was the responsibility of the state.”102  With this background in 
European public health, Nagayo made his first appearance during the second meeting of 
the Examination Committee and quickly proposed the installation of a number of 
“squares” and parks in order to improve air quality in the city and open up evacuation 
zones for use in times of emergency.  “Even if the importance of parks is not yet 
recognized in Japan,” Nagayo stressed, “they are so important that there is no country in 
Europe whose capital has no parks.”  To emphasize this point, Nagayo drew the attention 
of the committee to Hyde Park and the Kensington Gardens in London, the Tiergarten in 
Berlin, and even the Champs Elysees in Paris, provided detailed statistics for the ratio of 
residents to urban parks in London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna.103  In Japan, on the other 
hand, the lack of urban parks had led to “excessively docile” traditional “Japanese 
recreations” so “unhealthy for civilized society” – such as “watching plays, playing Go, 
performing tea ceremony, chanting ballads, and especially ‘Pin the tail on the Geisha’ 
[lit: ‘pinching the buttocks of the Geisha’].”  “If there are even the slightest gentlemanly 
                                                                                                                                            
Daigaku Nōgakubu Enshūrin Hōkoku 103 (2000): esp. 138-154, and Paul Waley, “Parks 
and Landmarks: Planning the Eastern Capital along Western Lines,” Journal of 
Historical Geography 31 (2005): 1-16. 
102 Ann Jannetta, “From Physician to Bureaucrat: The Case of Nagayo Sensai,” in New 
Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan, ed. Helen Hardacre with Adam L. Kerr (Leiden: 
Brill, 1997), 159. 
103 TTKSS, 31:54 front-55 back. 
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pastimes in this country,” Nagayo continued, “if there is no place to restore one's spirits, 
it would be humiliating in contrast to foreign countries.”104  Nagayo therefore suggested 
the inclusion of several parks and squares.  Nagayo’s motion for parks was seconded by 
Sakurai Tsutomu and further endorsed by Police Bureau official Onoda Motohiro, who 
added that he had also intended to suggest that the Committee consider adding 
recreational parks.  Gunnery colonel Kuroda Hisataka voiced his approval, noting that 
plazas were desirable in times of emergency from a military standpoint.  With this level 
of support, Chairman Yoshikawa put the issue to a vote and the motion passed with 10 of 
the 14 present members standing in approval.105  Ultimately, the Committee approved 10 
large parks and 45 small parks, explaining in the final plans, “In the civilized capitals of 
the West, parks are always placed proportionately to population.”  “While in Tokyo we 
already have 2 or 3 parks,” the plan reasoned, “because we still have not achieved our 
hygienic goals, it is necessary in the long run to install several dozen large and small 
parks based on population.”106 
Finally, Shibusawa Eiichi championed the inclusion of commercial facilities in 
the plans.  In his concurrent role as President of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, 
Shibusawa officially presented Chairman Yoshikawa and the Examination Committee 
with a document laying out the Chamber’s own urban improvement proposals.  Among 
the items listed in this document were port construction, river improvements, the 
reversion of Marunouchi to town areas, and the judicious widening of roads done 
                                                
104 TTKSS, 31:34 front-34 back. 
105 TTKSS, 31:33 back-36 front. 
106 TTKSS, 30:91 front-92 back.  The proposed parks are discussed and listed in TTKSS, 
31:161 front-170 back. 
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carefully so as to avoid causing too much destruction to existing areas.107  Since his time 
on Matsuda’s Tokyo Urban Area Investigation Board starting in 1880, Shibusawa had 
advocated the construction of a major port in Tokyo to compete with the larger port to the 
south in Yokohama.  Aside from the obvious commercial benefits for the city of Tokyo, 
an additional reason for Shibusawa’s persistence on the port issue may have been that he 
owned a substantial amount of land in the Kabutochō neighborhood to the east of 
Nihombashi, where he opened the Daiichi Bank and kept his own residence.  Placing a 
port on the nearby Sumida River, therefore, would greatly increase the commercial 
importance, and therefore the value, of his land.  For this reason Shibusawa questioned 
the need for the proposed rail link between the northern and southern rail termini in Ueno 
and Shimbashi.  Instead, he argued, priority should be given to port construction and river 
improvements.  In this regard, Shibusawa can be grouped with fellow businessmen 
Masuda Takashi and Taguchi Ukichi as “Commercialists” who called for projects 
designed to facilitate the commercial activity of the capital, such as markets and the port.  
Taguchi was a prominent entrepreneur, railway speculator, and newspaperman whose 
1880 series of editorials entitled “Theses on Tokyo” (Tōkyō Ron) were especially 
influential in spurring public discussion of urban reform and starting a dialogue on port 
construction.  As Taguchi’s Tokyo Keizai Zasshi newspaper reported in late 1884, “No 
matter how beautiful the buildings, or how organized the streets, if commerce is not 
accumulated, then Tokyo can become neither the Paris nor the London of the East!”108  
Advancing similar arguments in the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee, 
                                                
107 TTKSS, 31:207 front-211 back. 
108 Quoted in Mikuriya, Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru, 365. 
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Shibusawa was placed in charge of drawing up proposals for meat and produce markets, 
slaughterhouses, and a new chamber of commerce building and stock exchange.  The 
Committee adopted each of these proposals without alterations, pointing out in the final 
plans that it was important to relocate Tokyo’s current markets and slaughterhouses to the 
edges of the city as was done in the “great European capitals” because of their unsanitary 
and unhygienic conditions.  The chamber of commerce building and stock exchange, 
meanwhile, should be located in the “central and most convenient locations” so that they 
might “most easily captivate the gaze of onlookers” and constructed in “magnificent 
architect” that would “both demonstrate commercial prosperity and provide 
ornamentation for the capital.”109  Because of Shibusawa’s influence, both buildings were 
placed in Kabutochō, where they still stand. 
In this way, the Examination Committee broadened the scope of Yoshikawa’s 
original Functionalist transportation-based plan over the course of thirteen meetings to 
incorporate more comprehensive urban facilities, including the European-style theater 
and parks suggested by Yamazaki and Nagayo, and the Commercialist port, markets, 
slaughterhouses, stock market, and chamber of commerce building proposed by 
Shibusawa.  Because all of these facilities were based on Western examples, it is clear 
that they were intended to place Tokyo on an equal footing with the grand Western 
capitals.  As Yoshikawa reported in his summary report, all of these facilities were based 
on careful examination after “looking far and near, investigating Western examples, 
while considering domestic conditions.”110  In this regard, the expanded coverage of the 
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Examination Committee Plan denotes a significant increase in the monumentality with 
which Tokyo planners viewed the urban space of the capital.  As Yoshikawa wrote in his 
introduction to the Committee’s final plan, “If we are ever to make Tokyo live up to its 
name as the capital of the emperor’s realm (kōkoku no hōki) and the place of domestic 
and international trade, then we must reform antiquated customs and make the scale of 
reforms expansive.111  After listing the proposed facilities, the plan noted that 
simultaneously carrying out urban improvements and construction of a port “will be the 
best plan for the lasting prosperity of the Tokyo area” and the best way to “improve the 
city to make it the greatest capital in Asia.” 
Yet, the plans still lacked a Populist component.  Up to this point, facilities had 
been introduced mostly for their aesthetic quality and mainly for the reason that the 
Japanese capital should have all the same urban attributes of the grand western capitals.  
This is why each proposal for new amenities was supported by Western examples.  It was 
as if local Tokyo planning was being based not on the conditions of the Japanese capital, 
but rather on those of cities halfway around the world in Europe.  Ironically, the 
inducement for planners to turn their attention to domestic conditions rather than foreign 
models came from Special Architecture Bureau (Rinji Kenchiku Kyoku), chaired by 
Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru.  When the Home Ministry’s Examination Committee was 
dismissed by the central government in December 1885, planning power shifted to the 
Foreign Ministry and Inoue Kaoru until the passage of the Tokyo Urban Improvement 
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Ordinance in 1888.112  Historians frequently present the story of the two groups as a 
rivalry and competition between the Home Ministry and Foreign Ministry over political 
control of the Tokyo urban planning.  There is certainly some truth to this.  The widening 
political rift between Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo and Prime Minister Itō 
Hirobumi undoubtedly influenced Itō’s decision to favor the project of his ally Inoue 
                                                
112 Home Minister Yamagata had immediately endorsed the Examination Committee 
plans to the central government and recommended the creation of a Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Bureau (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Kyoku) to implement the plans, but the only 
response from the Central Chamber had been to dismiss the Examination Committee on 
December 8, 1885.  It is interesting to note the similarly between this proposed 
committee and the later Special Architecture Bureau chaired by Inoue.  The Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Bureau had been first suggested by Yamazaki Naotane during the first 
meeting of the Examination Committee.  Describing how a single government body in 
France and Austria planned all “civil” architecture resulting in aesthetic consistency, 
Yamazaki had insisted during his famous soliloquy that in Japan, too, urban reform of 
Tokyo should be undertaken as a national project and implemented by a new entity 
“called a Supervisory Bureau (Kantokukyoku) or Examination Bureau (Shinsakyoku).”  
Taking the floor in the second to last meeting on June 30th, 1885, Yamazaki had then 
resubmitted this motion: 
Just as I mentioned in the first meeting, I'd like to talk about the establishment of 
a Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Bureau.  From the beginning these 
urban improvements were meant to be the foundation for the next hundred years 
or so, and once these resolutions are enacted, the main objectives will not change 
even if the responsible authorities do.  In order to maintain this goal, we must 
establish a single bureau to control and supervise [the projects]...Incidentally, 
saying the projects should not be viewed as the affairs of one locality is to say that 
they should be seen as a special temporary (rinji) project of the central 
government, just one that will last longer.  Once actual implementation finally 
gets underway, a permanent Examination Bureau will be necessary to control and 
supervise finances and architectural specifics, and determine procedures for 
various other matters.  For that reason, a single Bureau should be created within 
the Home Ministry, with the Vice-Home Minister as the Chairman, the Tokyo 
Governor as Vice-Chairman, with a board of directors made up of 10 or so 
engineers and economists. 
Receiving the approval of the Committee, Yamazaki was appointed to draft a proposal 





Hirobumi over that of Yamagata’s second-in-charge, Vice-Minister Yoshikawa.  Scholars 
also emphasize the clear ideological differences between the two programs, noting that 
Inoue’s plans for an “European-style” grand imperial capital were incompatible with the 
Home Ministry’s plans for a gradual improvement of the city’s commerce through 
infrastructure.  When Inoue’s Europeanizationist image for the city eventually fell 
through once again, the Special Architecture Bureau nevertheless introduced a Populist 
element to the expanding Tokyo urban improvement plans.     
Without question, Inoue’s intention for the Special Architecture was to transform 
Tokyo into an imperial capital that would appear no less splendid than Paris or London.  
As early as September 1884, a full two months before Yoshikawa submitted his initial 
Yoshikawa Plan, Inoue had commissioned Tokyo Imperial University architecture 
professor Josiah Conder to design various government offices including a new Imperial 
Diet building, carry out site inspections, and supervise construction.113  Inoue had earlier 
retained Conder to design the famous Deer Cry Pavilion (Rokumeikan), completed in 
1883, so it was no surprise that he would again turn to Conder.  Inoue was preparing for a 
scheduled May 1886 treaty renegotiation conference with Germany and Great Britain, 
and much as he had done in the Ginza Bricktown project over a dozen years earlier, he 
hoped the construction of a grand Western-style capital – replete with a western-style 
National Diet, modern prisons, and impressive ministry buildings – would aid the treaty 
                                                
113 Fujimori Terunobu, “Ende Bekkuman ni yoru Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku no Kenkyū: 
Sono 1 Hottan yori Bekkuman rainichi made” [Research on Ende and Böckmann’s plans 
to concentrate government offices, 1: from the beginning until Böckmann’ arrival in 
Japan], Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Ronbun Hōkokushū 271 (1978): 133. 
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revision process.114  In this way, he too was attempting to rectify what he saw as the 
biggest failure of the Ginza Bricktown, namely that the project had been stopped before it 
could re-create Tokyo completely into a Western-style capital.  But for Inoue, Tokyo as 
the “greatest capital in Asia” meant a city that visually mimicked the idealized urban 
aesthetics of nineteenth-century European capitals: broad boulevards, opulent Baroque 
urban design, and monumental buildings.  Now with the Special Architecture Bureau, 
Inoue intended to spread the Ginza Bricktown and the Rokumeikan to the rest of Tokyo.  
Undoubtedly, Inoue’s vision of Tokyo as a Western-style capital was indicated by 
group of the leading architects and western-trained engineers he gathered to form the 
Special Architecture Bureau in February 1886.115  The importance of this Bureau, and its 
focus on architecture, is clearly evident in the list of personnel who would be affiliated 
with it: architects Josiah Conder, Tatsuno Kingo, Tsumaki Yorinaka, Matsugasaki 
Tsumunaga, Watanabe Yuzuru, Kawai Kōzō, and planners Mishima Michitsune, Yamao 
Yōzō and Aoki Shūzō, would all be members of, or advisors, to the Bureau before it was 
finally dismissed in 1890.  Inoue also commissioned a series of foreign engineers and 
architects to produce a succession of opulent plans for the capital that came to be known 
as “Plans to Concentrate Government Offices” (Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku).  In addition to 
retaining the longtime foreign advisor Conder, Inoue hired German civil engineer James 
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Hobrecht, and most famously the German architectural firm of Hermann Ende and 
Wilhelm Böckmann to sketch designs for the central government district and several 
buildings, including the National Diet building.116  Eventually, a total of a dozen German 
architects would be hired to assist Ende and Böckmann, and 20 more Japanese engineers 
would be sent to Germany for training.117   
Yet Inoue’s control of Tokyo capital city planning with the Special Architecture 
Bureau lasted only about 1½ years from the founding of the Bureau in February 1886 to 
Inoue’s resignation in August 1887.  When Inoue’s failure to secure new treaties led to 
calls for his resignation, inflamed by public demonstrations protesting Inoue’s 
willingness to compromise with the foreigners, Inoue attempted to deflect this backlash 
away from the Special Architecture Bureau by resigning as Foreign Minister in August 
1887 and then Chairman of the Bureau in September.118  Nevertheless, Ende revealed in 
his diary that following Inoue’s departure “he [Ende] could no longer see the enthusiasm 
the government once had for the plans.  Our plans came to be seen as wasteful, and that 
having them built by foreigners with complete control would be anti-nationalistic.”119  
Following the resignation of Inoue, the Special Architecture Bureau was transferred from 
the Foreign Ministry to the Home Ministry and placed under a new chairman, Vice-Home 
Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa, where it was reduced to a mere administrative entity and 
                                                
116 The most detailed account of Ende and Böckmann activities in Japan is found in 
Horiuchi Masaaki, Meiji no Oyatoi Kenchikuka: Ende & Bekkuman [The foreign 
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118 Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the 
Culture of Japanese Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 19. 
119 Quoted in Horiuchi, “Ōka seisaku no yume no ato,” 24. 
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finally disbanded in 1890.120  With the dissolution of the Bureau, it would seem on the 
surface that Inoue’s efforts to effect a dramatic transformation of central Tokyo were a 
total failure.  Certainly, the famously grandiose plans produced under the aegis of the 
Bureau never materialized.  Brought to Japan by the Bureau in April 1886, for example, 
Wilhelm Böckmann had presented an opulent Baroque-inspired urban plan for central 
Tokyo along with elevations for a imposing Imperial Diet building.  For the government 
district layout, Böckmann had called for an elaborate triangular plaza opening from a 
central station and framed by two broad ceremonial avenues, appropriately named 
Emperor Avenue and Empress Avenue, which merged into Japan Avenue and leading to 
the Imperial Diet Building.121  But such a transformation would have required destruction 
of much of the existing built environment south of the imperial palace, including 
demolition of nearly three-quarters of the Ginza Bricktown, and enormous building costs.  
As a result, Böckmann’s plans were scaled back by Ende as quickly as they were 
introduced.  Later plans drawn up by Hermann Ende and German civil engineer James 
Hobrecht called for grouping the various ministry buildings into a square-shaped 
                                                
120 NAJ, Doc.#: honkan-2A-018-00.ninA00129100, “Naimu jikan Yoshikawa Akimasa 
Rinji Kenchiku Kyoku jimu toriatsukai no ken” [Matters of Vice-Home Minister 
Yoshikawa Akimasa taking over the affairs of the Special Architecture Bureau]; Fujimori 
Terunobu, “Ende Bekkuman ni yoru Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku no Kenkyū: Sono 3 
Haikyoku he” [Research on Ende and Böckmann’s plans to concentrate government 
offices, 3: towards the dissolution of the Special Architecture Bureau], Nihon Kenchiku 
Gakkai Ronbun Hōkokushū 273 (1978): 141. 
121 Arriving in Tokyo in April 1886, Böckmann surveyed Tokyo from atop the German 
Embassy and was shown around the city by members of the Special Architecture Bureau, 
with translation provided by Matsugashima Tsumunaga, who had stayed on in Germany 
to study architecture after the Iwakura Mission (Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 228; 




arrangement surrounding a large plaza in the Hibiya parade grounds immediately south of 
the imperial palace.  Yet soil excavations quickly determined that the east half of the 
grounds were too unstable to support the planned large and heavy brick structures, a 
vestige of the marshy Hibiya Inlet reclaimed by the early 1600s.  The poor soil quality, 
compounded by Inoue’s resignation as Foreign Minister around this time, led to the 
further scaling back of even these already truncated plans.  In the end, only two of the 
buildings designed by Ende and Böckmann were eventually erected following revisions 
by Japanese engineer Yamao Yōzō, the recently restored Ministry of Justice building and 
the demolished Supreme Court building.122 
Despite the short tenure of the Special Architecture Bureau, the Bureau 
nonetheless had a far-reaching impact on the direction of future Tokyo urban 
improvement planning.  For example, when finally built several decades later, the 
Imperial Diet building sat in almost the exact site atop a natural rise in Nagatachō 
proposed in Böckmann’s original plans.  Also, following Yamao Yōzō’s revisions of the 
German plans, the eastern half of the Hibiya parade grounds were set aside as a park in 
the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans.  This park would be opened in 1903 as 
Hibiya Park, “the first park in any Japanese city,” Paul Waley explains, “to be modeled 
explicitly on the European concept of an urban park.”123  More significantly, the Special 
Architecture Bureau made an aggressive intervention into Tokyo urban planning role as it 
began to rethink its bureaucratic mission.  At first, as its name indicated, the Bureau had 
been established specifically to investigate and plan the construction of ministry 
                                                
122 Fujimori, “Ende Bekkuman ni yoru Kanchō Shūchū Keikaku no Kenkyū: Sono 3,” 
141-144. 
123 Waley, “Parks and landmarks,” 11. 
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buildings.  But on the advice of Böckmann, who stressed that building construction 
should only begin after urban improvement plans were finalized, the Bureau began to 
take on the responsibility of a more all-encompassing planning entity.124  Widening the 
Bureau’s initial focus on architecture to incorporate streets improvements and more 
general public works, Inoue brought into the Bureau as Vice-Chairman (Fuku-Sōsai), 
Mishima Michitsune to provide planning experience.125  Not only had Mishima been 
party to the planning of the Ginza Bricktown in 1872 and a member of Home Ministry’s 
Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee in 1885, he had also earned the 
nickname “Public Works Prefect” (Doboku Kenrei) for insistently pushing rail, road, and 
building construction projects while he was in office as governor of Shizuoka, Yamagata, 
and Fukushima Prefectures during the interim.126  In an attempt to seize urban planning 
power from the Home Ministry, Inoue and Mishima urged Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi 
                                                
124 Böckmann urged the importance of systematic planning and street improvements:  
As the construction of the various ministry buildings is greatly related to the 
Tokyo Urban Improvement (Shiku Kaisei) projects, to start construction of the 
buildings while the Urban Improvement plans have not yet been settled would be 
to mistake the order of the plans.  If construction were to start [on the buildings] 
today, only to give rise to obstacles to urban improvements later, then the 
advantages of both projects will be lost in the end.  Therefore only after the urban 
improvement plans are first fully completed can the locations for the buildings set 
and construction started (Quoted in Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 232) 
125 The position of Vice-Chairman was created within the Special Architecture Bureau by 
imperial decree on July 24th, 1886 (NAJ, “Rinji Kenchikukyoku Fuku Sōsai wo Oku” 
[Vice-chairperson placed in the Special Architecture Bureau], Doc.# honkan-2A-011-
00.rui00249100; TSS, vol. 70, 433; Mikuriya, Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru, 455-457). 
126 While governor, Mishima had also garnered the derisive nickname “Devil Governor” 
(Oni Kenrei) for his heavy-handed crushing of the Jiyūtō political party and its People’s 
Rights advocates in Yamagata and Fukushima.  For more on Mishima as “Devil 
Governor,” see Roger W. Bowen, Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A Study of 
Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980), esp. Ch. 1. 
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in December 1886 to reject the plans produced by the Home Ministry Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Examination Committee and place the Bureau in charge instead.127  
Criticizing the Examination Committee plans as nothing more than a “street revision plan 
that for the most part follows the old streets in accordance with the existing conditions 
(kotai),” Inoue and Mishima argued that planners should instead “view the urban areas of 
Tokyo as if they were open lands to be exploited (kaitakuchi),” and be “as decisive and 
resolute (kadan) as possible” in their transformation of the city.128 
                                                
127 JACAR, Ref.#: A03022953300, “Rinji Kenchikukyoku sōsai Inoue Kaoru, dō fuku-
sōsai Mishima Michitsune kengi” [Proposal by Special Architecture Bureau chairperson 
Inoue Kaoru and vice-chairperson Mishima Michitsune].  This proposal, known as the 
“Secret Proposal” (Himitsu Kengi), is believed to have been drafted by Mishima.  In 
reality, it was not “secret” at all because it was officially submitted to Prime Minister Itō 
on December 26th, 1886.  As submitted, the proposal contained two plans: the first was an 
implausibly expensive plan to move the capital to the countryside; the second was to 
transform Tokyo.  The first proposal was presumably a ploy to make the second appear 
more attractive.  Originals can be found in Mishima Michitsune, Mishima Michitsune 
Kankei Bunsho, Book 86, Doc.#: 522-7, “Kengi II – Rinji Kenchikukyoku sōsai Inoue 
Kaoru, fuku-sōsai Mishima Michitsune, Itō Hirobumi sōri daijin ate Meiji 19-nen 12-
gatsu” [Proposal #2 – from Special Architecture Bureau chairperson Inoue Kaoru and 
vice-chairperson Mishima Michitsune, to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, December 1886], 
134-142, obtained from the National Diet Library Modern Japanese Political History 
Materials Room (Kensei Shiryōshitsu).  This source contains three copies of the original – 
two of which were seemingly penned by Inoue and Mishima – in addition to two copies 
of draft versions, again apparently written personally by Inoue and Mishima.  A reprinted 
and annotated version of both proposals can be found in Fujimori, ed., Toshi Kenchiku as 
Document #8, entitled “Secret Proposal (Himitsu Kengisho),” 145-162.  As Fujimori 
explains, the document is known as the “Secret Proposal” because the only extant copy, 
discovered in the papers of Temporary Architecture Bureau engineer Tsumaki Yorinaka, 
was located inside a Police Bureau envelope inscribed with “Secret Proposal” that had 
been delivered to Tsumaki’s house.  As Fujimori notes, it is believed that the proposal 
was the work of Mishima since the document delivered to Tsumaki was contained inside 
a Police Bureau envelope – Mishima was Police Commissioner at the time.  Fujimori 
further speculates that the need for secrecy was because the proposal bluntly laid out 
Inoue and Mishima’s plan to seize planning power from the Home Ministry (Fujimori, 
ed., Toshi Kenchiku, see notes on 144, 151). 
128 Mishima proposed the rejection of the Examination Committee plans in Item 2 of the 
Proposal.  In its entirety, it reads:  
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By far the most lasting contribution the Special Architecture Bureau made to 
Tokyo Planning was to further expand the scope of urban improvement planning to 
include Populist demands for facilities not included in the earlier Home Ministry plans, 
most importantly fresh water and sewer systems.  Like the more well-known “flowers of 
Edo,” or fires that periodically razed through the city, Tokyo was afflicted throughout the 
                                                                                                                                            
Item #2: The decisions of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee 
shall be rejected.  As to these matters, although examinations were already 
completed in the Examination Committee after exhausting all arguments, now 
after careful reconsideration, to put it simply, the plan is nothing more than a 
street revision plan that for the most part follows the old streets in accordance 
with the existing conditions (kotai).  Tokyo is without argument the capital of the 
entire Japanese nation.  It is the place where all the people of the nation stay 
(todomaru), where all kinds of goods come together (atsumaru), and where 
foreigners pass through.  If we do not carry out improvements, that will all cease.  
If we attempt improvements in the slightest but are off-target, because it is not 
easy to rise from a fall, we will only pass down our regrets to all generations.  
This is the reason that the responsible authorities must be especially cautious.  
Therefore if we want to carry out this great project, then we must be as decisive 
and resolute (kadan) as possible.  If we want to be decisive and resolute, then we 
must revise the plans and conduct another examination.  If we want to revise the 
plans and conduct another examination, then more than anything else, we must 
first view the urban areas of Tokyo as if they were open lands to be reclaimed 
(kaitakuchi).  Secondly, we must do away with small and trifling matters.  
Thirdly, to achieve the happiness of the multitudes, we must not worry about the 
poverty of the few.  Fourthly, in planning the foundation for the ages, we must not 
be concerned about temporary difficulties.  Fifthly, we must have the oyatoi 
Böckmann carefully examine the ground surveys and the quality of the plans.  
Nevertheless, supposing that even if we carry out these five items, who knows 
how the results will actually turn out?  That is the reason that we must be as 
decisive and resolute as possible.  That is the reason why we are requesting that 
the decisions of the Examination Committee be rejected. 
The transformations Inoue and Mishima had in mind were for four boulevards radiating 
out from the imperial palace, cutting through the existing city in each of the cardinal 
directions: towards Senjū in the north, Kiba in the east, Takanawa (Shinagawa) in the 
south, and Shinjuku in the west.  In other words, the Ginza Bricktown on a citywide 
scale, at least in four cardinal directions.  Continuing the common refrain, they justified 
such decisive action by noting: “Tokyo is without argument the capital of the entire 
Japanese nation (Nihon zenkoku no shufu).  It is the place where all the people of the 
nation visit, where all kinds of goods come together, and where foreigners pass through.  
If we do not carry out improvements, this will all cease.”   
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Meiji period by recurring outbreaks of waterborne diseases, such as cholera, dysentery, 
and typhoid fever.  Tokyo’s fresh water supply dated back to a sophisticated system first 
laid under the Tokugawa in the early 1600s drawing water from the Inokashira spring and 
the Tama River in the high grounds to the west of the city to the low-lying coastal 
commoners districts, but after 200 years the underground pipes of wood, bamboo, and 
stone were in need of repair.129  Drainage and sewage disposal systems, to make matters 
worse, were almost nonexistent, perhaps because night soil was such a “hot commodity,” 
David Howell notes, for rural farmers, who would pay to haul it away to use as fertilizer 
on their fields.  As a result, major outbreaks of cholera, in particular, recurred roughly 
every 5 years, peaking in 1879, 1882, 1886, 1890, and 1895.130  Each occurrence 
understandably amplified public demands for sewers and upgrades to the water system.  
Despite cholera alone claiming nearly 2,000 lives in 1879 and over 5,000 in 1882, the 
Examination Committee had nonetheless refused to include water works or sewer 
improvements in its final plans.131  As a member of the Examination Committee, Home 
Ministry Hygiene Bureau Chief Nagayo Sensai had broached the issue of water and 
                                                
129 Susan B. Hanley, “Urban Sanitation in Preindustrial Japan,” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 18: no. 1 (1987), 6-7. 
130 Ishizuka Hiromichi compiles statistics for waterborne disease casualities in Tokyo and 
nationwide into a table in Ishizuka Hiromichi, “Tōkyō-shikukaisei Jigyō shi kenkyū 
josetsu: jōsuidō kairyō jigyō to shikai, burujowaji- no ugoki wo megutte” [Introduction to 
the history of Tokyo urban improvement projects: fresh water system improvement 
projects and the activities of the city council and bourgeoisie], Toshi Kenkyū Hōkoku 55 
(1975): 26-27. 
131 For more on hygience-related issues in Tokyo city planning, see: Ishizuka, “Tōkyō-
shikukaisei Jigyō shi kenkyū josetsu,” 23-35; and Ishizuka Hiromichi, Tōkyō no Toshi 
Suramu to Kōshū Eisei Mondai [The urban slums of Tokyo and the public hygiene issue] 
(Tokyo: Kokusai Rengō Daigaku, 1981). 
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sewer systems several times in committee meetings, but to no avail.132  As Mikuriya 
Takashi suggests, it is possible that committee chairman Yoshikawa Akimasa, who in 
fact acutely recognized the need for such improvements, had nevertheless been reluctant 
to take up the issue of sewers because it would have required coordination with the 
fiscally cautious Tokyo Urban Council (Tōkyō-fu Kubukai), a municipal legislative body 
who maintained oversight of Tokyo sewers and had already in 1885 cut the municipal 
street repair budget by 25%, from ¥103,000 to ¥77,000.133  Yet when the largest cholera 
outbreak in the Meiji period struck in the summer of 1886, killing over 10,000 Tokyo 
residents and more than 100,000 people nationwide, the problem became too big to 
sidestep because of politics.  In an attempt to popularize the activities of the Special 
Architecture Bureau, Chairman Inoue responded to popular demands for new systems by 
enlisting the German civil engineer James Hobrecht – architect of Berlin’s sewer system 
and designer of the 1862 Berlin urban use plan – to draw up water and sewer 
                                                
132 In the 6th meeting, for example, Nagayo suggested that if river and canal improvements 
were to be cancelled, then funding could be diverted to water and sewer systems.  Again 
in the 9th meeting, Nagayo requested that the committee take up the issue of water and 
sewere systems during the next meeting, adding that he had proposals already drawn up.  
Chairman Yoshikawa, however, responded that the next meeting would discuss the port 
plans.  See TTKSS, 31:121 front-121 back, 183 back.  It is possible that the proposals 
Nagayo referred to had been prepared by Hygiene Bureau official Gotō Shimpei, who 
had already produced several proposals for sewers by June 1886.  The Gotō Shimpei 
papers (Gotō Shimpei Kankei Bunsho) located in the National Diet Library Modern 
Japanese Political Documents Room contains several of these plans. 
133 The Tokyo Urban Council (Tōkyō-fu Kubukai) was a municipal legislative body of 
elected representatives from each of Tokyo’s 15 wards within the larger Tokyo 
Prefectural Council (Tōkyō Fukai, later Tōkyō-shikai).  The companion Tokyo Suburban 
Council (Tōkyō-fu Gunbukai) represented Tokyo’s 6 rural counties (gun) within the 
prefectural council.  According to Mikuriya Takashi, the Council in the mid-1880s was 
heavily populated by members of the Rikken Kaishintō, known for its support of the 
Popular Rights Movements and deflationary policies (Mikuriya, Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru, 
348, 355).  
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improvement plans.134  As a result, the Hygiene Bureau became tied to the Special 
Architecture Bureau as Hygiene Bureau Chief Nagayo guided Hobrecht around Tokyo 
after arriving in the city in late March 1887.   
Thus the Populist demands for water system improvements initiated by the 
Special Architecture Bureau merged with the expanded Europeanizationist and 
Commercialist facilities called for in the Examination Committee plans when the Home 
Ministry reclaimed planning power in 1888.  In the meantime, the Home Ministry had 
slowly continued street improvements by requesting national subsidies to carry out 
construction work following the Examination Committee plans each time there was a fire 
in the city.135  In order to provide more consistent financing for the Home Ministry’s 
                                                
134 Mikuriya, Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru, 468-469; Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 238-
239.  For more on Hobrecht’s planning activities in Germany, see: Brian Ladd, Urban 
Planning and Civic Order in Germany, 1860-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1990), esp. 80-81; and Claus Bernet, “The ‘Hobrecht Plan’ (1862) and Berlin’s 
Urban Structure,” Urban History 31, no. 3 (2004): 400-419. 
135 Following fires in Kanda Moto-Sakumachō, Kanda Sanbanchō, and Akasaka in 1886, 
the Home Ministry had successfully requested national funds (kokko kurikae) earmarked 
to finance road improvements according to the Examination Committee plans (Mikuriya, 
Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru, 470).  Despite this precedent, in May 1887 the Finance 
Ministry refused a Home Ministry request to allow additional funds to carry out fire 
reconstruction in the Rōgetsuchō and Shibaichō neighborhoods of Shiba District.  This 
prompted Tokyo Governor Takasaki Goroku to write to Home Minister Yamagata, 
pleading that this refusal amounted to “an abolition of improvements.”  See: TSS, vol. 72 
(Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho: 1981), 244.  Home Minister Yamagata, in turn, forwarded 
this appeal to Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, taking the opportunity to press his case for a 
final resolution of the Examination Committee plans.  It is interesting to note a significant 
change in Yamagata’s language in this petition as compared to his earlier endorsements 
of the Yoshikawa plans.  “Regardless of whether or not Tokyo is the national capital,” 
Yamagata cautiously entreated to the central government, “the roads are narrow causing 
injuries to vehicles, horses, and people; the rivers and canals are clogged and muddy, 
causing boats to be disorderly.  For these reasons especially the air of the capital is 
polluted.”  In this way, not only did Yamagata tone down his rhetoric in anticipation of 
opposition from those who considered the original plans too superficial, too Western, or 
too narrowly focused on transportation, but he also revealed the influence of social 
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urban improvement efforts, Home Minister Yamagata presented the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Ordinance (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei) to the government in early 1888 with 
the support of Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi.  Over the objections of Prime 
Minister Itō Hirobumi and the Chamber of Elders (Genrōin), Yamagata and Matsukata 
pushed the bill through the Cabinet and into law on August 6th, 1888.136  After half a 
                                                                                                                                            
demands for improvements to civic hygiene: “Whether looking at it from the perspective 
of transportation, or from that of hygiene, we certainly cannot leave it this way,” 
Yamagata concluded, “For this reason, I request a timely cabinet discussion concerning 
the previously submitted plans and their immediate adoption,” (TSS, vol. 72, 241-242).  
Mikuriya provides a more thorough analysis of the political circumstances behind this 
petition in Mikuriya, Meiji Kokka wo Tsukuru, 492-495. 
136 Article 1 of the Ordinance established a “Tokyo Urban Planning Committee” (Tōkyō 
Shiku Kaisei Iinkai) in order to “determine a plan for the improvement of the Tokyo 
urban area and which projects are to be carried out during each fiscal year.”  Articles 3 
and 5, meanwhile, specifically delineated how financing for the projects planned by the 
Committee would be secured.  According to Article 3, funds would be raised through 
various taxes on land, commerce, and housing.  Once again following the example of 
Paris, an additional tax would be levied on all liquor – in the case of Tokyo, “refined 
sake” – brewed or sold within, or transported into, the urban area.  These miscellaneous 
taxes were supplemented by a special “national business tax” beginning in 1902 to 
provide extra income for projects (JACAR, Ref.#: A03020538000, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei 
Jōrei ni yori Tokubetsuzei Shitei” [Special tax levy pursuant to the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Ordinance]).  In addition, Article 5 provided for the granting of all unused 
central government-owned river and canal embankment property located within Tokyo to 
the city free-of-charge and tax-free, provided that it be used for urban improvement 
projects.  Only in unavoidable situations, and only with the approval of the Home 
Minister, could these properties be sold or transferred.  As required by Article 7, the 
amount of money raised through these two means must not be below ¥300,000 or exceed 
¥500,000 annually.  As the number of projects increased over the years, these limits were 
increased to a ¥500,000 minimum and ¥1,000,000 maximum in 1902 (JACAR, Ref.#: 
A03020519200, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei-jū Kaisei Tsuika” [Amendment to the Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Ordinance]).  Concerning the order of projects to be carried out, 
Article 8 stipulated that funds would be allocated first for projects improving areas 
destroyed by fire; any remaining funds could then be applied to other planned projects.  
This stipulation was rescinded just two years later in 1890 by imperial edict (JACAR, 
Ref.#: A03020077000, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei Dai-hachijō sakujo” [Nullifying article 
8 of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance]).  Finally, Article 15 declared that a law 
would be passed delineating methods for the handling of lands and buildings related to 
improvements.  This law followed shortly after, promulgated by Imperial Edict #5 on 
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decade of contestation over the meaning of urban improvements in the capital, the Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Committee chaired by Yoshikawa Akimasa released the 1889 Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Plans responding to these various demands, calling for 315 streets, 
49 parks, 8 markets, 5 crematoria, 6 cemeteries.137  Plans for a new fresh water system 
were deliberated by the committee, approved by the central government in May 1890, 
and announced to the public in July the same year.138  Also reflecting a recognition of the 
need to incorporate as many viewpoints as possible in planning decisions, the Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Committee was split nearly evenly between central government 
bureaucrats and local Tokyo representatives in an attempt to balance central and local 
interests.139  Of the 30 members on the committee in addition to the chairman, 10 came 
from the Tokyo Urban Council, two from the Tokyo municipal government, and 2 more 
represented the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce.140 Joining Chairman Yoshikawa Akimasa 
                                                                                                                                            
January 28, 1889 as the Tokyo Urban Improvement Land and Building Acquisition and 
Disposal Codes (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Tochi Kenbutsu Shobun Kisoku). 
137 Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan, 71; Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa, 
“Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan and its Urban Development,” in Tokyo: Urban Growth 
and Planning, 1868-1988, ed. Ishizuka Hiromichi and Ishida Yorifusa (Tokyo: Center for 
Urban Growth Studies, 1988), 13. 
138 NAJ, “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Suidō Sekkei wo Ninka su” [Tokyo urban improvement 
water system plans approved], Call#: honkan-2A-011-00.rui00513100; and NAJ, “Tōkyō 
Shiku Kaisei Jigyō no uchi Suidō no Sekkei wo Sadamu” [Water system plans 
determined as part of the Tokyo urban improvement projects], Call#: honkan-2A-011-
00.rui00513100. 
139 The makeup and jurisidiction of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee was 
codified on August 17th, 1888, by Cabinet Decree (Kakurei) #14, entitled “Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Committee Organization and Jurisdiction” (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Iinkai 
Soshiki Kengen).  TTKSS, 33:50-51. 
140 Among the more notable names sitting on the committee when it first convened 
included: Chairman Yoshikawa Akimasa, Nagayo Sensai, Sakurai Tsutomu, Furuichi 
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were a number of familiar faces from his earlier Examination Committee and even from 
Governor Matsuda Michiyuki’s investigation board: Nagayo Sensai, Sakurai Tsutomu, 
Itō Masanobu, Haraguchi Kaname, Fukuchi Gen’ichirō, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Masuda 
Takashi.  Other notable members of the committee included Furuichi Kōi, Taguchi 
Ukichi, Inukai Tsuyoshi, and Matsumoto Sōichirō.  The imperial edict authorizing the 
Ordinance endorsed this more comprehensive coverage of facilities introduced and inputs 
considered, declaring: “We hereby approve and promulgate the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Ordinance for the purpose of planning the lasting commercial, hygienic, 
fire-prevention, and transportation benefits of the Tokyo urban area.”141   
 
Tokyo Station, Railways, and Imperial Space 
The best example of how the perceived importance of streets, the heightening rhetoric 
and elevating monumentality of the urban improvement plans, and the confluence of 
planning participants all came together to shape the urban space of Tokyo is the 
development of Tokyo Station and the station-front plaza/processional boulevard.142  
Planning for this space began as early as 1884 when the Yoshikawa Plan called for a new 
                                                                                                                                            
Kōi, Itō Masanobu, Taguchi Ukichi, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Fukuchi Gen’ichirō, Matsumoto 
Sōichirō, Haraguchi Kaname, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Masuda Takashi. 
141 JACAR, Ref.#: A03020025200, “Goshomei Genpon, Meiji 21-nen, Chokurei Dai 62-
gō, Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jōrei” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1888, Imperial 
Edict No.62, Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance]. 
142 Today, this boulevard is officially registered as Special Road 404, but known 
colloquially as “Imperial Progress Boulevard” (Miyuki Dōri).  The characters for Miyuki 
can also be read “Gyōkō” meaning “imperial progress” or “imperial visit.”  This Miyuki 
Dōri should not be confused with a second so-called “Miyuki Dōri” located near Ginza 




railway link through the city center and a new central railway station.  But it is important 
to note that this rather inchoate description of a rail line and station bore only the most 
superficial resemblance to the space that was eventually produced.  Although located in 
the same geographic vicinity as envisaged by Yoshikawa, the purpose and perception of 
the station and its surrounding space changed dramatically over the 30 years between its 
inception in 1884 and its completion in 1914.  As with the street and canal improvements 
in the rest of the Yoshikawa Plan, the main purpose of this proposed rail link and central 
station was to facilitate the movement and distribution of goods throughout the city in 
order to spur commercial prosperity.  Yet as demonstrated by the celebration of empire 
that occasioned the opening ceremony in 1914, the urban space consisting of the rail link, 
station building, and processional boulevard had taken on much more imperial 
significance by the time it was completed.  As the following section will demonstrate, the 
imperial space framed by Tokyo Station and its environs organically emerged as the 
mutual byproduct of actions performed by government actors, national politicians, and 
local planning participants.  While it was government urban planners who initiated the 
project in the 1880s, their designs were altered by the intervention of politicians in the 
1890s.  Following the acquisition of colonies and Japan’s emergence as a world power, 
previously antagonistic forces allied to produce a space that projected Japanese imperial 
power.  Finally, it was these central and local forces that charged Tokyo Station as an 
imperial space.        
Reflecting planners’ view of the city in the 1880s, the urban rail link and central 
station first envisioned by Yoshikawa served purely commercial purposes.  As 
Yoshikawa lamented in the Plan, “with existing railways lines reaching from Shimbashi 
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to Yokohama, and from Ueno to Jōmō Takasaki, and now with plans [for a line] along 
the Nakasendō to the Western Capital (Saikyō; Kyoto), that these lines are interrupted 
right in their center, the Tokyo urban area, is regrettable.”  While admitting the 
completion of the Shinagawa line between Shinagawa and Kawaguchi (today’s 
Yamanote Line) currently under construction would greatly improve shipping between 
the northeastern regions and the port of Yokohama, Yoshikawa noted that this had little 
effect on the urban area of Tokyo.  Because the most prosperous commercial areas in 
Tokyo – indeed the place where all goods traded into or out of Tokyo would pass – were 
around Nihombashi, such a rail line was of little use to merchants located in these areas.  
As it stood then, the number of goods shipped by rail from these areas did not compare to 
that of the areas around the Ueno and Shimbashi termini.  A rail link between the two 
termini was all the more important, the Plan argued, because future port construction 
plans would cause an exponential increase in shipping, overwhelming the current system 
of horse carriage transport of goods throughout the city.  For this reason, the plan 
concluded, in addition to the rail link, “a central station should be located in Kajibashi, 
and another station placed to the north of the Kanda River, in order to improve the 
convenience for transportation and the shipping of goods.”143   
The proposed location of these two stations boosted their intended commercial 
function.  Placing a station near the Kanda River (today’s Akihabara Station) would 
provide a convenient transfer point between the rail network and Tokyo’s still vibrant 
river and canal shipping, which was sure to further expand with the canal improvements 
proposed by the Yoshikawa Plan.  This would allow freight to be shipped by train all the 
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way to the banks of the Kanda River and to be unloaded directly onto waiting canal 
barges, rather than being first unloaded at Ueno terminal and then transported by horse 
carriage to their destination.  Kajibashi, likewise, was an ideal location for a central 
station.  Not only was it located immediately to the west of the thriving central 
commercial areas of Nihombashi and Kyōbashi, Kajibashi in 1884 was government-
owned property that could be acquired at little to no cost.  Located inside the outer moat 
(sotobori) of Edo castle, the Kajibashi area had been seized by the Meiji Government 
along with many other former daimyō lands in the city upon taking possession of the city 
following the Meiji Restoration.  Many of these seized lands were put to use as 
residences for government officials or as grounds for various government ministry 
offices, and Kajibashi was no different.  At the time the Yoshikawa Plan was drawn up in 
1884, the grounds where the central station would be located were home to many of the 
capital’s juridical and legal institutions: the Supreme Court of Judicature of Japan 
(Daishin’in), the Tokyo Court (Tōkyō Saibansho), the Tokyo Appellate Court (Tōkyō 
Kōso Saibansho), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Justice Law School, the Police 
Bureau, and finally the Kajibashi Prison.  Placing the central station in this area, 
therefore, would be a cost-effective way to construct a commercial depot to service the 
nearby business areas to the east, especially with a new road leading directly from the 
station to the planned port at Tsukiji.  Together, the two stations would join the 
repurposed Shimbashi station as the principal freight links between the national railway 
network and Tokyo’s two primary means of intra-urban shipping: the Kanda River station 
connected to canal and riverine transport; the central and Shimbashi stations coupled to 
the street network.   
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Tokyo planners were by no means unanimous in their support for the proposed 
rail line and stations.  In the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee, for 
example, a number of committee members spoke out against the line and the central 
station, raising issues of costs, disruptions such a line would cause to the urban areas, and 
the practical need of such a line at all.  Speaking on behalf of the Tokyo Chamber of 
Commerce, Shibusawa Eiichi pointed out the financial difficulties a new rail line would 
present and questioned the reasoning behind it.  “After all,” Shibusawa quipped, “the 
reason for this line is so that freight and passengers from the northeast can reach 
Yokohama directly from Shimbashi, but is not the whole point of these urban 
improvements and port construction to transfer Yokohama’s business to Tokyo?”144  
Fellow businessman Masuda Takashi initially agreed with Shibusawa, pointing out that a 
railway through the middle of the city would cause all sorts of inconvenience, not only 
from a cost standpoint, but also from the disruption this would cause in street traffic.  
Onoda Motohiro jumped in, arguing, “I don’t see the need for a railway through the 
center of the city.  Maybe it’s necessary in a city like Amsterdam, but if we place a 
station in Manseibashi, then it would be just a short distance from Shimbashi.  Such a 
short distance would not be that inconvenient for horse carriages.”  Railway advocates 
Sakurai Tsutomu and Haraguchi Kaname spoke up to address each of these doubts.  
Sakurai pointed out that laying the line along the outer moat of the palace and through 
government-owned land in Marunouchi would reduce expenses, while Haraguchi noted 
that elevating the tracks on brick arches above street level would avoid traffic disruptions.  
Finally, both called on Western precedents to justify the expansion of the urban railway 
                                                
144 TTKSS, 31:63 back. 
188 
 
network and the construction of the central station.  “Looking at the example of 
England,” Sakurai argued, “where more and more railways are laid everywhere in all 
directions above ground and below, it is unmistakable that the laying of railways 
becomes more vital as society progresses (yō no susumu ni shitagatte sono fusetsu wo yō 
suru ni sōi nashi).”145  “It is becoming commonplace lately for capital cities to pass 
railways through the city center,” Haraguchi added, “in England, they are increasing 
every year.”146  As for the central station, he observed, “In America, all the railways split 
off from central stations.  In Europe, too, it is a general rule [to build central stations] 
when capitals are built anew.”147  These explanations satisfied those unsure of the plan, 
and the committee unanimously approved the line.  
Although initial disagreements over the rail line were settled, opinion remained 
divided over the proposed central station.  One major issue was the station’s orientation; 
critics complained that it was facing the wrong way, away from the commercial districts 
it was meant to service and turning its back on the actual center of the city in Nihombashi.  
In fact, as Haraguchi Kaname explained in the Examination Committee, the original plan 
was to have entrances on both sides of the station.148  As planning for rail lines in the city 
progressed, however, it quickly became clear that this would be impossible.  In 1889 the 
Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee increased the number of rail lines included in the 
plans to include several new urban railways envisioned by committee member Taguchi 
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Ukichi.  As drawn up by railway engineers Haraguchi and Matsumoto Sōichirō, 
classmates at the Rennselear Polytechnic Institute, the new network would include 6 new 
lines in addition to the link between Ueno and Shimbashi, making use of as much 
government-owned property along the outer moat of the imperial palace as possible to 
reduce land acquisition costs.149  Yet integrating these lines into a coherent system would 
require the station unavoidably to face west.  Otherwise, railway engineer Hirai Seijirō 
explained to the Committee, the tracks for the shorter distance urban railways would have 
to cross those for long-distance freight railways, leading to unnecessary traffic 
complications and needless danger.150  One option considered for an entrance from the 
east side of the station was a tunnel underneath the tracks, but this was cancelled later in 
1903 on account of expenses.151  Ultimately, a rickety pedestrian bridge was constructed 
to allow access from the east.  
By no means did critics of the station go away over the coming years as planning 
for the line progressed, even while consensus emerged on the need for the rail line.  
Preliminary surveys for the line began in 1890, but construction was delayed by the 
opening of hostilities with China in 1894 in the Sino-Japanese War.  Because the line 
would connect the terminals of both the government line and the Nippon Railway 
Company, the line south from the proposed station would be built by the government, 
                                                
149 The proposed lines are as follows: 1) the “Central line” from Shimbashi to Ueno; 2) 
the “Sotobori line” from Akihabara to Ushigome and Akasaka; 3) the “Koishikawa line” 
from Kanda Misakichō to Sugamo and Itabashi; 4) the “Ichigaya line” from Ichigaya to 
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with the line north to Ueno being built by Nippon Railway.152 Shortly after being placed 
under the jurisdiction of Home Ministry in 1890, the renamed Railway Agency (Tetsudō 
Chō) had been ordered by Home Minister Yamagata to conduct surveys of its half of the 
line.153  The Nippon Railways followed with a survey of their own portion in 1893, hiring 
German engineer Herman Rumshöttel.154 Critics continued to challenge the orientation of 
the station and, indeed, question the need for the station at all.  As late as 1897, members 
of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee continued to press Hirai for explanations of 
why an entrance could not be installed on the east side of the station.  Several members 
even proposed the formation of a special committee to investigate the possibility of 
creating an entrance on the eastern side of the station, but this motion failed to receive the 
majority of votes needed to pass.155   
Opposition to the plans for the central station were also voiced on the floor of the 
9th Imperial Diet in 1896, where the central station issue commanded lengthy discussion 
in both general Diet meetings and special budget appropriations committees.  In that year, 
the Communications Ministry introduced into the budget of fiscal 1896 a line item for 
“Improvement of Existing Government Railways” (Kansetsu Kisei Tetsudō Kairyō) as a 
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6-year project for the enormous sum of over ¥26.5 million, appropriating ¥4,500,000 on 
average annually to carry out construction work.  As the Ministry explained, these funds 
would be used for several projects: double-tracking the as yet single-tracked Tokaidō 
Line in order to accommodate an expected increase in shipping and rail traffic following 
the Sino-Japanese War, extending a railway line to the city of Naoetsu in Niigata 
Prefecture on the Japan Sea coast, and constructing the planned elevated railway line and 
“central station” in Tokyo.  The priority for the first year, the ministry clarified, would be 
the central station.  From the time the government submitted the draft budget to the Diet, 
representatives of areas outside of Tokyo spoke out against the projects in the capital on a 
number of grounds.  Learning that the station and rail line alone would consume 
¥3,500,000 of the ¥4,500,000 allotted for the first year, Yamagata representative Shigeno 
Kenjirō opposed the plans, stressing that devoting so much money to the construction of 
a central station in Tokyo was unnecessary, especially considering that it would only 
benefit the residents of the capital while so many places around the country had yet to 
even receive railways or telephones.156  Although disagreeing with Shigeno’s 
“regionalist” argument, Gumma representative Kusakari Shimmei also opposed the 
central station and elevated rail line, referring to them as “non-essential public works 
(fukyū no doboku).”  Pointing to the distance of track that would be laid between 
Shimbashi Station and the new central station, furthermore, Kusakari accused the 
                                                
156 The central government submitted the budget to the Diet during the third general 
meeting on January 9th, 1896.  Shigeno first denounced the central station during the first 
Communications Budget Committee meeting held four days later on January 13th, and 
then in several later meetings, including the 4-6th Communications Budget meetings on 
January 16, 17, and 20.  Railways and telephones were two major components of the 
Communications ministry budget.   
192 
 
Communications Ministry of deviously attempting to circumvent the necessary Diet 
approval for new railway lines required by the 1892 Railway Construction Act by 
duplicitously casting the projects as “improvements” even though they were obviously 
“expansions.”157  Finally, Kagoshima representative Kawashima Atsushi made a last ditch 
effort to nix the plans prior to the final budget vote in the general meeting of the Imperial 
Diet on February 4th, arguing that available funds should instead be devoted to the 
construction of a port in Tokyo and continuing urban improvements.158  Such concerns 
over necessity and financing led the special committee charged with overseeing the 
Communications Ministry budget to reduce funding for the central station and rail line 
from the requested ¥4,500,000 to ¥3,500,000 yen in January 1896.159  A compromise was 
                                                
157 Indeed, article 2 of the 1892 law stipulated, “changes to, or the addition or subtraction 
of” railway routes delineated in the law “shall be made only with the authorization of the 
Imperial Diet.”  Kusakari made this accusation in the sixth meeting of the 
Communications Budget appropriations special committee on January 20th, 1896.  See: 
Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives Budget Appropriations Committee, Fourth 
(Communications) Subcommittee, 6th meeting, January 20th 1896 (Dai-kyūkai Teikoku 
Gikai, Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai sokkiroku dai-yonka, dai-rokugō), 17-18. 
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meeting of the 9th session of the House of Commons on February 4th, 1896.  See Ninth 
Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 19th General Meeting, February 4th, 1896 (Dai-
kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūkyūgō). 
159 This vote occured in the seventh meeting of the Communications Budget Committee 
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Representatives, 16th General Meeting, January 31st, 1896 (Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, 
Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūrokugō), 3. 
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later reached in the general session of the Diet, when the Diet voted to restore funding to 
its original level while adding an additional year to the project to spread the ¥26.5 million 
over 7 years.160   
Opposition to the station quickly faded as its status became increasingly tied to 
the image of Imperial Capital Tokyo as the metropole of the expanding Japanese colonial 
empire in the early 20th century.  Two events in particular caused major shifts in the 
perception of the station: victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the 
nationalization of over half of all private railways in Japan shortly thereafter in 1906-
1907.  Not only did victory over Russia foster popular support at home for imperialist 
expansion abroad, Japan left the costly war primed to expand its railway network more 
deeply into the Asian mainland.  Decades of Japanese consternation over Russian 
eastward expansion and rivalry between the two countries over influence in Korea and 
Manchuria had exploded into war with the Japanese attack on the Russian naval 
stronghold at Port Arthur in February 1904.  After a nearly year-long siege, the port had 
fallen to Japanese troops in January 1905, and only a short time later the Russian Baltic 
fleet had been annihilated at the hands of Admiral Tōgo Heihachirō in the Battle of 
Tsushima in May 1905.  Defeated on both land and sea, Russia agreed to the mediation of 
American President Teddy Roosevelt, leading to the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth 
                                                
160  For Diet up-down vote, see: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 19th 
General Meeting, February 4th, 1896 (Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku 
Dai-jūkyūgō), 12-13.  For 1896 budget, see: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020265200, “Go-shomei 
Genpon, Meiji nijūkyū-nen, Yosan Sangetsu jūsannichi, Meiji nijūkyū-nen sainyū 
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revenues and expenditures, and 1896 budget of special accounting revenues and 
expenditures].   
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in September 1905.  Although the fighting had severely exhausted the Japanese military, 
sensationalist media coverage of the war had led the Japanese public to believe the nation 
had won an outstanding victory over a major European power.  When the Treaty of 
Portsmouth failed to award Japan any major war spoils or a sizeable indemnity, outraged 
Tokyoites took to the streets to protest the treaty.  As an agitated crowd of 30,000 spread 
from an anti-treaty rally in the recently completed Hibiya Park in central Tokyo on 
September 5th, police lost control of the city for three days as rioters ran rampant through 
the city, looting almost three-quarters of police boxes, setting fire to 15 street cars, and 
attacking the headquarters of the pro-government Kokumin Shimbun newspaper, the 
police headquarters, and several ministry buildings.  By the time martial law was 
declared and order restored in the city by army troops, nearly 500 police and firemen had 
been injured, 311 protestors had been arrested, and 17 people killed in the chaos.161  
Although not to the satisfaction of the disappointed public – who apparently expected 
Japan to acquire all Russian territory east of Lake Baikal – the Treaty of Portsmouth did 
indeed grant Japan control of several territories, including the southern half of Sakhalin, a 
leasehold in Southern Manchuria, and a free hand to declare Korea as a protectorate.  As 
stipulated in article 6 of the treaty, more significantly, Russia agreed to relinquish to 
Japan ownership of the Manchurian railway between Changchun and Port Arthur.162  
Japan followed this up by quickly forcing the “Manchurian Remedial Protocol” (Manshū 
                                                
161Gordon, Andrew, “Social Protest in Imperial Japan: The Hibiya Riot of 1905,” The 
Asia-Pacific Journal 12:21 No. 4 (2014): 3. 
162 The New York Times, “Text of the Treaty: Signed by the Emperor of Japan and Czar of 
Russia,” October 17, 1905, page 6. 
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Zengo Jōyaku) on the Qing Government in December of the same year to recognize 
Japanese control of the railway.163   
Victory over Russia and the acquisition of the railway line in Manchuria marked a 
significant turning point in Japanese railway development that saw a major restructuring 
in nationwide railway ownership, administration, and finance.  First, anticipating an 
economic boom and concomitant increase in shipping following the Russo-Japanese War, 
the government resurrected the issue of private railway nationalization.  Government 
purchase of private railways had been a frequent topic of debate ever since the Meiji 
government had authorized the establishment of Japan’s first private railway, the Nippon 
Railway Company in 1881.  Arguing against the establishment of private railways as 
early as 1883, for example, Railway Bureau Chief Inoue Masaru had written to Itō 
Hirobumi warning of the “harmful effects” of entrusting railways to private companies 
and insisting that “the government itself should undertake railway enterprises.”164  
Thereafter, calls for nationalization had ebbed and flowed in relation to the success of the 
private railway business during two “Railway Manias” that swept across Japan in 1885-
                                                
163 Andō Hikotarō, Mantetsu: Nihon Teikoku Shugi to Chūgoku [The South Manchurian 
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1890 and 1893-1897.  While struggling private railways went bankrupt or merged with 
competitors during a recession in 1890, the Cabinet submitted a bill for nationalization in 
1891 that ultimately led to the promulgation of the 1892 Railway Construction Act.  Calls 
for nationalization resurfaced following the collapse of the second railway mania amidst 
recession in 1898, when no fewer than 15 companies were dissolved through mergers and 
absorption, reducing the number of private railways to 66 in 1897 and to 39 by 1906.165  
When the two bills for nationalization presented to the Imperial Diet in 1890 both failed, 
the government responded with the Private Railway Law and Railway Operations Law.  
Following the Russo-Japanese War, the central government once again presented a 
Railway Nationalization Law to the Imperial Diet in 1906 in order to reduce costs, to 
facilitate operational convenience through standardization and by eliminating needless 
redundancies, and to prevent foreign investors from controlling the railways.166  Amended 
by the Upper House of the Imperial Diet, the number of railways to be nationalized was 
reduced from 32 to 17.  Still, 17 railways was nearly half of the 39 private lines operating 
in Japan at the time.  The bill finally passed the Diet after all opposing lawmakers walked 
out of the in protest, and was promulgated by the Meiji Emperor on March 30st, 1906 as 
the Railway Nationalization Law (Tetsudō Kokuyū hō).167  When purchase of all 17 lines 
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was finalized in October 1907, the percentage of government railways in relation to 
private lines nearly tripled, from 30% of the national total to almost 90% of national 
trackage.168   
While the Japanese government was consolidating control of railways at home, it 
was also extending the reach of Japanese railways overseas as a means of expanding 
Japanese colonial influence.  As a Japanese Government railway report later explained in 
retrospect, “overseas expansion of Japanese railways” was possible because of two 
factors: “the nationalization of railways and the Continental expansion of the Empire 
after the successful campaign with Russia.”169  Solidifying the link between railway 
nationalization and colonial expansion, on the same day that the government promulgated 
the Railway Nationalization Law, a second law authorized the government to purchase 
the Keifu Railway Company in Korea.  As will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, the Keifu Railway Company was the product of years of negotiations between 
Japan and Korea over railway concessions in the peninsula dating back to the 1890s.  
Finally established by Japanese investors including Shibusawa Eiichi, the Keifu Railway 
Company operated the Keifu Line between Seoul and Pusan and the Keijin Line between 
Seoul and Inch’ŏn.  Through the so-called “Keifu Railway Purchase Law,” the Japanese 
government took possession of all lines, structures, and properties formerly belonging to 
                                                                                                                                            
Tetsudō Kokuyū hō” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1906, law #17, railway 
nationalization law]. 
168 W. Dean Kinzley, “Merging Lines: Organising Japan’s National Railroad, 1906-
1914,” The Journal of Transport History 27 (206): 41-42.  For a detailed chart of 
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the company.170  After announcing the purchase of the Keifu railway in March 1906, the 
government established the South Manchurian Railway Company by imperial decree in 
June to operate the rail line acquired from Russia.  According to the decree, shares of 
company stock were to be limited to the governments of China and Japan and nationals 
of both countries.  The Japanese government, moreover, reserved the right to invest in all 
assets and coal mines associated with railways in Manchuria.171  There are several reasons 
to see the railway company as a Japanese vehicle for gradually colonizing Manchuria.  
First, the company was the recommendation of the Manchurian Administration 
Examination Committee (Manshū Keiei Chōsa Iinkai), which was chaired by Kodama 
Gentarō, the Governor-General of Taiwan.172  Secondly, Kodama famously admitted that 
the railway company was merely a cover for building other facilities that would expand 
Japanese territorial control.  “The sole point of postwar administration of Manchuria will 
be to don the public mask of railway management (yō ni tetsudō keiei no kamen wo 
yosoi),” he wrote in a proposal for Manchurian administration policy, “while secretly 
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establishing all kinds of facilities (in’ni hyappan no shisetsu wo jikkō suru ni ari).”173  
Finally, Kodama hand picked as the first president of the South Manchurian Railway his 
subordinate in the Taiwan Government-General, Gotō Shimpei.  
Reflecting the heightened importance of railways in the growing empire, railway 
administration and financing underwent significant changes designed to reduce budgetary 
reliance on the central government and bureaucratic oversight.  First, following soon after 
the promulgation of the Railway Nationalization Law, railway financing was made 
independent of the general budget by the Imperial Railway Finance Law (Teikoku 
Tetsudō Kaikei Hō) in April 1906, and later revised by the 1909 Imperial Government 
Railways Accounting Regulations (Teikoku Tetsudō Kaikei-Kisoku).174  The idea was that 
all expenses for railway expansion and improvement would be funded only through 
surplus profits from imperial railways operations in an attempt to make the railways more 
self-sufficient and reduce the burden they placed on state coffers.  Nevertheless, the 
central government continued to supplement the Imperial Railways with funds from the 
imperial treasury in the form of transfers to the tune of ¥26 million in 1907 and just over 
¥30 million in 1908 to continue work on improvement of existing government lines.175  
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sanjūnana-gō, Teikoku Tetsudō Kaikei Hō Seitei Kansetsu Tetsudō Kaikei Hō Haishi”  
[Original script signed by the Emperor, 1906, Law #37, enactment of the Imperial 
Railways accounting law, annulment of the Government Railways accounting law]. 
175 For line items in 1907 budget, see: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020737100, “Go-shomei 
Genpon, Meiji yonjū-nen, Meiji yonjū-nen sainyū saishutsu sōyosan narabini dōnendo 
kaku tokubetsu kaikei sainyū saishutsu yosan” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 
1907, 1907 general budget of revenues and expenditures, and 1907 budget of special 
accounting revenues and expenditures], slide #57; For 1908, see: JACAR, Ref.#: 
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Secondly, in addition to reducing reliance on government financing, administration of 
railways was reorganized to limit bureaucratic oversight.  Reflecting the imperial reach of 
Japanese railways, the Railway Operations Bureau (Tetsudō Sagyōkyoku), responsible for 
constructing, maintaining, and operating the government-owned railways, was given a 
more regal moniker as the “Imperial Government Railways” (Teikoku Tetsudōchō) in 
March 1907, and placed under the direct supervision of the Communications Minister.176  
Then, in December 1908, administration of railways across the empire, which by now 
included the Imperial Government Railways (Teikoku Tetsudō) in the Japanese mainland, 
Korea, Taiwan, and Karafuto, and the South Manchurian Railway Company, were 
consolidated under a new cabinet level organization called the Railway Agency 
(Tetsudōin).  With the endorsement of Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and then-
Communications Minister Gotō Shimpei, railway supervision was removed from the 
Communications Minister and elevated to directly under the Prime Minister.177  The first 
director of the Railway Agency was none other than Gotō Shimpei.  
                                                                                                                                            
A03020779400, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūichi-nen, Yosan Sangetsu Jūsannichi, 
Meiji yonjūichi-nen sainyū saishutsu sōyosan narabini Meiji yonjūichi-nendo kaku 
tokubetsu kaikei sainyū saishutsu yosan” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1908, 
1908 general budget of revenues and expenditures, and 1908 budget of special 
accounting revenues and expenditures], slide #58. 
176 JACAR, Ref.#: A03020704100, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjū-nen, Chokurei dai 
nijūroku-gō, Teikoku Tetsudōchō Kansei Seitei Tetsudō Sagyōkyoku Kansei Haishi” 
[Original script signed by the Emperor, 1908, Imperial Edict #26, establishment of the 
Imperial Government Railways, and the dissolution of the Railway Operations Bureau]; 
Teikoku Tetsudō Taikan Hensan kyoku, ed., Teikoku Tetsudō Taikan Taikan: Meiji 
Taishō Tetsudō Hattatsu-shi [General survey of imperial railways: development of 
railways in the Meiji and Taishō periods](Hara Shobō, 1984), 4.  The Communications 
Minister at this time was Yamagata Isaburō. 
177 JACAR, Ref.#: A03020776600, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūichi-nen, Chokurei 
dai nihyakukyūjūroku-gō, Tetsudōchō Kansei Seitei Teikoku Tetsudochō Kansei Haishi”  
[Original script signed by the Emperor, 1908, Imperial Edict #296, establishment of the 
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All of these changes greatly affected the design and planning of the central station 
in Tokyo.  Whereas the original plans for the central station in the 1884 Yoshikawa Plan 
had been for a commercial rail depot, the years of delay between then and the breaking of 
ground for the railway yard in 1902, the laying of the foundation in 1908, and the actual 
start of construction of the station superstructure in 1911 allowed plenty of time for 
perceptions of the station to change.  As Fujimori Terunobu points out, there did not 
seem to be a connection between the central station, Marunouchi as a business district, 
and the imperial palace at the time the central station was planned.178  Indeed, the first 
western-style buildings of the nearby Marunouchi “One Block London” were not 
completed until 1894.  Before being sold to the Mitsubishi Corporation four years earlier, 
in fact, Marunouchi was nothing more than a vacant army parade ground overgrown with 
weeds.179   
As Tokyo became a capital of both emperor and empire following the Sino-
Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, planners began to see the need for a symbolic central 
station at the heart of the imperial capital for two reasons.  First, planners began to place 
the station in the context of famous monumental train stations around the world.  As early 
as 1896, railway engineer Matsumoto Sōichirō had defended plans for the station in 
Imperial Diet budget committee meetings by drawing attention to the fact that people had 
                                                                                                                                            
Railway Agency, and dissolution of Imperial Government Railways]; and Teikoku 
Tetsudō Taikan Hensan kyoku, ed., Teikoku Tetsudō Taikan, 5; Aoki and others, A 
History of Japanese Railways, 41.   
178 Fujimori Terunobu, “Tōkyō-Eki Tanjōki” [Birth story of Tokyo Station], in Tōkyō-Eki 
no Sekai, ed. Kanō Shobō (Tokyo: Kanō Shobō, 1987), 44. 
179 Ishizuka and Ishida, “Tokyo, the Metropolis of Japan,” 10; Sorensen, The Making of 
Urban Japan, 73. 
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at first been opposed to Victoria Terminal in Bombay, India, too, but now largely 
approved of the terminal.  Large stations, Matsumoto added, were being erected in major 
cities across Europe and America.180  Indeed, the symbolic importance of the planned 
station building was magnified as Japanese officials started to view Tokyo’s central 
station in competition with iconic railway stations around the world.  Victoria Terminal, 
London’s St. Pancras, Berlin Station, Amsterdam Central, Paris’s Gare De’est, and Grand 
Central Terminal in New York City were all symbols of their cities.  On floor of the 9th 
Imperial Diet, Diet member Wada Hikojirō accordingly emphasized the need for a station 
to represent the Japanese capital, lamenting that riders on Japan’s trunk railway from the 
northeast could only go as far as Ueno, and those from the southwest only as far as 
Shimbashi.181  As these arguments show, politicians and planners recognized that the 
“central station” would come to represent the capital.  Secondly, planners began to view 
the central station as the personal station of the emperor.  The timing of this shift is 
harder to pinpoint, but it is notable that no mention is made prior to the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1894-1895 of the station’s propinquity to the imperial palace or the possibility of 
its use by the imperial family as a justification for its construction.  This is underscored 
by the persistence of complaints about the station’s orientation away from the commoner 
districts of the city.  This is perhaps not surprising for urban planners who tied 
international prestige primarily to economic function and less to monumental 
                                                
180 See: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives Budget Appropriations 
Committee, Fourth (Communications) Subcommittee, 5th meeting, January 17th 1896 
(Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai sokkiroku dai-yonka, dai-gogō), 8. 
181 See: Ninth Imperial Diet, House of Representatives, 19th General Meeting, February 
4th, 1896 (Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūkyūgō), 264. 
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architecture.  Nevertheless, it is clear that sometime after 1898 planners recognized the 
possibility of the emperor’s personal use of the station.  This date can be determined as 
the year the government hired German engineer Franz Baltzer to design the elevated rail 
line.  In addition to schematics for the elevated line, Baltzer also sketched the first 
elevations for the station building.  After being dismissed in 1903, Baltzer returned to 
Germany and published his designs in the German engineering magazine Zeitschrift des 
Vereines deutscher Ingenieure.  Notably, two significant similarities can be seen between 
these plans and the later Tokyo Station.  Baltzer separated departures and arrivals into 
two separate pavilions, as was common in German railway stations to ease congestion.  
In between the two passenger pavilions, Baltzer also planned an individual building for 
the emperor that he called the “Kaiser Pavilion.”  While this Kaiser Pavilion is often used 
as evidence that Baltzer oriented the station towards the imperial palace, it is clear from 
debates in the Tokyo Urban Improvement Examination Committee over a decade earlier 
that the station’s direction was a product of the railway design and had been determined 
much earlier.  It is unclear, however, whether Baltzer included the Kaiser Pavilion under 
his own initiative or whether he was instructed to do so.  Regardless, the station took on 
the role of personal station of the emperor and a pavilion reserved for the imperial family 
was retained in the plans.   
The growing symbolic importance of the station greatly affected its architectural 
design.  With the station’s new imperial roles in mind, the government a building that 
would make a suitable architectural statement.  Baltzer had initially envisioned Tokyo 
Station as a grouping of several Japanese-inspired buildings featuring stone walls 
uneasily capped by traditional karahafu pediments.  As William Coaldrake describes, 
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Baltzer’s designs were “entirely in keeping with Japanese traditions of architecture and 
authority, but it was entirely out of step with the intention of the Meiji imperial state to 
represent its new authority as a modern, Westernised nation.”182 Hired in 1903 to replace 
Baltzer, Japanese architect Tatsuno Kingo likewise later criticized what he saw as a 
foolhardy attempt to replicate Japanese architectural style.  Baltzer’s design, Tatsuno 
pejoratively wrote, was like the “Western-beauty-with-a-Shimada-Haircut Style” 
(Shimada-mage no Yō-bijin Shiki) of a Western woman who comes to Japan and 
awkwardly dons Japanese hairstyle and dress.  “While she may happily think that she is 
rare,” Tatsuno mused, “to Japanese eyes she is exceedingly unsightly and unbalanced, as 
inedible and indigestible as Japonesque food with too much seasoning.”183  Baltzer’s 
designs were not only lacking in the preferred architectural style, they did not fulfill the 
Japanese government’s hope for an appropriately modern and monumental station for the 
Japanese imperial capital.  As Tatsuno wrote: “It appears that [Baltzer’s original plan] 
was not for a long, continual building as it is now, but…rather to line up individual 
buildings along the railway line.  But that is nothing more than lining up small houses, 
and was said to be too shabby (misuborashii) for the central station of the Imperial 
Capital (Teito).”  The government therefore instructed Tatsuno to design a more 
magnificent station.  “I received a request from the head of the Railway Operations 
Bureau at that time, Hirai [Seijirō],” Tatsuno recalled, “to make the building continuous 
and to emphasize the magnificence of the building.”184  Clearly, Hirai and Tatsuno 
                                                
182 Coaldrake, Architecture and Authority, 232. 
183 Tatsuno Kingo, “Chūō Teishajō no Kenchiku” [The architecture of the central station], 
in Tōkyō-Eki no Sekai, ed. Kanō Shobō (Tokyo: Kanō Shobō, 1987), 219. 
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understood the symbolic importance of the building that would become Tokyo Station.  
Hirai, for one, was a classmate of Haraguchi Kaname’s at Rensselaer, and had traveled 
extensively in Europe.185  Tatsuno, for his part, knew that Tokyo Station would be 
compared to the iconic central stations of the great capitals of the world.  “All of the great 
cities of Europe,” Tatsuno wrote in an article describing the design of the station, “even 
London, even Berlin; they all have central stations.”186  Finally, the Railway Bureau 
directed Tatsuno to place the imperial entrance in the middle of the station.187   
In addition to instructing Tatsuno to design a fittingly Western-style station, the 
government also ordered the building plans to be expanded to match the increasing 
importance of the Railway Agency.  Serving at the time as Communications Minister and 
Railway Agency director, Gotō Shimpei famously urged the building of “a station that 
befits a Japan that defeated the great power Russia; one that will shock the world.”188  
Consequently, after the establishment of the Railway Agency, two significant changes 
were made to the existing station plans even after the commencement of foundation work 
in 1908.  First, because the station would serve as the Railway Agency headquarters, it 
was necessary to design a station large enough to accommodate the required office space, 
not to mention reflect the Railway Agency’s importance as a cabinet-level department in 
charge of railways stretching across the empire.  For this reason, as Tatsuno described, 
plans for the station, which had at first only been one story, were expanded to two floors, 
                                                
185 Rezneck, Education for a Technological Society, 179-180. 
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and then later to three.  Second, as the size of the station expanded, so too did its 
construction budget.  From an original estimate of ¥420,000, the cost of the building 
soared over 600% to a final price of ¥2,800,000.189  The impact of these changes is 
unmistakable over the three generations of Tatsuno’s elevations for the station.  First 
produced in 1904, Tatsuno’s initial design for the station featured individually massed 
central and octagonal flanking pavilions connected by shorter bays, each accentuated by 
an intermediate projecting pavilion.  The first plan was heavily ornamented, with ox-eye 
dormers, domed turrets accenting the corners of each pavilion, slender lanterns jutting 
from roofs of the central pavilions, and ribbed domes capping each flanking pavilion.  
The most striking change in the second generation of plans was the replacement of the 
short lantern over the central pavilion in the first plan with a much taller pyramid-capped 
tower in the second.  Other noticeable changes were the elimination of projecting 
pavilions in the intermediate bays, and addition of characteristic lunette-shaped curved 
open pediments in the cornice of each pavilion, bringing the flanking pavilions close to 
their finished form.  Some within the government were concerned that such a high tower 
over the central pavilion would “look down” on the imperial palace.  The final generation 
of plans, completed by December 1910, took into consideration the instructions of the 
Railway Agency and the increased budget of the central station.  The high tower over the 
central entrance was replaced by a shorter hipped crested roof that more suitably 
acknowledged the station’s location facing the imperial palace.  The intermediate bays 
                                                
189 The architect of Tokyo Station, Tatsuno Kingo, later recalled that at the time he joined 
the project, the budget of the station building was a mere ¥420,000 (Tatsuno, “Chūō 
Teishajō no Kenchiku,” 219-220).  The final price frequently cited for the building is 
¥2,800,000 (Tokyo Minami Tetsudō Kanrikyoku, ed., Tōkyō-Eki Eki-shi, 27). 
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were also raised to give the station a more continuous massing, with each bay adorned 
with Corinthian pilasters and interrupted by a projecting square pavilion capped by a 
concave curved roof.  The frame of the building was steel, as reflected in the crisscross 
pattern of the façade ornamentation and interior coffered ceiling, and the building was 
constructed in red brick, which had become a symbol of “civilization and enlightenment” 
after the Ginza Bricktown.  The curved pediments, ribbed domes, and front portico gave 
the station a strong Italianate or Neo-Renaissance form, while its red brick accented by 
white ornamental quoins, pilasters, and stringcourses, produced an unmistakable Queen 
Anne Revival appearance.  Built in this trademark “Tatsuno Style,” Tokyo Station fit in 
perfectly with the similar buildings of Marunouchi, or even London, where Tatsuno had 
studied before designing the station.   
As the magnificence of the station building design intensified, so too did the 
monumentality of the surrounding streetscape.  Notably, these monumental street plans 
came not from the imperial government, but from local planning forces in the Tokyo 
Urban Improvement Committee, which after 1898 was split equally between Tokyo 
representatives and central government officials.190  Through a series of plan changes, 
                                                
190 Revisions to the organization of the committee were passed in 1896 and 1898.  After 
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streets around the station were redesigned to form a large station-front public plaza 
(hiroba).  In a city that lacked large parks, truly open, public space was rare.  As Jinnai 
Hidenobu explains, in Edo, bridgeheads had functioned as de facto plazas, if only 
because they were the largest public spaces where residents could convene in large 
numbers.  Such plazas had also traditionally been important as places of evacuation and 
refuge during conflagrations, although by 1914 fires had ceased to be the constant threat 
they were in previous decades.  Thus, the plaza fronting Tokyo Station served an entirely 
different purpose.  Planning for the Tokyo Station plaza began as early as 1897.  The 
Examination Committee had in 1885 called for a 15-ken road to be placed through the 
middle of the grounds set aside for the central station, but this conflicted with the 
Railway Board’s designs for the location of the station building.  Plans for the road were 
consequently removed at the request of the Communications Ministry in 1897 in order to 
create room for the future station.191  As construction of the building neared completion, 
planners wanted to make sure the plaza would be ready for the scheduled opening 
festivities.  First, the Railway Board petitioned the Urban Improvement Committee in 
December 1913 to change to the planned route through the plaza to deviate around the 
station and to urge its immediate completion.  The committee, on the other hand, decided 
that it was “not appropriate (tekitō narazaru)” for a road to bisect the station front plaza 
and cancelled the road altogether, enlarging the plaza.  Secondly, the Committee 
unanimously approved a plan to add street gutters on the approaches to the plaza for 
immediate completion as a supplementary project.  As Home Ministry representative to 
the Committee Horita Mitsugu explained, construction on the station building was being 
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expedited in order to be completed in time for “this year’s big festivities (honnen no o-
daiten).”  So this road plan had been added just that day and should also be completed as 
quickly as possible.192  
Perhaps the most monumental aspect of the plaza design was the clearing of a 
new processional boulevard leading from the front of the station directly to the imperial 
palace.  Planning of this link dated to 1908, when the Improvement Committee approved 
a motion by newly appointed member Aki Toratarō to nominate a special committee to 
propose additional routes to the Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans.  Aki was a Tokyo City 
Council member who was making his first appearance in the Committee with a number 
of other council members.  Taking the floor, Aki lamented the crooked boundaries of the 
city of Tokyo, and proposed the committee as a way to install roads to clearly demarcate 
the city limits.  Presenting a more formal petition in the following meeting, Aki 
emphasized the need to expand the range of urban improvements because the city had 
expanded significantly in the two decades since the plans were first codified in 1889.193  
As a result of the petition, a 9-member Road Planning Enquiry Committee was formed to 
investigate and report their recommendations.  Returning two years later, the committee 
recommended 20 changes to the existing plans, including alteration of 2 planned routes 
and the introduction of 18 entirely new roads.  One of these new routes was a ceremonial 
link between the Wadakura Gate of the Imperial Palace and the planned central station.  
                                                
192 Discussion of these projects spread over two meetings, #266-267.  See TTKSS, 25 for 
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193 Aki voiced this motion during his first Committee Meeting after being assigned by the 
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Not surprisingly, the stated purpose of this route was to enhance the monumentality of 
the station.  “With the growth of the Imperial Capital, there are many unsatisfactory parts 
of the current Urban Improvement Plans,” Improvement Committee executive secretary 
(kanji) Toki Kahei justified the route selection.  One in particular was “the lack of a road 
leading to the central station.”194  Unanimously approved by the Improvement 
Committee, this route was added to the Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans with a length of 
121 ken (~720 feet) and a width of 40 ken (~240 feet), making it the widest street in 
Tokyo.195  Construction of this new axial boulevard commenced from December 1911, 
just months after the construction of the Tokyo Station superstructure got underway, and 
was completed in time for the opening ceremony of the station in 1914 (See Figure 11).196 
With a ceremonial station-front plaza matching its monumental Western 
architecture, Tokyo Station capped an urban space that united railways, architecture, and 
urban planning to project imperial power.  Through both its function as a railway depot 
and its Western “Renaissance”-style façade, Tokyo Station symbolized modernity and 
civilization.  As a product of the Tokyo Urban Improvement projects and situated within 
a monumental streetscape, meanwhile, Tokyo Station – the “Gateway to the Imperial 
Capital” – tied the national railway network to the urban fabric of the city.  As the 
personal train station of the emperor, moreover, Tokyo Station embodied the emperor 
system.  Not only did the station directly face the imperial palace, it’s ornately decorated 
central pavilion was reserved for the imperial family.  If the two symbols of progress in 
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Meiji Japan were the monarch and the locomotive, they were conjoined in Tokyo Station, 
the “Gateway to the Imperial Capital.”197  The urban space framed by Tokyo Station and 
its surrounding streetscape thus symbolically linked the various mechanisms of Japanese 
modernity and power: the emperor system, railways, and the modern built environment.  
Thus, after 30 years, the stage was set for the opening ceremony that doubled as a 
celebration of the empire – the spark that charged this urban place as an imperial space. 
 
Conclusion: Politics, Space, and Ideology 
How different the December 1914 opening ceremony of Tokyo Station was from scenes 
that had often played out in central Tokyo in recent years.  Just several months earlier in 
February of 1914, riots had broken out in the streets of the capital over four days from the 
10th to the 14th as news of the Siemens naval scandal and rumors of tax increases reached 
the public.  Saber-wielding police clashed with a mob of stone-throwing protesters 
outside the Imperial Diet on the 10th leading to the arrest of over 200 hundred protestors 
and several newspaper editors accused of inciting the revolts, but not before rioters 
smashed rickshaws and streetcars, looted pro-government newspapers and police boxes, 
and stormed the Diet building.198  Even more deadly and damaging riots had occurred 
nearly one-year to the day earlier in February 1913.  Protestors outside the Diet 
overturned the rickshaws of fleeing parliament members on the 5th, and stoned Prime 
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Minister Katsura Tarō as he fled on the 10th after resigning and dissolving the cabinet as a 
result of the protests.  The situation grew more serious when police gunfire killed one of 
the demonstrators.  In response, mobs once again set fire to the pro-government Kokumin 
Shimbun newspaper headquarters in Ginza and a number of streetcars.  By the time the 
military was called in to disperse the rioters and re-establish control of the city, 38 police 
boxes had been destroyed, 168 people including 110 policemen had been injured, 253 
protestors had been arrested, and 6 people had been killed.199 
 As these contrasting examples illustrate, the urban space of Tokyo was contested 
terrain during the late-Meiji period.  On the one hand we have what appears to be a 
conflation of space and imperialism, a celebration of the power of space.  On the other 
hand, in the riots, we have what could be seen as the total resistance to and blatant 
subversion of spatial power by forces opposed to the producers of space.  Yet, perhaps 
these two seemingly incongruous spatial practices were not so different.  As Andrew 
Gordon points out, riots in 1905, 1913, and 1914, after all, had been pro-imperial.  “To 
honour the nation and the emperor,” Andrew Gordon notes, “the crowd wanted Japanese 
hegemony in Asia and equality with the west.”200  Crowds celebrating empire in the 
station-front plaza or taking to the streets outside the Imperial Diet were both reaffirming 
the power embedded in that urban space.  These sites were chosen specifically because 
they were already imbued with power – power that was reified by the participation of 
local residents.  As Gordon adds, “The belief that the streets and public places belonged 
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to the people was widely held.”201  Indeed, the public had every right to rearticulate for 
their own purposes the power of the space in which they moved, because they had been 
active participants in its production. 
Following the failure of the Ginza Bricktown, urban visionaries and reformers in 
Tokyo remained frustrated with the conditions of the city.  The forestalled project had 
failed to satisfy those who saw Ginza as the jumping-off point for the westernization of 
the city, as well as those who saw it as merely the beginning of longer-term efforts to 
fireproof buildings and widen streets throughout the capital.  Yet it had also left these 
planners even more motivated than ever to enact reforms.  As government planners set 
about transforming Tokyo into a suitable capital, they worked from the steadfast belief in 
a triangular relationship between the city’s transportation network, commercial 
prosperity, and international prestige.  For this reason, transportation infrastructure 
improvements – specifically the construction of “improved streets,” (kaisei dōro) 
indicating streets that had been widened, straightened, and paved – became the common 
element of increasingly comprehensive urban improvement plans in Meiji Tokyo.  As the 
Meiji period progressed, these planners’ functionalist goals for the city were stretched 
and expanded by various inputs from participants at all levels of society.  Whether it was 
opulent European-style urban amenities, necessary commercial facilities, or popular 
demands for sanitation, these various inputs formed a planning milieu that contributed to 
the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plans.  That is to say, the eventual plans were not 
produced by a single actor as much as they materialized through the collective efforts of 
several participants.  The example of Tokyo Station, furthermore, demonstrates how 
                                                
201 Gordon, “The Crowd and Politics in Imperial Japan,” 165. 
214 
 
these various impulses for reform merged to reshape a commercial depot into a 
monumental space of emperor and empire at the heart of the imperial capital.     
In this regard, shifts in the perception of the urban space of Tokyo mirrored the 
development of Meiji imperial ideology over the course of the late Meiji period.  As 
Carol Gluck and Sheldon Garon have noted, imperial ideology was not unilaterally 
imposed from above by a monolithic state onto a passive Japanese population.  Rather, 
for Gluck, Meiji government hegemony and national orthodoxy emerged from a 
“congeries of ideologies,” and while fraught with “areas of shared agreement, as well as 
those of tension,” was nonetheless accepted because it resonated with ideas that already 
existed in society and fulfilled practical needs.202  Moreover, Gluck notes, “the strongest 
views – the hard line – often came from outside the government, from the minkan, as it 
was called, from ‘among the people’,” that is, from the “journalists, intellectuals, and 
public figures” who joined the bureaucratic ideologues in furthering the reach of imperial 
ideology.203  Garon, similarly, argues that private groups in Japanese society 
enthusiastically cooperated with central government “social management” in order to 
advance their own causes.  “Japanese officials and groups within society,” Garon notes, 
“frequently interacted in formulating and implementing programs to manage society” 
through various moral suasion campaigns.204  
The emergence of imperial space in Tokyo was no different.  This was best seen 
in the local involvement in the planning of the monumental processional boulevard and 
                                                
202 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 16. 
203 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 9-10. 
204 Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, 6. 
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plaza fronting Tokyo Station and the opening ceremony of the station.  Ultimately, 
various groups participated in the production of modern urban space because it satisfied 
their own needs and desires: quality streets and markets for commerce, sewers and fresh 
water systems for hygiene and sanitation, and monumental urban design for city pride.  In 
this regard, it seems all groups, including the State, benefitted.  Just as with the 
production of imperial ideology, where “the strongest views” came “from outside the 
government,” the creation of imperial space was as much the result of local forces as it 
was central state actors.  With this in mind, perhaps we can speak of the marches of the 
rioters in Tokyo not as emancipatory “pedestrian speech acts,” as de Certeau theorized, 
but instead as the performance of a “spatial practice” tying mutually produced urban 
space to disciplinary control.205  In this light, the protests can be seen as Gluck’s 
                                                
205 No social processes are unidirectional or carried out without being part of a dynamic 
dialectical interaction, whereby different actors and factors share in the final product.  
This is as true for the (uneven) social production of space, as demonstrated by urban 
theorists Henri LeFebvre and Michel de Certeau, and critical geographers David Harvey, 
Edward Soja, and Manuel Castells, as it is for the production and spread of urbanism, as 
argued by Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait.  That is to say, urban residents – whether they 
are citizens, colonial subjects, or citizen-subjects – are always already active agents in the 
production and definition of the urban space of the cities, by necessity including even the 
power relations immanent in and mediated through the built environment. Following 
Louis Althusser’s accusation of the proletariat’s complicity in the reproduction of the 
labor and material conditions for capitalism, then, the agency of the urban dweller in the 
production of urban space must also extend to participation in the reproduction of this 
power in built form.  This was equally true for de Certeau’s “voyeur” at the top of the 
World Trade Center, as it was for Benjamin’s flâneur strolling the arcades of Paris, or for 
Jane Jacob’s dancers in the “ballet” of the sidewalk.  Finally, Althusser writes, it is the 
performance of the practices of ideological state apparatuses that interpellates individuals 
as subjects of the ideology of that apparatus.  If we view urban space as being heavy with 
the ideology of power, then participation in “spatial practices,” even protesting, can thus 
be said to be a mechanism for reifying the power of space, and making urban residents 
subjects to spatial power.  See Henri LeFebvre, The Production of Space (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1991), and The Urban Revolution (Minneapolis:  University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003); Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984); David Harvey, Limits to Capital (Chicago: 
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“areas...of shared tension” within Meiji ideology.  Although violent and targeted at 
specific political parties or individual politicians, the frequent riots during Tokyo’s “era 
of popular violence” never sought to undermine Meiji imperial ideology or challenge 
Japanese imperial expansion.  As Japanese colonial officials sought to cultivate imperial 
hegemony in the colonial capitals of Taipei and Seoul, they would deploy the flexible and 
responsive planning system forged in Tokyo in an attempt to foster the same type of 
coproduction of imperial space seen in the imperial capital.   
                                                                                                                                            
University of Chicago Press, 1982), and The Urban Experience (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989); Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The 
Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (New York: Verso, 1989); Manuel 
Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); and 
Joe Nasr and Mercedes Volait, Urbanism: Imported or Exported?: Native Aspirations 
and Foreign Plans (London: Wiley-Academy, 2003); Louis Althusser, “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy: and Other Essays (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1971), 130-131; Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999); Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE GROUNDWORK OF EMPIRE: THE SEOUL-PUSAN RAILWAY AND 
JAPANESE INFORMAL EMPIRE IN KOREA 
 
If there came a day when Korea was divided by the 
great powers, the existence of a railway belonging 
to us would be good reason for the maintenance of 
our rights in any distribution of territory. 
 – Maejima Hisoka, 18961 
In early May 1905, a diverse groups of dignitaries – Japanese and Korean royalty, 
government officials from both countries, and diplomats from the United States, England, 
France, and Germany – gathered in the plaza in front of Namdaemun Station in Seoul to 
celebrate the opening of the Keifu Railway between Seoul and Pusan.  Pronouncements 
by Japanese Prince Fushimi-no-miya Hiroyasu and Korean Prince Yi Jae-gak both 
expressed hopes that the new line would lead to greater transportation, commerce, and 
amity between the two countries.2  The presence of royalty and central government 
officials from these several countries at the ceremony gave the event a palpably dignified 
air, far more than expected for the opening of a rail line owned and operated by a private 
railway company.  What the wide range of attendees at the ceremony indicated was that 
the rail line required the cooperation of a large number of private and public actors, not 
only limited to Japan and Korea, but also including the United States.   
                                                
1 Quoted in Janet Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy, Business Opinion and the 
Seoul-Pusan Railway, 1894-1906,” Modern Asian Studies 11, no. 4 (1977): 580. 
2 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudōshi [History of railways in 
Korea], vol. 1, Sōshi Jidai [The beginnings](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu Tetsudōkyoku, 
1915), 338-339.  Notably, the president of the Keifu Railway at the time of its opening 
was Furuichi Kōi, former member of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee, who 
had taken over as president from Shibusawa Eiichi.   
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For Japan, the ceremony marked the culmination of over a decade of tortuous and 
often contentious diplomatic negotiations between the governments of Japan and Korea 
over the funding, building, ownership, and management of the railway.  Indeed, this final 
segment signaled the consummation of attempts since 1872 to pry open the “hermit 
country” and extend Japanese imperial influence into the Korean peninsula.  Built to 
secure lines of logistical support for military actions on the continent, fix efficient 
shipping lanes for commercial interests, and anchor Japanese claims to ownership of 
Korean territory, the Keifu Railway represented more than just an overseas investment 
opportunity.  As Japanese Communications Minister Ōura Kanetake proclaimed at the 
opening ceremony: “Hereafter, the railways of our two countries will be separated by 
only a narrow strip of water, and our national capitals set apart by only a few days’ travel.  
It goes without question that this will be of use in times of emergency.”  “As a result of 
this railway,” Ōura continued, “we can now make international friendships more 
intimate, promote industrial development, and anticipate drastic changes (isshin) in 
politics and economics.”3  As Ōura suggested, the railway was the backbone of a 
deliberate policy of Japanese informal empire in Korea intended to demarcate a 
defensible, profitable, and internationally recognized buffer space between the Japanese 
home islands and western imperialist incursion in Asia.  
Opening ceremonies of railways and train stations were important events in Meiji 
Japan; so important, in fact, that the most significant ceremonies were presided over by 
members of the imperial family.  The 1872 opening of Shimbashi Station, the northern 
terminus of Japan’s first railway between Yokohama and the imperial capital of Tokyo, 
                                                
3 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudōshi, vol. 1, 343. 
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was one such occurrence.  Addressing the assembled Japanese officials, subjects, and 
foreign representatives inside the station building, none other than the Meiji Emperor 
himself expressed his hopes for railways in Japan.  “At this time, We announce the 
completion of our country’s initial railway,” the Emperor proclaimed to the assembled 
officials: “Looking forward to the wealth and prosperity of our nation, we celebrate the 
opening of the railway for the sake of all the officials and people of the nation.”  Turning 
to his gathered subjects, the Emperor voiced his benevolent wishes for their well-being.  
“We personally open the Tokyo-Yokohama railway,” the Emperor pronounced, 
“Henceforth, may the benefits of the railway make trade increasingly thriving and the 
people all the more rich and prosperous.”4  While the Meiji Emperor spoke in terms of 
the increasing wealth and prosperity of his people, railways played an equally substantial 
role in the geographical integration, political centralization, and ideological unification of 
the modern Japanese nation.5  Thereafter, as the Meiji emperor encouraged at the opening 
ceremony, railways in Japan “spread like a vine across the whole country” during two 
“railway manias” in 1885-1890 and 1893-1897 as a result of the combined efforts of the 
Railway Bureau and private railway companies, such as the Nippon Railway Company 
                                                
4 Tōkyō Shiyakusho, Tōkyō-shi Shikō Shigai-hen [Manuscripts of Tokyo history: the 
urban area], vol. 53 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1963), 463-464; and Tristan R. Grunow, 
“Trains, Modernity, and State Formation in Meiji Japan,” in Trains, Culture, and 
Mobility: Riding the Rails, ed. Benjamin Fraser and Steven D. Spalding (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2012), 239-240. 
5 See Tristan R. Grunow, “Tracks to Teito: The Tokyo Train Network and the Meiji 
Question for Domestic Hegemony and International Recognition,” MA Thesis, 
University of Oregon, 2008; and Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State 
Formation in Meiji Japan.” 
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established in 1881.6  From the 18-miles of the Tokyo-Yokohama Line opened in 1872, 
the national railway network quickly grew to over 1,000 miles by 1889, and to nearly 
4,750 miles by 1906.7  With rail lines extending central rule to all parts of the 
archipelago, each railway or train station opening marked one more link in the progress 
of Japan’s growth as a modern united nation, each ceremony a celebration of the 
maturing state.   
As Japanese territory expanded, the locomotive followed the flag: first to 
Hokkaidō and then to Taiwan.  After asserting Japanese control over the island of Ezochi 
and renaming it Hokkaidō, the Meiji government built the Horonai Railway in 1869 to 
lay the infrastructure for the development of the new territory.  Continuing the practice of 
imperial presence at important railway opening ceremonies, the opening ceremony of the 
Horonai Railway was attended by Prince Komatsu-no-miya Akihito.8  Acquiring the 
island of Taiwan from China nearly two decades later in 1895 as Japan’s first formal 
colony following the Sino-Japanese War, colonial officials undertook repairs of existing 
railways and the construction of new lines.  Mirroring opening ceremonies in the 
mainland and Hokkaidō, the 1903 opening ceremony of the northern segment of the 
                                                
6 Quoted in Tristan R. Grunow, “Trains, Modernity, and State Formation in Meiji Japan,” 
239-240; TSS, vol. 53, 463-464; Aoki Eiichi, “Expansion of the Railway Network,” 
Japan Railway & Transport Review 2 (1994): 34-35. 
7 Aoki, “Expansion of Railway Network,” 34–35; Imperial Government Railways of 
Japan, Railway Nationalization in Japan Railway Nationalization in Japan: Ten Years 
Progress Under State Management, 1907-1908 to 1916-1917 (Tokyo: Tsukiji Type 
Foundry, 1919), 2, 4–5; Harada, Technological Independence and Progress of 
Standardization in The Japanese Railways (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 
1981), 11. 
8 Tetsudōshō, ed., Nihon Tetsudōshi [History of railways in Japan](Tokyo: Tetsudōshō, 
1921), 1:310.   
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improved trans-insular railway denoted the important role of railways in colonial rule.  
With over 500 distinguished guests assembled amongst the “Great Green Arches” erected 
in front of Miaoli Station in central Taiwan, Japanese colonial rulers emphasized the 
political importance of railways.  “It goes without saying,” Director of Public Affairs 
Gotō Shimpei told the assembled crowd of Japanese colonial officials and Taiwanese 
subjects, “that the development of railways reflects a nation’s prosperity and culture, as 
well as its national strength, to the rest of the world.”  Yet there were also more 
immediate benefits of railways, Gotō noted: “The influence of this railway for the culture 
of this island is by no means insignificant.”9  Not only did railways serve industrial and 
military purposes, they had added benefits as conveyors of colonial power.  Whether by 
bounding territory or by forging progress, rails of steel were deployed as tools of 
Japanese hegemony.  Governor-General of Taiwan Kodama Gentarō clearly denoted this 
connection between railways, culture, and hegemony at the same opening ceremony.  
“The development of humanity, the promotion of industry, and the mobility of the 
military all largely rely on railways,” Kodama told the gathered crowd, “My greatest 
hope is that by protecting and riding this railway, you will stay devoted civilized imperial 
subjects (seidai bunmei no tami).”10  In this regard, each station or line opening signaled 
another step in Japan’s emergence as a colonial power, each ceremony a celebration of 
the expanding empire.   
Yet in Korea, it was the flag that followed the locomotive.  In May 1905, Korea 
was not yet a colony of Japan.  It would be another 6 months before Japan compelled the 
                                                
9 Taiwan Sōtokufu Tetsudōbu, ed., Taiwan Tetsudōshi [History of railways in 
Taiwan](Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Tetsudōbu, 1910), 1:454. 
10 Taiwan Sōtokufu Tetsudōbu, ed., Taiwan Tetsudōshi, 458. 
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Korean government to sign the infamous Protectorate Treaty (also known as the “Eulsa 
Treaty”), making Korea a protectorate of the Japanese empire and establishing the 
Resident-General to control Korea’s foreign diplomacy.  Nevertheless, the similarities 
between the opening ceremonies in Japan, Hokkaidō, Taiwan, and Korea represent 
Japanese leaders’ similar view of railways in each territory: as tools for expanding 
Japanese hegemony into new areas in response to perceived outside challenges.  It is 
notable in this regard that railway construction by Japanese companies in these areas – 
one the Japanese mainland, one more a newly claimed territory, another a formal colony, 
and the other a foreign country – proceeded simultaneously.  Once laid, the Keifu 
Railway later provided the jumping off point for a Japanese-constructed and -controlled 
railway network that spanned the Korean peninsula and provided the infrastructure for 
Japanese colonial rule after annexation of the peninsula in 1910.  As early as 1902, the 
Japanese Cabinet declared, “Railway management is the true essence [lit. “marrow”] of 
our political platform towards Korea (waga tai-Kan seikō).”11  Once the line was opened 
in 1905, Army Minister and later Governor-General of Korea, Terauchi Masatake, used a 
similarly corporeal metaphor, gloating to Foreign Minister Katsura Tarō: “With the 
completion of the Keifu Railway, coupled with the military railway between Seoul and 
                                                
11 This statement was included in a proposal submitted by Foreign Minister Komura 
Jūtarō and adopted by the Cabinet on October 2nd, 1902.  See Gaimushō, ed., Nihon 
Gaikō Nenpyō narabini Shuyō Bunsho [Chronology and pricinple documents of Japanese 
foreign diplomacy], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965), 207; and Gaimushō, ed., Nihon 
Gaikō Bunsho [Japanese diplomatic documents], vol. 35 (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Kyōkai, 
1957), Doc.#: 268, Komura-Katsura, 498-503.  Also quoted in Takahashi Yasutaka, 
Nihon Shokuminchi Tetsudō Shiron: Taiwan, Chōsen, Manshū, Kahoku, Kachū Tetsudō 
no Kei’eishi-teki Kenkyū [History of Japanese colonial railways: a study of railway 
management in Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, northern China, and central China](Tokyo: 
Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1995), 63-64. 
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Sinŭiju, the backbone (kikan) of railways traversing Korea is hereby completed.”12  With 
this backbone in place, Japanese railways in Korea, nationalized in 1906 and placed 
under the administration of the Resident-General in 1907, expanded radially from Seoul 
towards Sinŭiju in the northwest, Wŏnsan in the northeast, and Mokp’o in the 
southwest.13  Centering on the capital, these lines together produced the characteristic 
“X”-shaped pattern of Japanese controlled trunk railways bounding the Korean peninsula.  
While these railways undoubtedly served economic purposes, Japanese officials also saw 
locomotives as engines for expanding the empire.  For this reason, colonial officials 
encouraged and aided the growth of Japanese-controlled railways.  With this support, 
railway mileage increased rapidly after annexation in 1910, nearly doubling in ten years 
from 674 miles in 1910 to 1,157 in 1920, reaching 1,777 miles two years later in 1922.14  
As discussed in Chapter 3, it was the acquisition of these new territories and 
colonies that put the finishing touches on Tokyo Station as an imperial space at the heart 
of the imperial capital.  As the regal 1914 opening ceremony of the so-called “Gateway to 
the Imperial Capital” demonstrated, railways were integrally linked not only to the space 
of the Japanese capital but also to the expansion of the Japanese empire beyond.  In other 
                                                
12 JACAR, Ref.#: B04010942300, “Chōsen Tetsudō Fusetsu Kankei Zakken” 
[Miscellaneous documents of railways in Korea], 4. 
13 The first railway in Korea had opened in 1900 between Seoul and Inch’ŏn, operated by 
the Kei-Jin Railway Company.  Against the wishes of the Korean government, the 
concession to construct this railway, which had been originally granted to an American, 
was sold to a group of Japanese investors funded by Japanese government subsidies.  The 
Resident General Railway Management Bureau was in charge of railways.  The chairman 
of the Bureau was former Keifu Railway Company president Furuichi Kōi.  See: 
Takahashi, Nihon Shokuminchi Tetsudō Shiron, 73-74. 
14 Government-General of Chosen, Annual Report on Administration of Chosen, 1922-
1923 (Keijo: Government-General of Chosen, 1924), 151. 
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words, the ideological shift over the mid-to-late Meiji period that transformed the “home 
of the emperor” into the “imperial capital” was fulfilled with the procurement of colonial 
possessions.  Chapters 4 and 5 will now shift the analytical lens from the metropole to the 
colonies to examine how Japan asserted hegemony overseas by exploiting colonial space 
– first in the natural environment, and then in the built environment.  Whether by 
constructing railways or by improving the built form of the native city, Japanese pre-
colonial agents and colonial administrators followed models forged in the metropole as 
they attempted to assert claims of territorial ownership and project Japanese power in the 
colonies.   
This chapter will take up the issue of Japanese attempts to cultivate imperial 
hegemony through manipulation of the natural environment, namely in the form of 
railways.  Nearly a decade before Japanese colonial officials in Korea began organized 
forest planting programs in 1906, Japanese agents broke ground on construction of 
railways cutting through the Korean countryside.15  Not only did these railways plow 
through existing rice paddies, but they also had a massive environmental impact on the 
mountains and fields of Korea.  Railways caused considerable transformations of the 
natural environment to provide straight and level passages for the train.  Mountainside 
cuttings, tunnels, bridges, and embankments all required the demolition, clearing, or 
moving of vast amounts of earth.  Track beds themselves were formed from earth 
subgrade and stone ballast, not to mention the wooden railway ties and iron rails laid on 
top to form the tracks.  Even before any of this earth moving or construction could be 
                                                
15 See: Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “The Nature of Empire: Forest Ecology, Colonialism and 
Survival Politics in Japan’s Imperial Order,” Japanese Studies 33, no. 3 (2013): 225-242. 
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done, however, there was an equally appreciable amount of diplomatic and financial 
groundwork necessary.  In this regard, the awarding of railway concessions was only a 
turning point; the 1905 opening of the Keifu Line and its nationalization by the Japanese 
central government in 1906 marked the culmination of Japanese government efforts to 
solidify and demonstrate its power in the natural environment of the Korean peninsula – 
not necessarily as a precursor to formal colonization and annexation in 1910, but as a 
means to establish Korea as a protective buffer from perceived Western threats.   
As early as 1894, Japanese diplomatic “men on the spot” and commercial 
“patriotic capitalists” in Korea acted in concert to secure Japanese rights to construct 
railways in Korea as the primary goal of a larger program of internal reforms.16  The 
actions of these Japanese actors was informed by the fear that an underdeveloped and 
unstable Korea would attract the intervention of Western imperialists, which would in 
turn potentially threaten Japanese national security and commercial interests.  Driven by 
these concerns, Japanese strategists looked to the example of Hokkaidō as they sought to 
develop the Korean borderland into a defensible buffer, by force if necessary.  This 
required first releasing the peninsula from the suzerainty of the Qing Empire by securing 
international recognition of Korean independence.  Japan therefore sought to foster 
Korean modernization by supporting the efforts of Korean progressives and sponsoring 
reforms intended to remove the China-leaning ruling party from power.  But when 
internal reforms did not proceed at a pace they deemed sufficient, Japanese diplomats 
took the more direct action of conspiring to incite a Japanese-led coup d’état that would 
                                                
16 “Patriotic capitalists” from Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, “‘Railpolitik’: An 
Introduction,” in Railways and International Politics: Paths of Empire, 1848-1945, ed. 
T.G. Otte and Keith Neilson (London: Routledge, 2006), 8. 
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install a Korean government more favorable to modernization, reform, and – not to 
mention – Japan itself.  In this way, reforms were merely a pretext for increasing 
Japanese control of Korea.   
Amidst this push for reforms, one persistent goal of Japanese diplomats was the 
securing of “material advantages,” specifically railway and telegraph concessions.  These 
were desirable because they would facilitate control of the peninsula and garner Western 
recognition of Japanese dominance in Korea.  Not only would transportation and 
communication infrastructure improve military logistics and increases commercial profits 
through expedited trade and shipping, the necessary land grants and concessions would 
permit Japanese ownership and exploitation of Korean territory.  When international 
incidents undermined diplomatic attempts to secure Japanese control of Korean railways, 
the business community stepped in to pick up where the diplomats left off.  As Peter 
Duus argues, Japanese expansion into Korea was the symbiotic result of “two separate 
but interlinked processes,” one political and the other economic.  “Symbiotic ties linked 
the two processes,” Duus explains, “Each was propelled by an independent energy, yet 
each nourished the other: the sword was the servant of the abacus, the abacus the 
handmaiden of the sword.”17  Following policies dictated by the Foreign Ministry, private 
commercial interests acted as government proxies advancing Japan’s informal empire 
into the Korean peninsula. 
Securing railway concessions was only one half of the story; the other half was 
building the railway.  In addition to the negotiations to secure the railway concession and 
                                                
17 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-
1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 24. 
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the necessary financing, construction of the lines required land for the right-of-way and a 
large labor force to transport materials to the work sites, move earth to make way for the 
trains, and to lay the iron tracks.  The Seoul-Pusan railway therefore required the 
cooperation of a number of actors on both sides of the Korea/Tsushima Strait: Japanese 
diplomats and businessmen to secure the railway concession; Japanese entrepreneurs and 
engineers to operate the railway; the Korean government to donate the right-of-way; 
Korean laborers to make up the work force; and the Japanese government to provide 
emergency funds.  The laying of the Keifu Railway in particular is thus a prime example 
of how the cooperation of multiple participants – the Japanese government, Japanese 
capitalists, foreign diplomats and capitalists, the Korean government, and Korean 
laborers – was required to produce spaces of empire.   
 After considering the concept of “informal empire,” the first section of the chapter 
will outline the development of Japan’s foreign policy towards Korea as articulated by 
Japanese Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo.  The idea of “enlightened exploitation” will 
be introduced in the second section in order to explain why railways in particular made 
for an effective engine of informal empire by solidifying Japanese claims of “cultivator’s 
rights” to Korean territory.  The remaining three sections of the chapter will then detail 
how various actors worked together to lay the infrastructure of empire. 
 
Informal Empire, Western Imperialism, and Early Meiji Foreign Policy 
In an influential 1953 article and 1961 book, John Gallagher and Ronald E. Robinson 
argued that the defining feature of British overseas expansion in the mid-19th century was 
the establishment of “informal empire” through the “imperialism of free trade.”  Arguing 
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against the orthodox view of mid-Victorian laissez-faire and anti-imperialist 
“disinterest,” Gallagher and Robinson asserted that Great Britain still consolidated new 
territories into a British-dominated global economic system by imposing treaties of free 
trade and friendship onto weaker territories through “gunboat diplomacy.”  In doing so, 
Great Britain was able to spread their empire by “extending formal control informally if 
possible and formally if necessary.”18  As a result, “the formal empire of rule was but a 
part of the informal empire of trade and influence.  Commercially speaking, colonies 
were the lesser part of the iceberg visible above the water-line.”19   
The scholarly response to the concepts of “imperialism of free trade” and 
“informal empire” was mixed.  Not surprisingly, Gallagher and Robinson’s provocative 
interpretation of British expansion sparked heated responses from historians of 
economics and imperialism.  One of the most forceful came from D.C.M Platt, who 
maintained that Victorian laissez-faire attitudes were indeed “faithfully reflected 
overseas.”20  Years later, no less a scholar of imperialism than Ann Laura Stoler 
                                                
18 Robinson and Gallagher first proposed their alternative theory of European imperialism 
in John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic 
Historical Review 6, no. 1 (1953): 1-15, and then refined it in Ronald E. Robinson and 
John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: 
Macmillian, 1961).  Building on this original theory, Robinson later argued in a series of 
article that imperialism was as much the result of European “push” as it was Non-
European “pull.”  See: “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for 
a Theory of Collaboration,” Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, ed. Roger Owen and 
Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972), 117-142; and, “The Excentric Idea of 
Imperialism, with or without Empire,” in Imperialism and After: Continuities and 
Discontinuities, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1986), 267-289. 
19 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 8.  
20 See D. C. M. Platt, “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations,” The 
Economic History Review, New Series, 21, no. 2 (1968): 296-306, and Platt, “Further 
Objections to an ‘Imperialism of Free Trade,’ 1830-1860,” The Economic History 
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dismissed the idea of informal empire, saying that it and the related concept of “indirect 
rule” were nothing more than “unhelpful euphemisms, not working concepts.”21  Yet 
other scholars have found the concept a useful framework for analyzing imperialist 
expansion.  Jürgen Osterhammel, for example, suggests that informal empire is an apt 
framework for analyzing the uneven economic relationship between Great Britain and 
China following the First Opium War and the signing of a series of treaties including the 
Treaty of Nanking (1842), Treaty of Tientsin (1858), the Peking Convention (1860), and 
the Chefoo Convention (1876).22  Similarly, Japan was arguably threatened by Western 
informal empire following the “opening” of the country in 1853 by the American 
Commodore Mathew Perry and the signing of the Treaty of Shimoda in 1854.  The more 
formal Treaty of Amity and Commerce, signed in 1858, was quickly followed thereafter 
by other so-called “unequal treaties” with Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and 
Russia that gave each of these countries extraterritoriality rights on Japanese soil while 
severely limiting Japan’s power to control tariffs on imported goods.  It was in response 
to this foreign pressure that Japanese formulated its foreign policy, and eventually 
                                                                                                                                            
Review, New Series, 26, no. 1 (1973): 77-91.  For an overview of the writings Gallagher 
and Robinson, critical responses, and thoughtful commentaries, see William Roger Louis, 
ed., Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York: New 
Viewpoints, 1976).  For quote from Platt, see “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some 
Reservations,” 305. 
21 Ann Laura Stoler, “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty,” Public Culture 18, no. 1 
(2006): 136. 
22 Peter Duus, “Japan’s Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An Overview,” in The 
Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, ed. Peter Duus and others (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), xv; Jürgen Osterhammel, “Semi-Colonialism and 
Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China: Toward a Framework of Analysis,” in 
Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and 
Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 290-314. 
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channeled informal empire onto its Asian neighbors. 
 In adopting the concept of “informal empire,” this chapter follows the definition 
of Osterhammel, who explains that “informal empire” was an effective way for 
imperializers to secure access to foreign markets and sources of raw materials without 
establishing permanent colonies, especially in areas where “colonial rule would have 
been too costly and would have involved unwanted responsibility.”  Instead, 
Osterhammel explains, “Governing was left to Anglophile indigenous rulers, who, 
however, were rarely enthusiastic ‘collaborators’.”23  What resulted, was a situation of 
“quasi-colonial control” where the weaker state “remain[ed] intact as an independent 
polity with its own political system” and conducted its own foreign policy, but the 
stronger state was able to gain favorable trading rights and extraterritoriality through 
pressure by diplomats, consuls, and settler communities.24  Peter Duus has also provided 
a useful distinction between traditional international economic relations and informal 
imperialism.  “What distinguishes informal imperialism from nonimperialistic trading 
relationships...is the use of coercive methods,” Duus notes.  “Normal trading 
relationships between modern societies presumably rest on mutual consent and a shared 
sense of advantage.  The will of one party is bent to the other not by force or threat of 
force but by persuasion.”25   
As will be discussed in this chapter, Japan used railways in an attempt to assert 
informal empire over Korea as early as 1894.  Actions by Japanese diplomats and 
                                                
23 Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, 19. 
24 Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, 20-21. 




commercial agents seeking railway concessions in Korea in the mid-1890s can certainly 
be classified as “coercive methods.”  Although always couched in terms of transportation 
and commerce, it was not only economic concerns that propelled Japan’s drive for 
informal empire in Korea.  That is to say, Japanese imperialism in the mid-1890s was not 
“economic imperialism.”  Instead, capitalism and economic motivations merged with 
concerns over strategic interests in the East Asian region to propel Japanese expansion.26  
As a “latecomer to the contest for overseas empire,” Hyman Kublin argued, Japan’s 
foreign policy was founded largely on “fear.”27  As Kublin saw it, the defensive Meiji 
regime was intent on the “ultimate abolition of the so-called ‘unequal treaties’, and a 
modest expansion aimed at the promotion of the national security.”28  For Kublin, then, 
                                                
26 The question of whether or not Japanese expansion was conditioned by economic 
factors has been a major point of contention among scholars of Japanese imperialism.  
The debate was for a long time framed by Lenin’s interpretation of imperialism as the 
highest stage of capitalism.  As this theory holds, imperialism was the inevitable outcome 
of capitalism as entrepreneurs in the metropole monopolized domestic markets and 
therefore needed new markets in which to invest capital and obtain raw materials and 
markets of consumption.  Peter Duus has helpfully reminded scholars not to “brush aside 
the question of economic impulses entirely” or “ignore the economic context of 
expansion.”  Carefully eschewing Marxian overtones, Duus convincingly showed that 
Japan was “driven by a sort of economic ‘necessity’ to expand its economic activities in 
the peninsula.”  “If the Japanese economy were to continue expanding,” Duus rightly 
noted, “it had to find markets for its exports.”  As Duus admits, “there is little evidence in 
the diplomatic documents or in the papers of the statesmen to indicate that economic 
advantage was the primary concern of the decision makers or that they were heavily 
influenced by the lobbying of private business interests.”  But for Duus, economic 
conditions added to an expansionist impulse that had other motivating factors.  As Duus 
acknowledges, “The primary goal of the advance into Korea was to deny control to any 
other power lest Japan’s own strategic position in the region be weakened.”  See: Peter 
Duus, “Economic Dimensions of Meiji Imperialism: The Case of Korea, 1895-1910,” in 
The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 129, 161). 
27 Kublin, “Evolution of Japanese Colonialism,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 2, no. 1 (1959): 67, 73. 
28 Kublin, “Evolution of Japanese Colonialism,” 73. 
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rather than economic forces or internal political rivalries, Japanese expansion was 
propelled by a desire to secure “unqualified acceptance as a great power.”  “Japanese 
leaders may well have feared that,” Kublin suggested, “if they failed to respond to the 
challenges which empire posed, admission to the ranks of the world’s élite might be 
delayed.”29  Similarly, in The Abacus and the Sword, Peter Duus argues that Meiji 
expansionism was “preemptive,” and was practiced in a game where the rules stated, “if 
one’s own country did not establish dominion over a particular territory, then a rival or 
enemy would.”  Given this precarious international situation, Duus argues, “It is not 
surprising that the Japanese leaders, aspiring to join the great game, became caught up in 
this peculiar psychology.”  Put more specifically: “If Korea or China were to fall under 
the dominion of the Western imperialist powers, Japan would find itself increasingly 
vulnerable to Western pressure.  In this sense, the late Meiji impulse to expand was 
aimed as much at denying territory to others as in acquiring it for Japan.”30   
Emerging onto the world scene in the latter half of the 19th century, Japan 
formulated its foreign policy in the midst of, and in response to, an imperialist race for 
territorial control.  Coming to power in 1868 after Japan had been forcefully “opened” to 
the West by American gunboats in 1853, the Meiji Government acutely recognized the 
pressure of “foreign threats.”  From the Japanese perspective, the scene was especially 
dire as Western imperialists continued to inch closer and closer to East Asia.  As Duus 
writes: “Throughout the 1870s and 1880s a series of events – Russian encroachments on 
the Chinese border, French seizure of Indo-China, British expansion in to Burma and 
                                                
29 Kublin, “Evolution of Japanese Colonialism,” 76. 
30 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 17-18. 
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Malaya – reminded [the Japanese leaders] that an aggressive Western imperialism was on 
the march in Asia.”31  Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru lamented the dire political situation 
in an 1887 memorandum: 
The [European] countries are all devoting their power more and more to the 
colonization and development of overseas territories…In India, Cambodia, 
Cochin-China, and elsewhere, the weak become prey for the strong…During 
the past three or four years the European countries have expanded their power 
into Asia and Africa more than ever before, and they are brandishing their 
power in the Far East as well.  Ah, the continent of Africa and Asia are about 
to become the cockpit of conflict among the Europeans.32 
 
Russian eastward expansion was particularly worrisome for Japanese 
policymakers, and had preoccupied defensive strategists since even before the Meiji 
Restoration.  Russia had first appeared on Japanese shores in 1792 when Russian 
diplomat Adam Kirillovich Laksman showed up in the northern island of Hokkaidō.  This 
was followed two decades later by Admiral Ivan Fedorovich Kruzenshtern’s arrival at 
Nagasaki in 1804, carrying the Russian ambassador Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov.  
Rebuffed by the Tokugawa Shogunate, the frustrated Rezanov ordered two Russian naval 
officers to lead attacks on several Japanese possessions on Sakhalin and the Kurile 
Islands in 1807.33  Later, Russia was one of the western countries to “open” Japan in 
1853, when an expedition led by Admiral Evfimii Putiatin sailed into northern Japanese 
waters the same year as Mathew Perry’s better-known arrival.34  Thereafter, Japanese 
                                                
31 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 16. 
32 Quoted in Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 17. 
33 Brett L. Walker, “Mamiya Rinzō and the Japanese Exploration of Sakhalin Island: 
Cartography and Empire,” Journal of Historical Geography 33 (2007): 297. 
34 Sho Konishi, “Reopening the ‘Opening of Japan’: A Russian-Japanese Revolutionary 
Encounter and the Vision of Anarchist Progress,” The American Historical Review 112, 
no. 1 (2007): 103. 
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defense strategists had continued to eye Russia with increasing trepidation.  Army 
Minister Yamagata Aritomo cautioned the Emperor in 1874 that Russia continued to pose 
a military risk on Japan’s northern frontier.  “We have achieved our independence,” 
Yamagata warned, “but still the lack the power to oppose threats from abroad, 
particularly the Russian threat from the north.”35  Suspicion of Russia was exacerbated by 
rumors of the planned Trans-Siberian Railway.  Writing even before construction of the 
railway had started, Yamagata anticipated the revolutionary impact the line would have 
on the balance of power in Eastern Asia when completed.  In an 1886 statement that 
would not leak to the public until 1888, Yamagata wrote that the railway would 
“strengthen connections between all the important places in Russia and Siberia and 
facilitate transportation to the Pacific coast, thereby allowing the transport of troops to the 
Port of Vladivostok in just few days time should a need arise in the east.”  As a result, 
Yamagata added, “This railway completely changes Russian military strength and 
solidifies the Russian position in Asia.”36  These fears became all the more real when 
word reached Japan that construction had started on the line in 1891.  Yamagata 
reiterated to the Emperor the impending crisis this posed in 1893:  
Russia is unable to use force in the direction of the Balkans, and so she will 
turn singlemindedly [sic] her eyes to the East and will want to give full play 
to her bestial greed.  Such things as the establishment of the Siberian railway 
are to this end.  The progress of these works will indeed hasten a crisis in the 
Far East…After ten years from now, with the completion of the Trans-
                                                
35 Quoted in Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-
1922 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 75. 
36 Yamagata’s manuscript is reprinted in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, ed., Nihon 
Gaikōshi Kenkyū: Meiji Jidai [Research in Japanese diplomatic history: the Meiji 
period](Tokyo: Yūshindō, 1957), 186-192.  The original is held in the Mutsu Munemitsu 
papers of the National Diet Library Political Documents Collection. 
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Siberian railway, Russia will be in a position to invade Mongolia, and who 
cannot tell that in the future she will not reach right into China?37 
 
The task of formulating Japanese defense policy in response to this threat of 
Western incursion fell to Yamagata, one of the most prominent Japanese generals and 
politicians in the Meiji period.  As Chief of the Army General Staff, it was Yamagata’s 
duty to prepare Japanese military strategy, and personally memorialize the emperor as 
the chief advisor for defense matters.  Position papers presented by Yamagata represent a 
shift in Japanese foreign policy in response to continuing Western threats: whereas the 
first impulse was to consolidate internal hegemony, once this was secured with the 
quelling of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 Japanese strategists began eying external 
extension of Japanese influence.  Yamagata consistently pressed the urgency of 
expanding the military in order to ensure Japanese national security, establish a dominant 
position within East Asia, and maintain territorial buffers to Western encroachment.  
After personally leading troops in 1877, Yamagata turned his strategic gaze from the 
Meiji government’s domestic rivals to potential foreign enemies.  Yamagata’s first step 
in determining Japanese defense needs was dispatching numerous officials to investigate 
conditions in northern China and Korea in 1878.  As Roger Hackett relates, these secret 
fact-finding missions produced a number of studies on “The Military Preparedness of 
Neighboring Countries,” and “The Geography of China.”38  These reports led Yamagata 
to argue that Japan needed to expand its military in order to assert its position as the 
regional hegemon of East Asia.  As Yamagata argued in a policy proposal in 1882, “The 
nation with which our country must be concerned and must compete in terms of strength 
                                                
37 Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 575. 
38 Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo, 82. 
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is not a remote country but one situated closeby.”  “If we fail now to recover our martial 
spirit, expand the army and navy to make a veritable floating fortress of our Imperial 
nation, extend our strength to all corners of the state in the spirit of steadfast valor,” 
Yamagata concluded, “our nation, which in the past has experienced troubles with 
nations in the immediate vicinity, will unquestionably suffer again from weakness.”39   
An unpublished position paper penned in 1886 provides a revealing glimpse into 
how the precarious international situation refocused Yamagata’s strategic gaze outwards.  
Continuing his crusade of military preparation and expansion, Yamagata wrote this paper 
to urge military readiness in order to defend the Japanese homelands in case of war in 
East Asia.  As Yamagata argued, the Panama Canal, Trans-Canadian Railway, and 
Trans-Siberian Railway would cause chaos in the balance of power in East Asia by 
shortening British shipping routes and expediting Russian troop movements.  Moreover, 
as Yamagata continued, “Because Russia’s intent is to invade, as soon as the Siberian 
railway is completed, they will turn towards opening inroads into Korea or India.”  In the 
event war broke out between Russia and England as a result, Japan would be forced to 
either remain neutral or to join the war itself.  Even if Japan were to remain neutral in 
case of war between Russia and England, Yamagata urged, it must make military 
preparations so as to prevent the belligerents from encroaching on Japanese neutrality.  
“Naturally, the same is true,” Yamagata advised, “whether we are to remain neutral or 
are to take a belligerent stand ourselves.”40   
                                                
39 Quoted in Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo, 87-88. 
40 This document is found in NGK, “Yamagata Ikensho,” 183-203.  For quote, 188. 
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For Yamagata, the key to East Asian stability, and in turn Japanese self-defense 
and independence, was Korea.  Moving beyond urging military preparation, Yamagata 
argued that Japan must develop a calculated defense policy in case of emergency in East 
Asia.  This was necessary, he insisted, because a war between Russia and England would 
have far-reaching effects on all countries in the region.  Although any battles in such a 
war would most likely be staged on the Korean peninsula, Yamagata cautioned that 
Korea would not be the only country to suffer in case of bloodshed between Russia and 
England.  Rather, a war would also cause a breakdown in relations between China and 
Japan.  “For this reason,” Yamagata advised, “we must determine in advance whether or 
not we can really remain neutral in a time of emergency in the East.”41  In the context of 
potential military conflict in East Asia, Yamagata tellingly wrote of the need to secure 
Korean independence from Western colonization in the name of Japanese self-defense: 
Our national policy is to completely detach Korea from relations with 
China and make it an autonomous, independent country so that a strong 
European power will be unable take advantage of the situation and move 
in to occupy it.  Korea’s location dominates the situation for all of East 
Asia, and so for a [European] power, especially, to occupy Korea would 
be a direct disadvantage for our country.  Consequently, starting long ago 
we dispatched diplomats to Seoul in order to exhaust efforts to sign a 
treaty with the various Western powers recognizing Korean autonomy and 
independence, and we have now started to achieve increasingly favorable 
results.42   
 
It was policy statements such as this that led William Beasley to conclude, “It appears 
that what Yamagata had in mind was an international agreement on the subject of 
                                                
41 NGK, “Yamagata Ikensho,” 188. 
42 NGK, “Yamagata Ikensho,” 188. 
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Korea.”43  Certainly, Yamagata spoke of an international acknowledgment of Korean 
independence, but it was premised on concerns for Japanese national security.  The fear 
was that if Korea stayed under Chinese influence it would fall into the hands of a 
European power, thereby placing Japan in danger.  Yet it is also important to point out 
that at this point there does not appear to be any indication of ideas or support for actions 
more aggressive than maneuvering for the international diplomatic recognition of Korean 
autonomy and independence.   
The Japanese attitude toward Korea grew decidedly more hawkish by the time 
Yamagata announced the official government policy towards Korea during his first 
tenure as Prime Minister from 1889-1891.  In his opening address to the first National 
Diet on December 6, 1890, Yamagata laid out his proposals for Japan’s future defense 
policy, again highlighting the need to bolster Japanese military preparation.  “If we wish 
to maintain the nation’s independence among the powers of the world at the present 
time,” Yamagata proclaimed to the Diet, “it is not enough to guard only the line of 
sovereignty; we must also defend the line of advantage...For this reason, it is necessary to 
make comparatively large appropriations for our army and navy.”44  Explaining this in 
                                                
43 W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), 46. 
44 Quoted in Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 138.  For more on 
this speech, see: Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 138-139 and 
Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 118.  Joseph Pittau writes that Yamagata’s speech was 
written by Inoue Kowashi, and was entitled “Plan to Defend the Sphere of National 
Interest,” in Joseph Pittau, “Inoue Kowashi, 1843-1895: And the Formation of Modern 
Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica 24, no. 3/4 (1965): 273.  The terms Yamagata uses for 
“line of sovereignty” (shuken-sen) and “line of advantage,” (rieki-sen) have alternately 
been translated in various ways by different historians.  Pittau uses “sphere of 
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more detail in a written opinion earlier submitted to the Cabinet in March of that year, 
Yamagata insisted that there were two “paths” to Japanese “independence and self-
defense”: 1) defending a “line of sovereignty (shuken-sen)” and not allowing its violation 
by others; and 2) protecting a “line of interest (rieki-sen)” and not losing strategic 
territories.45  If there was any uncertainty about what territories where encircled by his 
envisioned “line of interest” and what threats challenged it, Yamagata stated bluntly:  
The focal point of our nation’s “line of interest” is surely Korea.  The 
Siberian railway has already progressed into central Asia, and when it is 
completed in a few years, Russians will be able to water their horses in the 
Amur River just a dozen or so days after leaving the capital.  We must not 
forget that the completion of the Siberian railway will, in other words, be 
an eventful time in Korea.  And we also must not forget that this eventful 
time in Korea, in other words, will be an opportunity for a great 
fluctuation in East Asia.  If there is any guarantee for preserving our line 
of interest, then this is it: the independence of Korea.  Is this not the thing 
that provokes the sharpest impetus?46   
  
Responding to what they saw as constant threats of Western encroachment on 
Japanese national security, Meiji government leaders and defense strategists began to 
look outwards with increasing trepidation.  Korea looked especially vulnerable from 
across the Tsushima Straits, as Japanese leaders viewed the peninsula as a culturally 
underdeveloped political vacuum that posed a danger to Japan.  Writing in 1920, Nitobe 
Inazō acknowledged the cultural debt Japan owed to the Korean peninsula throughout 
history, comparing it to a “phial from which was poured milk and honey into the mouth 
of Japan.”  “As long as Korea remains a really independent country, strong and well 
                                                                                                                                            
sovereignty” and “sphere of interest”; Duus opts for “cordon,” in Duus, Abacus and the 
Sword, 64. 
45 NGK, “Yamagata Ikensho,” 193.   
46 NGK, “Yamagata Ikensho,” 193. 
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governed, it may well be a buffer State;” Nitobe concluded, “But when it is now under 
China, and now under Russia, there can be no security for peace in the Far East nor 
safety for Japan.”  Citing a much-quoted phrase, he went on to add:  “We can easily 
change the geographic metaphor, and liken the Peninsula to a sword-blade aimed at the 
heart of a Japan.”47  Although Korea was ruled at the time by an Yi Dynasty that had 
been in power for over 500 years, Japanese leaders feared that instability on the 
peninsula would invite the intervention of the approaching Western imperialist powers.  
In the worse case scenario, Western colonization of Korea would threaten Japanese 
national security by breaching its “line of interest” and encroaching on its “line of 
sovereignty.”48  As Itō Hirobumi explained to the Diet in the midst of the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1894: “From the close proximity of Korea to our shores, it follows that her 
tranquility or disorder, her prosperity or decline, have most important bearings upon this 
country’s welfare.”49  The Japanese government went one step further in 1903, asserting 
its paramount interests in Korea because of its geographic propinquity to the peninsula: 
Korea is an important outpost of Japan’s line of defense and Japan 
consequently considers her independence absolutely essential to her own 
repose and safety.  Moreover, the political as well as commercial and 
industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are 
paramount over those of other powers.  Those interests and influence 
Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent to surrender to, or 
share with, another Power.”50 
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50 Quoted in Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910: A Study of 
Realism and Idealism in International Relations (Philadelphia: University of 




For this reason, Japanese leaders decided that it was in Japan’s national interest to act 
proactively to prevent the western colonization of Korea by extricating the peninsula 
from the grasp of China and placing it firmly under that of Japan.  Searching for a 
promising avenue for securing inroads into the peninsula, Japan looked to railways.   
 
Engines of Empire: Railways and “Enlightened Exploitation” 
As the Meiji government reacted to perceived threats of Western imperialist 
encroachment, their first response was not outward, but inward.  In either direction, the 
Japanese government attempted to establish central power in peripheral regions through 
programs designed to develop new territories.  Seeing a need to defend Japanese 
sovereign national territory from Western imperialism, the Japanese government found it 
necessary first to demarcate national borders.  After all, a government cannot protect its 
borders if it does not know where they are.  But it was not enough to merely delineate 
national boundaries.  “Once the borders were defined,” Marius B. Jansen succinctly 
stated, “the problem was to become master within them.”51  For this reason, the Japanese 
government initiated programs of “domestic colonization” to establish hegemony within 
its territory and consolidate the far reaches of the nation.  This entailed the cultivation of 
undeveloped lands and the construction of myriad modern facilities, such as railways, 
telecommunications, schools, banks, and post offices.  For Japanese leaders seeking to 
                                                
51 Marius B. Jansen, “Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan,” in Political 
Development in Modern Japan, ed. Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1968), 171. 
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cordon off zones of Japanese domain from Western colonialism, it was this exploitation 
of land that lay at the root of claims of territorial ownership. 
The case of Hokkaidō is illustrative as an example of a new land forcefully and 
unevenly integrated into the Meiji state in response to fears of Western expansion.  
Historically a borderland between mainland Japan and indigenous Ainu inhabitants, the 
island known as Ezochi had been only loosely tied to the Japanese Tokugawa polity prior 
to 1868.  Yet, after the Meiji Restoration, the new Meiji Government fulfilled earlier 
Tokugawa attempts to incorporate the island into the Japanese sphere by quickly 
asserting ownership over the island and renaming it “Hokkaidō” in 1869.52  As the 
famous scholar of Japanese colonialism and one time Under-Secretary of the League of 
Nations, Nitobe Inazō, wrote in 1920, “the colonization of the long-neglected island of 
Hokkaidō” arose from the “necessity of protecting our northern frontiers” from “the 
Muscovite Power,” who, “like a huge avalanche, was steadily descending southwards 
from its Siberian steppes, crushing everything on its way.”53  On one hand, integrating the 
new territory required conceptually redefining what “Japan” was, both in terms of 
geography and identity, as David Howell has argued.  Like the inhabitants of the Ryūkyū 
Islands to the south, the indigenous peoples of Ezochi to the north, Howell argues, 
underwent acculturation into Japanese imperial subjects through “ethnic negation” as 
their native identities were stripped away while their homelands were integrated into the 
                                                
52 As Brett Walker describes, the Tokugawa had reacted to Russian intrusion by 
dispatching cartographers in the early 1800s to survey and define Japan’s coastline and 
surrounding territories in an attempt to “guard its national sovereignty and to anticipate 
empire” – particularly in the north (Walker, “Mamiya Rinzō and Japanese Exploration” 
312).   
53 Nitobe, “Japanese Colonization,” 114. 
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Japanese empire as the prefectures of Okinawa and Hokkaidō.54  On the other hand, 
integration of these new lands also required more tangible efforts of cultivation and 
development.  For this reason, the Meiji government established the Colonial Department 
(Kaitakushi) in Hokkaidō to administer the settlement and exploitation of the island.  
Under Commissioner Admiral Kuroda Kiyotaka, the Colonial Department undertook 
wide-scale projects across the island to promote industry, mining, fishing, and education, 
in addition to encouraging the settlement of emigrant Japanese farmers to spread modern 
agriculture to Hokkaidō.  Railways also played an important role in the exploitation of 
the newly acquired territory.  In addition to the construction of the Horonai Railway to 
ship coal for industry, the government passed the Hokkaidō Railway Construction Act in 
1896 authorizing a public loan to finance government construction of 6 additional lines 
encircling the island.55   
Hokkaidō provided an instructive example for Japanese strategists who saw Korea 
as an undeveloped territory to be cultivated as a defensive buffer to Western expansion.  
It was Japanese fears of Western intrusion into the Korean peninsula that propelled 
attempts to bolster Japan’s “line of interest” by garnering international recognition of 
Korean independence as early as 1872.  Borrowing a tactic deemed legal by Western 
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imperializers, Japan initiated its own “gunboat diplomacy” towards Korea when it sent a 
warship and two infantry platoons to “open” Korea in 1872.56  Japan broke through two 
years later when the Japanese gunboat Un’yō manufactured an incident by traveling close 
enough to the Korean shore to draw fire from a coastal defense battery on Kanghwa 
Island.57  Reinforcing the link between Hokkaidō and Korea as buffer zones in the eyes of 
Japanese strategists, the Meiji government sent Inoue Kaoru to negotiate a treaty with the 
Korean court, escorted by Hokkaidō Colonial Department Commissioner Admiral 
Kuroda, numerous officials from the Colonial Department, three gunboats, and 800 
marines.58  After several weeks of tense negotiations, the so-called “Treaty of Peace” – 
more commonly known as the Kanghwa Treaty – was signed on February 26, 1876.  As 
Alexis Dudden describes, throughout the negotiations, the Japanese side were intent on 
basing the treaty in “international terms,” namely as an agreement between two equally 
independent and sovereign nations.  This was significant because Korea at this time 
maintained a position whereby it was neither entirely independent, nor was it entirely a 
vassal state of the Qing empire of China.  Article 1 of the treaty, however, stipulated: 
“Chosen [sic] being an independent state enjoys the same sovereign rights as Japan.”59  
As Dudden points out, Japan had an ulterior motive in urging Korea to declare itself an 
“independent” and “sovereign” nation.  “Defined by Japan,” Dudden notes: “Korea’s 
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independence allowed Japan to establish a colonial outpost in Korea, a privilege 
independent Japan could contract only with independent Korea.”60  Reminiscent of the 
“unequal treaties” that had been thrust upon Japan by the Western imperializers prior to 
the Meiji Restoration, the Kanghwa Treaty allowed Japan access to two “treaty ports” in 
Korea – Inch’ŏn and Mokpo – and even granted Japanese soldiers and businessmen 
extraterritoriality in Korea.  As will be discussed later in more detail, Korea’s 
“independence,” as established at Kanghwa Island, would be a major factor in Japanese 
actions towards the peninsula over the next several decades.61   
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Western civilization.”  See: Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The 
Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” American Historical 
Review 107, no. 2 (2002): 389.  Marius B. Jansen has similarly argued that “Japan’s drive 
for colonial control was an entirely reasonable approach to security” and that “Meiji 
Japan had every reason to pursue an imperialist path” considering the Social Darwinian 
struggle over essential resources and markets that characterized the New Imperialism of 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  But for Jansen, there was another reason that Japan 
would mimic western imperialism: “National policies premised on the necessity of 
emulating the countries that were Japan’s problem could not have been expected to 
overlook the expansive drive that was such a prominent feature of all modernizing states 
in the last decades of the nineteenth century.”  As Jansen observed, “Japanese 
imperialism was readily explicable as the response to international examples by a 
generation that was modeling its behavior and polity on those of the world’s leading 
countries...”  See: Marius B. Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,” in 
The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75-76.  Yet there is a difference between 
borrowing and deploying Western models in order to achieve specific Japanese goals, 
and copying them merely for the sake of copying.  Such an interpretation downplays the 
fear the Meiji leaders felt when they surveyed the prevailing international situation, and 
furthermore impugns their ability to read and respond to the existing international order.  
Japanese leaders undoubtedly desired to demonstrate their modernity vis-à-vis the West 
by participating in the Western practice of imperialism, but they also had more practical 
benefits in mind as well – military, diplomatic, and economic.  All of this is not to say, 
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 With Korea “opened” to the outside world, Japanese agents searching for an 
avenue to insinuate Japanese influence further into peninsular affairs followed two tracks.  
Some influential Japanese figures such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, Shibusawa Eiichi, and 
Inoue Kaoru, for example, eagerly counseled Korean progressives and aided Korean 
efforts to modernize from within.  Korean reformers in the “Enlightenment Party” 
(Kaehwadang), including Ŏ Yun-jung, Hong Yŏng-sik, Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yŏnghyo, Sŏ 
Kwangbŏm, and Sŏ Chaep’il (Philip Jaisohn), in turn, initially viewed Meiji Japan as an 
exemplar of successful Asian modernization in response to Western pressure.62  Other 
Japanese took a more direct approach, penetrating Korea diplomatically and 
commercially in order to cast Japanese imperial influence over the peninsula.  Japanese 
settlers emigrated to Korea in large number from the 1880s, promoting Japanese 
commercial interests and links to the continent.  In this way, Japan played an awkward 
                                                                                                                                            
however, that early attempts to “open” Korea reveal long-held designs of formal 
colonization.  On the other hand, that does not mean that Japan had no intention of 
forcefully extending its political and economic influence into these areas in the name of 
self-defense, either.  Rather, what these actions indicate is that Meiji leaders felt 
compelled to react to what they saw as a precarious international political situation in 
East Asia. 
62 Sent to Japan in 1881 by the Korean King Kojong as part of an observation mission, Ŏ 
Yun-jung and Hong Yŏng-sik became convinced that Korea should follow the blueprint 
of Japanese modernization.  Reforms proposed by Ŏ in particular, inspired the efforts of 
the pro-Japanese “Enlightenment Party.”  Strongly encouraged by Fukuzawa, this group 
initiated the bloody and failed Kapsin Coup in 1884 with the armed assistance of the 
Japanese legation in an attempt, Yŏng-ho Ch’oe writes, to “emulate the Meiji restoration 
and subsequent reforms in Japan.”  See: Yŏng-ho Ch’oe, “The Kapsin Coup of 1884: A 
Reassessment,” Korean Studies 6 (1982): 105; and Donghyun Huh, “The Korean 
Courtiers’ Observation Mission’s Views on Meiji Japan and Projects of Modern State 
Building,” Korean Studies 29 (2005): 40.  For Fukuzawa’s role in inspiring the Korean 
reformers, especially Kim Ok-kyun, see: In K. Hwang, The Korean Reform Movement of 
the 1880s: A Study of Transition in Intra-Asian Relations (Cambridge: Schenkman 
Publishing Company, 1978), and Harold F. Cook, Korea’s 1884 Incident: Its Background 
and Kim Ok-kyun’s Elusive Dream (Seoul: Seoul Royal Asiatic Society), 1972. 
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“double role” towards Korea, “being both a ‘sponsor of progress and independence’ and 
simultaneously an imperialist aggressor,” as Donghyun Huh has aptly noted.63   
Another track for extending Japanese influence into Korea lay along the railway 
line.  As Daniel Headrick describes in a series of deftly titled works, the steamships of 
gunboat diplomacy were only one of several “tools of empire” that allowed 
technologically advanced Western countries to spread their “tendrils of progress” into 
overseas territories in order to attain “power over people.”64  As Headrick argues, these 
tools made “imperialism possible where it was otherwise unlikely, or by making it 
suitably cost-effective in the eyes of budget-minded governments.”65  In addition to 
steamships, it was medicine, rapid-firing rifles, telegraphs, and railways that allowed 
European countries to carve “spheres of influence” out of overseas territories and link 
these areas to the world market.  But, as the “main engine of imperialism,” it was the 
locomotive that was the most powerful “tool of empire.”66  Ronald E. Robinson 
succinctly describes the role of railways in the spread of the New Imperialism of the late 
19th century, writing: “Industrialized Europe cast its imperial influence over much of a 
                                                
63 Huh, “The Korean Courtiers’ Observation Mission’s Views,” 35. 
64 See Daniel Headrick, “The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of 
European Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century,” The Journal of Modern History 
51, no. 2 (1979): 231-263; Daniel Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and the 
European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1981); Daniel Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of 
Imiperialism, 1850-1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Daniel 
Headrick, Power Over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 
1400 to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).    
65 Headrick, The Tools of Empire, 12. 
66 Ronald E. Robinson, “Introduction: Railway Imperialism,” in Railway Imperialism, ed. 
Clarence B. Davis and Kenneth E. Wilburn, Jr. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 3. 
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still agrarian world in the half century before 1914 by building railways in other people’s 
countries.”67  By laying railways in developing countries, the “conquistadors of steam” 
were able to spread their informal empires into by increasing control of foreign territory 
and indebting foreign governments.68  As Robinson argues, “steel rails had a capacity for 
transforming the societies through which they ran and for spreading imperial influence in 
their domestic affairs.”69  George Lynch put it best on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War: 
“The path of Empire is along the railway track.”70   
In Korea, Japanese leaders saw lines of steel as a means to solidify Japanese 
control over the peninsula.  In a paper on Korean policy at the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War, Army Minister Yamagata Aritomo urged Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi to 
pursue railways in Korea at all costs out of military necessity.  “The need with the most 
pressing urgency at this time is the laying of railways in Korea,” Yamagata intoned.  
“Not only will the success of railways in Korea greatly affect the future sovereignty of 
our country, it is an extraordinary inspiration for the outcome of the coming war.  I 
cannot express enough how important it is for construction to begin immediately.”71  
Even after the immediate military need for railways to expedite troop movements passed 
                                                
67 Robinson, “Introduction: Railway Imperialism,” 1. 
68 “Conquistadors of steam” from Nicholas Faith, The World the Railways Made (New 
York: Carroll and Graff, 1990), 145. 
69 Robinson, “Introduction: Railway Imperialism,” 3. 
70 Quoted in Neilson and Otte, “‘Railpolitik: An Introduction,” 7. 
71 Tokutomi Iichirō, Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den [Biography of Prince Yamagata 
Aritomo](Tokyo: Yamagata Aritomo Kō Kinen Jigyōkai, 1933), 150-151; Quoted in Jae 
Jong Chung, Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai to Kankoku Tetsudō, 1892-1945 
[Imperial Japanese colonial administration and Korean railways, 1892-1945](Tokyo: 
Akashi Shoten, 2008), 72. 
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after Japanese victory in the war, Japanese strategists continued to see railways a means 
for controlling Korea.  “If the Keigi (Seoul-Sinŭiju) Line is constructed by Japanese 
hands and is connected to the Keifu Line,” Foreign Minister Komura Jūtarō pleaded to 
Prime Minister Katsura Tarō in a 1902 proposal adopted by the Cabinet for special 
budget allocations to fund various projects in Korea and China, “then a railway running 
straight through Korea will be entirely in the hands of our empire, placing all of Korea 
completely within the sphere of our power and influence (waga seiryoku han’i).”72   
More importantly, railways were seen as a way to solidify Japanese claims to 
ownership of Korean territory.  As Maejima Hisoka observed in the journal Taiyō in 
1896, Japanese construction of railways meant not only secured lines of logistics and 
shipping in Korea, but permanent ownership of physical territory on the peninsula: 
...However the wielders of power [in Korea] may change, they can never 
violate the property of a private individual, and were the sovereignty of 
Korea itself to pass into the possession of another country the property of 
a Japanese national could in no way be violated...indeed, if there came a 
day when Korea was divided by the great powers, the existence of a 
railway belonging to us would be good reason for the maintenance of our 
rights in any distribution of territory.73 
 
Likewise, the Tōkyō Keizai Shinpō imagined the diplomatic benefits of a Seoul-Pusan 
railway: “from the diplomatic point of view, possession of this railway will act as a basis 
which must surely guarantee our strength in any future negotiations on the continent.”74  
                                                
72 See “Shin-Kan Jigyō Kei’eihi Yōkyū Seigi” [Detailed exposition of requests for 
funding for the management of projects in China and Korea] in Gaimushō, ed., Nihon 
Gaikō Nenpyō narabini Shuyō Bunsho, 1:206-207; Alternate translation in Nakano Akira, 
“Railway Network was Key to Japanese Army’s Control of Korea,” The Asahi Shimbun, 
Sept. 28, 2007. 
73 Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 580. 
74 Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 588. 
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Finally, lamenting Japan’s weakened position in Korea following the Sino-Japanese War, 
Japanese politician Ozaki Saburō argued that Japan needed railways in Korea to solidify 
its position on the peninsula.  “Without this Seoul-Pusan railway,” Ozaki wrote in the 
Tōkyō Keizai Zasshi in September 1896, “Japanese interests will not be upheld, and there 
will be a decline of our position in the East.”75  
As these statements indicate, Japanese colonial leaders began to conflate 
cultivation and development of land with rights of ownership.  That is to say, in the mind 
of Japanese leaders, improvement of the existing terrain or environment entitled the 
cultivator to the rights and privileges of control.  Alexis Dudden has described this 
thought-process as “enlightened exploitation,” and has noted that it characterized much of 
Western imperialist ideology.  As Dudden writes: “So-called civilized governments 
predicated their claims to legitimacy on conquering and ruling so-called barbaric ones...A 
regime was civilized only if it could claim to ability to transform an uncivilized people.”76  
Robert Eskildsen points out that a similar idea had informed Japanese plans to colonize 
eastern Taiwan following the 1874 punitive expedition.  In the case of Taiwan, Eskildsen 
argues, “the Japanese government’s rationale for intervening in Taiwan rested on the 
colonialist logic that for any government – Chinese, Japanese, or Western – to claim 
sovereignty over eastern Taiwan, that government must bring civilization to the 
savages.”77  In the minds of Japanese diplomats and business, ownership and operation of 
railways in these areas would not only facilitate Japanese economic advancement, it 
                                                
75 Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 582. 
76 Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea, 9. 
77 Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages,” 398.   
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would also validate Japanese territorial claims.  That is to say, Japanese leaders believed 
that “enlightened exploitation” of the natural environment entitled the cultivator to 
ownership of territory and justified claims to cultural superiority.   
For Japanese actors in Korea, bringing “civilization” meant improvement, first of 
the transportation network, and later, of the urban built environment.  As the next chapter 
will argue, this idea led Japan to conduct urban improvement projects in Seoul following 
annexation.  For now, Japan would start with railways.  Japanese proponents of railway 
control in Korea frequently trumpeted their actions as altruistic attempts to advance 
civilization and enlightenment in a land that was, in the words of an 1899 Taiyō editorial, 
a “half-civilized, barbaric land.”78  As Ozaki Saburō put it in 1896, “out of sheer 
kindness” Japan was “trying to improve the country, it was but a solicitude that we 
should put Korea on the road to becoming a civilized country.”79  In 1899, the Tōyō 
Keizai Shinpō likewise admonished Japanese investors to support the fledgling Seoul-
Pusan Railway by arguing that it was Japan’s duty to assist Korean advancement: 
By and large, when people look at Korea, they think of it as an infirm and 
weak country whose sources of wealth have already all been exploited, but 
in fact it is rich in minerals and cereals and other natural resources...The 
only reason whereby Korean industry is today not greatly flourishing is 
largely that the Korean people are weak and lazy, and lacking the spirit of 
enterprise; also transport facilities are inefficient...Therefore, if we do 
something like build a railway, opening up for them the means of traffic 
and transport, and continue to encourage vigorous immigration from here, 
then Korean industry must surely immediately start to flourish.80 
 
                                                
78 Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 587. 
79 Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 582. 
80 Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 585-586. 
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This view of railways as bringing civilization to Korea was reinforced by a secret 
railway survey conducted by Japanese engineers in 1892.  Travelling through the Korean 
countryside under the cover story that they were collecting rare bird samples for an 
American museum, Japanese railway engineers surveyed topographical conditions and 
charted potential rail routes through the mountainous peninsula with “imperial eyes,” as 
they envisioned future Japanese construction and control of the lines.81  The report issued 
two months later by railway engineer Kōno Tenzui accentuated the need for reliable 
transportation infrastructure in Korea.  “There is probably no traveler to the interior of 
Chōsen,” Kōno proclaimed, “who is not first of all astonished by the danger of the roads, 
the flooding of the rivers, the scarcity of bridges, and the tardiness of stagecoaches.  
There are so many kinds of inconveniences of travel in the Korean interior, that there is 
not enough time to enumerate them all.”82  This report laid the foundation for railways 
planning for years to come.  Four years later in 1896, Consul Murota Yoshiaya in Pusan 
forwarded Kōno’s report to Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu and urged him to push 
for the construction of a railway.  While conditions in the interior displayed a need for 
                                                
81 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudōshi, vol. 1, 28; Cover story of 
bird specimen collecting is found in Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 138.  “Imperial 
Eyes” is a term coined in Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and 
Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992), 9-15, quoted in Walker, “Mamiya Rinzō 
and the Japanese exploration of Sakhalin Island,” 298.  
82 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudōshi, vol. 1, 28.  For quote, see: 
Gaimushō, ed. Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, vol. 29 (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai, 
1954), Doc.#: 325, Murota-Mutsu, May 26, 1896, 629.  Originals of Kōno’s report, 
complete with route survey maps, can be found in JACAR, Ref.#: B04010886900, “Keifu 
Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu 
Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of 
materials relating to the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the 
dispatching of patrolmen to protect the Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials 
concerning expanding our interests along the Seoul-Pusan railway line], images 5-33. 
253 
 
infrastructural development, Murota wrote, the topography along the route was also 
favorable for a railway.  “According to what [Kōno] said,” Murota relayed, “the middle 
road between Keijō and Pusan – namely, passing through Keishō (Gyŏngsang), Zenra 
(Jŏlla), and Chūsei (Chungchŏng) provinces before reaching Keiki (Gyŏnggi) province – 
has many flat areas, and is most appropriate ground for laying a railway.”83   
 Inspired by concerns for national security and dreams of commercial profit, Japan 
trained its gaze on the Korean peninsula as an underdeveloped territory waiting to be 
opened and exploited.  Railways provided a handy tool for nailing down Japan’s claims 
to influence and territorial rights in Korea.  Observing Western imperialism in Africa and 
Asia, moreover, Japanese strategists knew they had to act quickly to secure railways in 
Korea before the other Western powers were able to carve out spheres of influence on the 
peninsula.  As Maejima argued: “We now have a chance of spreading our limbs a bit, but 
if we take no notice and let it pass, it will immediately pass into the hand of some other 
country, and this opportunity, once gone, will be lost forever.”84  Therefore, when internal 
rebellion in Korea provided cause for sending troops to the peninsula, Japanese agents on 
the ground seized the opportunity to insert Japanese influence into Korean affairs.  When 
diplomatic attempts to secure concessions failed, Japanese officials turned to conspiracy 




                                                
83 NGB, vol. 29, Doc.#: 325, Murota-Mutsu, May 26, 1896, 628.  Original in JACAR, 
Ref.#: B04010886900, “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken,” image 3. 
84 Quoted in Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 580. 
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Engineers of Empire: “Men on the Spot” and Diplomatic Efforts for Railway Rights 
If there was a consistent logic informing Japan’s stance towards Korea in the late 19th 
century, it was that earlier articulated by Yamagata Aritomo: an underdeveloped Korea 
would invite the intervention of foreign powers.  In the eyes of Japanese observers of the 
peninsula, Korea’s problems were primarily attributable to the lack of “modernization” in 
the “backwards” country.  In the political calculus of Japanese strategists, then, internal 
reforms were necessary to ensure that Korea would grow strong enough to stave off the 
encroachment of Western imperializers – and by extension, to defend Japan’s “line of 
interest.”  The problem, as they saw it, was that the Yi court, influenced by the pro-China 
Min family, was disinclined to reform, lest it weaken the political authority of the 
dynasty.  But for Japanese strategists, the Korean peninsula was such a security issue to 
Japan that they had no hesitation in adopting the paradoxical position of directly 
intervening in Korean affairs to prevent foreign interference in Korean affairs.  When 
presented an opportunity, Japanese diplomatic “men on the spot” in Korea took 
aggressive action to remove Chinese influence, induce the Korean court to reform, and 
secure Japanese rights to construct railways all at once. 
 The spark that led to more direct Japanese intervention in Korean affairs was the 
Tonghak Rebellion, an uprising of disgruntled peasants that broke out in the southwestern 
Korean province of Chŏlla in the spring of 1894.85  The defeat of Korean government 
                                                
85 Led by the disgruntled official Chŏn Pong-jun, armed peasants rallied under the banner 
of the “Eastern Learning” (Tonghak) religion to oust the local governor in the name of 
eliminating government corruption.  Some Korean “People’s” (minjung) historians have 
interpreted the Tonghak uprising as a revolutionary peasant movement to install a 
radically democratic and egalitarian government.  This populist minjung interpretation of 
the Tonghak Rebellion is analyzed in Namhee Lee, The Making of Minjung: Democracy 
and the Politics of Respresentation in South Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
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troops sent to quell the uprising led to fears that the rebellion would spread to Seoul and 
threaten the very existence of the Yi Dynasty.  Although the rebels had already agreed to 
a cease-fire at the end of May to prevent foreign action, the Chinese minister to Korea, 
Yuan Shikai, and other pro-Chinese Min advisors prevailed on King Kojong to request 
the dispatch of Chinese troops to Korea.86  By urging King Kojong to request Chinese 
assistance in suppressing the rebellion, the Min faction inadvertently provided Japan 
exactly the opportunity it had been waiting for to expel China from the peninsula and 
more forcefully press for reforms within the Korean government.  Following the 
disastrous 1884 Kapsin Coup in Seoul, China and Japan had signed the 1885 Treaty of 
Tianjin, which stipulated that both countries would withdraw troops from Korea and 
would provide prior notification if troops were to be sent to Korea in the future.  Under 
this clause, when China dispatched 2,000 troops to Korea in early June at the request of 
King Kojong, Japan responded by sending 5,000-8,000 by the end of the month.87 
                                                                                                                                            
2007), 55-59.  Other Korean scholars have seen different motivations behind the uprising.  
Young-Ick Lew, for example, has argued that rebellion was designed by the 
fundamentally conservative Chŏn and the Taewŏn’gun in an attempt “to restore the 
Taewŏn’gun to power at the expense of the Min faction regime,” in Lew, “The 
Conservative Character of the 1894 Tonghak Peasant Uprising: A Reappraisal with 
Emphasis on Chon Pong-jun’s Background and Motivation,” Journal of Korean Studies 7 
(1990): 153.  Either way, most Korean scholars are in agreement that the movement 
quickly took on anti-imperialist and anti-foreign overtones.  This has led scholars such as 
Chong-sik Lee to identify in the Tonghak uprisings the “seeds” of Korean nationalism in 
Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1963), 22.  Another point of agreement amongst scholars is that the Tonghak 
Rebellion of 1894 set the stage for the Sino-Japanese War.   
86 Rumors circulated at the time that the Taewŏn’gun was conspiring with the Tonghak 
rebels to oust the Min and return him to power.  It may have been for this reason that the 
Min faction sought to rely on their Chinese benefactors for protection.  See: Lew, “The 
Conservative Character of 1894,” 161-165. 
87 Paine, The Sino-Japanese War, 117. 
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As the usual story goes, the presence of troops from both China and Japan created 
a militarily volatile situation that soon led to war.  Hostilities broke out off the 
southwestern Korean coast on July 25th, 1894, when the British warship the S.S. 
Kowshing – on loan to the Chinese government to ferry troops to Korea – was sunk by 
the Japanese cruiser Naniwa under the command of Tōgō Heihachirō, who later gained 
fame for routing the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima Straits during the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1905.88  A formal declaration of war followed a week later on 
August 1st, which laid out the official Japanese cause for war:  
Korea is an independent State.  She was first introduced into the family of 
nations by the advice and under the influence of Japan.  It has, however, 
been China’s habit to designate Korea as her dependency, and both openly 
and secretly to interfere with her domestic affairs.89  
  
A closer look at events, however, reveals that the Sino-Japanese War was sparked 
by Japanese diplomats in Seoul, who used the presence of Japanese troops on the ground 
during the summer of 1894 as an opportunity to compel the Korean government to enact 
a number of reforms, including the granting of railway rights to Japan.  For consulate 
officials Sugimura Fukashi and Uchida Sadatsuchi, namely, the presence of Japanese 
                                                
88 The sinking of the S.S. Kowshing was controversial for several reasons.  Not only was 
the ship owned by a British company, the Indo-China Steamship Company, its sinking 
occurred before a formal declaration of war.  Moreover, although the Japanese sailors 
were careful to rescue the majority of the 75 British crewmen after the ship went down, 
Japanese gunboats ensured that over 900 of the 1,100 Chinese soldiers onboard never 
made it to shore.  As Douglas Howland points out, the sinking of the S.S. Kowshing led to 
a protracted legal battle, with the final judgment that the Chinese government was liable 
for British losses, and was required to repay the British owners of the ship.  See: Douglas 
Howland, “The Sinking of the S.S. Kowshing: International Law, Diplomacy, and the 
Sino-Japanese War,” Modern Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (2008): 673-703; and Douglas 
Howland, “Japan’s Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-1895),” Journal of the History of International Law 9 (2007): 179-201. 
89 Quoted in Paine, The Sino-Japanese War, 135. 
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troops in Seoul seemed the perfect opportunity for Japan to attain a free hand in Korea, 
eradicate Chinese influence from the Korean court, and create room for the installation of 
a pro-Japanese government open to reform, in one fell swoop – even at the cost of war 
with China.  On May 22, 1894, Sugimura sent notice of the Tonghak uprisings to the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry and first suggested that Japan should match any Chinese 
dispatch of troops in the name of protecting diplomats and residents and keeping the 
military balance between Japan and China.90  Writing that “It would hard to plan any 
change in the future conditions of Korea in the event China does dispatch troops,” 
Sugimura recommended that a decision should be made in advance as to whether “we 
should also, for the time being, dispatch troops in the name of protecting our embassy 
until the riots are put down and Chinese troops withdrawn” or not.91  Word came on June 
1st that the Korean government would indeed request the assistance of Chinese troops and 
then on the 4th that China would send 1,500 troops to Korea.  “By all means,” Sugimura 
pleaded, “should we not also immediately dispatch Japanese troops?”92  In response, 
Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu recommended that the Cabinet be prepared to match 
any Chinese dispatch of troops to Korea.  Army Minister Yamagata added that a General 
                                                
90 NGB, vol. 27.2, Doc.#: 497, Sugimura-Mutsu, May 22, 1894, 152-153.  Also in Kim 
Chŏng-myong, ed., Nikkan Gaikō Shiryō Shūsei [Collection of documents of Japanese-
Korean foreign diplomacy], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten, 1967), 3-4. 
91 NGB, vol. 27.2, Doc.#497, Sugimura-Mutsu, May 22, 1894, 152-153. 
92 Sugimura wrote on June 1st that Chinese Ambassador Yuan Shih-kai had informed him 
that the Korean government requested troops.  Referring to his suggestion to match troop 
movements, Sugimura advised that Foreign Minister refer back to his message from the 
22nd (See NGB, 27.2, Doc.#: 500, Sugimura-Mutsu, June 1, 1894, 155; also in NKGSS, 
vol. 4, Doc.#: 3, 6).  For message on June 4, see NGB, vol. 27.2, Doc.#: 504, Sugimura-
Mutsu, June 4, 1894, 158; also in NKGSS, vol. 4, Doc.#: 6, 9. 
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Headquarters (Daihon’ei) should be established to command troop movements.93  The 
Japanese cabinet agreed, deciding on the 2nd to go ahead with preparations to send troops 
to protect the Japanese consulate and Japanese residents in Seoul.94 
As more and more Japanese troops arrived in Korea from the middle of June, 
Sugimura joined with other legation officials, including Uchida, Matsui Keishirō and 
Honno Ichirō, to implore Ambassador Ōtori Keisuke to take a stronger stance towards the 
Korean court.  Writing in his own memoirs of the situation, entitled Record of My 
Hardships in Korea in 1894-1895 (Meiji Nijūnana hachi-nen Zai-kan Kushin Roku), 
Sugimura severely criticized Ōtori’s reluctance to capitalize on the favorable situation.  
“At that time,” he recalled, “I secretly thought: ‘Our government must have some ulterior 
motive for dispatching such a large number of troops.  If that’s the case, the Ambassador 
should also pursue that course of action without fail.  So unconditionally refusing to 
allow our troops to land, using the excuse of the current conditions in Korea, is 
impermissible’.”95  Going over Ōtori’s head, Sugimura wrote directly to Foreign Minister 
Mutsu on June 13th while in Inch’ŏn away from the supervision of his boss.  Japan should 
                                                
93 Conroy, The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 240-241. 
94 JACAR, Ref.#: A03023061500, “Chōsenkoku nairan ni kan-shi heiin haken ni kan-
suru hōshin no ken” [Policy regarding the dispatch of troops in response to the rebellion 
in Korea], 3-5. 
95 KDL: Sugimura Fukashi, Meiji Nijūnana hachi-nen Zai-kan Kushin Roku Zai-kan 
Kushin Roku [Record of my hardships in Korea in 1894-1895](Tokyo: Sugimura Yōtarō, 
1932), 10-11.  Conroy offers a slightly different translation in Conroy, The Japanese 
Seizure of Korea, 243-244.  Also, Conroy writes that Sugimura “presumed, though he 
was not told,” that the large number of troops dispatched by the Japanese cabinet “meant 
that the Japanese government had decided on a big action to ‘sweep out Yuan, the Min 
clan, and the Chinese’ from their dominant position in Korea,” (Conroy, The Japanese 
Seizure of Korea, 246).  In fact, rather than being merely Sugimura’s supposition of the 
Japanese government’s intentions, ousting Yuan and the Min at the same time was 
exactly what he had proposed to Foreign Minister Mutsu on June 13th.   
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capitalize on the current opportunity, the old Korea hand Sugimura urged, to expand 
Japanese influence (sei’i) in Korea while reducing that of China: first, Japan should 
refuse to withdraw its troops, and should instead force China to remove theirs; secondly, 
Japan should instigate internal reforms in Korea, drive away (shirizoke) the Min faction, 
and set up rivals of the Min or neutral individuals in the government.  This had already 
started, Sugimura noted, with the recent troubles seen by Min Yong-jun and the 
reappearance at court of the Taewŏn’gun.  Making these changes, he predicted, “would 
be to the future benefit of Korea, and consequently to the benefit of Japan.”  Finally, 
Sugimura added that stationing Japanese troops in the capital until reforms were 
completed was “80 or 90%” of achieving this final goal.96  Sugimura was joined by other 
officials in the Japanese embassy in Seoul in his efforts to push Ōtori to take more severe 
action.  As Sugimura relates, on the morning of June 17th, legation officials Matsui 
Keishirō and Honno Ichirō visited Ōtori to urge him to “abrogate the agreement with 
China to simultaneously withdraw troops,” and to “settle the issue of Korean 
independence even if it means war with China.”97    
Certainly the strongest advocate of capitalizing on the current situation was 
legation official Uchida Sadatsuchi, who went so far as to propose making Korea a 
“protectorate” of the Japanese empire.  Writing in a lengthy memorial to Mutsu at the end 
of June, Uchida expanded on Sugimura’s earlier arguments.  While sending troops to 
protect the consulate and Japanese residents was an appropriate action, Uchida 
emphasized, “I believe we should without fail use the dispatch of this large number of 
                                                
96 Sugimura, Zai-Kan Kushin Roku, 12-13. 
97 Sugimura, Zai-Kan Kushin Roku, 14-15. 
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troops to achieve a goal of even higher benefit.”  “What I mean by that,” he bluntly 
clarified, “is nothing other than making Korea into a protectorate nation of the Japanese 
Empire (waga Nihon Teikoku no hogokoku).”  Uchida went on to assert that even though 
Japan had secured the independence of Korea and garnered international recognition of 
Korean independence, China still asserted suzerainty over the peninsula.  The corrupt 
Min government, he added, welcomed Chinese protection and resisted reforms in order to 
stay in power.  In language strongly echoing Yamagata Aritomo’s foreign policy 
statements from half a decade earlier, Uchida went on to note: 
As far as I understand, the main idea of our political strategy of 
recognizing Korea as an independent nation over the years has, after all, 
been to prevent the intervention and invasion of another country (takoku) 
and to solidify Korea as a strong and enlightened nation in order to: 1) act 
as a defensive barrier (hanpei) for our country; and 2) to develop thriving 
trade with our country.   
  
But instead of modernizing, Uchida bewailed, Korea had only regressed under the lasting 
Chinese suzerainty to the point where it threatened to not only “embarrass Japan’s 
national prestige,” but also to “tear down Japan’s defensive barrier (hanpei) and endanger 
the profits of Japanese merchants.”  For that reason, Uchida asserted, Japan must move 
beyond the policy of merely recognizing Korean independence, and instead take actions 
to remove Chinese influence and then directly intervene to institute reforms.  Various 
“fundamental great reforms” in the central administration and in the countryside were 
necessary, Uchida maintained, in order to preserve Korean independence by making the 
country wealthy and strong.  The problem with all of this, he continued, was that the 
Koreans could not be relied on to succeed in carrying out the kind of reforms necessary.  
Another more promising option lay in the people affiliated with the King’s father, the 
Taewŏn’gun, but he was already over 70 years old, and there were questions about 
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whether or not he would be around to fulfill such revolutionary reforms that may take 10 
or as many as 20 years to complete.  Instead, it was Japan’s responsibility, Uchida 
surmised, to support these reforms.  “Doing these things and preserving Korea’s honor as 
an undeniably independent Asian country in the face of China and the other great 
powers,” Uchida exclaimed, “is the most honorable and safest policy for the Japanese 
empire.”  Uchida added emphatically: “Moreover, there is no better way to expand our 
imperial influence into the Korean peninsula.”   
Realizing the glaring contradiction of declaring Korean independence while 
working behind the scenes to intervene in Korean affairs to Japan’s advantage, Uchida 
pointed out that it was important for Japanese actions in Korea to be sanctioned by treaty.  
Japan should therefore endeavor to sign a treaty with Korea to receive the protection of 
the Japanese empire and a special agreement for Japanese assistance in internal reforms.  
Conveniently, the presence of several thousand Japanese troops in Korea, Uchida noted, 
made the signing of such a treaty much easier.  As an added benefit, such actions could 
disabuse the Chinese and Koreans of any misunderstandings about the strength of the 
Japanese military as a result of the ignominy they had suffered after backing down from 
Chinese troops in the Kapsin Coup of 1884.  Finally, Uchida summarized his 
recommendations in his conclusion: 
In summary, instead of losing this favorable opportunity of dispatching 
such a large number of troops to Korea, I think we should adopt a policy 
whereby: we advance beyond just protecting the consulate and Japanese 
nationals in Korea; we sign a treaty making Korea a protectorate of the 
Japanese Empire; and henceforth the Imperial government intervenes in 
Korean foreign and domestic affairs to institute reforms and direct Korea 
into a rich and wealthy region in order to 1) reinforce the defensive 
perimeter (hanpei) of the Empire, and 2) expand our imperial influence in 
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this country, while at the same time increasing the interests of Japanese 
merchants.98 
 
 With such strong pressure from legation officials Sugimura and Uchida, the 
initially cautious Ōtori changed course to embrace aggressive action.  At first, Ōtori had 
done what he could to prevent the crisis in Korea from escalating out of control.  In 
addition to negotiating the mutual withdrawal of troops with Chinese Minister Yuan in an 
attempt to de-escalate the situation, Ōtori had exasperatedly questioned the need for the 
dispatch of more Japanese troops, and had deflected instructions from Mutsu to station 
the troops in Seoul.  Finally giving in to the exhortations of both his superior and his 
subordinates, Ōtori laid before the Korean government a detailed 26-point internal reform 
program drawn up and approved by the Japanese cabinet calling for far-reaching reforms 
in court politics, government financing, taxes and currency, infrastructure, jurisprudence, 
the military, and education.  The plan even delineated deadlines by which the above 
reforms must be carried out: as quickly as 10 days for some, 6 months, and finally 2 years 
for others.  Notably, one of the reforms that must be announced within 10 days was the 
laying of railways between Seoul and important ports, and the construction of telegraphs 
                                                
98 NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 379, Sugimura-Mutsu, June 26, 1894, 562-567.  Peter Duus 
briefly discusses Uchida’s petition in his work, The Abacus and the Sword (71-72).  Duus 
rightly paraphrases Uchida’s “bleak picture” of a politically corrupt Korean government, 
economically stagnant Korean countryside, and the need for reforms to revive the 
country.  Yet this discussion falls in a section where Duus, albeit acknowledging that 
Japanese leaders thought reforms would “serve Japanese interest,” argues that “the 
Japanese insistence on reform was too persistent, and in execution too politically inept” 
for reforms to be a “cynical cover for territorial and political aggression.”  Ultimately, 
Uchida was clearly not sorrowfully lamenting the poor state of the Korean countryside.  
Instead he was eagerly making a case for making Korea a Japanese protectorate, as Duus 
points out two pages later (74). 
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“so as to facilitate the means of communication.”99  But entreaties for reform did not 
proceed well.  First of all, the Korean government was hesitant to give Japan a free hand 
in railway and telegraph construction on the grounds that it could not allow a foreign 
country to undertake such work.100  Secondly, as it soon became clear to Japanese leaders 
in Korea, two factors consistently inhibited Japanese attempts to gain influence: pro-
Chinese factions within the Korean court, and the presence of conservative Chinese 
political advisers.  As Ōtori complained to Mutsu on July 11th, reforms were unlikely 
because “[the] Corean Government really are not disposed for any reform, and because 
Chinese party is gaining greater power in Court.”101  With this Chinese influence over the 
Korean court, any hope for Japanese-led reforms was futile.  Growing increasingly 
                                                
99 The entire reform plan is found in Kajima Morinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-
1922, vol. 1, Sino-Japanese War and Triple Intervention (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of 
International Peace, 1976), 53-56.  Some historians have seen these reform proposals as 
merely a pretext for Japan to inexorably infiltrate Korean politics by making the Korean 
government beholden to Japan for technical knowledge, financial assistance, and political 
advice.  Mutsu himself provided fodder for such ideas when he revealed in his memoirs, 
Kenkenroku, “Naturally, I myself never saw any significance in the issue of Korea’s 
reform other than its being a matter of political necessity.  Furthermore, I saw no need 
whatsoever to launch any crusade in the name of national chivalry.”  See: Mutsu 
Munemitsu, Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, 29); also quoted in Duus, Duus, The Abacus 
and the Sword, 70-71.  Nevertheless, Peter Duus disagrees with those who might see 
reforms such as these merely as a “cynical cover for territorial and political aggression.”  
Instead, as he maintains, “the Japanese insistence on reform was too persistent, and in 
execution often too politically inept, to support this interpretation.  Had the commitment 
to reform been cynical, the Japanese would have abandoned it early on,” (Duus, The 
Abacus and the Sword, 71).  No doubt, if the reforms were merely a pretext for political 
infiltration, then such a detailed program would be unnecessary.  On the other hand, for 
saber-rattling legation officials in Korea such as Uchida Sadatsuchi, if not a “cynical 
cover,” then such reforms were at least a convenient vehicle for removing Chinese 
influence and justifying Japanese intervention towards a final destination of establishing 
Korea as a Japanese “protectorate.”   
100 NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 397, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 10, 1894, 591. 
101 NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 400, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 11, 1894, 594. 
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frustrated, Ōtori and legation staff took drastic measures that would temporarily turn the 
table in their favor. 
Bolstered by the presence of Japanese troops in Seoul and frustrated by Korean 
refusals, agents in the Japanese legation in Seoul conspired to incite a coup d’état in July 
1894 designed to drive out the Min faction and install a Japanese-leaning, pro-reform 
government.  Ōtori outlined his plans for a Japanese-led coup in “Classified Transmission 
#122,” sent to Mutsu on July 10th, 1894.102  As Ōtori explained, the resistance to the 
reform program from certain conservatives in the Korean government made it an “urgent 
necessity” that Japan take “decisive measure[s]” in order to “compel them, directly or 
indirectly, to carry the reform into execution.”  Ōtori laid out two possible paths Japan 
could take for forcing the issue in case the Korean government refused Japan’s 
recommendations for reform “either implicitly or explicitly.”  According to Part A, Japan 
would “threaten” the Korean court “with the force of arms,” “under the plea” that the 
maladministration of Korea and the recurring disturbances and rebellions had 
“endangered the safety of our country” and Japan “cannot but urge Korea to undertake 
administrative reform” because of Japan’s “close relationship with Korea, politically and 
in trade.”  “And the way by which we coerce the Korean Government,” Ōtori clarified, 
“is to despatch our military guards to fortify the city gates of Seoul and protect the gates 
of the Royal Palace and to carry on relentless negotiations with the Korean Government 
until they consent to our recommendations.”103  Following Part B, meanwhile, Japan 
would demand the “termination of the relationship of a suzerain and a vassal” between 
                                                
102 This message can be found in NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 398, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 10, 1894, 
592-593; and in Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 1, 50-52. 
103 Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 1, 50-51. 
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Korea and China, and would claim, “on the ground of the most-favored nation clause,” 
all rights and privileges granted to Chinese nationals in Korea, including the right to lay 
telegraph lines.  Until both demands were met, Ōtori added, “We should dispatch our 
soldiers to guard the gates of Seoul and the Royal Palace.”104  Concluding, “if we do not 
resort to these exceptional measures there is little likelihood of our achieving satisfactory 
results,” Ōtori pointed out that both plans had drawbacks.  Plan A, Ōtori said, “cannot be 
free from the criticism that it is a far too exceptional approach,” while Plan B “may 
appear to lack consistency because this measure is incompatible with the purposes of the 
reform.”  Ōtori then stated his preference for Plan B, despite its glaring internal 
contradictions, because it was “less open to criticism.”105 
 When the Korean government failed to meet a deadline arbitrarily imposed by 
Ōtori for responding to his reform demands, Ōtori took matters into his own hands.  
“There being no hope of our advice to be adopted,” Ōtori wrote to Mutsu on July 18th, “I 
am taking steps mentioned in part B of Classified Transmission #122 dated July 10, but I 
shall not besiege Royal Palace until your further instructions.”106  In response, Mutsu, not 
wanting to make Japan appear to be the aggressor just days after he finalized a “revised 
treaty” with Great Britain, warned against taking “impolitic” violent action.107  Ōtori, 
                                                
104 Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 1, 51. 
105 Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 1, 52. 
106 NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 411, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 18, 1894, 604-605. 
107 Japan’s first “revised treaty” was signed with Great Britain on July 16th, 1894, and 
took effect 5 years later.  Throughout negotiations and the ensuing war with China, 
Japanese diplomats were careful to avoid arousing the suspicions of the West.  As Mutsu 
wrote in Kenkenroku, “At a time when the Western powers focused their attention on the 
measures we would implement on the peninsula, a single false step might well cause us to 
find ourselves surrounded by enemies,” (Mutsu, Kenkenroku, 30).  As a result, it was 
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however, was undeterred.  Japanese troops entered Seoul through the southern gate of the 
city around four in the morning on July 23, 1894 and took control of the Kyongbok 
Palace after limited resistance.108  Ōtori explained the action to Mutsu, writing on the 
morning of the 23rd: 
As the Corean Government gave very unsatisfactory answer to second 
demand mentioned in my telegram I have been compelled to resort to 
decisive means of besieging Royal Palace.  I executed this measure early 
in the morning July 23 and Corean troops thereupon fired upon Japanese 
soldiers and some firing took place on both sides.109   
 
After taking control of the imperial palace, the conspirators set about installing a 
pro-Japanese government made up of progressive Koreans open to reform.  In order to 
legitimize the new regime, the conspirators placed at the head of the new government Yi 
Huang, who was the regent and father of the reigning King Kojong and known by his 
court title “Taewŏn’gun,” or Grand Prince.110  This was truly a “marriage of 
                                                                                                                                            
desirable to not appear as the aggressor in case any violence unfolded.  “In the event a 
Sino-Japanese conflict occurred,” Mutsu continued, “we were determined to have the 
Chinese be the aggressors, while we ourselves assumed the position of the aggrieved 
party,” (Mutsu, Kenkenroku, 8).  Also quoted in Louis G. Perez, Japan Comes of Age: 
Mutsu Munemitsu and the Revision of the Unequal Treaties (Madison: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1999), 157.   
108 For a more thorough and detailed discussion of this event see Conroy, The Japanese 
Seizure of Korea, 262-265. 
109 NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 419, Ōtori-Mutsu, July 23, 1894, 617. 
110 After being named regent to his adolescent son in 1864, the Taewŏn’gun had led a 
decade-long program of sweeping reforms in government organization, education, and 
taxes strategically balanced with traditional Confucian values, before being forced out of 
office by more traditional Confucian scholars and the rival Queen Min faction in 1873.  
This started a lasting competition between the Taewŏn’gun and the Min faction that led 
to his exile to China from 1882-1885, his house arrest upon returning to Korea in 1885, 
and two attempts on his life in 1892.  Over the intervening years, the Taewŏn’gun 
strategically shifted alliances between the big three powers in Korea – China, Russia, and 
Japan – searching for a sponsor to assist his efforts to depose first Queen Min, and then 
his own son the King, in favor of his favorite grandson Yi Chun-yong.  For more, see 
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convenience” for both sides.111  By entertaining Japanese goals for reform, the 
Taewŏn’gun found in Japan a power eager to overthrow the sitting pro-Chinese 
government, effectively returning him to power and ousting the rival Min faction at the 
same time.  By returning the Taewŏn’gun to office, meanwhile, the Japanese conspirators 
found a respected Korean court official who could champion Japanese reforms, lend their 
new progressive government a patina of legitimacy, and help Japan drive Russia and 
China out of the peninsula.112  According to Young-ick Lew, the initially reluctant 
Taewŏn’gun’s decision to join the coup was “motivated both by his desire to eliminate 
his political enemies in the Min family and by his goal of carrying out gradual reforms in 
the government and cementing ties among China, Japan, and Korea.”113  With the 
                                                                                                                                            
Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewŏn’gun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi Korea 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).   
111 Young-ick Lew, “Korean-Japanese Politics behind the Kabo-Ŭlmi Reform Movement, 
1894 to 1896,” Journal of Korean Studies 3 (1981): 52. 
112 Lew, “Korean-Japanese Politics,” 41-42. 
113 Lew, “Korean-Japanese Politics,” 79.  When the conspirators beseeched him to 
participate in the coup, the Taewŏn’gun refused, adamantly declaring that foreigners had 
no right to interfere in Korean affairs.  Only after extracting a written promise “in the 
name of your Emperor” from Legation Secretary Sugimura that Japan “will not demand a 
single piece of Korean territory,” did the Taewŏn’gun reluctantly agree to take part in the 
action (Quote from Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 262).  Soon after the coup, 
this “marriage of convenience” between Japan and the Taewŏn’gun quickly led to an 
inimical divorce as both sides realized they had rushed in a little too quickly.  Less than a 
week after entering the palace, the Taewŏn’gun began revealing “his original nature as an 
obstinate conservative” by conspiring with Chinese forces, sponsoring anti-Japanese 
“righteous armies” (ŭibyŏng), and opposing Japanese reforms.  See: Young-Ick Lew, 
“Minister Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese Reform Attempts in Korea During the Sino-
Japanese War, 1894-1895,” Journal of Asiatic Studies 7 (1984): 153.  Quote from Lew, 
“Korean-Japanese Politics,” 52.  After being installed, the Taewŏn’gun – called “an old 
fox” by the next Japanese ambassador, Inoue Kaoru – solicited Japanese support to place 
his grandson to high-level positions (NGB, vol. 27.2, Doc.#: 472, Inouye-Mutsu, October 
29, 1894, 25).  As Ōtori explained to Mutsu, the new reform government quickly 
“engaged in factious struggles” with “Taewŏn’gun and his grandson on one side and the 
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Taewŏn’gun on board for the time being, the new Deliberative Council (KRN: Kun’guk 
kimuch’ŏ; JPN: Gunkoku Kimusho) was established five days after the coup, Young-ick 
Lew argues, “as a vehicle to promote Japanese-oriented institutional reforms” and staffed 
with “the core of the pro-Japanese leadership” including Ŏ Yun-jung, Kim Ka-jin, Kim 
Hong-jip, Kim Yun-sik, and An Kyŏng-su.114  Nonetheless, the Deliberative Council 
should not be seen merely as a puppet of the Japanese.  Instead, Japanese diplomats left 
much of the planning of practical reforms to the Deliberative Council.  As Lew noted, 
“the Korean reform movement was conducted mainly by Korean reform officials, with 
limited interference from Japanese authorities in Seoul.”115  Meeting daily for nearly a 
month, the Council passed over 200 sweeping reforms in governance, taxation, 
education, social policy, and the military.116  The dramatic and controversial reforms have 
subsequently been referred to as the Kabo Reforms from the name of the year in which 
they started.  
                                                                                                                                            
pro-Japanese party on the other,” (NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 448, Ōtori-Mutsu, September 
18, 1894, 666).  The Taewŏn’gun also encouraged Ōtori to send his grandson as an 
emissary (KRN: Bobing Taesa; JPN: Hōden Taishi) to Japan instead of Pak Jong-yang 
(NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 451, Ōtori-Mutsu, September 29, 1894, 671).  For their part, 
Japan refused to fulfill the Taewŏn’gun’s desires to oust the King in order to enthrone his 
grandson.  Ultimately, Japan forced the Taewŏn’gun to resign as a result of these 
irreconcilable differences.   
114 Lew, “Minsiter Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese Reform Attempts,” 149; and Young-
Lew, “An Analysis of the Reform Documents of the Kabo Reform Movement, 1894,” 
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 40 (1974): 34. 
115 Lew, “An Analysis of the Reform Documents of the Kabo Reform Movement,” 30. 
116 Kyung Moon Hwang, “Governmental Growth in the Taehan Empire Era: Origins of 
the Modern Korean State,” in Reform and Modernity in the Taehan Empire, ed. Kim 
Dong-no, John B. Duncan, and Kim Do-hyung (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2006), 166-171. 
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With a favorable government in place, and the Min and the Chinese opponents no 
longer in the picture, Japan lost little time in achieving sought-after reforms.  Rather than 
reprimand Ambassador Ōtori for his impetuous and potentially disastrous action upon 
learning of the events of the July 23rd coup in Seoul, Foreign Minister Mutsu encouraged 
the ambassador to not miss this golden opportunity to advance Japanese interests on the 
peninsula.  “I am gratified of your success,” Mutsu wrote in a letter dated July 28, “Seize 
this opportunity to effect most radical reforms for regarding officials in Corean 
government in shortest time possible and give Taewŏn’gun every assistance in your 
powers and do your utmost to solidify this ascendancy so that it will last at least one year 
[sic].”117  Ōtori did not have to be told twice.  He later enthused to Mutsu, “Japanese-
Korean relations took a sudden turn with the incident on the 23rd of last month…it is of 
extreme importance that we not lose this opportunity to quickly conclude a temporary 
treaty between Japan and Korea and settle past and future relations.”118  Mutsu in turn 
beamed to the Japanese ambassador to Great Britain, Aoki Shūzō, after the coup: “Now 
our desired improvements after repeated refusal by China will be effected by the will of 
the King...Japanese government are no longer called upon to await concurrence of 
China.119  This was a situation that Japan was willing to defend through war with China.  
                                                
117 JACAR, Ref.#: B03050308500, “5 Meiji 27-nen 7-gatsu 18-nichi kara Meiji 27-nen 7-
gatsu 30-nichi” [July 18, 1894 to July 30, 1894], 20-21.  This document is section 5 of 
JACAR, Ref.#: B03050307700, “Kankoku Naisei Kaikaku ni kansuru Kōshō Zakken 
Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of miscellaneous documents relating to negotiations regarding 
internal reforms in Korea].  This message is also found in NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc #425, 
Mutsu-Ōtori, July 28, 1894, 632; and in edited form in Conroy, Japanese Seizure of 
Korea, 263-264. 
118 NKGSS, vol. 4, Doc.#: 39, Ōtori-Mutsu, 109; and NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc. #: 428, Ōtori-
Mutsu, August 1, 1894, 633-632. 
119 JACAR, Ref.#: B03050308500, “5 Meiji 27-nen 7-gatsu 18-nichi,” 25-26. 
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As Mutsu wrote to Ōtori on August 5th, after the declaration of war: “in order to firmly 
establish independence of Corea and to consolidate Taewŏn’gun government it would be 
necessary that Japan fight a decisive battle with China.  For that purpose, it may happen 
that Japan send a large number of troops to Corea.”120   
Amidst the confusion of the Sino-Japanese War and the flurry of reforms 
promulgated by the Deliberative Council, Japanese diplomats methodically negotiated 
treaties with the new Korean government.  At the top of the list were concessions for 
railways and telegraphs.  After being instructed by Mutsu on July 10th to “endeavor to 
secure all possible material advantages such as railways, telegraphs, etc.,” Ōtori moved 
quickly to sign a favorable secret agreement concerning exactly these “material 
advantages.”121  The resulting agreement was called the Japan-Korea Temporary Joint 
Provision (Nikkan Zantei Gōdō Jōkan) and was signed by Ōtori and Korean Foreign 
Minister Kim Yun-shik on August 20, 1894, less than a month after the coup.  The first 
article maintained the pretense of reform, stating: “The Japanese government desires 
internal reforms of the Korean government.  The Korean government, in turn, aware of 
the urgency [of such reforms], guarantees that it will strictly enforce the 
recommendations of the Japanese government.”  But the primary objective of the 
Provision was clear; the second article left no questions: “Concerning one of the internal 
reforms – the construction of a railways between Seoul-Pusan, and Seoul- Inch’ŏn – 
because the finances of the Korean government are as yet inadequate, a deal shall be 
made with either the Japanese government or a Japanese company to start construction at 
                                                
120 NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 432, Mutsu-Ōtori, August 5, 1894, 639. 
121 NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc. #399, Mutsu-Ōtori, July 10, 1894, 593-594. 
271 
 
an appropriate time.”122  The Korean government immediately declared the Provision 
void on the grounds that they had been duped into signing it.  Japanese diplomats, on the 
other hand, saw the Provision as a much more binding agreement, and continued to use it 
over the following years to assert the legitimacy of Japanese railway claims.  As late as 
1898 the New York Times reported “the Japanese Minister at Seoul, M. Kato Masuo will 
demand that the contract for the construction of the Seoul-Fusan Railway by Japan, under 
an agreement made in August, 1894, shall be signed without delay.”123   
The agreements included in the Provision were based on a draft originally made 
by Ōtori and Korean reformist party member Kim Ka-jin.124  After a perfunctory 
“guarantee” in the draft that the Korean government would “adopt advice on internal 
reforms from the Japanese government, and take this opportunity to carry them out” in 
the first article, the second and third articles of this draft contained clauses providing the 
Japanese with concessions to build a railway and telegraph between Seoul and Pusan.  As 
the second article stated, however, the concession was conditional: “If in the event that 
the finances of the Korean government are not sufficient to construct the Seoul-Pusan, 
and Seoul-Inch’ŏn railways, as in the reform proposal, a treaty shall be signed and 
conditions shall be set with either the Japanese government or a Japanese company to 
start construction.”125  In return, the Japanese government would “guarantee” the 
                                                
122 The text of the Provision can be found in Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., 
Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 34-36.  One of the more notable provisions stipulated that the 
two governments would “not pursue any matters regarding the accidental conflict 
occurring between troops of both countries in the royal palace on July 23rd.” 
123 The New York Times, “Japan’s Demand on Korea,” February 7, 1898. 
124 NKGSS, vol. 4, Doc.#: 39, Ōtori-Mutsu, 109; Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 81. 
125 NKGSS, vol. 4, Doc.#: 39, Ōtori-Mutsu, 109-110. 
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independence of Korea, as laid forth in the eighth article: “The Japanese government, 
from the beginning having assisted the independence of Korea and having desired the 
achievement of the goal of Korean self-rule, will separately establish a committee made 
up of members from both countries to decide all appropriate matters relating to 
guaranteeing (hoshō) the future independence of Korea.”126  Mutsu, however, was 
concerned about the implications this promise to “guarantee” Korea’s future 
independence, and advised Ōtori to change the wording accordingly: 
If eighth clause of provisional agreement…is intended to guarantee forever 
Corea’s independence by Japan it is very weighty matter and you should not make 
even provisional agreement.  If so, strike out the clause.  If not, replace words 
[guarantee] (hoshō) by some other suitable words so as to avoid to be taken in the 
sense of guarantee.  Change title of agreement as we use [treaty] (jōyaku) only as 
equivalent of treaty.  I understand the agreement to be kept secret between both 
parties.127 
 
As Mutsu suggested, regarding future Korean independence, the term “guarantee” was 
removed from the draft in favor of the less binding term “secure” (kyōko), and the title of 
the agreement was changed from “treaty” (jōyaku) to the less official “Provision” (jōkan).   
Once the agreement was signed, the Japanese government decided that the 
negotiations for a railway treaty were too important to leave to the “old” and “indecisive” 
ambassador Ōtori Keisuke.  Indeed, Ōtori’s earlier reluctance to capitalize on the 
presence of Japanese troops to take more aggressive action towards the Korean court had 
made Ōtori an unpopular figure in the Japanese embassy in Seoul.  As early as July of 
that year, foreign ministry official Kurino Shinichirō had even broached the subject of 
replacing the ambassador with a more charismatic politician.  Sent to Seoul by Foreign 
                                                
126 NKGSS, vol. 4, Doc.#: 39, attachment, in NKGSS, vol. 4, 110. 
127 NGB, vol. 27.1, Doc.#: 434, Mutsu-Ōtori, August 9, 1894, 641. 
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Minister Mutsu to hand deliver special instructions to Ōtori, Kurino was not sparing in 
his criticism of Ōtori’s ambassadorial ability.  “Ōtori[’s] manner of negotiations would 
not attain speedy result,” Kurino chided in a telegram to Mutsu, “while keeping fool 
hardiness for indefinite period is not only very difficult but will cause several 
disadvantages.”  “Under these circumstances,” Kurino recommended, “it seems to be 
highly recommendable that Japanese Government should send immediately special 
ambassador with extraordinary power to effect our object.”128  As a result, Ōtori was 
replaced in October 1894 by a more well-known politician with more experience in 
Korea, then-Home Minister Inoue Kaoru.129   
Appointed the new Japanese ambassador to Seoul, Inoue was charged with 
spearheading wide-ranging reforms of the Korean government.  Inoue’s real goal, 
however, was to secure railway construction rights.  As Janet Hunter notes, Prime 
Minister Itō pressured Inoue soon after his arrival in Korea to secure a railway 
concession, “addressing the military need for Korean railways, and the general 
importance of Korea to Japan’s future.”130  Once in Seoul, the more aggressive Inoue took 
advantage of the confusion of the Sino-Japanese War to redouble efforts to push through 
a formal treaty recognizing Japanese railway rights.  In November, Inoue submitted to the 
                                                
128 JACAR, Ref.#: B03050308200, “2 Meiji 27-nen 6-gatsu hatsuka kara 1894 (Meiji 
27)nen 7-gatsu, 12-nichi” [June 20, 1894 to July 12, 1894], 39. 
129 Inoue had been one of the main architects of Japanese informal empire in Korea, with 
his involvement in Korean-Japanese affairs extending back to 1876 when he had been the 
deputy Japanese envoy in negotiating the Kanghwa Treaty.  As Foreign Minister in 1882, 
Inoue had also been responsible for the Treaty of Chemulp’o and personally signed the 
Convention of Seoul following the failed the Kapsin Coup in 1884.  Lew, “Minister 
Inoue Kaoru and the Japanese Reform Attempts in Korea,” 151. 
130 Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 575-576. 
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Japanese government a plan drawn up by his predecessor, Ōtori.  According to the plan, 
Inoue would negotiate for two railways – one between Seoul and Pusan and one between 
Seoul and Inch’ŏn – with three conditions: first, the two railways would be built by either 
the Japanese government, or a Japanese company; second, all expenses for acquiring land 
for the railways would be supplied to the Korean government by Japan; and third, until 
the Korean government completely repaid the Japanese government, either the Japanese 
government or a Japanese company would retain all rights of management of the two 
railways.131  As Chung Jaejeong points out, “Although this plan was later revised and 
supplemented through negotiations with the Korean government and was not enacted as 
is, it was significant as the basis for the 1898 Keifu Railway Agreement that ultimately 
allowed Japan to seize rights to construct the Keifu railway.”132   
As the Sino-Japanese War turned in Japan’s favor, Inoue feared he might lose the 
opportunity to press reforms and secure a railway concession.  Concerned that the line 
might not be constructed as it lost logistical necessity, Inoue pressured Mutsu on January 
8th: “Work of Seoul- Inch’ŏn railway must be begun before conclusion of peace 
negotiations.  All the foreigners here seem to desire its speedy completion as it is not 
difficult road...I wish to see work begun and completed at the earliest possible date.”133  
Inoue was authorized two weeks later to commence secret negotiations with the Korean 
government for a potential “Japan-Korea Treaty” (Nikkan Jōyaku).  Shortly thereafter, 
                                                
131 Chung, Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai, 75. 
132 Chung, Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai, 75. 
133 JACAR, Ref.#: B07080194700, “Bunwari 1” [Partition 1], slide 63.  This document is 
one part of JACAR, Ref.#: B07080194300, “Tetsudō Denshin sono hoka ni kan-suru 
Nikkan Jōyaku Teiketsuhō Kōshō Ikken” [Matters relating to negotiations regarding the 
conclusion of a Japanese-Korean treaty for railways and telegraphs among others]. 
275 
 
the Foreign Ministry issued Inoue an 8-point directive laying out Japan’s objectives for 
these negotiations, all of which – except for two regarding telegraphs and the opening of 
ports – concerned rights to construct railways.  Based on the earlier Ōtori-Inoue plan, the 
proposed treaty would prescribe that the Seoul-Pusan and Seoul-Inch’ŏn railways be built 
and managed by either the Japanese government or a company chosen by the Japanese 
government until the Korean government repaid all expenses.  Clearly revealing Japan’s 
intent for long-term ownership and control, Korea would not be allowed to even begin 
repaying the loans until 50 years had passed from the opening of the railways.134  Inoue 
was named Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary by order of the Meiji Emperor 
and granted authority to sign a treaty “concerning railways, telegraphs, and the opening 
of ports, as agreed in the Temporary Provision of August 20, 1894.”135 
Despite Inoue’s high court rank and prestige, negotiations went nowhere.  
Suspicious of Japanese intentions and reluctant to allow Japan too much power, the 
Korean government attempted to strategically stall until the leverage the Japanese side 
gained during Sino-Japanese War subsided with the conclusion of peace.  Claiming that 
they were not opposed to granting Japan a railway concession, the Korean government 
held out for retention of telegraphs.  Attempting to speed the process, Inoue tried to 
compromise by proposing that the Korean government could retain control of the 
                                                
134 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 36-37. 
135 JACAR, Ref.#: A01200802400, “Chōsen ni okeru tetsudō denshin oyobi kaikō ni kan-
suru jōyaku teiketsu no tame Keijō chūtō tokumei zenken kōshi Inoue Kaoru he go-inin 
kafu seraru” [Commissioning Keijō resident minister extraoridinary and plenipotentiary 
Inoue Kaoru for the purpose of concluding a treaty regarding railways, telegraphy, and 
the opening of ports in Korea]. 
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telegraph, provided that Japanese were able to use it in times of emergency.136  When 
even this did not break the deadlock, the Japanese government decided to separate the 
proposed railways.  They now concentrated on only the less difficult Seoul to Inch’ŏn 
segment, leaving the much longer and more mountainous Seoul-Pusan section for later 
negotiation.  A new draft for a treaty was drawn up and negotiations commenced in 
April, yet even these alterations were not enough to shake the Korean government before 
their calculated stalling tactics paid off.137   
 
Changing Tracks and Merging Lines: Co-Production of the Seoul-Pusan Railway 
As Gallagher and Robinson argued, informal empire was only possible through the 
“inter-relation” between economics and politics.  “Political actions aided the growth of 
commercial supremacy,” they noted, “and...this supremacy in turn strengthened political 
influence.”138  The same applied to the acquisition of the Seoul-Pusan railway and 
establishment of Japanese informal empire in Korea.  Regardless of the political 
developments over the previous year – the July 23rd Japanese-incited coup, the war with 
China, the tedious diplomatic negotiations, and the signing of the Temporary Union 
Provision – Japanese diplomatic negotiations for railway concessions were completely 
thrown off track by the Triple Intervention and the Assassination of Queen Min in 1895.  
In the wake of these unexpected events, Japanese attempts to secure railway construction 
rights would change tracks as private investors would step into to continue pick up where 
                                                
136 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 95-96. 
137 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 37. 
138 Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” 6. 
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diplomats left off.  By no means, however, did the Japanese government officials no 
longer play a role in the acquisition of railway construction rights in Korea.  Rather, the 
Japanese government actively supported the activities of the business community in 
Seoul, and even promised funding when it appeared lack of money would cause projects 
to fail.  In the end, completion of the Seoul-Pusan Railway would take the contribution of 
various actors from several countries.  While obtaining the concession for the line 
required the collaboration of Japanese and American diplomats and businessmen, 
construction of the line was possible only with the permission of the Korean government, 
the labor of Korean workers, and emergency funds provided by the Japanese government.  
But securing the concession agreement was only the halfway point; even after rights for 
the line were secured, it would take the equally vital participation of several performers 
before the opening ceremony of the Seoul-Pusan Railway could be held in 1905.   
Japanese diplomatic negotiations for railway rights were joltingly derailed by two 
events in 1895: the Triple Intervention, and the assassination of Queen Min.  The first 
came quickly after the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.  Following a string of 
convincing Japanese victories on land and sea, China had little choice but to sign the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed April 17, 1895, concluding the Sino-Japanese War in 
overwhelming Japanese triumph.139  As the terms of the treaty stipulated, China would 
                                                
139 With hostilities opened at the end of the previous July, Japanese army and naval forces 
routed their Chinese counterparts on both land and sea in the following months.  Japanese 
victories on land at Pyongyang and at sea in the Battle of the Yalu River on consecutive 
days in September 1894, followed shortly thereafter by the Japanese crossing of the Yalu 
River at Juliancheng in November, had effectively driven China out of the Korean 
peninsula.  Japan then pressed the offensive towards the Chinese capital of Beijing.  After 
Japanese forces had occupied China’s two most important naval ports, Port Arthur in 
November 1894 and Weihaiwei in February 1895, the matter was all but decided.139  By 
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pay a large indemnity, recognize Korean independence, and cede to Japan a number of 
territories including the island of Taiwan, the Pescadores island chain, and the Liaotung 
Peninsula on the mainland.140  Yet the idea of Japanese possession of the Liaotung 
Peninsula was too much for the western powers to bear.  Only days after the signing of 
the treaty, Russia, Germany, and France strongly recommended that Japan return the 
peninsula in a diplomatic move known as the Triple Intervention.  With this unanticipated 
development, what Japanese political leaders and diplomats in Korea had long feared – 
interference by the Powers in Japan’s actions in Korea – had finally come to pass.  Japan 
had been careful not to provoke the Powers, but now Japan’s interests in the Far East had 
come head to head with those of the Western countries.  Railways were one such point of 
conflict.  On May 5, the same day Japan announced its intention to accept the demands of 
the Triple Intervention, the English, American, German, and Russian representatives in 
Seoul jointly advised the Korean government not to allow any one country to monopolize 
all rights for railways and telegraphs in Korea.  Such a development, they warned, would 
be detrimental to merchants of all countries.141  As a result of the Triple Intervention and 
Western intervention in railway negotiations, Japan was forced to step back from taking 
                                                                                                                                            
taking these two ports situated on either side of the entrance to the Bohai Sea, Japan had 
controlled the land and sea routes to Beijing.   
140 The specific provisions were: 1) China, but not Japan, would recognize the 
independence of Korea; 2) Japan would receive from China sizable indemnities, and 
would occupy the city of Weihaiwei until payment was completed; 3) four Chinese treaty 
ports would be opened to Japanese merchants, and Japan would be allowed to conduct 
trade in the Chinese interior; and most significantly, 4) China would cede to Japan the 
island of Taiwan, the Pescadores island chain, and the Liaotung peninsula Paine, The 
Sino-Japanese War, 273. 
141 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 39; Duus, The 
Abacus and the Sword, 97. 
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an active role in Korean reforms, especially regarding railway concessions.  Two days 
after receiving the “advice” of Russia, Germany, and France to relinquish the Liaotung 
Peninsula, Mutsu cautioned Inoue “not to resort forcible measures in dealing with the 
Korean government for the time being.”142  “As a result of the above,” the Cabinet agreed 
on June 4th, “we shall not interfere strongly in Korean railway and telegraph matters.143  
The second event that sidetracked Japanese hopes for gaining railway concessions 
in Korea was the assassination of Queen Min by Japanese strongmen and Korean allies in 
the so-called Ŭlmi Incident of October 8th, 1895.  Early that morning, Japanese soldiers 
escorted the Taewŏn’gun to the palace, where they were met by 30 Japanese in civilian 
clothing and about 20 Korean soldiers.144  Dressed as Korean policemen, the attackers 
entered the palace, took King Kojong and his son prisoner, and then assassinated the 
Queen and two of her ladies-in-waiting.  After identifying the Queen’s body, the 
attackers dragged it into the courtyard and set it afire.  Adding insult to injury, the captive 
King was forced to issue a decree demoting the queen to commoner status.145  The 
Queen’s assassination, as it later became clear, was part of a plot by the new Japanese 
minister to Seoul, Miura Gorō, and first legation secretary Sugimura Fukashi, to incite 
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another coup in the Korea court.  As in the earlier 1884 and 1894 coups, the goal was to 
again place the Taewŏn’gun at the head of a pro-Japanese government while driving the 
anti-Japanese Min faction out of the government.  Despite Miura’s attempts to conceal 
the involvement of Japanese, there had been several witnesses.  Court ladies had seen the 
attackers dragging away the Queen’s corpse, the American military adviser General 
William Dye had seen Japanese with swords drawn in the palace, and the American 
diplomat Horace Allen had seen a group of “evil-looking Japanese” running away from 
the palace.146  When the roles of Miura and Sugimura role in the plot were revealed, they 
were recalled to Japan and immediately put on trial along with forty-six other 
conspirators.  All were later acquitted of any guilt.  Together, these two events nearly 
eliminated Japanese influence in Korea, along with diplomatic channels to secure any 
railway concession.  While the Triple Intervention forced Japan to take a less active 
diplomatic stance towards negotiating with the Korean court, the ill feeling towards Japan 
caused by the Ŭlmi Incident – not to mention the acquittal of the conspirators – hardened 
Korean government resistance to Japanese entreaties for the Seoul-Pusan railway. 
As Japanese efforts to aggressively attain influence in the peninsula came to a 
halt, the Korean court accelerated efforts to modernize the country and establish Korean 
independence.  Understandably fearful for his own life following the murder of the 
Queen and wide-scale riots after a recent government order to adopt Western hairstyles, 
King Kojong fled to the Russian legation in February 1896 under the protection of 
Russian marines dispatched to Seoul the previous day (an event known as the Agwan 
P’achŏn).  Safely under the protection of the Russians in the Russian Embassy, where he 
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resided until February 1897, King Kojong promulgated death sentences for the pro-
Japanese conspirators.  Angry mobs executed these orders by assassinating Prime 
Minister Kim Hong-jip and Treasury Minister Ŏ Yun-jung, both of whom were longtime 
pro-Japanese reformers.  This cleared the way for the Korean court to embark on the so-
called Kwangmu reforms intended to affirm Korea’s independence, while also undoing 
many of the Kabo reforms.  Out from under the influence of both China and Japan, King 
Kojong declared the founding of the Great Han Empire (Taehan Teguk) after leaving the 
Russian embassy in 1897 and undertook these reforms as a way to legitimize the new 
empire.  In addition to financial and legal matters, the reforms introduced several new 
tangible forms of modernity.  The capital of Seoul, for example, underwent several 
projects intended to modernize the city, including street improvements, the laying of 
street trolleys, and the introduction of electricity.   
One significant part of the Kwangmu reform program was the modernization of 
the national transportation network, including road and telegraph infrastructure 
improvements.  Railways, of course, were a major focus of the program.  In July 1899, 
the Korean court announced its intention to sponsor railway construction by 
promulgating new “railway regulations,” which stipulated that the government intended 
to build lines to every part of the country to “facilitate the travel of the people and the 
shipping of goods,” that all railways would follow the international gauge, and that all 
lines must conform to government standards of gauge, fares, and supervision.  Finally, 
aware that railways could be the first steps towards colonization, the regulations dictated 
that, other than railway employees, no foreigners would be allowed to reside or open 
businesses within station lands in an attempt to prevent the use of railway lands for 
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colonial settlement.147  In order to plan and coordinate railway development, the Korean 
court established a Railway Agency (JPN: Tetsudōin; KRN: ch’ŏldŏwŏn) in April 1900. 
The Korean court’s desire to construct railways led to concessions being awarded 
to American and French interests.  First, rights for a line between Seoul and the port of 
Inch’ŏn were awarded to an American businessman active in Yokohama, James R. 
Morse.  This arrangement was encouraged by Russian Minister Karl Ivanovich Waeber, 
who had made a deal with Morse whereby Morse would receive the railway rights in 
exchange for giving up his claims to a timber logging concession.  Waeber then endorsed 
a plan by the French company Fives-Lille for a northwestwardly line from Seoul towards 
the city of Ŭiju and the Trans-Siberian Railway beyond.  To the consternation of Japan, 
the Korean government signed an agreement for this concession two months later in July 
1896.  Indicating the Korean government’s intention to retain control of the national 
railway network, the agreements between the Korean government and the Americans and 
French included a number of conditions.  First, the Korean government would grant the 
company land necessary for track right-of-way and stations, warehouses, etc., in return 
for free transport of mail and Korean troops.  Secondly, the concession stipulated that 
90% of labor required the build the earthworks of the railway would be provided by 
Koreans.  Finally, not only was the concession contingent on construction of the lines 
commencing within 1 year and being completed within 3 years, the Korean governed 
reserved the right to repurchase the railway and all its properties after 15 years.148  
                                                
147 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 50-52. 
148 The concession agreement between Morse and the Korean government is reproduced 
in NGB, vol. 29, Doc.#: 345, Komura-Mutsu, April 23, 1896, 667-670. 
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While the Korean decision to construct railways was meant to strengthen the 
court, it had the unintended affect of providing a new track for Japanese interests to 
finally acquire rights to construct railways in Korea.  Worried that it was falling too far 
behind the US and France, Japan used this announcement by the Korean government to 
jump back into the competition over railway concessions.  On this point, Japanese 
diplomats and private entrepreneurs were united.  In their mind, it did not matter whether 
railways were built or management by the Japanese government or a Japanese private 
company; the only thing that mattered was that they were Japanese.  As a group of 
Japanese railway promoters trumpeted in the Tōkyō Keizai Shinpō in 1896:  
Today, in the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line, we are not in the least 
concerned with the sort of distinction as to whether it will be a state or 
private enterprise.  If only it can be constructed by Japanese hand, that’s 
enough...The first thing is to gain something which is a previously granted 
right.149   
 
With concessions already awarded for lines to Inch’ŏn and Ŭiju, Japanese 
investors focused on the line between Seoul and Pusan.  This line was of particular 
importance for Japanese commercial and strategic interests because it connected the 
Korean capital to southeastern city of Pusan, the closest large Korean port to Japan.  The 
Army General Staff Headquarters (Daihon’ei) had sent assistant chief Kawakami Sōroku 
to Korea to investigate the logistical situation on the continent in 1892, resulting in the 
report submitted by Kōno Tenzui.150  Considering Pusan to be the most likely port of 
disembarkation for Japanese troops in the event of deployment to the mainland, 
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150 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 28. 
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Kawakami had recommended exactly such a line.151  Because of the importance of 
conveying military supplies during war, Kawakami had also stressed that the railway be 
built by Japan.152  The rail link between Pusan and Seoul became especially desirable 
during the Sino-Japanese War.  In the midst of the fighting, the Daihon’ei had dispatched 
a team of 29 railway engineers including Sengoku Mitsugu – who had just completed 
surveying the elevated line in Tokyo – and Ishimaru Shigemi to draw up plans for the 
lines between Seoul and Pusan, in addition to a second line between Seoul and Inch’ŏn.153  
A rail link from the port at Pusan to Seoul and beyond to the Trans-Siberian Railway also 
piqued the interest of Japanese entrepreneurs.  Even politicians such as Ōkuma 
Shigenobu, for example, recognized that the line promised great commercial potential for 
Japanese businesses.  “We should extend railway lines either from Pusan to Seoul, then 
on to Pyongyang and Uijiu, or from Pusan to Wonsan, through Hamgyong Province and 
on to the Russian border,” Ōkuma proclaimed, “In the future when the Siberian railway is 
completed, if we connect it from Korea to the Japanese Sanyō and Tōkaidō line, making 
it a world route, it would lead to great income.154  With visions such as these in mind, 
Japanese merchants Takeuchi Tsuna, Ōmiwa Chōbei, and Ozaki Saburō presented to 
Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi a plan in February 1896 to form a company to construct 
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both lines, funded by a new Korean central bank established expressly for that purpose.155  
All three had been active in planning Korean railways prior to this proposal.  Takeuchi 
and Ozaki had been employed by the Korean Mint Bureau (Jŏnhwan’guk) to plan a 
railway between Seoul and Pusan.  Ōmiwa, meanwhile, had separately sketched another 
line from Seoul to Inch’ŏn along with another Japanese working in the Mint Bureau, 
Masuda Nobuyuki.156   
Spurred to action by the granting of concessions to the Americans and French in 
the summer of 1896, the Japanese government actively supported the efforts of private 
Japanese entrepreneurs to establish a railway company to build the desired Seoul-Pusan 
railway.  Receiving approval from Prime Minister Itō, the trio of Takeuchi, Ōmiwa, and 
Ozaki started soliciting investors to form such a company.  As a result of their efforts, 
155 investors gathered at the Nihombashi Club in Tokyo in July 1896 to declare the 
foundation of the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company.  Among the assembled investors were 
several well-known government leaders and businesspeople, such as Shibusawa Eiichi, 
Maejima Hisoka, Ōe Taku, Inoue Kakugorō, and Masuda Takashi.  At this first meeting, 
Shibusawa was elected chairman of a board of 8 titular “promoters” made up of 
Shibusawa, Ozaki, Takeuchi, Maejima, Ōe, Nakano Buei, Ōmiwa, and Inoue.  As its first 
act of business, the company petitioned Foreign Minister Saionji Kinmochi for central 
government assistance in arranging an introduction to the Korean court.157  Japanese 
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negotiators had been careful in their deliberations with the Korean government over the 
Japan-Korea Temporary Joint Provision to include language stipulating that the railway 
would be constructed by “either the Japanese government or a company designated by 
the Japanese government.”  Now with a suitable company in hand, Japanese diplomats 
sought to make good on this agreement.  Forwarding the company’s petition to 
Ambassador to Korea Hara Takashi (Kei) and instructing him to provide an introduction 
to the Korean court, Saionji highlighted the Japanese government’s desire to see a 
railway laid between Seoul and Pusan and reminded Hara of the wording in the Provision 
clearing the way for a private Japanese company to lay the line.158  The Korean 
government, however, was reluctant to entertain proposals for a Japanese company to 
construct the line, citing unrest in the countryside that would be aggravated by the 
presence of a Japanese railway.  A more pressing issue was Korean frustration over the 
acquittal of the conspirators in the assassination of Queen Min.  As Ambassador Hara 
Takashi wrote to Foreign Minister Saionji Kinmochi in July 1896: “It is needless to say 
that the reason the Korean government will not allow the railway anytime soon is entirely 
because of the sentiment resulting from the October 8th Incident.”159 
When the Korean court denied these requests, it seemed that Japanese efforts to 
secure rail lines in Korea would hit a dead end.  But then help came from an unexpected 
source in early 1897: the United States.  Twice, American diplomats and businesspeople 
made deals with their Japanese counterparts that led to Japanese ownership of both the 
Seoul-Inch’ŏn and Seoul-Pusan railway lines in Korea.  The first case concerned the 
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concession to the Seoul-Inch’ŏn line, held by American James R. Morse.  Morse’s 
agreement with the Korean government in 1896 had stipulated that the line must be 
completed by 1899, but his inability to secure financing from investors made it unlikely 
that he would fulfill this requirement.  Looking for a way to recover his investment and 
turn a profit, Morse began shopping the concession around to the highest bidder.  Seeing 
an opportunity for Japanese interests to take control of the line, Masuda Takashi 
propositioned to Morse that Japanese investors associated with the Seoul-Pusan Railway 
would be happy to take the concession off Morse’s hands for the right price.  Morse 
informed Shibusawa Eiichi that such a deal could be arranged.  What made the final 
transaction come to fruition was the collaboration of politician Ōkuma Shigenobu, and 
businessman Shibusawa Eiichi.  According to Shibusawa’s recollections, Ōkuma thought 
it was a shame that the concession had fallen into the hands of a foreigner and that it was 
vital for the line to be constructed by Japan.  If Shibusawa would organize a group of 
investors to form a company, then Ōkuma would do his part to provide government 
financial support.160  As Shibusawa explained to a group of regional government officials 
at a fundraising event in 1900, he then set to work on his side of the bargain.  Although 
he could not promise potential investors a return on their profits, Shibusawa appealed to 
their patriotism by saying it would be “regrettable” to leave the line to a foreigner and 
that even the smallest amount of money would help to ensure that the line was 
constructed by “Japanese hands.”  Yet because this would not be a “normal” company, 
Shibusawa decided that a “syndicate” of investors would be more appropriate.  
                                                
160 KDL: Shibusawa Eiichi, “Keifu Tetsudō Iken” [On the Seoul-Pusan Railway], in 
Shibusawa Danshaku Jitsugyō Kōen [Lectures on business by Baron Shibusawa], vol. 1, 
ed. Iguchi Masayuki (Tokyo: Teikoku Tosho Shuppan, 1913), 370-371. 
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Ultimately, the syndicate of 15 investors Shibusawa gathered from the ranks of the Seoul-
Pusan Railway Company promised to purchase the line from Morse for ¥2 million after 
construction had been completed.  In the meantime, they would provide funds to assist 
construction.  
It was then Ōkuma’s turn to spring into action when the deal between Morse and 
Shibusawa’s syndicate broke down in mid-1897, when Morse demanded triple the 
amount of start-up cash.161  Three times Ōkuma and the Japanese government stepped in 
to promise funding in order to make sure the concession was not scooped by another 
foreign power.  First, Ōkuma arranged for the Yokohama Specie Bank to offer Morse a 
¥1 million ($500,000) loan, backed by the government, to continue construction on the 
line.  Secondly, when Shibusawa’s syndicate expressed concerned that it might not be 
able to secure the ¥2 million necessary to purchase the finished line as agreed, Ōkuma 
and Matsukata circumvented a constitutional provision dictating that all national loans be 
approved by the Diet to earmark ¥1 million from the Sino-Japanese War indemnity from 
China to loan to the syndicate.  Thirdly, the government intervened once more in early 
1898 when Morse again attempted to “realize handsomely on his little investment” by 
shopping the concession around to Russia and Japan.162  In March 1898, Morse 
mentioned to the Japanese investment syndicate that a group of French entrepreneurs was 
willing to purchase the concession for ¥3 million.  As before, the Japanese government 
scrambled to promise Shibusawa’s syndicate a further no-interest loan of ¥800,000 on top 
of the previous ¥1 million.  When the government finally came through on the promised 
                                                
161 Shibusawa Eiichi, “Keifu Tetsudō Iken,” 370-371. 
162 Quoted in Duus, Abacus and the Sword, 144. 
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¥1.8 million loan, they did so on the condition that construction and operation of the line 
would be subject to oversight by officials from the Communications, Finance, and 
Foreign ministries.  With this agreed, the syndicate finally purchased the Seoul-Inch’ŏn 
concession from Morse in May 1899 for $1 million, or just under ¥1.75 million.163  
Construction on the line proceeded more rapidly after it passed into Japanese hands, and 
the entire line was completed just over one year later in 1900.  Morse had broke ground 
on the line in the spring of 1897 on the Inch’ŏn end of the line, but his inability to secure 
financing slowed progress considerably.  Construction started from the Seoul end when 
the Japanese investors led by Shibusawa stepped in to providing funding.  With the influx 
of Japanese cash, work on the remainder of the line commenced in April 1899 and was 
completed in July.  The opening ceremony was then held on December 12, 1900.164 
The second case of US-Japanese cooperation concerned the Seoul-Pusan railway.  
After Japan purchased the concession for the Seoul-Inch’ŏn Line from Morse, US 
Ambassador Horace Allen urged the Korean government to award Japan the rights to the 
Seoul-Pusan line.  Allen’s support had apparently been bought through a deal made with 
Foreign Minister Ōkuma whereby the American Minister would cooperate in return for 
Ōkuma’s promise that “all material for the construction of this road would be ordered 
from America” and through the offices of the American Trading Company and its 
Yokohama agent, James R. Morse.165  Final negotiations with the Korean court were 
                                                
163 Duus, Abacus and the Sword, 140-145; Hunter, “Japanese Government Policy,” 585. 
164 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 282-285. 
165 This information is revealed in a letter from Morse to Foreign Minister Komura Jūtarō 
dated July 11th, 1902.  Morse was apparently writing to complain that despite this 
agreement, Japan had not made good on their side of the deal.  See: JACAR, Ref.#: 
B04010887500, “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō senro hogo no tame 
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completed by Ambassador Kato Masuō on the occasion of Itō Hirobumi’s visit to Korea.  
As Peter Duus writes, “Itō’s visit became a festival friendship, festooned with cordial 
speeches and a message of felicitations from the Meiji emperor to the Korean court.”166  
Under this pressure, the Korean government finally relented and awarded the rights to the 
Seoul-Pusan railway on September 8, 1898. 
 Yet securing the rights to construct the railway was just the beginning.  As lack of 
capital prevented the start of construction on the line, investors turned to the Japanese 
government for assistance lest the concession expire.  As the investors appealed to Prime 
Minister Yamagata Aritomo in November 1899, the concession for the line from the 
Korean government stipulated that construction must begin within three years or else the 
concession would become void.167  The investors, however, were having trouble rounding 
up funds domestically as a result of an economic downturn in Japan.  In response, the 
cabinet passed bills through the Imperial Diet in February 1900, urging the rapid 
completion of the Seoul-Pusan Railway and authorizing the government to provide 
“appropriate protection (sōtō no hogo)” of the company.168  With this mandate to support 
the activities of the Seoul-Pusan Railway, the central government convened a committee 
charged with deliberating proper government procedures regarding overseas railways 
                                                                                                                                            
junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku keikaku no ken Dai-
ni maki” [Volume 2 of materials relating to the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway, 
materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the Seoul-Pusan railway line, 
and materials concerning expanding our interests along the Seoul-Pusan railway line], 
slides 18-21. 
166 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 147. 
167 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 170-171. 
168 See: Fourteenth Imperial Diet, House of Peers, 18th General Meeting, February 7th, 
1900 (Dai-jūyonkai Teikoku Gikai, Kizokuin Giji sokkiroku, dai-jūhachigō), 350. 
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owned by Japanese nationals.  Sitting on this committee were Vice-Minister of Finance 
Sakatani Yoshirō, Vice-Minister of Communications Furuichi Kō’i, Vice-Minister of the 
Army Nakamura Yoshijirō, and Shibusawa Eiichi.  With the strong support of Army 
Minister Katsura Tarō and the endorsement of Communications Minister Yoshikawa 
Akimasa, the recommendations of the committee were promulgated into law.  Passed in 
October 1900, these guidelines placed any company owned by Japanese nationals to 
operate railways overseas under the supervision of the Ministry of Communications and 
extended many domestic railway regulations to overseas companies.169  Meanwhile, a 
month earlier in September 1900, the Japanese cabinet authorized the granting of 
emergency funds to the Keifu Railway Company, promising to guarantee a 6% return on 
investments for a period of 15 years.170  The Imperial Diet provided the funds necessary 
for this in March 1901 by supplementing the 1901 budget with ¥90,000 earmarked for 
assisting the Keifu Railway Company.171  This was by no means enough to finance the 
entire 270-mile long railway, but it was sufficient to commence construction on the line 
and satisfy the requirements of the concession.  With this cash in hand, the company held 
the groundbreaking ceremony for the Seoul-Pusan railway on August 20th, 1901.172   
                                                
169 See JACAR, Ref.#: A03020477800, “Goshomei Genpon.  Meiji Sanjūsan-nen 
Chokurei Dai-sanbyaku rokujūroku gō. Gaikoku ni oite tetsudō wo fusetsu suru Teikoku 
kaisha ni kan-suru ken” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1900, Imperial Edict 
#366, matters relating to Japanese companies constructing railways in foreign countries]. 
170 For the rules, see Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 
182-187; and Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 151. 
171 See JACAR, Ref.#: A03020513700, “Goshomei Genpon.  Meiji Sanjūyon-nen, yosan 
sangatsu nijūshichi-nichi, Meiji Sanjūyon nendo sainyū saishutsu sōyōsan tsuika” 
[Original script signed by the Emperor, 1901, March 27 Budget, supplements to the 1901 
general budget of revenues and expenditures]. 
172 Chōsen Tetsudō-shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Chōsen Tetsudō Shi, vol. 1, 283-284. 
292 
 
Construction of the line was carried out according to terms of the 1898 concession 
between the Korean government and the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company.  Modeled on 
the earlier agreement between the Korean government and James R. Morse for the Seoul-
Inch’ŏn Line, the concession stipulated that land for the Seoul-Pusan line and all 
associated properties would be provided by the Korean government in exchange for free 
conveyance of Korean mail, troops, and military supplies.  Article 6 of the agreement, 
moreover, prescribed that “Natives shall be given the preference, especially upon the 
earthworks, where not more than ten per cent (10%) of other nationals will be employed, 
unless native labor is held at such a high price as to render the importation of foreign 
labor advisable.”173  As a result, according to Chung Jaejeong, there were no fewer than 
10 Korean construction companies contracted to work on the railway.174  For the Korean 
government, this provision was an attempt to limit the amount of foreign involvement in 
the construction of the railway, while also providing employment and profits for Korean 
labor managers.  Not surprisingly, many of these contracted companies were founded by 
Korean government officials.   For the Japanese Seoul-Pusan Railway Company, 
meanwhile, contracting Korean labor to lay the line had two main benefits.  First, because 
Korean laborers were only paid half the wage of Japanese laborers, the company could 
hire twice as many Koreans to work on the line, presumably speeding completion of the 
railway.  Secondly, the hiring of Korean laborers had the added benefit of popularizing 
                                                
173 JACAR, Ref.#: B04010887000, “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line], slides 27-28. 
174 Chung, Teikoku Nihon no Shokuminchi Shihai, 212-213. 
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the line while hopefully pacifying local insurgents by putting them to work on the 
railway.  This had been relatively successful in Taiwan when colonial administrators had 
paid insurgents, referred to as “dohi” by the Japanese, to work on road construction 
projects or in camphor factories.175  Nevertheless, Japanese construction contractors 
gradually replaced Korean laborers as the prospect of war with Russia approached in the 
mid-1900s.  At the urging of Army Vice-Chief of Staff Kodama Gentarō, the company 
was reorganized by imperial edict in late December 1903 and placed under the 
supervision of a government-appointed director.176  On the same day, citing military 
necessity, the cabinet granted the company a ¥1.75 million subsidy to cover construction 
costs and guaranteed a ¥10 million bond on behalf of the company.177  Already in effect a 
semi-governmental company, the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company was finally 
nationalized by the Japanese government in March 1906, making it an integral part of the 
Japanese imperial railway network.178 
                                                
175 Gotō Shimpei, “The Administration of Formosa (Taiwan),” in Fifty Years of New 
Japan, vol. 2, ed. Ōkuma Shigenobu (London: Smith & Elder, 1908), 539. 
176 JACAR, Ref.#: A03020584500, “Goshomei Genpon.  Meiji Sanjūroku-nen, Chokurei 
Dai-nihyaku kyūjūni-gō, Keifu Tetsudō Kabushikikaisha ni kan-suru ken” [Original 
script signed by the Emperor, 1903, Imperial Edict #292, Matters regarding the Keifu 
Railway Company]; Duus, Abacus and the Sword, 154. 
177 JACAR, Ref.#: A03020584400, “Goshomei Genpon.  Meiji Sanjūroku-nen, Chokurei 
Dai-nihyaku kyūjūichi-gō, Teikoku Kenpō Dai-nanajū-jō ni yoru zaiseijō hitsuyō shobun 
no ken” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1903, Imperial Edict #291, Matters 
regarding dispositions necessary for public finance pursuant to Article 70 of the Imperial 
Constitution]; Duus, Abacus and the Sword, 154. 
178 JACAR, Ref.#: A03020656200, “Goshomei Genpon.  Meiji Sanjūkyū-nen, Hōritsu 
Dai-jūhachi-gō, Keifu Tetsudō kaishūhō” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1906, 
law #18, Keifu Railway purchase law]. 
294 
 
In this way, the merging of public and private actions by self-interested actors 
from several countries was necessary to see the Seoul-Pusan railway to fruition.  As Peter 
Duus concludes, “The Japanese success was the product of their ‘tenacity,’ but it was also 
the product of consensus among key figures in the Tokyo government, the military high 
command, and small group of domestic promoters and investors.”179  Yet it is also 
important to note that the line required the choreographed participation of various actors 
from several different countries including Japan, Korea, and the United States.  The line 
would not have been possible without the permission of the Korean government, the 
labor of Korean workers to build the earthworks necessary for track beds, the deals made 
by American diplomats and businesspeople, or funds provided by the Japanese 
government and private investors.  Thus, if the opening of the Keifu-Railway in 1905 
marked the foundation of Japan’s infrastructure of empire, the presence of dignitaries 
from Japan, Korea, and the United States highlighted the various forces that combined to 
construct spaces of Japanese hegemony in Korea. 
 
Conclusion: Railways, Japanese Expansion, and Imperial Hegemony 
Following the Meiji Restoration, Japanese government leaders felt a dire need to defend 
their country from Western imperialism.  Policies of rapid industrialization and military 
expansion, political centralization, and ideological unification under the banners of “rich 
nation, strong army” (fukoku kyōhei), “increase production and industry” (shokusan 
kōgyō), and “civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kaika) were all undertaken in the 
name of making Japan strong enough to catch up to and surpass the West.  Railways 
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contributed greatly to these Meiji efforts of modernization.  Railways facilitated the 
mobility of troops – to great effect during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 – as well as the 
movement of raw materials necessary for industrial development.  Economically, 
railways would not only facilitate domestic consumption and foreign trade by conveying 
goods from productive regions to major cities and seaports such as Yokohama or Kobe, 
private investment in the railway industry was a good way to spur private capital 
growth.180  Ideologically, locomotives and railways symbolized progress and modernity, 
to the point where – as Carol Gluck famously argued – “two ubiquitous images gradually 
emerged as symbols of ‘civilization’: the monarch, and the locomotive.”181  One 
sometimes-overlooked, yet just as important, process in Japan’s emergence as a modern 
nation was geographic integration.  Once again, railways played a significant role as local 
lines were built around the country in order to overcome the historic isolation of remote 
regions and firmly tie all parts of the nation to the capital city of Tokyo.  When the Meiji 
government sought to assert territorial control over Hokkaidō in response to threats of 
Russian encroachment, it was railways that provided the infrastructure for commercial 
and industrial development of the island.  As the example of Hokkaidō demonstrates, it 
was through cultivation of “unused” land that Japanese colonizers sought to assert 
ownership rights to territory.   
 This belief in “cultivator’s rights” remained unchanged as Japanese defense 
strategists turned their attention from shoring up Japan’s domestic borders to extending 
imperial influence overseas in response to a persistent Western threat.  From the mid-
                                                
180 See Stephen J. Ericson, The Sound of the Whistle: Railroads and the State in Meiji 
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181 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 101. 
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1870s, Japanese policymakers such as Yamagata Aritomo began stressing the need to 
define and create defensible buffers to Western encroachment.  Because of its proximity 
to the Japanese mainland, Japanese defense strategists quickly identified Korea as a 
strategically important region.  Concerned that what they saw as “maladministration” of 
the peninsula would invite the intervention of Western imperialist powers, Japan tried to 
self-servingly support Korean independence.  By compelling Korea to declare itself 
independent of Chinese suzerainty in 1876, and then encouraging a fledgling native 
modernization movement within Korea in the 1880s, Japanese agents sought to foster 
Korean modern development.  When these efforts did not proceed at a pace deemed 
acceptable by Japanese strategists, more aggressive actions were taken in the mid-1890s.  
If these attempts at modernizing Korea were at first sincere, they were always motivated 
primarily by Japanese national defense concerns.  In the minds of Yamagata and other 
Japanese thinkers, the idea was that Korea must become a modern and powerful country 
in order to withstand Western encroachment, as Japan had done following the Meiji 
Restoration.  As these Japanese strategists saw it, the problem was that Korea at the time 
was ruled by a regime that resisted modernizing reforms that would undermine their 
power, all the while relying on Chinese recognition and protection to prop up their 
regime.  Thus began a complicated chain of logic whereby Korea as a defensive buffer to 
Western imperialism meant Korea as a sovereign independent nation, which required 
Korea becoming industrialized and wealthy, which could only be achieved by internal 
reform and modernization, which necessitated removal of the anti-reform regime, which 
finally entailed the expulsion of the Chinese.  The complexity of these logical gymnastics 
was duly reflected in the internally contradictory position taken by Japan towards Korea 
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during the Sino-Japanese War, which can be summed up as: “infringing on Korean 
independence in order to protect it.”  Perhaps no better commentary can be made on the 
inconsistency of this policy than that uttered by Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wang 
Feng-zao when he officially rejected the Japanese proposal for a joint committee of 
Japanese and Chinese representatives to implement internal reforms in Korea.  “We are 
sure that Japan has no more right to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea,” the Qing 
government communicated through Wang to Japan, “since you have from the first 
recognized her autonomy.”182  Only when keeping in mind that it was Japanese 
independence – not Korean – that was being protected in the end, does such a blatantly 
paradoxical policy begin to become comprehensible.  
 Motivated by security concerns, Japanese agents in Korea pursued railways in 
order to establish Japanese influence over colonial territory.  As the series of railway 
opening ceremonies recounted at the beginning of the chapter indicates, Japanese railway 
construction proceeded simultaneously and following the same pattern in the mainland, 
the newly integrated territory of Hokkaidō, the recently acquired colony of Taiwan, and 
Korea.  Although each of these lands had differing legal statuses, it is notable that 
railways were used to introduce and solidify Japanese influence in each case.  In Korea, 
constructing railways was seen as a way to facilitate commercial trade while also 
securing solid claims of ownership of Korean territory.  In Taiwan, Japanese colonizers 
touted the logistical benefits of railways while extoling the ability of locomotives to 
propel the advancement of civilization.  Thus the infrastructure of empire was the same 
as the Japanese empire expanded, regardless of whether it was through formal or informal 
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imperialism.  It was by developing the natural environment through construction of 
railways in new territories that Japanese agents attempted to expand imperial influence.  
As the next chapter will argue, this attempt to cultivate Japanese imperial hegemony also 




CULTURAL HEGEMONY IN BUILT FORM: COLONIAL PUBLIC WORKS IN 
TAIPEI AND SEOUL 
I expected to find all the large towns in Formosa built like 
the ones in China...But I found all were built after the 
European style and had wide streets, as clean as the best in 
Tokyo.  Some are even better than any to be found in 
Tokyo because they are properly macadamised. 
Takekoshi Yōsaburō, 19071 
 
In controlling a foreign race acquired through military 
force, the colonizer must by all means have in mind not 
only the objective of securing its own rights, but also the 
noble aims of proclaiming civilization and promoting the 
social welfare of humanity.  
Mochiji Rokusaburō, 19122 
 
It may be hoped with reason that the measures adopted by 
the present Governor-General with a view to developing 
industries, imparting education, and improving the sanitary 
condition will lead the native population to appreciate the 
boons of the Japanese administration and to assimilate 
themselves gradually to the ways of civilized life. 
Gotō Shimpei, 19023 
 
On the morning of October 1st, 1926, central Seoul’s Kwanghwamun Street – the widest 
thoroughfare in the city – was crowded with automobile traffic as nearly 1,500 visitors 
made their way through a ceremonial archway leading to the massive Edwardian Neo-
Baroque edifice presiding over the boulevard.  On this day, none other than the 16th 
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anniversary of the beginning of Japan’s colonial administration of Korea, Japanese 
military and civilian officials, Korean aristocrats, foreign dignitaries, and even the 
visiting Prince of Siam, gathered to celebrate the opening of the recently completed 
Government-General Building (JPN: sōtokufu chōsha; KRN: ch’ongdokbu chŏngsa).  As 
the distinguished guests assembled in the ornate marble-tiled hall at the heart of the 
building, the ceremony began with a traditional Shinto ablution (shubatsu) by the high 
priest of the Chōsen Shrine, a performance by Korean dancer Yi Dong-an, and the 
waving of a sacramental hinoki cypress tree branch by Governor-General Saitō Makoto.  
Turning to address the crowd, Saitō remarked that he was “overcome with happiness” 
that the event should be held on such a significant day for the Government-General.4   
For Governor-General Saitō, architect of Japan’s Cultural Rule (bunka seiji) 
policies formulated in response to the massive Korean anti-imperial 1919 March First 
Movement, the renovation of the Government-General Building denoted a far-reaching 
overhaul of the Japanese colonial administration.  During the first decade of colonial rule 
in Korea, Japan had harshly governed the peninsula through sheer military force, with 
policies accurately characterized as “military rule.”  No better illustration of the iron-
fisted Japanese military rule of this period exists than Governor-General Terauchi 
Masatake’s threat to those Koreans who dared to resist Japanese colonization.  “I will 
whip you,” thundered Terauchi, “with scorpions!”  Even “if the remark was apocryphal,” 
Mark Peattie notes, “the sentiment was not.”5  Governor-General Saitō, on the other hand, 
                                                
4 KDL: Anonymous, “Sōtokufu Shinchōsha Rakuseishiki” [Ceremony for the completion 
of the new Government-General Headquarters Building], Chōsen 138 (1926): 104 
5 Mark R. Peattie, “Introduction,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. 
Roman H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 18. 
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governed the peninsula through policies of cultural, rather than military, rule.  Adopting a 
strategy of “divide and rule,” the Japanese Government-General under Saitō attempted to 
establish Japanese cultural hegemony with administrative policies that “co-opted 
nationalist leaders and channeled popular anti-Japanese sentiments into institutionalized 
forums.”6  As Michael Robinson explains, these policies were “designed to soften the 
appearance of repression while at the same time strengthening Japanese control…The 
goal was to make Japanese rule acceptable not only to world opinion, but to gain 
legitimacy within the colony as well.”7   
To Saitō, the newly constructed Government-General Building symbolized the 
cultural emphasis of the reformed Japanese administration.  “This new building, 
constructed and completed in a solid (kenrō) and magnificent (kōsō) style, is beyond 
criticism as the central government office of the peninsula,” Saitō proclaimed.  Yet the 
building was only as meaningful as its occupants.  “Just as the building has renewed its 
appearance,” Saitō continued, “it is my hope that those involved in governance, too, will 
surely achieve even more desirable results by being all the more sincere (shisei), selfless 
(hōkō), deferential (kikkyū), and diligent (jinsui), thereby giving meaning to the 
reconstruction of this building.”8  It was as if the Governor-General Building, despite its 
rigid ferroconcrete construction, embodied the flexible, co-optive structure of Japanese 
cultural rule Saitō hoped to implement after 1920.  Indeed, the Government-General 
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Building was the capstone of Japanese attempts to achieve cultural hegemony in built 
form in the colonies, namely through public works projects designed to improve the built 
environment of the colonial city.   
Improvement of the built environment was paired with manipulation of the 
natural environment in Japanese efforts to solidify, validate, and profit from colonial rule 
in Taiwan and Korea.  Alongside the cadastral surveys, topographical maps, and 
meteorological statistics carried out to render the colonial countryside legible to 
administrators and agricultural planners – as well as the road, river, and railway 
improvements undertaken to accelerate shipping and mobilize troops throughout the 
colonial hinterland, the port construction programs executed to expedite trade with the 
metropole – Japanese colonizers in Taiwan and Korea initiated massive urban 
improvement programs to produce spaces that would at once facilitate urban commerce, 
advance “primitive” local culture, promote sanitation and hygiene, and project Japanese 
culture and modernity.  Working from within the preexisting built environment of Taipei 
and Seoul, Japanese planners sought to assert colonial power in the space of the city 
through public works: namely, street improvements, the promulgation of construction and 
street use codes, and the introduction of monumental urban design framed by streets and 
western architecture.   
The cultivation of Japanese cultural hegemony in the colonial built environment 
through public works projects consisted of three processes.  First, Japanese planners in 
Taipei and Seoul attempted to construct colonial difference in the built form of the city 
through the paving of “culture streets” as the groundwork for the development of “culture 
cities”.  This meant widening, straightening, and paving city streets, installing sidewalks, 
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gutters, and sewers, and planting roadside trees in order to produce a streetscape that was 
sanitary and visibly “modern” – that is, ordered, regular, hygienic, and “civilized” in 
appearance.  One reason for these projects was that Japanese officials assigned to the 
colonies and expatriate settlers desired familiar urban environments.  Planners therefore 
selectively modernized the built environment of Japanese areas of the colonial city to suit 
Japanese values and expectations.  Concentrating street improvement and sewer 
installation projects in areas of Japanese residence, planners created Japanese enclaves 
within the native city, such as Kyōmachi in Taipei, or Nihonmachi (“Japan Town”) in 
Seoul.  In the minds of planners, these “modern” Japanese spaces would be juxtaposed to 
what they dismissed as the “primitive” indigenous neighborhoods, which in the eyes of 
the Japanese community were disorganized, unsanitary, and diseased.  Secondly, 
Japanese planners attempted to frame colonial space and discipline public life through the 
promulgation of a number of building codes and street use regulations.  By dictating 
building forms and Japanese expectations of “civilized” public behavior, such restrictions 
projected Japanese cultural hegemony beyond Japanese enclaves to the rest of the city.  
Finally, Japanese planners used urban design to concretize this cultural hegemony in the 
built environment by choreographing street improvements and architecture to reconfigure 
the urban fabric of the city and produce imperial space. 
This chapter will chart Japanese attempts to cultivate cultural hegemony in built 
form through the construction of colonial difference, the enframing of public space and 
colonial life, and the designing of imperial space over three sections.  Before addressing 
these issues directly, however, it is necessary to situate public works in Japanese colonial 
policy.  As the first section of this chapter will argue, production of tangible “modernity” 
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in the colonies through civil engineering was a vital component of Japanese colonial 
“governmentality.”9  But public works projects could not be carried out without trained 
engineers to plan and execute them.  The second section of the chapter will therefore 
examine the make-up of the Japanese colonial engineering bureaucrat.  Only after 
understanding how public works fit into strategies of Japanese colonial rule – and 
examining the qualifications and experience of those who made these projects possible – 
can the discussion turn to the construction of cultural hegemony in Taipei and Seoul.  As 
each section will demonstrate, Japanese planners carried with them practical lessons and 
technical knowledge acquired from earlier urban planning projects in Tokyo as they 
moved to the colonial worksite.  Urban improvements in Taipei and Seoul were by no 
means identical to projects in Tokyo, and there was certainly no predetermined grand 
design that guided Japanese colonialism.  Nevertheless, Japanese colonizers and civil 
engineers responded to local problems in their respective territories by drawing from a 
shared archive of knowledge acquired in the metropole.  Identifying the similarities 
among Japan’s diverse colonies therefore reveals common strategies of colonial rule.  
                                                
9 In analyzing the characteristics of the modern state, French philosopher Michel Foucault 
coined the term “governmentality” to signify the various strategies and institutions by 
which the population of a given nation became known to the state.  According to 
Foucault, governmentality could be defined as: “the ensemble formed by the institutions, 
procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise 
of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as 
its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security,” also “the tendency that, over a long period and throughout the 
West, has steadily led toward the preeminence over all other forms (sovereignty, 
discipline, and so on) of this type of power – which may be termed ‘government’ – 
resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental 
apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of knowledges.”  
See: Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Power, vol.3 of The Essential Works of 
Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2001), 219-220. 
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Because Japanese colonizers frequently spoke in terms of constructing “modernity” and 
“culture,” similarities among the colonies can also illustrate how Japanese in the mid-
Meiji period conceptualized these complicated ideas.  Finally, if there was one 
commonality between the metropolitan and the colonial worksite, it was a pragmatic 
approach to urban improvements.  Rather than attempting to impose preformed urban 
space onto the city, Japanese colonial engineers worked from within the existing built 
environment in both Taipei and Seoul in order to slowly transform the city.  In the final 
analysis, it was this flexible approach to urban planning that allowed the construction of 
imperial space in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul. 
 
Engineering Colonial Governmentality 
Improving the natural and built environments of the colonies was just one of Japan’s 
strategies of colonial rule.  Japanese colonizers in both Taiwan and Korea published 
voluminous amounts of material documenting their various efforts to administer the 
colonies.  Published in the name of garnering acceptance and approval of Japanese 
achievements, these reports also archived for posterity the colonial governments’ 
systemic efforts to index and manipulate Taiwanese and Korean social life, institutions, 
and territory in the name of furthering Japanese knowledge of, and power over, the 
colonies.  With titles such as The Progress of Taiwan (Formosa) for Ten Years, 1895-
1904, Provisional Report on Investigations of Laws and Customs in the Island of 
Formosa, Report on the Control of the Aborigines in Formosa, and Annual Report on 
Reforms and Progress in Chosen [sic], and the Annual Report on the Administration of 
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Chosen [sic], these reports read as catalogues of Japanese micro-technologies of colonial 
rule.10   
It is easy to see the projects and statistics indexed in these reports as mechanisms 
of colonial governmentality by which colonial administrators sought to engender “bio-
power” over the colonial population.  Annual reports issued by the Government-General 
of Korea starting during the Protectorate period (1905-1910) are especially instructive in 
this regard.  Starting with the first issue, the Annual Report for 1907 Reforms and 
Progress in Korea, the reports covered reforms in: administration, the judiciary, defense, 
finance, currency, banking, commerce, communications, and education.  Finally, a 
number of statistical tables were appended, cataloguing “Population and Domicile 
(Exclusively Koreans),” Korean government revenues, imports and exports, the number 
of schools, and the size of the Korean student population.11  Later reports grew even 
larger as the government-general added programs of Shinto shrine administration, 
“charity and relief work,” and archeological excavation.  Reflecting this expanded 
coverage, later issues contained even more statistical tables.  The Annual Report for 
1921-1922, for instance, included a total of 49 statistical charts and tables detailing 
Japanese surveillance of all aspects of life in Korea.  From these statistics, we learn, for 
                                                
10 See: Government-General of Taiwan, The Progress of Taiwan (Formosa) for Ten 
Years, 1895-1904 (Taipei: Government-General of Taiwan, 1905); Okamatsu Santarō, 
Provisional Report on Investigations of Lans and Customs in the Island of Formosa 
(Kyoto: Commission for the Investigation of Old Laws and Customs in Formosa, 1900); 
Taiwan Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, Report on the Control of Aborigines in Formosa 
(Taipei: Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, 1911); Government-General of Chosen, ed., 
Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea)(Keijō [Seoul]: Government-
General of Chosen, 1911-1923); and Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report 
on the Administration of Chosen (Keijō: Government-General of Chosen, 1923-1938). 
11 Government General of Chosen, Annual Report for 1910-1911, 255. 
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example: the total rainfall and average temperature for 14 different cities; the number of 
Korean families in the peninsula; the population by occupation; births, deaths, marriage, 
and divorce figures; detailed totals for agricultural, industrial, and forestry production; 
and the Korean student population.12  Significantly, included among the projects detailed 
by the colonial government were civil engineering, forestry, agriculture and industry, and 
sanitation.  All were mechanisms of engineering Japanese colonial governmentality in 
space. 
Scholars of Japanese colonialism have long recognized the applicability of French 
philosopher Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality to analyze Japanese strategies 
of rule – particularly in Taiwan.  In her discussion of Japanese “colonial engineering,” 
Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai analyzed the Taiwanese hokō (CHN: baojia) system of local land 
administration adapted by the Japanese colonial authorities from the traditional Chinese 
practice in order to “illustrate the insights – and also the limits – of Foucauldian 
governmentality in colonial studies.”13  As Ts’ai demonstrates, local hokō agents became 
transponders of social control as they were increasingly tied to local police stations and 
charged additional responsibilities.  “In addition to local police work and documenting 
population movements,” Ts’ai notes, “they had to track infectious diseases and opium 
smoking, provide money for laborers for public works and community services, and the 
like.”14  Paul Katz, meanwhile, has included the hokō system along with regular censuses 
and the household registration system as policies of governmentality that exacerbated 
                                                
12 Government General of Chosen, Annual Report for 1921-1922, 260-274. 
13 Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building: An Institutional Approach 
to Colonial Engineering (New York: Routledge, 2009), 95-96. 
14 Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building, 117. 
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Taiwanese anger at the colonial regime and fueled the widespread 1915 protests known 
as the Ta-pa-ni Incident.15  Finally, Yao Jen-to has examined colonial statistics, land 
surveys, censuses, and research of local customs to demonstrate how governmentality 
informed Japanese colonial rule.16 
While building on this previous scholarship, this chapter will take a more spatial 
and material approach to governmentality and colonial power than have other scholars of 
early Japanese imperialism.  As Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker have pointed out, 
“governmentality has a material as well as discursive dimension: relations of power are 
inscribed in physical space as well as social relations.”  “Governmentality, in other 
words, has material effects;” Kooy and Bakker continue, “and material conditions play a 
role in constituting and/or contesting, government by constraining and shaping their form 
and effectiveness.”17  As a concrete example, Kooy and Bakker offer: “Differential access 
to water supply infrastructure was mobilized discursively by the colonial administration 
to deepen the differences between European and native (or, increasingly, ‘modern’ and 
‘primitive’) urban residents.”18  Paul Rabinow and Gwendolyn Wright, likewise, explain 
                                                
15 Paul R. Katz, “Governmentality and Its Consequences in Colonial Taiwan: A Case 
Study of the Ta-pa-ni Incident of 1915,” The Journal of Asian Studies 64, no. 2 (2005): 
387-424.   
16 See: Yao Jen-to, “The Japanese Colonial State and its Form of Knowledge in Taiwan,” 
in Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945, ed. Ping-Hui Liao and David Der-
Wei Wang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); and Yao Jen-to, “Governing 
the Colonised: Governmentality in the Japanese Colonisation of Taiwan, 1895-1945,” 
(PhD diss., University of Essex, 2002). 
17 Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker, “Technologies of Government: Constituting 
Subjectivities, Spaces, and Infrastructures in Colonial and Contemporary Jakarta,” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32, no. 2 (2008): 377. 
18 Kooy and Bakker, “Technologies of Government,” 379. 
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in a perceptive analysis of Foucault’s writings, that bio-power operated through a 
“modern synthesis of space, power, and knowledge.”19  
Manipulation of the natural and built environment through public works projects 
in both capital and countryside was one example of how the intersection of space, power, 
and knowledge contributed to colonialism.  Expansion of railway networks, restoration of 
rural highways, improvement of rivers, construction of ports, redevelopment of major 
urban centers, and the laying of water and sewer systems were all designed to further 
colonial rule.  Not only did such projects militarily consolidate, politically centralize, and 
economically integrate colonial territories into the empire, they also contributed to the 
colonizer’s knowledge of, and power over, the colonial population and landscape.  As 
scholars of the colonial built environment have pointed out, one way this was 
accomplished was by ordering colonial space and exposing it to governmental 
surveillance.  Ambe J. Njoh, for example, argued that urban planning and public works in 
colonial Africa “were necessary to broadcast the authority and power of the colonial state 
over the colonial subjects.”20  In addition to reaffirming “preconceived notions of 
European supremacy and power,” Njoh notes, “Colonial physical space was ordered to 
afford the colonial state total and inordinate control over the capital city, other cities, and 
the colonial territory as a whole, in that order.”21  Through projects that would make 
colonial territory “ordered, sanitized, and amenable to regulations, and structured to 
                                                
19 Wright, Gwendolyn, and Paul Rabinow, “Spatialization of Power: A Discussion of the 
Work of Michel Foucault,” Skyline 4 (1982): 15. 
20 Ambe J. Njoh, Planning Power: Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa 
(New York: UCL Press, 2007), 11. 
21 Njoh, Planning Power, 1, 229. 
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enhance the flow of economic activities such as trade and communications,” Brenda 
Yeoh adds, colonizers structured the built environment in order to “facilitate colonial rule 
and express colonial aspirations and ideals.”22  Clearly marked streets, sewers, parks, and 
open spaces, Yeoh argues, were all components of British attempts to construct a “legible 
system” in Singapore.23   
Yet in the case of Japanese colonialism, public works programs were designed 
less to increase territorial legibility and more to project Japanese modernity and culture.  
While there undoubtedly were commercial motives in mind as well, the desire to assert 
Japanese modernity drove the efforts of railway construction, street improvement, and 
urban sanitation, among all the others, undertaken by Japanese colonizers.  In Meiji 
period Japan, imposing modernity meant introducing the forms and practices that 
Japanese saw as “modern” – primarily meaning “Western.”  As a result, what was seen in 
the case of Japanese colonialism was attempts to buttress colonial power through the 
transposition of a borrowed culture onto the colonies.  
For Japanese colonizers, the introduction of “modernity” was a means of securing 
control by winning the hearts and minds of the colonized population.  This grew out of an 
unwavering belief in the cultural superiority of Japanese modernity and a naive faith in 
the proselytizing power of progress.  “It may be hoped,” explained Taiwan colonial 
administrator Gotō Shimpei in a 1902 English-language article on the Japanese 
administration of Taiwan, that “developing industries, imparting education, and 
                                                
22 Brenda S.A. Yeoh, Contesting Space: Power Relations and the Urban Built 
Environment in Colonial Singapore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 12-13, 
16. 
23 Yeoh, Contesting Space, 17. 
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improving the sanitary condition will lead the native population to appreciate the boons 
of the Japanese administration and to assimilate themselves gradually to the ways of 
civilized life.”24  As Gotō indicated, the production of the tangible forms of modernity 
through public works were an integral part of what he called “scientific colonialism” 
(kagakuteki shokumin seisaku).  “Any scheme of colonial administration, given the 
present advances in science, should be based on principle of biology,” Gotō famously 
argued.  “What are these principles?  They are to promote science and develop 
agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications, and police force.”25  Part of 
these scientific principles included thorough research of local customs and adaptation of 
policies to suit local needs, rather than the hasty importation of laws and systems from 
the mainland.  As E. Patricia Tsurumi relates, when asked to define what he meant by 
“biology politics,” Gotō replied: “To put it crudely, it is respecting customary usage, 
because, in any case, one cannot change a flounder into a sea bream right away.”26 
While Gotō may have talked in terms of assimilation, the real goal was solidifying 
control by securing consent.  Another colonial theorist who held positions in both Taiwan 
and Korea, Mochiji Rokusaburō, closely linked culture and control in a 1912 treatise on 
colonial policy in Taiwan.  “In controlling a foreign race acquired through military 
force,” Mochiji unequivocally stated, “the colonizer must by all means have in mind not 
only the objective of securing its own rights (riken fushoku), but also the noble aims 
                                                
24 Gotō, “Formosa Under Japanese Administration,” 1585. 
25 Quoted in Han-yu Chang and Ramon H.  Myers, “Japanese Colonial Development 
Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship.”  The Journal of 
Asian Studies 22, no. 4 (1963): 438. 
26 E. Patricia Tsurumi, “Taiwan Under Kodama Gentarō and Gotō Shimpei,” Harvard 
Papers on Japan 4 (1967): 107. 
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(kōshō no mokuteki) of proclaiming civilization (bunmei no senden) and promoting the 
social welfare of humanity (jinrui fukushi no zōshin).”27  What Mochiji had in mind, 
Michael Weiner describes, was a “reassurance and guidance” policy (suibu keidō), 
“which would gradually introduce the benefits of modern civilisation, discourage 
hostility to Japanese rule and safeguard the future welfare of the Taiwanese.”28  This is a 
perfect illustration of what Gotō, Mochiji’s boss in Taiwan, meant when he advocated the 
principal of bunsō teki bubi, which is often translated as “military preparedness in civil 
garb,” but could just as easily be rendered as “military preparation under the guise of 
civilization.”  In fact, considering the way Gotō himself defined the term, the latter might 
be more appropriate.  “In short, colonial policy is [bunsō bubi];” Gotō explained, “it is 
carrying out the hegemon’s strategies under the flag of the kingly way.”  “What facilities, 
then, are necessary to see it through?” he continued: 
We have to implement a cultural invasion with a Central Laboratory, popular 
education for the resident populace, and forge other academic and economic 
links.  Invasion may not be an agreeable expression, but [language] aside, we 
can generally call our policy one of invasion in civil garb.29 
 
While Gotō was admittedly talking specifically about his policy towards Manchuria in 
the early 1900s as president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, this strategy of 
establishing colonial control through modern cultural institutions was exactly what he put 
into action during his tenure as Director of Civil Affairs in Taiwan. 
                                                
27 Mochiji, Taiwan Shokumin Seisaku, 432. 
28 Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
28. 
29 Quoted in Joshua Fogel, The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Essays 
on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 119. 
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The construction of “modernity” through public works programs was a vital 
element in the Japanese “cultural invasion” of the colonies.  A 1929 Taiwan Government-
General report of water systems in Taiwan made a clear connection between public 
works and colonial governance, explaining that urban development (toshi setsubi), 
promotion of industry (sangyō shinkō), “winning hearts and minds” (min’i yūdō), and the 
pacification and development of remote areas (riban kaihatsu) were all “stages (kaitei) 
endlessly confronted in the cultivation (kaitaku) of rule over the island.”30  In practical 
terms, public works projects in Taiwan and Korea were meant to make both city and 
countryside sanitary, hygienic, and economically profitable by repairing gutters, 
installing water and sewers systems, constructing railways and ports, realigning city 
blocks, and improving urban streets.  At the same time, these projects were designed to 
expand colonial power in three ways: 1) by justifying Japanese claims of ownership of 
colonial territory and of a right to rule through cultivation and improvement of the natural 
and built environments; 2) by announcing the arrival of the new Japanese colonial regime 
by concretizing the transition of rule by juxtaposing the urban modern with the 
vernacular “pre-modern”; and 3) by garnering acceptance and approval of Japanese 
colonialism from the colonized population, the Japanese expatriate community, and 
Western imperialists.  As a 1930 report on public works in Taiwan reveals, Japanese 
colonizers drew a close connection between public works and notions of “civilization.”  
“When it comes to the development of colonies with low levels of civilization,” the 
report explained, “the first priority is to provide for the economic enrichment of the 
                                                
30 Taiwan Sōtokufu Naimukyoku, Taiwan Suidōshi [History of the Taiwan Water 
System](Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseibu Naimukyoku, 1929), 2. 
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people’s lives.  The most vital measure for achieving this is the completion (kanbi) of 
public works facilities, such as railways, roads, ports, urban planning, irrigation, and 
rivers.”31  A 1937 report from Korea sounded a similar note: “For the development of 
humanity (jinbun) and the promotion of industry, public works (doboku jiygō) must never 
be neglected.”32  As these reports demonstrate, in the minds of Japanese colonizers, 
“development,” “civilization,” and governance were all closely related concepts, and all 
were dependent on public works. 
Giving projects in both colonies a level of nation-wide planning impossible in 
Japan even in the early Meiji period, colonial public works programs were planned by 
central committees.  In Taiwan, the Taiwan Government-General Deliberative Assembly 
(Taiwan Sōtokufu Hyōgikai) was established by imperial decree in March 1896 and 
charged with advising the Governor-General on matters relating to annual budgets, public 
petitions, and the “planning of important public works.”33  Consisting of the Governor-
General, the heads of the civil affairs and military affairs bureaus, and the department 
chairs of various departments, the Assembly considered a variety of perspectives as it 
deliberated items presented by the Governor-General, including the urban planning of 
Taipei.  The more focused Taipei Urban Planning Committee (Taihoku Shiku Keikaku 
                                                
31  Taiwan Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Dobokuka, Taiwan Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Shukan 
Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō [Summary of public works projects carried out by the Taiwan 
Government-General Home Bureau Public Works Department](Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu 
Dobokukyoku, 1930), 2. 
32 NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed. Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi: Shōwa 3-nen made [Records 
of public works projects in Korea: until 1928](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1937), 1.   
33 JACAR, Ref.#: A03020232900, “Go-shomei genpon, Meiji Nijūkyū-nen, Chokurei Dai 
Hachijūkyū-gō Taiwan Sōtokufu Hyōgikai Shōtei” [Original script signed by the 
Emperor, 1896, Imperial Edict #89, charter of the Taiwan deliberative assembly]. 
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Iinkai) was formed as early as 1897 to plan hygienic facilities for the capital.  Despite this 
objective, the committee consisted of a mix of engineers and military personnel of which 
only two had experience in public health.34  New members with expertise in railways and 
architecture were added in mid-1899 as the Urban Planning Committee was granted 
unprecedented authority over urban design – including both street and building layouts – 
in the Japanese area within the city walls.35  The purview of the committee was further 
expanded to cover planning of the nearby port city of Keelung in 1900, and was finally 
restructured in 1910 as the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee (Taiwan Shiku Keikaku 
Iinkai) and charged with planning improvements in cities across the island.36  Public 
works administration was more streamlined in Korea, where projects were planned by the 
Public Works Council (Doboku Kaigi) established within the Government-General by 
Imperial Edict just one month after annexation in 1910.  This council in particular 
appears to have been modeled on a second Public Works Council (Doboku-kai) created 
                                                
34 The 14 members of this first committee were: Fujita Tsuguakira (Army), acquitted 
conspirator in the assassination of Queen Min of Korea in 1895 Kusunose Yukihiko 
(Army), Hashimoto Masaaki (Navy), Iwata Takeo (Tokyo, Electrical Eng., 1880), 
Oshima Kumaji (Tokyo, Law, 1888), Makino Minoru (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1886), Kaneko 
Yahei (journalist), Iida Kōsuke (Army), Kikuchi Suetarō (Civil Engineer), Katō Takashi 
(Hygiene engineer), Hamano Yashirō (Tokyo, Civ., Eng., 1896), Isobe Akimichi (Taipei 
city advisor), Takahashi Masashi (engineer), and Takahashi Ryota (finance).   
35 TWH: Doc. #437.24.7, “Taihoku Jōnai ni okeru Kanga oyobi Kōkyō Tatemono 
Shikichi ni kansuru ken” [Matters regarding government office and public building lots in 
the areas inside the Taipei city walls]. 
36 See: TWH: Kunrei #91, “Taiwan Sōtokufu Shiku Keikaku Iinkai Kitei hidari no tori ai-
sadamu” [Regulations of the Taiwan Government-General Urban Planning Committee 
are determined as follows], in Fuhō #2948, May 3, 1910.  The 12 members on this 
restructured committee were: Nagao Hanpei, Tamaki Tomoeda, Yamada Shin’ichirō, 
Takahashi Tatsujirō, Niimoto Shikanosuke, Mochiji Rokusaburō, Kawamura Takeji, 
Hamano Yashirō, Hazama Kenzai, Nomura Ichirō, Okada Yoshiyuki, and Sakakibara 
Kenori.  For members on this committee, see: TWH: “Jonin oyobi Jirei” [Investitures, 
appointements, and dismissals], in Fuhō #2954, May 11, 1910. 
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within the Japanese Home Ministry in 1892 to plan nationwide maritime and riparian 
improvements.37  In the case of the Public Works Council in Korea, however, the 
Council’s purview was extended to “the inquiry and deliberation of the systems (seido), 
planning (keikaku), and provision (setsubi)” of public works across the entire peninsula, 
including: “rivers, roads, harbors, navigational beacons, railways, light railways, 
tramways, power supplies, and water and sewer systems.”38  The urban improvement of 
Seoul was a major component of this peninsula-wide effort to project Japanese power in 
colonial space.  Of the 43 items covered by the Council before 1923, 12 concerned the 
Government-General’s plans for improving the built environment of the colonial 
capital.39   
Still, it is important to keep in mind that none of these civil engineering projects 
would have been possible without a large number of Japanese bureaucrats and engineers 
                                                
37 JACAR, Ref.#: A03020126200, “Go-shomei genpon, Meiji 25-nen, Chokurei Dai-52-
gō, Doboku-kai Kisoku” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1895, Imperial Edict 
#52, regulations for the Public Works Council]. 
38 The Council was established by Imperial Edict #375, issued September 29 and taking 
effect November 1, 1910; see: JACAR, Ref.#: A03020868800, “Go-shomei Genpon, 
Meiji yonjūsan nen, Chokurei Dai sanbyaku nanajūgo gō, Chōsen Sōtokufu Doboku 
Kaigi Kansei” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1910, Imperial Edict #375, the 
Korea Goverment-General Public Works Council]. 
39 This figure includes: 6 items discussing the Keijō Urban Improvement Projects on June 
29, 1911, August 10, 1912, May 15, 1913, January 11, 1917, and August 26, 1917; 2 
items for water and sewer system improvements in Seoul on March 16, 1915; 2 items of 
road, bridge, and water system improvements between Seoul and Inchŏn on July 14, 
1915; 1 item concerning the reconstruction of Namdaemun Station on August 26, 1917; 
and 1 item on improvement of the Han River riverbank on May 5, 1917.  See: KDL: 
Anonymous, “Kōtsū Kankei no Kenkyū Chōsakai no Jōkyō” [Current state of affairs of 
the investigative and survey council on transportation] Chōsen 102 (1923): 349-350; and 
Gotō Yasushi, “Nihon Tōjika ‘Keijō’ no Toshi Keikaku ni Kansuru Rekishiteki Kenkyū” 
[Historical research on the urban planning of “Keijō” under Japanese rule](PhD diss., 
Tōkyō Kōgyō Daigaku, 1996), 109. 
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to plan and carry out the projects.  If public works concretized Japanese colonial power, 
the planners sitting around the drafting table and the workers on the construction site 
were the operatives who made it all possible.   
 
Architects and Engineers of Empire: The Colonial Public Works Bureaucracy 
To be sure, Imperial Japan did not have an organized “colonial service” like that seen in 
the Colonial Administrative Service or Indian Civil Service that staffed the British 
Empire.  As Mark Peattie notes, even the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (Takumushō) 
established in 1929 “served largely as a coordinating and reporting instrument” and never 
came close to the influence wielded by the British Colonial Office or the French Colonial 
Ministry.40  Japan’s colonial officials were therefore largely left to their own devices 
when it came administering their territories, making the colonies nearly autonomous in 
their policymaking.  With high-level officials appointed by the emperor, the absence of 
an organized colonial service meant that the various colonial governments across the 
Japanese empire were individually responsible for hiring the ground-level office workers, 
accountants, engineers, lawyers, doctors, educators, and agriculturalists that would make 
things run.  In Taiwan and Korea, this number ran into the thousands: 12,000 in Taiwan, 
and 28,000 in Korea by 1926, making each as large as individual ministries in the 
Japanese central government.41  Given their relative autonomy from Tokyo and their large 
                                                
40 Mark Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire,” Chapter 5 to The Chapter 5 of The 
Cambridge History of Japan 6: The Twentieth Century, ed. Peter Duus (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 244. 
41 Matsuda Toshihiko, “Jō” [Introduction], in Nihon no Chōsen, Taiwan Shihai to 
Shokuminchi Kanryō [The colonial bureaucracy and Japanese colonial rule in Korea and 
Taiwan], ed. Matsuda Toshihiko and Yamada Atsushi (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 
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staffs, the colonies of Taiwan and Korea, in particular, were indeed what Edward I-te 
Chen poignantly referred to as “empires within an empire, contrary to the goal of political 
integration repeatedly proclaimed by the Japanese.”42  The lack of a central colonial 
apparatus, not to mention the lack of a regimented training program for colonial officials, 
helps explain why Japan never developed a well-articulated colonial policy or grand 
strategy of rule.  In the final analysis, Japan practiced several different colonialisms – one 
for each of the colonies.   
Despite the lack of central direction or coordination between Japan’s far-flung 
colonies, a closer look at public works projects reveals distinct similarities among Japan’s 
colonies and occupied territories.  As Chen admits, “there were more similarities than 
differences” between the colonial political and administrative systems of Taiwan and 
Korea.43  The same goes for the importance placed on public works in developing 
territory across the Japanese empire, not only in the more recognized colonies of Taiwan 
and Korea, but also in Hokkaidō, Karafuto, Manchuria, and the South Seas Mandate 
(Nan’yō).  This is reflected in the numbers of engineers and architects employed by the 
colonial governments.  Testifying to the importance of public works projects in Japan’s 
colonial strategy, 169 civil engineers were assigned to the Government-General of Korea 
in 1912 for “administering architectural and public works business.”44  In Taiwan, 
                                                                                                                                            
2009), 4.  As Matsuda notes, at that time, the Communications Ministry consisted of 
23,000 members, the Railway Minister 22,000, and the Justice Ministry 15,000. 
42 Edward I-te Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the 
Systems of Political Control,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 30 (1970): 155-156. 
43 Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa,” 155-156. 
44 Initially, only 7 special (rinji) engineers and 90 assistant engineers were assigned to the 
Government-General.  Because of the large number of works planned, these numbers 
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meanwhile, the Special Public Works Department (Rinji Dobokubu) was established in 
1896 with a staff of 100, including 98 engineers and assistants spread over sections of 
public works, architecture, and general affairs.45  By 1919, the Public Works Department 
(Dobokubu) alone, not including the accounting or maintenance departments of the 
Public Works Office (Dobokukyoku), had grown to a staff of 114 engineers, assistants, 
and part-time employees. 
 Despite Japan’s lack of an organized colonial service like those created by Britain 
and France, similarities in public works design across the Japanese empire can be 
explained by the existence of a pan-imperial human network of engineers and architects.46  
What set Japan’s particular “colonial bureaucracy” apart from Western examples, 
                                                                                                                                            
were increased two years later to 10 special engineers and 159 assistant engineers.  See:  
JACAR, Ref.#: A03020868800, “Chōsen Sōtokufu Doboku Kaigi Kansei”); and JACAR, 
Ref.#: A03020926900, “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūgo nen, Chokurei Dai nijūsan 
gō, kenchiku, doboku oyobi zaisan chōsa no jimu ni jūji seshimuru tame Chōsen 
Sōtokufu ni Rinji Shokuin secchi” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1912, Imperial 
Edict #23, appointment of temporary personnel to the Government-General to conduct 
examinations of public works and government-owned assets]. 
45 JACAR, Ref., #A03020240900, “Go-shomei genpon, Meiji Nijūkyū-nen, Chokurei Dai 
hyakurokujūkyū-gō, Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseikyoku Rinji Dobokubu Kansei” [Original 
script signed by the Emperor, 1896, Imperial Edict #169, establishment of the Taiwan 
Government-General Civil Affairs Bureau Special Public Works Department]. 
46 Some work has been done on networks of bureaucratic and architectural personnel in 
the Japanese empire.  Okamoto Makiko has analyzed the colonial bureaucracy in Taiwan 
and Korea in Shokuminchi Kanryō no Seijishi: Chōsen, Taiwan Sōtokufu to Teikoku 
Nihon (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2008).  Nishizawa Yasuhiko has traced the activities of 
Japanese “architects who went overseas” to practice in Manchukuo and occupied 
northeastern China in the 1930s in Umi wo Watatta Nihonjin Kenchikuka: 20-seiki 
zenhan no Chūgoku Tōhoku chihō ni okeru kenchiku katsudō (Tokyo: Shōkokusha, 
1996).  Finally, Huang Chun Ming has examined the activities of Japanese architects in 
Taiwan in “Meiji-Jiki Taiwan Sōtokufu Kenchiku Gishi no Nenpu (1895-1912),” Nihon 
Kenchiku Gakkai Taikai Gakujutsu Enkō Gaiyōshū F, Toshi Keikaku Kenchiku Keizai, 
Jūtaku Mondai, Kenchiku Rekishi, Ishō 1993 (1993): 1505-1506; and “Taishō-ki Taiwan 
Sōtokufu Kenchiku Gishi no Nenpu (1912-1926),” Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Taikai 
Gakujutsu Enkō Gaiyōshū F-2 Kenchiku Rekishi, Ishō 1995 (1995): 83-84. 
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Matsuda Toshihiko points out, was that it was characterized by a close human 
relationship between metropole and colony.47  Indeed, two particular features stand out 
when examining the ranks of Japanese civil engineers and architects active in Taiwan and 
Korea in the early colonial period.  First, many of the bureaucrats, architects, and 
engineers involved in the planning of colonial public works were trained in metropolitan 
programs, particularly at Tokyo and Kyoto Imperial Universities.  Because there was no 
preparatory course specifically for colonial service, graduates who took jobs in the 
colonies received the same training as graduates who went on to work in central 
government or other metropolitan positions.  Even after the founding in 1900 of the 
private Takushoku University (literally, “Colonization” University) by former Governor-
General of Taiwan, Katsura Tarō, specifically to train future colonial officials, the 
imperial universities continued to produce most colonial bureaucrats.  Secondly, there 
was a high degree of personnel rotation between the metropole and the colonies, and even 
amongst the colonies.  Although some colonial agents were hired by the governments-
general right out of school and spent their entire careers overseas, most worked for 
several years in Japan before transferring to colonial worksites.  A significant number 
used these positions in the colonies to gain experience and build their reputations before 
returning to fill prestigious jobs in the metropole or in other colonies.  These two features 
made individual colonial bureaucrats vital transponders in a pan-imperial flow of ideas 
and techniques that led to significant conceptual and technical parallels between public 
works projects in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul.  As a result, while there was certainly no 
                                                
47 Matsuda, “Shokuminchiki Chōsen ni okeru Kanryō,” 3-4. 
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grand strategy of Japanese colonial rule, this human network of colonial public works 
bureaucracy led to remarkably similar designs across the empire. 
If there was any training program for Japanese colonial bureaucrats, it was the 
imperial university system.  As Mark Peattie relates, colonial officials were mainly 
Japanese imperial university graduates, especially from Tokyo Imperial University, who 
had qualified for the civil service.  “The thinking behind this arrangement,” Peattie 
explains, “seems to have been that it was better to have Japan represented overseas by 
individuals who had met the exacting and uniform standards of the Japanese bureaucracy 
than by brilliant innovators or those who had expertise in a particular colonial area.”48  
The same was true for the bureaucrats, engineers, and architects responsible for colonial 
public works.  Many of these operatives of empire were trained at Tokyo and Kyoto 
Imperial Universities; the remainder graduated from private technical schools 
specializing in engineering, such as Kōshugakkō (today, Kōgakuin University) in Tokyo.  
In Taiwan, the instability of the public works bureaucracy initially mirrored the frequent 
turnover of government-general officials – Taiwan had three Governors-General between 
1895 and 1898.  This began to change in 1898 when Tokyo Imperial University graduate 
Nagao Hanpei joined the department after working in a series of public works positions 
in Japan.  Taking over as division chief (kachō) in less than a month, Nagao reformed the 
program to not only introduce more consistency, but also to bring in more engineers 
trained within the imperial university system as the bureau increased in size.  During 
Nagao’s time as division head and then as office head (kyokuchō) between 1901 and 1910, 
a single group of one dozen trained engineers and architects generally held all public 
                                                
48 Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire,” 248. 
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works “engineer” (gishi) positions.49  Eleven of these 12 were graduates of Tokyo 
Imperial University, 9 of them trained in the civil engineering program there, and 7 had 
actually been in school in Tokyo at the same time.  This was not just a trend. Statistics 
meticulously compiled by Tsai Lung-pao show that the far majority of public works 
engineers in Taiwan were imperial university graduates.  As Tsai calculates, of the 43 
engineers between 1898-1924 whose school could be ascertained (there were 54 total), 
graduates of the three imperial universities commanded 79% of the total: 24 (56%) were 
from Tokyo Imperial University; 9 (21%) were from Kyoto; and 1 (2%) was from 
Kyushu Imperial University.50  Assistant engineer (gishu) positions, meanwhile, were 
generally filled by graduates of the many metropolitan technical schools, such as the 
Kōshugakkō, which sent 128 graduates to Taiwan over the years 1895-1905, primarily to 
assist in land surveys.51 
                                                
49 After 1902, the public works department was moved from the Civil Affairs Bureau to 
an autonomous Public Works Bureau (Dobokukyoku), consisting of divisions of Public 
Works (Dobokuka), Maintenance (Eizenka), and Accounting (Keirika).  Nevertheless, the 
same group of civil engineers continued to hold the highest positions in the bureau.  The 
name of each (along with their program of graduation) are listed chronologically by date 
of graduation as follows: Nagao Hanpei (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1891); Takahashi Tatsujirō 
(Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1891); Togawa Yoshitarō (Sapporo Agricultural College, Engineering 
Program, 1892); Nomura Ichirō (Tokyo, Arch., 1895); Hamano Yashirō (Tokyo, Civ. 
Eng., 1896); Tajima Sekizō (Tokyo, Arch., 1896); Tokumi Tsuneo (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 
1896); Kawakami Kōjirō (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1898); Shimizu Ittoku (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 
1898); Yamagata Yōsuke (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1898); Ōgoe Taizō (Tokyo, Elec. Eng., 
1898); and Yamaji Kaitarō (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1899). 
50 Tsai, Lung-pao, “Rizhi Shiqi Taiwan Zongdufu zhi Jishu Guanliao – yi Tumu Jishi 
Weili” [The engineering bureaucracy of the Government-General of Taiwan during the 
period of Japanese rule: a case study of public works engineers], Xingda Lishi Xuebao 19 
(2007): 319. 
51 Tsai Lung Bao, “Meijiki Kōshugakkō Sotsugyōsei no Kaigai Katsudō: Taiwan wo 
Chūshin toshite (1895-1905),” Nihon Kenkyū 44 (Oct. 2011): 131-174.  For a detailed 
chart of each of these individual engineering bureaucrats, see Tsai, “Rizhi Shiqi Taiwan 
Zongdufu zhi Jishu Guanliao,” 335-381. 
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The predominance of imperial university graduates in public works projects 
carried over to Korea.  The History of Public Works Projects in Korea until 1928 
(Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi: Shōwa 3-nen made) published by the Government-General in 
1937, which lists all past and present personnel related to all sections of the Government-
General Public Works Office as of 1928, includes over 50 civil engineers attached to the 
Government-General.  Cross-referencing this directory with records of graduates from 
the civil engineering departments of Tokyo (as of 1919) and Kyoto Imperial Universities 
(as of 1920) reveals at least 16 matches.52  The directory also lists 15 engineers stationed 
in the Government-General Public Works Keijō Branch Office, which was established in 
1914 to carry out government-sponsored engineering projects in Seoul.  Of these 15, 
nearly half (7) had graduated from either Tokyo or Kyoto Imperial Universities.53  
The second important feature of the Japanese colonial bureaucracy was the 
frequent rotation of personnel between the colonies and the metropole.  As Edward I-te 
Chen notes, the position of Governor-General of Korea became known as “the stepping-
stone toward the post of Prime Minister” because of the number of Japanese prime 
                                                
52 See: KDL: Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi: Shōwa 3-nen made 
[History of public works projects in Korea until 1928](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1937).  
These 16 matches are listed as follows (with dates of graduation): Shimazaki Takahiko 
(Kyoto University, Civ. Eng., 1898); Sakaide Narumi (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1899); Suzuki 
Hantetsu (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1901); Nakano Fukamaro (Tokyo, Civ., Eng., 1904); 
Okuyama Kiichi (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1906); Noguchi Kōichi (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1907); 
Yashima Akira (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1908); Maruyama Yoshiki (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1909); 
Homma Takayoshi (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1910); Yokoi Masuji (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1913); 
Hanai Matatarō (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1913); Nakayama Chiaki (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1914); 
Nishi Yoshiichi (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1915); Homma Tokuo (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 1915); 
Tsuboi Toyohiko (Kyoto, Civ. Eng., 1916); and Matsuyama Yoshio (Tokyo, Civ. Eng., 
1917).  
53 These 7 are: office head Shimazaki Takahiko; Suzuki Hantetsu; Noguchi Kōichi; 
Yashima Akira; Hanai Matatarō; Homma Tokuo; and Tsuboi Toyohiko.  See: Chōsen 
Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi, Appendix 1, 7-8. 
324 
 
ministers who also held the position of Governor-General.54  Indeed, 5 of the 8 army 
generals named Governors-General of Korea ultimately held the position of Prime 
Minister: Terauchi Masatake, Saitō Makoto, Ugaki Kazushige, Koiso Kuniake, and Abe 
Nobuyuki.  In Taiwan, although only Governor-General Katsura Tarō later became prime 
minister, several others held important cabinet positions.  Governor-General Kodama 
Gentarō, for example, served as Minister of the Army and later as Minister of Home 
Affairs and Minister of Education.  Earlier Chief of the Metropolitan Police in Tokyo and 
navy admiral Kabayama Sukenori, likewise, held subsequent positions as Home Minister 
and Education Minister.  Den Kenjirō and Minami Hiroshi also both later took cabinet 
positions as ministers.  Finally, another, Ōta Masahiro had earlier served as Chief 
Executive of the Kwantung Leased Territory.55  Granted, while illustrating the close 
personnel ties between political administration in the metropole and the colonies, this list 
mainly includes high-level officials who would not have been directly involved in the 
planning of public works. 
Other lower level bureaucrats with ties to Tokyo were more directly involved in 
public works planning.  In Taiwan, after restructuring in 1910, the 12-member Taiwan 
Government-General Urban Planning Committee included 9 graduates of Tokyo Imperial 
University, five of whom were trained civil engineers or members of the public works 
division: Nagao Hanpei, Takahashi Tatsujirō, Hamano Yashirō, Nomura Ichirō, and 
Niimoto Shikanosuke.  Public works administration was an especially good career track 
                                                
54 Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa,” 131-132. 
55 Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa,” 132.  A helpful list of Japanese 
cabinets from 1885 to 1984 can be found in Janet Hunter, ed., Concise Dictionary of 
Modern Japanese History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), appendix 5. 
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in Taiwan, where the Director of Civil Affairs was concurrent head of the public works 
office from 1909 to 1911.  Although not trained engineers, bureaucrats Iwai Tatsumi and 
Ōshima Kumaji both rose from positions on the Taiwan Central Hygiene Committee and 
Taipei Urban Planning Committee to become Director of Civil Affairs.  Finally, another 
director of Civil Affairs, Uchida Kakichi, also served as public works director and as a 
member of the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee from 1911 before being appointed 
Governor-General of Taiwan in 1924.  In Korea, meanwhile, the presence of Yamagata 
Isaburō drew a direct line between the Iwakura Mission, the Tokyo Urban Improvement 
Projects, and street improvement projects in Seoul.  The nephew and adopted heir of 
Yamagata Aritomo, Yamagata had travelled to Europe as a member of the Iwakura 
Mission and stayed on for an extended study-abroad in Germany.  Upon returning to 
Japan in 1882, he held a number of central government and prefectural positions before 
transferring to the Tokyo municipal government in 1893.  While there, Yamagata applied 
his knowledge of western cities to the improvement of the Japanese capital as chief of the 
municipal Home Bureau (Naimu-bu) and as a member of the Tokyo Urban Improvement 
Committee (Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Iinkai) for over a decade from 1893-1906.  Yamagata 
finally served as chairman of the Improvement Committee from 1902-1906, before 
leaving to take office as Minister of Communications.  Shortly before the annexation of 
Korea in 1910, Yamagata was appointed Vice-Resident General (Fuku-Tōkan) of Korea.  
Following annexation, Yamagata was promoted to Administrative Superintendent (Seimu 
Sōkan) in the Government-General, which put him effectively second in command of the 
Japanese colonial administration in Korea from 1910-1919.56  One of Yamagata’s 
                                                
56 Biography of Yamagata Isaburō compiled from JACAR, Ref.#: A06051176600, 
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primary duties as Administrative Superintendent was to sit as chairman of the Public 
Works Council, which deliberated Seoul street improvements 6 times during Yamagata’s 
time, including each Government-General project.57 
For some public works bureaucrats, assignments in Taiwan or Korea were 
pathways that led to prestigious careers back in Japan.  Three examples stand out: 
Hamano Yashirō, Nagao Hanpei, and Nakahara Teisaburō.  Hamano was an 1896 civil 
engineering graduate from Tokyo Imperial University who held concurrent positions in 
the public works and hygiene divisions of the Government-General of Taiwan for over 20 
years until 1919.  During this time, Hamano sat on the Central Hygiene Committee, the 
Taipei Urban Planning Committee, the Taipei Hygiene and Public Works Survey 
Committee, and the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee.  Hamano is perhaps best known 
for collaborating with William Burton in introducing water systems to Taiwan in the late 
1890s.  After over 20 years overseas, Hamano relocated to Kobe, where he held 
simultaneous positions as head of the Urban Planning Bureau and head of the 
Waterworks Department from 1920.58  Better known than Hamano was Nagao Hanpei, 
who graduated from the Tokyo civil engineering program five years earlier in 1891.  
                                                                                                                                            
“Yamagata Isaburō”; and TTKSS, 33:293, 299, 316.  The 1921-1922 Annual Report gives 
the English title of Seimu Sōkan as “Administrative Superintendent.”  See: Government-
General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report on the Administration of Chosen, 1921-1922, 160. 
57 See: Gotō Yasushi, “Nihon Tōjika ‘Keijō’ no Toshi Keikaku ni Kansuru Rekishiteki 
Kenkyū,” 109. 
58 Fujii Hatsuo, Doboku Jinbutsu Jiten [Encyclopedia of civil engineers](Tokyo: Atene 
Shobo, 2004), 245.  Chao-Ching Fu, “From Political Governance and Spatial Restructure 
to Urban Transformation and Architectural Achievements: Discourse on Architecture in 
the Japanese Colonial Period, 1895-1945,” in Constructing the Colonized Land Entwined 
Perspectives of East Asia around WWII, ed. Izumi Kuroishi (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2014), 124. 
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After holding several public works directorships in Japan, Nagao took a position in 
Taiwan in 1898 as head of the Public Works Department in 1898.  Named to the Taipei 
Urban Planning Committee in 1899, Nagao was later appointed head of the colony-wide 
Taiwan Urban Planning Committee in 1910.  The next year, Nagao relocated to Japan, 
where he took a position with the Railway Agency.  Nagao was then reunited in the 
Tokyo metropolitan government with his former boss, Gotō Shimpei, when he became 
head of the Tokyo Electrical Bureau in 1921.59  Finally, the most prestigious of all three 
was Nakahara Teisaburō, an 1882 Tokyo Imperial University graduate who became the 
acknowledged head of the Japanese civil engineering profession.  Starting his career as a 
military cartographer, Nakahara later took a position as public works supervisor in 
Kumamoto prefecture.  Hired by the Resident-General of Korea in 1906 to supervise civil 
engineering projects, he directed road improvements in Seoul and Pyongyang before 
leading a prolific civil engineering career after returning to Japan.  Placed in charge of 
river improvement projects in Osaka and Tokyo throughout the 1910s, Nakahara was 
named head of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (Doboku Gakkai) in 1923.60   
                                                
59 See Huang Chun Ming, “Nagao Hanpei to Meiji-ki no Taiwan Eizen Soshiki,” 
Dobokushi Kenkyū 11 (1991): 281-288. 
60 JACAR, Ref.#: A04010148300, “Tōkanfu Shokikan Matsui Shigeru hoka, go mei 
Kankoku Seifu no heiyō ni ōji, hōkyū sono hoka no kyūyo wo uke narabini zaishokusha 
ni kan-suru kitei tekiyō no ken” [Matters regarding salaries and other payments for 
Resident-General secretary Matsui Shigeru and five others requested by the Korean 
government, in addition to regulations applied to employed individuals]; and Fujii, 
Doboku Jinbutsu Jiten, 218.  Also notable is the appointment during the same year of 
architectural advisor Kunieda Hiroshi, who would later supervise construction of the 
1926 Government-General Headquarters Building.  See: JACAR, Ref.#: A04010147700, 
“Tōkanfu Gishi Iwata Satsukimaro hoka ni mei Kankoku Seifu no heiyō ni ōji, hōkyū 
sono hoka no kyūyo wo uke narabini zaishokusha ni kan-suru kitei tekiyō no ken” 
[Matters regarding salaries and other payments for Resident-General engineer Iwata 
Satsukimaro and two others requested by the Korean government, in addition to 
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Yet, ultimately, it was the officials who transitioned between overseas possessions 
that wove the Japanese empire into a tight-knit human network of colonial bureaucrats.  
The best example was Gotō Shimpei, who used positions in Taiwan and Manchuria to 
advance his career in the metropole.  Beginning his civil service in 1883 as a low-ranking 
bureaucrat in the Home Ministry Hygiene Bureau under Nagayo Sensai, Gotō tirelessly 
penned proposals on a wide range of issues, including sewer and water improvements in 
Tokyo in the early 1880s.  Rising to director of the Health Bureau by 1892, Gotō 
continued to propose hygiene policies for Taiwan in the late 1890s.61  As a result of these 
proposals, Gotō was appointed Director (Minsei Chōkan) of the Civil Affairs Bureau 
(Minseibu) of Taiwan in 1898, in which role he was effectively the de facto ruler of 
Taiwan due to Governor-General Kodama Gentarō’s frequent absences from the colony.  
In addition to his responsibilities as director of civil affairs, Gotō was affiliated with a 
number of committees and departments dealing with engineering-related projects: the 
Deliberative Assembly, the Special Land Survey Committee, the Taiwan Central Hygiene 
Committee, the railway department, and the Special Keelung Port Office, among others.  
Because of his success over 8 years as a colonial administrator in Taiwan, Gotō’s former 
boss, Kodama, nominated him as the first president of the South Manchurian Railway, a 
position that he took up in 1906.  Gotō served in this role for two years before returning 
                                                                                                                                            
regulations applied to employed individuals].  Nishizawa Yasuhiko also identifies 
University of Tokyo engineering graduates Iwata Satsuma (1904), Iwai Chōzaburō 
(1905), and Watanabe Setsu (1908) as attached to the Takushibu (Ta’kshibu) of the 
Resident-General.  See: Nishizawa Yasuhiko, Nihon no Shokuminchi Kenchikuron 
[Japanese colonial architecture](Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2008), 39. 
61 For Gotō’s background, see Yukiko Hayase, “The Career of Gotō Shinpei: Japan’s 
Statesman of Research, 1857-1929,” PhD Diss., FSU, 1974, chapter 2.  These proposals 
are all located in the Gotō Shimpei papers in the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research 
and the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room in the National Diet Library. 
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to the metropole to sit concurrently as Communications Minister and President of the 
Railway Agency from 1908.  Later, Gotō drew on his experience as a colonial 
administrator when he was appointed President of the Colonization Office 
(Takushokukyoku).  Finally, Gotō was mayor of Tokyo from 1920.  Then as Home 
Minister from 1923, Gotō was chairman of the Imperial Capital Restoration Board 
charged with planning the reconstruction of Tokyo following the devastating 1923 Great 
Kantō Earthquake. 
One final example, above all, illustrates the archetype of the Japanese “colonial 
bureaucrat”: Mochiji Rokusaburō, a Tokyo Imperial University-trained lawyer who was 
directly involved with public works and urban planning in both Taiwan and Korea over 
the years 1900 to 1923.  Although he never achieved the high official appointments or 
international renown of his contemporaries in Taiwan, Gotō Shimpei and Nitobe Inazō, 
Mochiji nevertheless led a long overseas career as a bureaucrat and was more directly 
involved in colonial engineering projects than either Gotō or Nitobe.  Dispatched on 
inspection tours of the American Philippines, Dutch Java, and British India and Egypt 
during 1907-1908, moreover, Mochiji was a respected scholar of international 
colonialism who published a lengthy colonial policy proposal entitled Colonial Policy in 
Taiwan (Taiwan Shokuminchi Seisaku) in 1912, in which he argued that Japan must view 
Taiwan not as a “colonie d’ exploitation” but instead as a “colonie mixed” or “colonie de 
peuplement” (settler colony).62  After graduating from the political science program of the 
law department of Tokyo Imperial University in 1893, Mochiji began his career as a 
                                                




professor at the Fifth Higher Middle School in Kumamoto (predecessor of Kumamoto 
University), where he taught alongside the famous Lafcadio Hearn.  After a series of 
positions in the Ministry of Education between 1894 and 1900, Mochiji transferred to an 
administrative position in the Tainan, Taiwan prefectural office.  Soon after arriving in 
Taiwan, Mochiji rose through the ranks of colonial policymaking starting as a member of 
the Deliberative Assembly from 1903 to 1906 alongside Gotō Shimpei.  Mochiji’s 
involvement with public works planning began in 1908 when he was assigned to the 
Taiwan Central Hygiene Committee and the newly founded Public Works Office 
Irrigation Division.  Named head of the Communications Office in 1910 after the 
directing the general affairs division of the Construction Office, Mochiji became a 
member of the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee.  Mochiji later drew on his public 
works experience in Korea, where he headed the Government-General Public Works 
Bureau from 1912 to 1917.  As chair of public works, Mochiji also sat on the Public 
Works Council.63  Holding public works positions in both Taiwan and Korea, Mochiji 
was one of several colonial bureaucrats who formed a pan-imperial network that 
transmitted Japanese strategies of spatial manipulation across the Japanese colonies.  
With Mochiji seated at the planning table, designs of modern urban space adopted in 
Taipei were adapted in Seoul to produce imperial space. 
Connections between the bureaucratic planning personnel and the educational 
background of civil engineers resulted in striking parallels between public works projects 
in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul.  Colonial engineers and architects drew on lessons they 
learned from their education and experience in Tokyo as they constructed spaces of 
                                                
63 Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi, Appendix 1, 2. 
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colonial difference and passed building regulations and street use codes to enframe urban 
space and discipline public life in Taipei and Seoul.  In this way, Tokyo provided the 
design for the production of space that would project Japanese modernity and extend 
Japanese colonial power.   
 
“Culture Streets” and “Civilized Cities”: Constructing Colonial Difference 
As Partha Chatterjee writes in The Nation and Its Fragments, colonizers attempted to 
govern their territories through the “rule of colonial difference,” a tactic whereby the 
colonial state maintained a distinct separation between the colonizer and the colonized by 
“representing the ‘other’ as inferior and radically different, and hence incorrigibly 
inferior.”64  While noting, “the difference could be marked by many signs, and varying 
with the context, one could displace another as the most practicable application of the 
rule,” Chatterjee argues that, “race was perhaps the most obvious mark of colonial 
difference.”65 
Japanese colonizers most tangibly attempted to assert their power by constructing 
colonial difference in the built form of the city.  This meant not only the building of 
“modernity,” but also the destruction of the “primitive” in order to emphasize the rupture 
between colonizer and colonized.  “It is said that if we are to build a new age here in 
Korea, then the present must be destroyed,” wrote Tokyo Imperial University professor 
of ancient history Kuroita Katsumi in 1922.  “But even that destruction is done for the 
                                                
64 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 33. 
65 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, 20. 
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purpose of creation.”66  Just as early Meiji Japanese planners had approached the Ginza 
Bricktown project in Tokyo as an opportunity for the Meiji government to differentiate 
itself from the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japanese planners would now utilize “creative 
destruction” as a tool in the colonies.67  For Japanese colonial planners, the built 
environment was most visible “mark” of colonial difference.  Streetscapes of straight, 
paved, and clean thoroughfares outfitted with sidewalks, sewers, and roadside trees, it 
was believed, would join with western architecture to frame modern urban spaces that 
dramatically contrasted with surrounding areas not yet improved.  To Japanese planners 
who saw street conditions as the barometer of civilization, it was so-called “culture 
streets” (bunka dōro) and “civilized cities” (bunmei toshi) that would convey Japanese 
cultural hegemony.68 With this in mind, Japanese colonizers in Taiwan and Korea carried 
out street improvements immediately after occupation of the colonial capitals of Taipei 
and Seoul.  In doing so, these cities became what Park Chan Seung has referred to as 
                                                
66 Kuroita Katsumi, “Bunka to Kenchiku” [Culture and architecture], Chōsen to Kenchiku 
1, no. 2 (1922): 3. 
67 In using the term “creative destruction,” David Harvey refers to both the radical man-
made physical transformations to existing built forms and the conceptual tearing asunder 
of social organizations and pre-existing thought that intentionally gouged the chasm 
severing the modern from the premodern.  That is to say – whether it was Haussmann 
destroying existing structures in order to install new thoroughfares, or embellishing 
Napoleon III’s and his own roles in the planning of Paris – if “modernity” is a myth, it is 
a myth purposely created in order to differentiate the new from what came before.  See: 
David Harvey, Paris: Capital of Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2003), 1. 
68 Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, Taihoku-shi Doboku Yōran [Survey of public works in 
Taihoku](Taipei: Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, 1939), 8; and Taiwan Tsūshinsha, ed., Taihoku 
Shi-shi [History of the city of Taihoku](Taiwan Tsūshinsha, 1920), 55. 
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“dual cities,” drawing on the French colonial planning policies of Hubert Lyautey.69  
Describing the southwestern Korean port city of Mokpo, Park writes that “Mokpo thus 
bore the features of a dual city, where living spaces were ethnically divided and the urban 
infrastructure differed greatly according to ethnic groups.”70  In Taipei and Seoul, 
likewise, street improvements and building codes were designed to produce spaces of 
colonial difference that would reify Japanese modernity and colonial power by vividly 
differentiating “modern” Japanese and “primitive” native space.   
For the rule of colonial difference to work, there had to be appreciable contrast 
between the precolonial past and the colonial present.  Only by demonstrating a dramatic 
transformation between “before” and “after” could such a strategy work.  With this in 
mind, Japanese colonizers’ attempts to deploy the rule of colonial difference incorporated 
three components: saying, doing, and showing.  In order to justify their programs and 
embellish their accomplishments, colonial planners and administrators first emphasized 
the unhygienic and disorderly conditions of the “primitive” precolonial city in their 
writings.  In the process, they downplayed efforts of modernization that had taken place 
prior to the beginning of colonial rule.  Simply claiming colonial difference was not 
sufficient, however: Japanese colonizers backed up their words with actions by carrying 
out key urban improvements.  Although planners in Taipei in Seoul used slightly 
different rhetoric, projects in both cities focused on street repair, sewer installation, and 
roadside tree planting in order to produce modern urban space.  Yet, it was equally 
                                                
69 Gwendolyn Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism 
in French Colonial Policy, 1900-1930,” The Journal of Modern History 59, no. 2 (1987): 
299-300. 
70 Chan Seung Park, “Colonial Modernity and the Making of Mokpo as a Dual City,” 
Korea Journal 48, no. 3 (2008): 106. 
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important that these programs not work too well.  As Chatterjee points out, the 
overwhelming paradox of colonial power was that it was “destined never to fulfill its 
normalizing mission because the premise of its power was the preservation of the 
alienness of the ruling group.”71  To put that another way, normalizing colonial powers 
based on difference were only effective when they were able to sustain that difference.  
Constructing spaces of colonial difference therefore meant not only paving new streets 
and erecting new buildings, but also maintaining old ones in order to preserve a visible 
distinction between colonial and precolonial forms.  For this reason, traditional structures 
were set aside and exhibited as historical remnants – often publicized in travel literature 
as “historical ruins” (kyūseki) that could be juxtaposed to the new modern built 
environment.  Finally, these displays of colonial difference were advertised around the 
world as Japanese colonizers sought to garner international approval of Japanese 
colonialism with reports of urban “transformations” and dramatically staged photos. 
                                                
71 Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, 18.  Writing in 1988, Mark Peattie 
anticipated Chatterjee’s recognition of the paradoxical nature of colonial power.  
Japanese colonial policy, Peattie showed, was based on two “inherently contradictory” 
doctrines: 1) a “racially separatist approach to colonial rule” based on social Darwinism; 
and 2) practices of “assimilation” (dōka) “aimed at eliminating all differences between 
the colonial and the motherland,” encapsulated in catchphrases such as “same script, 
same race” (dōbun dōshū), “impartiality and equal favor” (isshi dōjin), and “extend the 
homeland” (naichi enchō).”  See: Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire,” 238-240; and 
Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895-1945,” in The Japanese 
Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Roman H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 97-102.  Of course, such claims of commitment to 
assimilation were only superficial.  As Mark Caprio has demonstrated regarding 
assimilation efforts in Korea, for example, policy decisions never quite matched the 
Japanese rhetoric of colonial assimilation.  See: Mark Caprio, Japanese Assimilation 
Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Seattle: Univesity of Washington Press, 2009), 
198.  Yet, as Taylor Atkins, has argued, Japanese nevertheless felt an affinity for Koreans 
in particular, because of a belief in a joint ancestry.  See: E. Taylor Atkins, Primitive 
Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910-1945 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2010). 
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The first component in constructing colonial difference was emphasizing the 
squalor and disorder of the “primitive” native city prior to Japanese street improvements.  
Not only did this serve to justify new projects, it exaggerated the before-and-after 
transformation they accomplished.  In Taiwan, especially, the rhetoric of colonial 
officials was shaped by what George Steinmetz has called a “precolonial ethnographic 
discourse.”  As Steinmetz argues in the case of German colonialism, the ethnographic 
“library” of depictions of indigenous inhabitants found in “travel accounts, fiction, visual 
images, and any other representations that claim to represent the culture or character of a 
community defined variously as an ethnic group, race, nation, community, or people,” 
was marshaled by colonial leaders and employed in the shaping of native policy 
following colonization.72  Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan was conditioned by a 
precolonial discourse that defined the island as unsanitary and diseased.  Even before 
Japanese colonizers went ashore on the island of Formosa, as it was then called, the idea 
that Taiwan was dangerously unsanitary was widespread in Japan.  “Formosa has been 
known as a very unhealthy land where none but adventurers would fain set their feet,” 
Gotō Shimpei informed a foreign audience in 1907.  “The general conditions of the island 
before and just after its cession to Japan may be imagined by the fact that even in Taipeh, 
the capital, life was made disagreeable by an enourmous number of mosquitoes and flies 
[sic].”73  Elsewhere, Gotō added: “Most people in Japan would consider Taiwan a very 
                                                
72 George Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial 
State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007), xiii, 2, 27. 
73 Gotō, “Formosa Under Japanese Administration,” 1583. 
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unhealthy place and would not dare to go and live there.”74  Japanese politician Takekoshi 
Yosaburō made similar remarks regarding Japanese attitudes toward the tropical island: 
“The people of Japan imagined that Formosa must be a most unhealthy country.  In 
addition to this, those Japanese who went to the island, but failed to succeed in the battle 
of life, brought back a bad report of the land which tallied all too well with the people’s 
already preconceived ideas.”75   
This “precolonial ethnographic discourse” of an unsanitary Taiwan shaped how 
Japanese residents and planners viewed the cities they encountered upon disembarking on 
the island.  Takekoshi revealed his expectations for Taiwanese cities: “I expected to find 
all the large town in Formosa built like the ones in China,” he wrote, “with narrow streets 
10 or 15 feet wide, swarming with young pigs, the streets overflowing with filthy water 
and laid irregularly with stones of all shapes and sizes, and all the drinking water mixed 
with sewage.”76  As Takekoshi intimates, the idea of disorderly and unclean Chinese 
cities, and the difficulties they posed for Japanese, was widespread among Japanese in 
Taipei.  “The main cities in Taiwan were all built during the time of Chinese 
administration,” Governor-General Kodama explained in authorizing the 1899 law that 
provided land for urban improvements, “and so cannot help but be defective in terms of 
both transportation and hygiene.”77  Blaming the squalid conditions on the Chinese 
                                                
74 Gotō Shimpei, “The Administration of Formosa (Taiwan),” in Fifty Years of New 
Japan, Vol. 2, ed. Ōkuma Shigenobu (London: Smith & Elder, 1908), 550. 
75 Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, 284. 
76 Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, 284. 
77 This law was the cumbersomely entitled Law Regarding Land and Buildings in Areas 
Designated for Public or Government Use for the purposes of Urban Planning (Shiku 
Keikaku-jō Kō-yō mataha Kan-yō no mokuteki ni kyō-suru tame, Yotei Kokuji shitaru 
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became a common refrain.  “Under the Chinese régime,” Columbia University historian 
Seiji Hishida wrote in the Political Science Quarterly in 1907, “sanitation in Formosa 
was altogether neglected and the island was generally regarded as a place unsafe for the 
abode of civilized people...Even Taihoku, the capital of the island, was in a chronic state 
of filth, and swarmed with flies and mosquitoes.”78  Finally, a 1924 public works report 
lamented the condition of the built environment in Taiwan, describing it as follows: 
“Existing cities in Taiwan were all built in the Chinese style, so the urban streets were all 
exceedingly narrow and winding, and the houses all constructed without concern for 
ventilation or lighting.  The roads were always damp, the gutters on either side had no 
covers, and the stagnated garbage was decayed enough to start epidemics.”79 
Urban improvements were seen as especially important in Taipei for two reasons: 
1) Taipei was the political capital and economic hub of the colony; and 2) the area inside 
the city walls was early identified as a Japanese space where most of the institutions of 
governance and Japanese residents would be housed.  As a 1939 report of public works in 
Taipei demonstrated, planners justified street improvement efforts by decrying the poor 
road and sanitary conditions of the city.  “Even though it was the sole capital of this 
                                                                                                                                            
Chiiki-nai ni okeru Tochi Tatemono ni Kan-suru Ritsurei).  See: JACAR, Ref.#: 
A01200885200, “Taiwan ni okeru Shiku Keikaku-jō Kō-yō mataha Kan-yō no mokuteki 
ni kyō-suru tame, Yotei Kokuji shitaru Chiiki-nai ni okeru Tochi Tatemono ni Kan-suru 
Ken wo sadamu” [Matters determined concerning the Law Regarding Land and 
Buildings in Areas Designated for Public or Government Use for the purposes of Urban 
Planning in Taiwan]. 
78 Seiji Hishida, “Formosa: Japan’s First Colony,” Political Science Quarterly 22, no. 2 
(1907): 274. 
79 Taiwan Sōtokufu Dobokukyoku, Taiwan Sōtokufu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō [Summary of 
Taiwan Government-General public works projects](Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu 
Dobokukyoku, 1924), 246-247. 
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island,” the report lamented, “the streets of Taipei at that time were all narrow and dirty, 
and a foul stench hung over the city, incubating countless viruses.”  Hygienic issues were 
not the only problem; planners also bemoaned the negative impact such conditions had 
on the appearance of the city.  “Although Taipei thrived with the trading of foreign and 
domestic goods as the political and economic center of the island,” the same report 
complained, “its streets were narrow and sewers and gutters incomplete so that sewage 
would pool in the streets.  Livestock roamed the streets, giving the impression that 
humans and animals were living together.”  Once Taiwan came under Japanese colonial 
control, planners felt it was necessary to carry out improvements that would bring the 
urban area up to Japanese standards of living not only because it was the colonial capital, 
but also because Japanese residents desired comfort.  “The most pressing issue,” the 
report made clear, “was to conform the city to the trends of civilization by placing the 
Government-General here, preserving the beauty of the city, completing hygienic 
installations, and smoothing transportation.”80  These efforts were encouraged by 
Japanese residents in the city, who found themselves surrounded by potentially dangerous 
conditions.  Petitioning Governor-General Kodama Gentarō in 1898 at the behest of the 
Taipei Christian church (Taihoku Kumiai), Congregation Executive Committee Chairman 
(jōgiin kaigichō) Yamada Kaizō wrote that Taipei, “was established by the Chinese 
government, but not only was the planning faulty (fukanzen), it was never fully carried 
out.”  “Especially now that Japanese (naichijin), who have completely different manners 
and customs from the Chinese (Shinjin), have started to live here,” Yamada pleaded, “the 
inconveniences and disadvantages (fuben furi) are beyond dispute.”  “The people all 
                                                
80 Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, Taihoku-shi Doboku Yōran, 19-20. 
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desire the implementation of urban improvements.”81 
 Predictably similar rhetoric was used to lament the condition of precolonial urban 
areas in Korea.  As an official history of public works projects in Korea recorded, “[In] 
the urban areas of Korea, as a rule, the streets are narrow and excessively winding, 
making the city blocks even more irregular; not only do they cause many hindrances in 
transportation, hygiene, and fire prevention, but they also cause many impediments in the 
development of the urban area.”82  Likewise, the “great inconvenience to 
communications, and sanitary and fire-brigade arrangements” posed by the “narrow, 
dirty, and crooked streets” of Korean cities was a common theme in the Government-
General’s Annual Reports.83  Planners also tied the improvement of streets to the 
development of civilization.  A 1922 Government-General report asserted that urban 
planning was necessary in Korea because of its “current low level of civilization 
(kaimei)” and the need for “comparatively rapid future development.”84  Later, the 
Government-General elaborated that street improvements were necessary because Korea 
was “still in the first stages of modernization in many ways” and “nothing [was] more 
                                                
81 TWH: Doc.#330.3.4, “Shiku Keikaku iin no gi ni tsuki kengi, Taihoku kumiai jōgiin 
kaigichō Yamada Kaizō” [Petition from Taipei Christian church Congregation Executive 
Committee Chairman Yamada Kaizō regarding the urban planning committee]. 
82 Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi, 1023. 
83 Quotes from Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report 1921-1922, 162.  
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1924, 1924-1926, and 1929-1930. 
84 Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsen Sōtokufu Shisei Nenpō [Annual report on the 




keenly required” to “forward the sound development of a Korean town.”85  
Improving streets in Seoul, in particular, was seen as imperative for producing the 
commercial efficiency and modern appearance expected of the colonial capital.  “Most of 
the streets, even in the city of Keijo [sic], the capital,” the Government-General lamented 
in 1912, “developed very irregularly, so that great inconvenience has hitherto been felt in 
street communications and sanitation.”86  A 1935 Public Works report went further: 
“Because of the outdated transportation system, the urban streets within Keijo, as seen in 
the back streets of the northern parts of the present-day city, are meandering and narrow, 
as if they were mazes.”87  Engineer Iwamiya Noboru, meanwhile, tied street 
improvements to urban aesthetics, speaking in familiar terms, “because the streets in 
traditional Korean cities for the most part lacked any order and were so crooked, and their 
widths so narrow, they were so inconvenient that we could simply not leave them in that 
condition for the sake of [Seoul’s] transportation, hygiene, security, and appearance.”88  
Clarifying that “Keijo [sic], the capital, was no exception” to the “miserable state in 
which most Korean towns were before the Japanese authorities took in hand the 
improvement or reconstruction of their streets,” the Government-General explained that 
                                                
85 Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report 1922-1923, 142-143; and 
Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report 1924-1926, 140. 
86 Government-General of Chosen, Annual Report on Administration of Chosen, 1911-
1912, 120. 
87 NDLD: Keijō-fu, ed., Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō: Shōwa 10-nen 5-gatsu 15-nichi 
genzai [Summary of Keijō public works projects: as of October 15, 1935](Keijō: Keijō-
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88 Iwamiya Noboru, “Dorō Keikaku ni Tsuite” [On road planning] in Chōsen Toshi 
Mondai Kaigiroku [Minutes of meetings on urban problems in Korea], ed. Keijō Toshi 
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street projects in Seoul were intended to “set an example to other towns.”89   
Japanese rhetoric of precolonial primitivity necessarily overlooked modernization 
efforts undertaken prior to the arrival of Japanese colonizers.  Despite Japanese claims to 
the contrary, both Taipei and Seoul had seen improvement projects initiated by previous 
rulers.  The city of Taipei had been founded in 1875 as the capital of the newly reformed 
northern province of the island, and city walls were erected between 1879-1882 to protect 
residents from raiders.  Yet the area inside the walls did not urbanize until Chinese 
governor Liu Ming Ch’uan began improvement efforts soon after arriving in the city in 
1884 to lead the Chinese defense of the island in the Sino-French War.  Between 1884 
and his retirement in 1891, Liu initiated a number of improvement projects designed to 
encourage settlement.  In addition to laying out an urban plan for the area in side the 
walls, Liu introduced stone-paved streets and street lamps, erected new government 
buildings and public temples, and even laid a railway from Taipei to the coastal cities of 
Hsinchu and Keelung.90 
Whereas Taipei was a young city, Seoul had a much longer history of 
improvement efforts that dated back to its founding as the capital of the Yi Dynasty in 
1394.  Over this time, the city had seen a series of projects that effected a remarkable 
change in its appearance long before the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.  The 
famous world traveler Isabella Bird, for example, extolled the “extraordinary 
metamorphosis” she saw in the face of the city between her first trip to the city in 1894 
                                                
89 Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report 1923-1924, 135. 
90 Harry J. Lamley, “The Formation of Cities: Initiative and Motivation in Building Three 
Walled Cities in Taiwan,” in The City in Late Imperial China, ed. G. William Skinner 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 167, 197. 
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and her return in 1896.91  “Seoul in many parts, specially in the direction of the south and 
west gates,” Bird exclaimed, “was literally unrecognizable.”  Gone were the narrow 
alleyways and overflowing sewage ditches she had seen on her first visit.  In their place 
were new streets “widened to 55 feet, with deep stone-lined channels on both sides, 
bridged by stone slabs.”  “Seoul,” Bird concluded, “from having been the foulest is now 
on its way to being the cleanest city in the Far East!”  She went on to attribute these 
improvements to the work of two people, British advisor to the Minister of Finance, John 
McLeavy Brown, and the governor of Seoul, Yi Ch’aeyŏn.  Yi had visited Washington 
D.C. with the first Korean ambassador to the United States, Pak Chŏngyang, and this 
experience influenced his ideas for urban improvement.92  
                                                
91 First arriving in the city in 1894, Bird did not mince words describing the squalid 
conditions.  “I thought it the foulest city on earth till I saw Peking,” she lambasted, “and 
its smells the most odious, till I encountered those of Shao-shing.”  Adding, “For a great 
city and a capital its meanness is indescribable,” Bird wrote that Seoul was full of 
“labyrinthine alleys, many of them not wide enough for two loaded bulls to pass...and 
further narrowed by a series of vile holes of green, slimy ditches.”  Returning two years 
later in October 1896, she could barely believe her eyes.  Isabella Bird, Korea and Her 
Neighbors ([1897] London: KPI Limited, 1985), 40, 435-436.  See Yi Tae-jin, The 
Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization in Korean History (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 246-247, and Sohn Jung-mok, “Colonial City Planning and Its 
Legacy,” in Seoul, Twentieth Century: Growth & Change of the Last 100 Years, ed. 
Kwang-Joong Kim (Seoul: Seoul Development Institute, 2003), 434-435 for more 
discussion of Bird’s recollections. 
92 Writing in 1990, urban planning historian Kim Kwang’u attributed these improvements 
to the efforts of the Independence Club led by Sŏ Chae’pil (aka Philip Jaisohn, publisher 
of The Independent newspaper), of which Yi was a founding member.  Kim points to 
Interior Ministry Order No. 9, issued September 28, 1896, as evidence that the changes 
observed by Bird were part of larger, more systematic modernization efforts initiated by 
Yi and Pak.  According to Kim, the Order called for the widening of streets in the capital 
to their original widths by tearing down houses impeding the roadways, the creation of a 
new road network of radial roads centering on the main gate of Kyŏng’un Palace, and 
construction of Western buildings along main streets (Yi, The Dynamics of Confucianism 
and Modernization, 247, 270-271). 
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Street improvements in Seoul specifically were part of an attempt by the Korean 
government to re-brand “the hermit kingdom” as a modern empire.  In addition to 
contracting foreign investors to construct railways across the peninsula, the Great Han 
Empire (Taehan Cheguk) carried out a number of urban improvements in the capital.  As 
Todd Henry has described, the government cleared stalls impeding the city’s main 
thoroughfares, installed new roads, and constructed several monuments in an attempt to 
“re-create the royal city of Hanyang into an ‘imperial capital’.”93  Yi T’ae-jin, likewise, 
has asserted that the street improvements observed by Bird in the mid 1890s were 
undertaken at the behest of King Kojong as part of a larger attempt to “make Seoul into a 
suitable imperial capital” for a newly independent Korea starting in mid-1896.94  As Yi 
argues, this included the reconstruction of Seoul into an imperial capital “befitting the 
new monarchical system.”95  According to Yi, King Kojong ordered the relocation of the 
court from Kyŏngbok Palace to the Kyŏng’un Palace in early September 1896, and then 
initiated a massive urban redevelopment program centered on the new palace.  As Yi 
notes, this explains the timing of the Interior Ministry Order No. 9 issued later that 
month.96  Piecing together the admittedly limited historical record, Yi catalogues the 
improvements included in the plan as: 1) the laying or repair of roads and sewers, in 
addition to the clearing of new roads radiating from the Kyŏng’un Palace; 2) the 
                                                
93 Todd Henry, “Respatializing Chosŏn’s Royal Capital: The Politics of Japanese Urban 
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Geography, ed. Timothy Tangherlini and Sallie Yea (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
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construction of new buildings, including the Kyŏng’un Palace and Independence Gate; 3) 
the opening of new parks, such as Independence Park and Pagoda Park; 4) the 
introduction of electricity, waterworks, streetcars, and railways; and 5) the designation of 
an industrial district in Yongsan and a city market near Namdaemun.97  Yi concludes that 
these projects “visibly changed the city’s landscape,” but during the colonial period, “The 
Japanese systematically obliterated the physical landmarks of the urban development that 
had been implemented by the emperor beginning in 1896, and the project itself was 
eventually forgotten.”98  Some scholars, such as planning historian Sohn Jung-mok, on 
the other hand, have been skeptical of these arguments, pointing out “although highly 
feasible, no concrete proof has been found to prove what Kim and Lee [Yi] suggested.”99  
There is also evidence indicating street projects by the Korean government may have 
started as early as the 1894 Kabo reforms.100  In any event, Korean attempts to rebrand 
                                                
97 Yi, The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization, 275-276. 
98 Yi, The Dynamics of Confucianism and Modernization, 290-291. 
99 Sohn, “Colonial City Planning and Its Legacy,” 437. 
100 According to a diplomatic report filed in December 1896 by Japanese ambassador to 
Seoul, Komura Jutarō, the Korean government began planning urban improvements as 
early as after the “reformation of the year before last” (issakunen no kaikaku) – 
presumably the July 23rd 1894 Japanese-led coup and ensuing Kabo reforms.  As Komura 
reported, it was another governor of Seoul, Yu Chŏng-su, who called on the Japanese 
consulate on April 16, 1895 – the day before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed 
ending the Sino-Japanese War – to convey a prohibition on the building of houses that 
extended beyond the roadside gutters and encroached on the streets.  As Komura 
explained, the stated purpose of this order was to prevent the building of structures that 
could not be torn down in preparation for precessions by the King.  Another legation 
official, Uchida Sadatsuchi, saw it another way.  Writing in a January 1896 report, 
Uchida suspected that this order was targeted primarily at Japanese storeowners who had 
been gradually buying Korean houses leading to the Namdaemun and replacing them 
with Japanese-style buildings.  Because solidly constructed Japanese houses could not be 
easily torn down on the occasion of a court procession, Uchida surmised, the purpose of 
the ban was to prevent the spread of Japanese-owned structures outside the settlement.  
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the city as an imperial capital continued beyond the turn of the century as two Americans 
were hired to install streetcars, electricity and telephone lines, street lamps, and water 
pipes in the city starting in 1898.101  Although Japanese colonizers downplayed the 
success of these reforms, they clearly also benefited from them when enacting their own 
projects following colonization in 1910. 
Claiming colonial difference by emphasizing the poor conditions of the native 
city and exaggerating the lack of planning and urban development in Taipei and Seoul 
was only the first step.  The actual street improvement work of breaking ground, moving 
earth, laying pipe, and rolling pavement was the next component of constructing colonial 
difference.  By no means were these programs were identical.  Indeed, there were two 
marked differences between the projects in the two cities.  First and foremost, Japanese 
colonial urban design went much more according to plan in Taipei than it did in Seoul.  
                                                                                                                                            
After receiving the cooperation of the Japanese legation to ensure the compliance of 
Japanese residents, the Korean government commenced removing temporary structures in 
June or July of 1895.  The plan, Komura detailed, was to widen streets and repair ditches 
on both sides of the street.  Owners of houses that had been constructed before the April 
announcement, including Japanese residents, were to be compensated for destroyed 
houses, but not those who erected structures afterwards.  As Komura noted, work 
proceeded until what he called the “Incident of August 8th” – that is, the assassination of 
Queen Min.  The September 28, 1896 Interior Ministry order presumably restarted these 
stalled projects, eventually completing improvements in the areas that Komura identified 
as the Sodaemun [West Gate] and Taedong neighborhoods.  Perhaps it was these two 
projects that achieved the great “metamorphosis” Bird noticed in the west gate area.  For 
Uchida’s report, see: JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6.  Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no gi 
Zai Keijō Uchida ryōji yori hōkoku no ken, Meiji nijūjyūnen ni-gatsu” [6.  Consul 
Uchida’s report of Deiken area road improvements, February 1896].   For Komura’s 
report, see: JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364600, “7.  Keijō Nandaimon dōri hanro kaoku 
torikowasu kata chakuraku no tenmatsu guhō no ken, Meiji sanjūnen” [7.  Report 
relaying full details of arrangements regarding the tearing down of houses impeding 
Nandaimon Street in Keijō, January 1897]. 
101 Yi Tae-jin, “Seoul at the Beginning of the 20th Century: Urban Development Based on 
Western Models,” Korea Journal 39, no. 3 (1999): 111. 
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On one hand, this was because Taipei was a younger and less developed city than Seoul, 
granting Japanese planners in Taiwan much more freedom in shaping the city as it grew.  
On the other hand, planners in Taipei had few impediments in carrying out projects 
because they were able to take advantage of a local custom whereby the government 
could obtain land free of charge provided that it would be used for public facilities, such 
as roads or schools.  In fact it was not until after 1905 that frustrated Japanese landowners 
forced the Government-General to pay for appropriated land, even if they only received 
half price.102  Projects in Korea, on the other hand, were jointly opposed by Korean and 
Japanese residents.103  Secondly, there were notable differences in the order of urban 
improvements in Taipei and Seoul.  Programs in Taiwan started with improvements to 
the water system and then transitioned to the streets, while in Korea the first priority was 
on transportation infrastructure.  Taipei also saw the adoption of arcades typical in 
tropical climates but not seen in either Tokyo or Seoul, in addition to more opulent urban 
design with a number of rotaries whereas Seoul only had one.  Also notable were the 
disparate architectural styles adopted for the design of the Tatsuno-style neo-renaissance 
                                                
102 Taihoku Dobokuka, ed., Taihoku Doboku Yoran 1939, 37. 
103 Notably, Korean residents had also opposed street improvement projects carried out by 
the Korean court in 1896.  The November 5th, 1896 issue of the Korean newspaper The 
Independent recorded: 
The Governor of Seoul, Yi Chai Yun, has ordered that the houses and booths that 
have been built on the public streets throughout the city be torn down.  The people 
in Jun-Dong petitioned to the Governor to rescind the order, but Mr. Yi explained 
to them that it is against the law of the country and the municipal ordinance to 
have houses built on the thoroughfare.  It is not within the Government's power to 
ignore the law, hence he has to enforce the order under any circumstances.  But 
the people, nearly fifty in number, followed him round wherever he went and sent 
up continual bursts by saying: “Let the law go to rest,” “We don't want to have 
our houses torn down,” etc.  It seems the Governor is traveling on a rough road 
just at present (“Local Items,” The Independent, November 5th, 1896). 
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Government-General of Taiwan building constructed in 1919, and the Edwardian 
Baroque Revival-influenced Government-General of Korea headquarters built in 1926.  
Yet it is also important not to let these differences obfuscate important similarities 
between the programs.  In both Taipei and Seoul, Japanese colonizers initially localized 
improvements to primarily Japanese areas in order to construct spaces of colonial 
difference before expanding projects outward in order to encompass the entire city.  
Furthermore, in both cases, plans were pragmatically altered to fit into the existing built 
environment of the city.  It was this pragmatic adaptation that made Japanese colonial 
urban planning feasible.   
 In Taipei, planners boasted of the street improvements that transformed what they 
saw as the primitive and diseased Chinese city into the “Little Paris of the Orient” (Tōyō 
no ko-Pari), as the 1938 travel brochure Touring Taiwan (Taiwan no Tabi) praised the 
city.104  This was accomplished over 6 stages of urban improvements that began as soon 
as the Japanese occupied Taipei in 1895 and continued until 1945.105  Already by August 
of 1895, only two months after entering the capital, the Government-General was in 
discussions with the Civil Affairs Bureau concerning the repair of streets and sewers in 
                                                
104 KDL: Kinkai Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha, ed., Taiwan no Tabi [Touring Taiwan](Taipei: 
Kinkai Yūsen, 1938).   
105 The 6 stages of planning as described by the Taihoku Shisei Nijūnen Shi [History of 20 
years of Taipei administration] were: 1) 1895-1896 – gutters outside the city walls; 2) 
1896 – sewer improvements planned by Japanese Home Ministry advisor William K. 
Burton; 3) 1900.8.23 – street improvements inside the city walls announced by the Urban 
Planning Committee; 4) 1901.6.1 – street improvements south of the city walls 
announced by the Urban Planning Committee; 5) 1905.10.7 – city plan covering the 
entire city announced by the Urban Planning Committee; 6) 1932 – Taipei Urban Plan 
(Taihoku Toshi Keikaku) announced with 55 routes, 16 parks, and 4 bridges.  See: 
Taihoku Shiyakusho, Taihoku Shisei Nijūnen Shi [History of 20 years of Taipei 
adminsitration](Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 2011), 542-555. 
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the area inside and around the city walls, which had already been designated as the 
location of the institutions of Japanese rule.106  As a result, “gutters” 30 feet wide and 5 
feet deep were dug around the outside of the walls in order to collect rainwater, prevent 
flooding, and thwart the entrance of pathogens – a symbolic moat protecting the besieged 
Japanese inhabitants from the invading tropical environment, not to mention the guerilla 
raids by armed bandits who still resisted Japanese possession of the island.107 
Citywide street improvements were first announced by the Taipei Urban 
Improvement Committee in 1905 (See Figure 12).108  An earlier plan calling for 6 classes 
of roads, the widest of which was nearly 60 ft. and large central park had been announced 
in 1900, but this plan was limited to the primarily Japanese-area inside the city walls (See 
Figure 13).109  Improvements expanded to areas immediately outside the southern gate in 
1901 (See Figure 14), but it was not until 1905 that the Urban Planning Committee 
adopted a citywide street plan.  The 1905 plan retained the street widths and central park 
from the earlier 1900 plan, but for the first time planned the removal of the city walls and 
the extension of the street network to the rest of the city with over 50 miles of new 
                                                
106 TWH: Doc.#54.17.19, “Taihoku Jōnai oyobi sono fukin Dōro Kyōryō nado no Shūzen 
ni kansuru ken” [Matters regarding the improvement of roads and gutters within the city 
walls and surrounding areas in Taipei]. 
107 Taihoku Shiyakusho, Taihoku Shisei Nijūnen Shi, 542. 
108 Taihoku-chō, Kokuji #200, October 7th, 1905.  This documents is reproduced as 
document #5, “Taihoku Jōnaigai Shikukeikaku,” in Huang Wu Dar, Rizhi Shidai Taiwan 
Dushi Jihua Richeng Jiben Shiliao zhi Diaocha yu Yanjiu: Shiliao Bian [Examination of 
fundamental historical documents of the urban planning process in Taiwan during the 
period of Japanese rule: document collection](Taipei: Shili Zhongguo Wenhua Daxue 
Jianzhu ji Dushi Jihua Yanjiusuo), 1997. 
109 The 6 specified widths were 10 ken (~60 ft.), 8 ken (~48 ft.), 6 ken (~36 ft.), 5 ken 
(~30 ft.), 4 ken (~24 ft.), and 3 ken (~18 ft.).   
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streets, in addition to nearly 110 miles of new sewers, and almost 20 acres of new 
parks.110  As Taipei Urban Planning Committee member Nomura Ichirō described, 
planners had two things in mind when they designed the street layout.  First, planners 
purposely resisted aligning streets perfectly east-west in order to prevent Taipei’s 
predominantly easterly winds from stirring up dust, while also allowing adequate 
sunlight.  Secondly, as much as possible, planners tried to follow the existing street 
pattern, particularly in the older areas of the city.  “The Wanhua and Dadaocheng areas 
already have streets,” Nomura explained, “so we couldn’t just draw lines without taking 
these into consideration.”  As Nomura clarified, this was a choice made for economical 
reasons: “if we didn’t take account of these existing streets,” he wrote, “the necessary 
expenses would have been extraordinary.”  “As a result, the plan is to improve the older 
streets to a certain extent and for the most part to use the existing layout.”111  This 
adaptation to the existing street network in the area inside the city walls can be seen in a 
series of maps of Taipei drawn between 1895 and 1916 (See Figures 15-17).  Gotō 
Yasushi has also helpfully charted a map clearly delineating routes in the 1905 plan that 
followed existing streets (See Figure 18).   
The best example of the Japanese construction of colonial difference in Taipei 
was the development of the area inside the city walls as a modern Japanese space of 
sanitary and improved streets, and western architecture.  Although this area had been 
established as the administrative center of the province during the Chinese 
administration, Japanese colonizers adopted it as the location for the many of their own 
                                                
110 Taihoku Shiyakusho, Taihoku Shisei Nijūnen Shi, 543. 
111 Nomura Ichirō, “Taihoku no Shiku Kaisei ni Tsuite” [Concerning the urban 
improvement of Taipei], Kenchiku Zasshi 378 (1917): 31. 
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institutions of colonial rule.  Whereas city walls had originally encompassed the area, 
Japanese planners replaced the walls with another boundary more apropos of the 
Japanese vision of modernity: tree-lined boulevards.  In the end, it was these tree-lined 
boulevards that became the biggest factor in Taipei’s new “civilized” appearance.  
“Whoever it was that called Taipei the ‘Little Paris of the Orient’,” declared one history 
of the city, “must have been talking about these orderly roads and their streetscapes of 
beautiful greenery.”112  Gwendolyn Wright’s analysis of the French construction of broad 
thoroughfares in Morocco is just as applicable to the parkways of Taipei: “These barriers 
marked the distinctions between two parts of a city, setting off two scales of construction, 
two periods of history, and often two races.”113  Planning for the “3-lane boulevards” 
(sansen dōro) that made up this barrier zone began with the 1905 urban plan.  A number 
of Baroque-inspired rotaries were planned: one for each corner of the rectangle, and more 
to lead circulation around 4 of the 5 main gates of the city walls.  Ranging in width from 
nearly 150 feet on the north, east, and west sides of the rectangle, to over 230 feet on the 
south side, the boulevards were called “three lane boulevards” because the two vehicle 
lanes were separated by a shaded pedestrian parkway.  Constructed between 1910-1913, 
these boulevards were heralded as markers of Taiwanese advancement.  “Planted with 
unique tropical trees, and designed with circular and semicircular parks placed here and 
there,” boasted a 1939 public works report, “the boulevards have an elegant scenery not 
seen elsewhere...they are the oldest two-lane ‘culture streets’ in all of Japan.”114  The 
                                                
112 Taiwan Tsūshinsha, Taihoku Shi-shi, 109-110. 
113 Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity,” 301. 
114 Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, Taihoku-shi Doboku Yōran, 8. 
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centerpiece of the Japanese area delineated by these “culture streets” was the 
Government-General headquarters building completed in 1919.  Designed by Tatsuno 
Kingo-pupil Nagano Uheiji, the building displayed an updated form of the Italianate Neo-
Renaissance “Tatsuno-style” seen in Tatsuno’s Tokyo Station, but also exhibited 
elements of more contemporary Edwardian architecture.  But this building was only one 
of many elements that demarcated this area as Japanese.  As a Taipei municipal public 
works report described this space:  
Today, [the area inside the city walls] consists for the most part of 
Japanese (naichijin), with many of the most important buildings – the 
governor-general, the court, the military headquarters, the library, the 
museum, banks, and companies – all located here.  The flat and paved 
improved streets, furthermore, crisscross the area, lined on both sides by 
tall buildings constructed in brick or ferroconcrete, the arcades and streets 
crowded with the traffic of pedestrians and vehicles (jinba no kenma 
kokugeki).  This has all given the area inside the walls a characteristic 
atmosphere.115  
 
To Japanese in Taipei, this space marked the advancement of Taiwanese culture for all to 
see.  “The urban areas of Taipei have consequently progressed to their current prosperity 
by receiving the light of modern civilization (atarashiki bunmei),” reported an official 
city history.  “Today...the cultured cityscapes (bunkateki no gaikan) are beautiful in their 
orderliness and indisputably live up to those of a civilized city (bunmei toshi).”  More 
importantly, city officials believed the construction of such spaces and streets would 
advance the cultural development of the city.  “Modern civilization constantly crosses the 
ocean from the homeland and from foreign countries to arrive in Taiwan, where it 
stimulates the human spirit and is harvested to advance Taiwanese culture, steadily 
producing remarkable progress in culture year after year,” the same history stated.  
                                                
115 Taihoku-shi Dobokuka, Taihoku-shi Doboku Yōran, 8. 
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“Undoubtedly, Taipei will grow into a grand civilized city (bunmei toshi) demonstrating 
splendid cultural advancement in as few as 100, or even 50 years.”116 
Japanese efforts to construct spaces of difference in Seoul, meanwhile, started 
even before the beginning of formal colonial rule in 1910.  As early as 1891, then-
consulate official Sugimura Fukashi praised the “remarkable progress” seen in the 
Japanese areas of the southern part of the city, writing that the area around the consulate 
was starting to “take on the appearance of a Japanese village.”117  This was the product of 
Japanese emigrants, who had begun to reside in the city in large numbers from the early 
1880s.  At first, Japanese residents were confined to an area granted by the Korean 
government as the Japanese Settlement (kyoryūchi) on a hill at the foot of Mr. Namsan to 
the south.  As the Japanese settlers quickly realized, this was not prime real estate.  The 
area was known as “‘muddy town’ (deiken or chinkōkai)118,” Jun Uchida notes, and was 
“an area of relative neglect that had been inhabited by impoverished yangban elites and 
Chinese merchants in the Chosŏn period.”119  Sohn likewise relates the origin of the name 
for the area, quoting 18th century scholar Hong Ryang-ho: “It is a narrow low land, and 
                                                
116 Taiwan Tsūshinsha, Taihoku Shi-shi, 55, 64. 
117 JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364100, “2.  Keijō Kyoryūchi Honpōnin Shoyū no Tochi 
narabini Kyoryūjin no tame Shōrai toru beki no Hōshin ni tsuki zai Keijō Ryōji gushin no 
ken” [Detailed report from the consul in Seoul regarding future policy for land possessed 
by Japanese nationals in the Keijō settlement area and for the benefit of settlers].  
118 “Deiken” is the Japanese pronunciation of the two Korean Hanja characters for the 
name of the hill.  In Korean, the characters can be pronounced either “Yihyŏn” or 
“Nihyŏn,” although “Chinkokae (Jingogae)” appears to be the common local reading.  
The Keijō-fu Shi, published by the municipal government in 1936, gives the reading of 
these characters in Hangul as “Chinkokae.”  See: NDLD: Keijō-fu, Keijō-fu Shi [History 
of Keijō] (Keijō: Keijō-fu, 1936), 2:634. 
119 Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 71.  
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when it rains the water does not drain well and the roads get muddy causing trouble for 
passers-by.  That was why the village there is called Jingogae [Chinkokae, or JPN: 
chinkōkai] meaning ‘a muddy hill.’”120  Japanese residents understandably became 
frustrated with the area because of its muddy conditions, its isolated location, and the fact 
that they were not allowed to open stores in other parts of Seoul.  As the Japanese consul 
in Seoul, Sugimura Fukashi, complained to Tokyo in 1891, the settlement was “stuck into 
a corner of Seoul,” which was bad for business.  Chinese merchants, he noted by contrast, 
were free to open stores wherever they wanted in the city.121  Legation official Uchida 
Sadatsuchi echoed these frustrations in 1896, complaining, “Chinkokae is a backwoods 
(hekichi) part of Seoul, located at the foot of Mt. Namsan.  Its roads are so narrow and 
steep that it is exceedingly difficult for people or animals to pass, not to mention carts or 
wagons.”122 
Unhappy with the poor conditions of the settlement, the Japanese consulate and 
residents in Seoul set about converting this muddy hill into a modern Japanese town by 
improving streets and removing Korean dwellings in the process.  As Uchida Sadatsuchi 
described, this was done with the cooperation of the Korean government.  To widen the 
street running through the area, the Korean government and Japanese legation agreed that 
Korean-owned temporary structures would be torn down and Japanese houses would be 
withdrawn to the new street line when remodeled.  According to the deal, Uchida 
explained, the Korean government funded the removal of Korean structures:  “In the end, 
                                                
120 Sohn, “Colonial City Planning and Its Legacy,” 437. 
121 Sugimura’s memo, along with a map of Japanese holdings in settlement, can be found 
in JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364100, “2.  Keijō Kyoryūchi Honpōnin Shoyū no Tochi.”  
122 JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6.  Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no Gi.” 
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we achieved out goal of widening the street without any Japanese spending even one 
dollar.” 123  Once the street widening was completed in the Japanese settlement area by 
May or June of 1895, the Japanese legation funded the digging of stone gutters on both 
sides of the street, leveling of the road surface, and the application of new gravel paving.  
The Japanese Settlement Assembly (Kyoryūchi minkai) – later called the Seoul 
Resident’s Association (Keijō Kyorūchimindan) – then determined plans for future road 
improvements and established a Road Improvement Committee to oversee their 
completion.  To make the area more attractive to residents and shoppers alike, the 
association funded a garbage collection program and the installation of street lamps.124  
Several years later in 1901, the Assembly funded more street repairs in the settlement, at 
which point, according to a history of the Association, “the Settlement for the first time 
began to look like a Japanese village (machi).”125  Uchida Jun points out that this had 
been the objective of the president of the organization, Nakai Kitarō, who even 
envisioned building two-storied brick houses lining the street, “just as the Meiji state had 
done along the streets of the Ginza.”126 
Following the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japanese colonizers expanded their 
gaze from the Japanese settlement to the entire city of Seoul.  Over the years 1911-1937, 
the Government-General and Keijō Municipal Government carried out a series of 
                                                
123 JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6.  Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no Gi.” 
124 JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6.  Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no Gi.” 
125 Keijō Kyoryūmin-dan Yakusho, ed., Keijō Hattatsu-shi [History of the growth of 
Keijō](Keijō: Keijō Kyoryūmin-dan Yakusho, 1912; Tokyo: Ryūkei Shohsa, 2001), 75-
76, 106.  Page references are to 2001 edition. 
126 Quoted in Uchida, Brokers of Empire, 71. 
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concurrent programs to modernize the transportation network of the whole city.  The 
most well known of these were the Keijō Urban Improvement (Keijō Shiku Kaishū) 
projects planned by the Public Works Council and implemented by the Government-
General over 2 phases between 1912-1929.  Notably, these street improvement plans 
were made at a time when the public works bureau was directed by former Taipei Urban 
Planning Committee member Mochiji Rokusaburō.  As planners had done in Taipei, 
Mochiji used the rhetoric of culture and civilization to justify street improvements in 
Seoul.  As Todd Henry explains, Mochiji “plac[ed] the city within the global contexts of 
modern imperialism and urban planning...In addition to being a transportation hub, the 
new colonial capital also served as a gauge for what Mochiji called the ‘country’s level of 
civilization’ and its ‘barometer of culture’.”127  Not surprisingly, the optimistic plans for 
street improvements in Seoul exhibited several stylistic flourishes also seen in Taipei.  
Phase 1 of the Keijō Urban Improvement (See Figure 19), announced in November 1912, 
called for an opulent baroque-style grid network of streets traversing the entire city 
center, featuring radial boulevards focused on Hwangt’ohyŏn Plaza and “Kōganechō 
Plaza” located in the center of the southern Japanese residential area.128  Phase 2, which 
began in 1919, updated the total number of routes to be improved to 47 (See Figure 
                                                
127 Todd A. Henry, Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in 
Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 32. 
128 Initially, 29 routes were announced.  See: NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu 
Kokuji #78, “Keijō Shiku Kaishū Yotei Keikaku Rosen hidari no gotoshi” [Routes 
planned for the Keijō urban improvement program are as follows] in Kanpō #91, 
November 18, 1912.  Two more routes were later added in 1917.  See: NDLD: Chōsen 
Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #24, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-
gō Keijō Shiku Kaishū Yotei Keikaku Rosen Hyō-jū hidari no tōri tsuika-su” [Additions 
will be made to the diagram of routes planned for the Keijō urban improvement program 
in 1912 notification #78 as follows], in Kanpō #1335, February 9, 1917. 
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20).129  As with Phase 1, this second plan also laid out an elaborate grid network of streets 
cast over the city center.  Although the monumental rotary plazas from the first plan were 
absent from this Phase 2 plan, new radial boulevards accentuated the planned location of 
the future Government-General Headquarters Building directly in front of the historical 
Kyŏngbok Palace.  The grid of broad boulevards, plazas, and rotaries envisioned in these 
plans vividly illustrate what Baek Yung Kim has called the Japanese “panopticonization” 
of Seoul.  By creating wide urban plazas, Kim argues, colonial urban planners increased 
the legibility of the urban area, making it more visible to the imperial gaze.  To evade this 
surveillance, interestingly, Korean colonial subjects avoided these large plazas and 
instead traveled along older alleyways, especially in the northern, more traditional parts 
of the city.130   
Yet Japanese manipulations of the colonial built environment in Seoul did not 
stop with major thoroughfares or plazas.  Rather, the Keijō city government 
                                                
129 Only 46 routes were initially listed in 1919.  See: NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen 
Sōtokufu Kokuji #173, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-gō-jū hidari no tōri 
kaisei-su” [1912 notification #78 will be revised as follows], in Kanpō #2072, July 2, 
1919.  Revisions in 1922, 1925, and 1928 raised the final number of routes to 47.  For 
1922, see: NDLD: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #204, “Taishō Gan-nen 
Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-gō-jū hidari no tōri kaisei-su” [1912 notification #78 will be 
revised as follows], in Kanpō #3047, October 28, 1922.  For 1925, see: NDLD: Chōsen 
Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #134, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji 78-
gō Keijō Shiku Kaishū Yotei Keikaku Rosen Hyō-jū hidari no gotoku kaisei-su” [The 
diagram of routes planned for the Keijō urban improvement program in 1912 notification 
#78 will be revised as follows], in Kanpō #3875, July 23, 1925.  For 1928, see: NDLD: 
Chōsen Sōtokufu, Chōsen Sōtokufu Kokuji #264, “Taishō Gan-nen Chōsen Sōtokufu 
Kokuji 78-gō Keijō Shiku Kaishū Yotei Keikaku Rosen Hyō-jū hidari no tōri kaisei-su” 
[The diagram of routes planned for the Keijō urban improvement program in 1912 
notification #78 will be revised as follows], in Kanpō #483, August 6, 1928. 
130 Baek Yung Kim, “Shokuminchi toshi Keijō no Hiroba to Roji” [The plazas and alleys 
of colonial Seoul] in Shokuminchi Chōsen to Teikoku Nihon: Minzoku, Toshi, Bunka, ed. 
Chŏng-wan Sŏ and Masuo Shin’ichirō (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2010): 21-31. 
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supplemented Government-General projects by extending street repairs into backstreet 
areas with three phases of its own projects.  First, the Keijō government took over 
execution of the Government-General’s projects after 1929.  With subsidies from the 
National Treasury, the city completed just over 5 miles of 10 uncompleted routes from 
the Government-General programs between 1930 and 1937.131  Before this, the city had 
again used national subsidies to improve and pave 3.5 miles of 11 separate trunk roads, 
including the major east-west thoroughfares of Chongno Road, Kōganechō Road, and 
Meijimachi Road between 1924 and 1930.132  Finally, spanning both of these projects, the 
Keijō government used city funds to carry out sectional improvements and paving of 
nearly 20 miles of 96 older backstreets located largely in the southern half of the city 
from 1917 to 1937.133  As one public works report explained, “because these construction 
projects carry out sectional improvements in the especially unregulated backstreets of the 
old urban area, the results are remarkable.”134  By accomplishing this seemingly 
innocuous paving of Seoul’s backstreets, Japanese colonizers attempted to frame colonial 
urban space in order to demonstrate Japanese modernity.  It could even be said that these 
paving projects in the backstreets of Seoul formed the “capillaries” circulating Japanese 
                                                
131 These projects are designated the “Keijō Municipal Urban Improvements” (Keijō-fu 
Shikō Shiku Kaishū).  See: Keijō-fu, Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō: Shōwa 13-nen 
[Summary of Keijō public works projects: 1938](Keijō: Keijō-fu, 1938), 13, 19-20. 
132 These projects are called “Trunk Road Improvement Projects” (Kansen Dōro Kaishū 
Kōji).  See: Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi, 1045; Keijō-fu, ed., Keijō-fu 
Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō [1935], 12 front-13 front; Keijō-fu, ed., Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō 
Gaiyō [1938], 13, 20-21. 
133 The projects are referred to as “Keijō Municipal Sectional Improvements and Street 
Surface Repair Projects” (Keijō-fu shikō kyokubu kaishū oyobi romen kairyō kōji).  
Keijō-fu, ed., Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō [1938], 23-28. 
134 Keijō-fu, ed., Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō [1935], 13 back. 
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imperial power further into the illegible backstreets and throughout the urban body of 
colonial Seoul.135   
With all of these projects, Japanese colonial planners in the Government-General 
and Keijō city government worked in concert to complete the widening and improvement 
of a total of 141 streets in the city, for a total length of just over 42 miles, of which 128 
acres was paved, lined by 21 acres of paved sidewalks, and shaded by over 6,000 trees.136  
Upon completion, the Government-General frequently boasted that these streets 
improvements “[brought] about an extraordinary change in both the appearance and 
traffic efficiency of the city,” and “[added] one more step in the beautifying of the city 
and the convenience of traffic.”137  The partial paving of the trunk streets in “tar 
macadam” and asphalt, especially, was said to “[add] to the modern aspect of the city.”138  
By improving “the modern aspect of the city” in the southern, Japanese half of the city 
especially, Japanese colonial planners attempted to create a Japanese enclave of urban 
modernity within the vernacular city.  At one level, this was done to make Japanese 
expatriate settlers feel more at home by providing amenities to which they had grown 
accustomed in Japan.  At a deeper level, however, the production of an organized, 
                                                
135Todd Henry, on the contrary, has argued that Japanese street improvements never 
achieved this “capillary” affect because they were restricted to arterial roads and were 
never able to penetrate into the interior of older Korean neighborhoods.  See: Henry, 
Assimilating Seoul, 36-37.  For the “capillary form” of power, see: Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980), 39. 
136 Keijō-fu, ed., Keijō-fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō [1938], 14; Keijō-fu, ed., Keijō-fu Doboku 
Jigyō Gaiyō [1935], 17 back-19 front, 20 back-21 back. 
137 Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report 1923-1924, 135; and 
Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report 1929-1930, 118. 
138 Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report 1924-1926, 140. 
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hygienic, and visibly “modern” Japanese space in the city was intended to assert Japanese 
cultural hegemony to the colonial population.  Japanese planners programmed these 
spaces to announce not just that Japan had the power to modernize the built environment, 
but that this represented a more advanced culture.   
Amidst street improvements, Japanese colonizers in both Taipei and Seoul 
carefully preserved examples of vernacular “primitive” architecture in order to visibly 
display colonial difference in the built form of the city.  Architectural historian 
Gwendolyn Wright has argued that such dramatic embrace of vernacular built form in the 
colonial setting was often an attempt to justify colonial rule and limit popular resistance 
by “temper[ing] the disruptions” of modernity on colonial societies.139  Colonizers 
“sought specifically to mitigate the disruptions caused by modernist urban reforms,” 
Wright writes elsewhere, “by actively engaging traditional architectural forms and 
attuning themselves to the ways in which various cultural groups typically responded to 
the city.”140  It was such adaptation to local form that made Morocco, in the words of one 
Parisian observer, “a laboratory of Western life and a conservatory of oriental life.”141  
Writing about Seoul, Chon Uyong has similarly noted that such purposeful retention of 
“shabby” traditional structures juxtaposed to nearby modern buildings served as a 
reminder of the transition of power while also encouraging the association of the new 
                                                
139 Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 9-10. 
140 Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity,” 299. 
141 Wright, The Politicis of Design, 85. 
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buildings with the old structures of power.142   
In both Taipei and Seoul, the vernacular structures repurposed as artifacts of 
colonial difference were historical city gates.  Many cities in Taiwan and Korea had been 
originally constructed following the Chinese model of cities encircled by city walls 
penetrated by several gates.  The gates were therefore prime symbols of the pre-colonial 
city.  Following colonization, Japanese occupiers demolished these city walls in the name 
of urban development, commercial mobility, and hygiene.  “Although the Japanese 
authorities claimed that the deconstruction was intended to develop the city by removing 
obstacles,” Kim Il-Su poignantly notes about the removal of walls in the Korean city of 
Daegu in 1906-1907, “in actuality, it was for the purpose of securing commercial 
hegemony for the Japanese and ultimately restricting Daegu to suit the purposes of 
Japanese colonial rule.”143   
In Taipei, the city walls had been erected by Chinese administrators over the years 
between 1879-1882.  These were originally penetrated by five gates: the North Gate 
(located in the northwest), the East Gate, the Small South Gate (located in the southwest), 
the South Gate (located in the southeast), and the West Gate.  When Japanese colonizers 
arrived in 1895, they immediately recognized the walls and their narrow gates as 
impediments to transportation and the hygiene-focused urban improvements they had in 
mind.  Destruction of the gates and walls therefore started in 1900.  The plan was to use 
                                                
142 Chon Uyong, “Shokuminchi toshi ime-ji to Bunka Genshō – 1920 nendai to Keijō” 
[The image of the colonial city and cultural phenomena: Keijō in the 1920s], in Nikkan 
Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Hōkokusho 3, jō-maki, ed. Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Iinkai 
(Tokyo: Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Iinkai, 2005): 220.  
143 Kim Il-Su, “Colonial Modernization of the Traditional City of Daegu,” Korea Journal 
48, no. 3 (2008): 82. 
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stones from the gates and walls to construct walls surrounding government buildings and 
to line roadside gutters.  Demolition started from the West Gate but was halted halfway 
by Gotō Shimpei, who ordered that the gates should be preserved.  As an official history 
of Taipei from 1932 records, Gotō’s idea was that the gates should be retained as “relics 
from the older generation” (kyūdai no ibutsu).144  Although it was too late to save the 
West Gate, the four remaining gates became monumental centerpieces of parks forming 
stylistic rotaries – where they still stand today.  Displayed as artifacts and surrounded by 
parks and boulevards, the gates became public spaces where tourists could visualize the 
colonial transformation of Taipei.  As the 1940 travel brochure Sightseeing Taipei 
(Kankō no Taihoku) advertised, the gates were “even now preserved as historical ruins 
(kyūseki) evoking a bygone time.”145 
The preservation of city gates as artifacts of colonial difference was even more 
pronounced in Seoul, where Japanese urban planners carefully set aside and preserved the 
Namdaemun, the southern gate to the city.  Starting in 1907, Japanese engineers attached 
to the Korean government used Korean government funds to tear down the city walls on 
either side of the gate, leaving the gate itself standing alone at the center of a newly 
constructed rotary.  Because the existing route through the gate itself was only 3 ken 
(~18ft.) wide and “the inconvenience and danger for transportation could not possibly be 
concealed any longer,” new 8 ken (~48ft.) roads were constructed on both sides.  The 
historical gate, meanwhile, was retained in order to “preserve the beauty of the city” 
                                                
144 Taiwan Tsūshinsha, Taihoku Shi-shi, 110. 
145 KDL: Taihoku-shi Kankō-kakari, Kankō no Taihoku [Sightseeing Taipei](Taipei: 
Taihoku-shi Kankō-kakari, 1940). 
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(shigai no bikan wo tamotashime).146  Not only was the gate repurposed as an isolated 
ceremonial archway into the city, but, juxtaposed to the adjacent Namdaemun railway 
station, the historical city gate also became a stark sign of native primitiveness.  Once the 
Western-style Keijō Station replaced Namdaemun Station in 1925, moreover, the 
Namdaemun became a site of Japanese cultural hegemony.  Solidifying this link between 
the old gate and the neighboring train station, the existing road was widened into a 19 ken 
(~108ft.)-wide thoroughfare starting in 1910.147  This exhibition of the Namdaemun was 
part of a larger Japanese design strategy in Seoul.  As Todd Henry has argued, the 
difference between “dynamic” and “modern” Japanese southern parts of the city and the 
“‘quaint’ and ‘decrepit’ anachronisms of the northern part of the city” was a common 
theme in Japanese travel-guides of Seoul.  “This discursive strategy worked to strip these 
areas of their precolonial significance as centers of kingly rule,” Henry notes about the 
former palace complexes in Seoul, “and their potential in the colonial present as rallying 
points of Korean nationalism.”  “Instead, they were refashioned as archaic counterparts to 
the modern present and future of the city, converted into entertainment and tourist sites to 
be visited by Japanese and foreign travelers.”148  The importance placed on the 
Namdaemun in this regard is revealed in the fact that its image graced the cover of the 
                                                
146 Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi, 1023-1024. 
147 Construction on this road was started in 1907, the city walls were torn down in 1909, 
and a sidewalk of 2.75 ken laid on one side in 1910.  This route was repaved in 1910-
1911and a sidewalk installed on both sides over the next year.  See: Keijō-fu, ed., Keijō-
fu Doboku Jigyō Gaiyō [1935], 9 front; Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsen Doboku Jigyōshi, 
1023-1024, 1041-1042; and Government-General of Chosen, ed., Annual Report on 
Administration of Chosen 1921-1922, 162-163. 
148 Todd Henry, “Sanitizing Empire: Japanese Articulations of Korean Otherness and the 




1913 New Guide to Seoul (Shinsen Keijō Annai)(Figure 21).  The Namdaemun was also 
frequently featured as the first stop on Seoul tourist itineraries, such as in the 1935 Tour 
Guide to the Sights of Keijō (Keijō Meishō Yūran Annai) or the 1940 Keijō Sightseeing 
Guidebook (Keijō Kankō no Shiori), because of its proximity to Keijō Station.149   
Japanese colonizers sought an even wider audience for the display of colonial 
difference in built form by advertising urban improvement efforts worldwide with 
progress reports complete with photos staged to dramatically illustrate the success of their 
projects.  Such publications were an attempt to solicit popular acceptance of Japan’s 
claims to its “mission civilisatrice” in the colonies – especially from their Western 
imperialist counterparts.  This was especially the case in Korea, where colonial 
authorities published large numbers of reports and books starting from the beginning of 
the protectorate period in 1905 boasting of the success of their multifaceted reform 
efforts.  The Government-General’s Japanese-language Annual Reports (or, Shisei 
Nenpō), for example, ostentatiously celebrated the success of Japanese-led reforms on the 
peninsula, complete with illustrations, charts, and graphs.  The Keijō Urban Improvement 
Projects: 20 Years of Memories (Keijō Shikukaisei Jigyō: Kaiko Nijūnen) published by 
the Government-General Public Works Office in Seoul in 1930 is remarkable in this 
regard as a 100-page portfolio of dramatically staged before-and-after photos 
aggrandizing the modern transformation accomplished by Japanese urban improvement 
                                                
149 See: KDL: Keijō Takushii Yūran Basu Kakari, Keijō Meishō Yūran Annai [Tour guide 
to the sights of Keijō](Seoul: Keijō Takushii Yūran Basu Kakari, 1935); and KDL: Keijō 
Kankō Kyōkai, Keijō Kankō Shiori [Keijō sightseeing guidebook](Seoul: Keijō Kankō 
Kyōkai, 1940).   
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programs in Seoul.150  Companion Annual Reports, meanwhile, were published in English 
and distributed to libraries worldwide in an attempt to legitimize Japanese rule in the eyes 
of the Western imperialist audience.  With titles such as Annual Report on Reforms and 
Progress in Chosen (Korea), Annual Report on Administration of Chosen, and Thriving 
Chosen: A Survey of Twenty-Five Years of Administration, these reports publicized 
Japanese-initiated reforms, especially urban improvements in Seoul and other cities.  
Without fail, these reports proudly displayed the same before-and-after photos of the 
urban transformation of Seoul (Figure 22). 
The construction of colonial difference in the streets of Taipei and Seoul was only 
one component of Japanese attempts to assert colonial rule through public space.  Once 
the infrastructure of the city was laid, Japanese colonizers issued a number of building 
construction regulations and street use codes in order to enhance colonial power by 
shaping the built form of the city and conditioning public behavior.  These codes worked 
in tandem with street improvements to produce colonial difference by fostering and 
regulating modern Japanese space in the city.  Once those spaces were created, street use 
laws disciplined public life.  In this way, colonial power was exercised both in space and 
on those who occupied that space.   
 
Enframing Colonial Space and Public Life: Building and Street Use Codes 
In the book Colonising Egypt, Timothy Mitchell analyzes how colonial space was 
disciplined and ordered through a strategy he terms “enframing” – defined as “a method 
                                                
150 Chōsen Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Keijō Doboku Jimusho, ed., Keijō Shikukaisei Jigyō: 
Kaiko Nijūnen [Keijō Urban Improvement Projects: 20 Years of Memories](Keijō: 
Chōsen Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Keijō Doboku Jimusho, 1930). 
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of dividing up and containing...which operates by conjuring up a neutral surface or 
volume called ‘space’.”  Enframing served to discipline the colonized population, 
Mitchell argues, by divvying up neutral space into a series of “containers,” into which life 
was broken down “into a series of discrete functions – sleeping, eating, cooking, and so 
on – each with a specific location.”  This strategy was most visible in the reconstruction 
of model villages, where, Mitchell points out, “the spacing that forms [the village’s] 
rooms, courtyards, and buildings is specified in exact magnitudes, down to the nearest 
centimeter.”151  For Mitchell, the purpose of this enframing of colonial space was to make 
the colonized population and urban environment legible for the purposes of disciplining 
the colonized population and increasing capitalist profits.  “Egypt was to be ordered up as 
something object-like,” Mitchell notes, “In other words it was to be made picture-like and 
legible, rendered available to political and economic calculation.”152 
As in Mitchell’s Egypt, Japanese colonial projections of power in built form were 
not limited to the physical structure of streets, but extended into the otherwise neutral 
urban space framed by the built environment.  In areas under Japanese control, colonial 
urban planners followed up on street improvements by disciplining public space through 
a number of regulations on building construction and street use.  As with in Mitchell’s 
example of enframing in Egypt, these codes constituted the means by which colonial 
power was brought to bear on colonized individuals.  Yet the difference from Mitchell’s 
model in the cases of Taiwan and Korea, is that Japanese efforts to order the built 
                                                
151 Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 
44-45. 
152 Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, 33. 
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environment were not so much about rendering the colonial population legible as they 
were about imposing and enforcing Japanese notions of “modernity” onto the existing 
native city in both the appearance of the city and public behavior.  For Japanese colonial 
planners, regulations on building construction and street use picked up where street 
improvements and spaces of colonial difference left off.  While Japanese urban 
improvement efforts were initially confined to areas of Japanese residence, building 
regulations and street use codes were ultimately applied to colonial urban space as a 
whole.  These codes, then, were ways through which colonizers attempted to legislate 
adherence to Japanese expectations of “civilized” life outside Japanese colonial enclaves.  
To be sure, such building codes were not limited to the colonies of Taiwan and Korea.  
Instead, as Nishizawa Yasuhiko points out, similar building regulations were also issued 
in Japanese-occupied territories in northeastern China, such as Dairen in 1905 and 
Manchuria in 1907.153  With this in mind, this section will examine codes in Taiwan and 
Korea to show how Japanese colonizers used such codes in an attempt to “improve” 
native life – both to justify colonization and compel the assimilation of the colonial 
population. 
Restrictive building codes and street use regulations in Taipei and Seoul can be 
seen as products of a “laboratory” of sorts in the cultivation of Civilization that would 
have been impossible to set up in the metropole.  Indeed, scholars of Japanese urban 
planning often point out that the Japanese colonies were more advanced than the 
mainland in terms of planning laws and building codes.  One famous example of this is 
the monumental urban design accomplished in the Japanese-constructed Manchukuo 
                                                
153 Nishizawa, Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron, esp. 300-340.   
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“puppet capital” of Shinkyō in the 1930s.154  “Numerous innovative planning concepts 
were created and applied first in the colonies,” writes Carola Hein.  “For example, the 
Provisional Taiwan Buildings Code was enacted in 1895, and the Taiwan Housing 
Regulation came into force in 1900 and was amended in 1912.”155  By contrast, there was 
no nationwide Japanese urban planning or building code until 1919, with the City 
Planning Law (Toshi Keikaku Hō) and companion Urban Area Building Law (Shigaichi 
Kenchikubutsu Hō).  This would seem to fit with the argument that colonies constituted 
laboratories and test grounds where frustrated metropolitan planning idealists could 
experiment with and enact policies impossible to introduce back in the mainland. 
Yet a closer look at building construction and land use laws in Taiwan and Korea 
reveals two important features of these colonial ordinances.  First, building codes and 
land use laws issued in Taipei and Seoul exhibited a striking resemblance to fireproofing 
codes and street use regulations seen in Tokyo as early as 1878 (See Table 3).  As 
planners assigned to the colonies confronted problems in the city, they responded with 
measures crafted from their training and personal experience in the metropole.  
Considering that many of these planners were trained at Tokyo Imperial University, it is  
                                                
154 Bill Sewell, “Railway Outpost and Puppet Capital: Urban Expressions of Japanese 
Imperialism in Changchun, 1905-1945,” in Colonialism and the Modern World: Selected 
Studies, ed. Gregory Blue and others (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 283. 
155 Carola Hein, “The Transformation of Planning Ideas in Japan and Its Colonies,” in 
Urbanism: Imported or Exported?: Native Aspirations and Foreign Plans, ed. Joe Nasr 































4 Building3Height 1878!*!15!feet!(Article!2);!1894!*!50!feet!(Article!34) 1900!*!12!feet!or!more!(Article!5)
1913!*!not!to!exceed!3!stories!
(Article!4)
5 Building3Setbacks 1874!*!3!feet 1907!*!3!feet,!1.5!feet!between!buildings!(Article!2) 1913!*!1.5!feet!(Article!3)
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not surprising that they should apply lessons learned in the metropole to the colonial 
worksite.  This is also not to say that the Tokyo laws were imposed unilaterally on the 
colonial cities.  Instead, the second important feature of colonial building codes and street 
use laws is that regulations from Tokyo were pragmatically adapted to address what 
planners saw as the most urgent urban problems in Taipei and Seoul.  In tropical Taipei, 
Japanese planners identified hygiene and sanitation as the biggest problem, and revised 
their building codes accordingly.  Planners in Seoul, meanwhile, saw conflagration as a 
bigger threat to the urban environment and therefore issued building codes more focused 
on fireproofing.  In this way, colonial planners in Taipei and Seoul flexibly adapted an 
urban improvement model forged in Tokyo to local conditions.  It was this flexible 
alteration of Tokyo models to fit local conditions in Taipei and Seoul that allowed 
colonial power to pervade and become so embedded in the built environment of the 
colonial city, and by extension into the daily lives of the colonized population.    
Regulations on building construction and street use in Tokyo proceeded gradually 
from the early 1870s.  While it is true that there were no building codes that applied 
universally to the entire country of Japan until the 1919 Urban Area Building Law, there 
were nevertheless a number of successive fireproofing ordinances, construction 
guidelines, and draft building codes passed in Tokyo from the mid-Meiji period that 
introduced elements of architectural control seen in later codes in Taipei and Seoul.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the biggest problem facing Tokyo in early and mid-Meiji period 
was recurring conflagrations.  Predictably, each fire resulted in new efforts to prevent the 
next one by widening streets to clear firebreaks (called “wide streets,” or hirokōji) and by 
issuing new construction guidelines.  Responding to this primary threat of fire, 
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regulations starting in 1870 dictated various components of building construction and 
layout with an eye towards preventing and containing conflagrations by maintaining 
firebreaks and requiring fireproofing measures.  The main problem with firebreaks was 
that over time they would lose effectiveness in the face of the never-ending cycle of what 
could be called “building creep.”  To clear firebreaks, streets were widened to the stone-
covered roadside drainage ditches that demarcated the extent of the roadbed.  Following 
commercial custom, storeowners in the rebuilt buildings would place goods for sale 
under the storefront awnings.  Over the years, the areas under these awnings would be 
enclosed and made an integral part of the building – and new awnings would be extended 
even further into the street.  Such “building creep” slowly narrowed the street; that is, 
until the cycle would start all over again with another fire and the clearing of another 
firebreak.  In an attempt to break this pattern, the Tokyo government prohibited buildings 
from encroaching on streets in 1870.  These initial restrictions were strengthened in 1874 
when the government not only required that stores be set back 3 feet from the gutters, but 
also stipulated that if store goods were displayed under the awnings then these spaces 
could be included in rent calculations.156   
Maintaining firebreaks through building setbacks was not enough to stop the 
spread of fires.  In order to prevent fires from jumping firebreaks, additional codes were 
passed requiring the use of non-flammable materials in building construction.  For 
example, houses fronting main streets were to be constructed in either plaster (1870)157, 
                                                
156 For the 1874 Construction Standards (Kenchiku Kijun Shirei), see: TSS, vol. 56 
(Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1965), 644-645. 
157 1870 Fire Prevention Building Construction Restrictions (Bōka-jō Kaoku Kenchiku 
Seigen), Article 1.  See: TSS, vol. 51 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1961), 23. 
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stone, or brick walls of a thickness of at least 1.5 bricks (1878)158.  Because most fires in 
Tokyo were sparked by embers flying from chimneys, moreover, the 1878 Building 
Construction Restrictions required chimneys to be made of stone or brick, and any 
exposed wood nearby to be covered in plaster.  Finally, the comprehensive 1881 Fire 
Lines and Roofing Construction Restriction Codes (Bōka Rosen narabini Okujō Seigen 
Kisoku) expanded an earlier requirement for roofs to be tiled in porcelain (1873)159 to 
allow metal, stone, or other non-flammable materials.160  Most significantly, new rules set 
in 1881 established time limits for houses in designated areas to be re-constructed up to 
code.  Houses with nonflammable roofs along firebreaks could rebuild in plaster, stone, 
or brick within 3 years.  Others had only one year.161  Although it was not until the first 
decades of the 20th century that fires ceased to be a concern for city residents, fireproofing 
guidelines allowed government control to extend down to the level of the home in the 
name of the public good. 
Fires were not the only problem plaguing Tokyo.  Another problem spreading 
through the city was communicable disease.  As construction guidelines limited the 
spread of fires from the mid-Meiji period, cholera and other waterborne diseases replaced 
                                                
158 1878 Building Construction Restrictions (Kaoku Kenchiku Seigen Rei), Article 1.  See: 
TSS, vol. 61 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1969), 71-73. 
159 1873 Burnt Areas Housing Roof Construction Regulations (Ruishōmachi Machiya 
Okusei).  See: TSS, vol. 55 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shiyakusho, 1964), 786. 
160 1881 Firelines and Roofing Construction Restriction Codes (Bōka Rosen narabini 
Okujō Seigen Kisoku).  Reprinted in Fujimori Terunobu, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku [Urban 
Planning of Meiji Tokyo](Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), 63-65. 
161 See Fujimori, Meiji no Tōkyō Keikaku, 63-65; and Jordan Sand, “Property in Two Fire 
Regimes: From Edo to Tokyo,” in Investing in the Early Modern Built Environment: 




conflagrations as the main threat to residents of the capital.  Just as the city was getting 
over routine fires, it was periodically afflicted by increasingly serious outbreaks of 
cholera as victims of the disease increased rapidly from nearly 2,000 lives in 1879, to 
over 5,000 in 1882, and over 10,000 in 1886.162  As mentioned in Chapter 2, it was these 
outbreaks that finally led to the inclusion of water and sewer system improvements in the 
Tokyo urban improvement plans.  Yet as Japanese urban reformers knew, another 
important element of sanitation and hygiene was housing construction.  As Andre 
Sorensen describes, hygienic issues had motivated calls for a comprehensive Tokyo 
building code by reformers such as Taguchi Ukichi, Nagayo Sensai, and Mori Ōgai.  
Mori had even been named to a committee tasked with drawing up a draft building code 
to accompany the 1889 Tokyo Urban Improvement Ordinance.  Nonetheless, as Sorensen 
notes, the building code failed because of a number of factors, including political 
opposition from wealthy landowners who did not like the idea of stricter building codes 
and the limited popular political support resulting from the “lack of civic consciousness” 
in the mid-Meiji period.163   
Although efforts to pass a building code ultimately failed, a closer look at two 
drafts produced in the process reveals notable consideration of urban hygiene.  The first 
draft, the Tokyo Building Construction Ordinance draft (Tōkyō-shi Kaoku Kenchiku 
Jōrei), was initiated by architect Yamaguchi Hanroku and completed by another 
                                                
162 Ishizuka Hiromichi, “Tōkyō Shikukaisei Jigyō shi kenkyū josetsu: jōsuidō kairyō jigyō 
to shikai, burujowaji- no ugoki wo megutte” [Introduction to the history of Tokyo urban 
improvement projects: fresh water system improvement projects and the activities of the 
city council and bourgeoisie], Toshi Kenkyū Hōkoku 55 (1975): 26-27. 
163 André Sorensen, The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the 
Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2002), 69-71. 
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architect, Tsumaki Yorinaka, for the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee sometime in 
1889.164  As article 2 of this first draft makes clear, “the regulations put forth in this 
ordinance are not limited only the general appearance of the city and the hygiene of the 
populace, but extend to surveillance (kanshi) of all elements of architecture in order to 
maintain public peace (annei) for all house dwellers.”165  While fireproofing was still a 
major concern, 13 of the 154 separate articles delineated in this draft were specifically 
devoted to hygienic regulations.  Among these were detailed restrictions on the 
placement and structure of wells (Article 138), the construction of privies and toilets 
(Articles 139-144), and requirements for fresh water supply (Article 145) and inspection 
before inhabitation (Article 147).  Because vaporous miasmas were thought to contribute 
to the spread of disease, other health related construction guidelines included 
proscriptions against the installation of doors or windows in buildings that produce 
noxious fumes facing neighbors homes (Article 33), requirements to leave crawlspaces 
under the floor and windows for ventilation of residential dwellings (Article 47), and to 
allow sunlight access (Article 79) and proper fenestration (Articles 81 and 82) for living 
quarters.  The second draft code to be examined updated the first draft and further 
                                                
164 As Ishida Yorifusa explains, this draft plan is thought to be the one discussed in an 
October 1889 meeting of the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee, when Chairman 
Yoshikawa Akimasa assigned 7 members, including Nagayo Sensai and Furuichi Kōi, to 
a special committee to discuss a draft code drawn up by Tsumaki.  The whereabouts of 
the drafts were unknown until they were serendipitously discovered among Tsumaki’s 
papers in the archival collections of the Architectural Institute of Japan (Nihon Kenchiku 
Gakkai) during the institute’s 1982 relocation to its current headquarters in Tokyo.  For a 
reprinting of two of the drafts found in the collection, see: Ishida Yorifusa, “Nihon 
Kenchiku Gakkai Toshoshitsu Shozō Tsumaki Bunko-jū no Kenchiku Hōki Kankei 
Shiryō” [List of Drafts of Building Ordinance for the City of Tokyo and Their Materials 
Found in Tsumaki Library Which is Now Owned by the Architectural Institute of Japan].  
Sōgō Toshi Kenkyū 19 (1983): 169-189. 
165 Ishida, “Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai Toshoshitsu Shozō,” 180. 
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expanded on these provisions.  Released by the Tokyo Urban Improvement Committee in 
1894, this second Buildings Code draft responded to the growing threat of disease by 
introducing two important construction guidelines.  First, in an attempt to prevent the 
overcrowding that was thought to breed squalor, article 32 of the 1894 codes stipulated 
that buildings could only occupy 4/5ths of the lot; the remaining 1/5th must be left as open 
space (Article 32).  Secondly, requirements were added for kitchen sinks and drains to be 
constructed in non-permeable materials to prevent the spread of contaminated water.166  
While these codes were not enacted, they nevertheless represent the conventional wisdom 
of Japanese engineers and architects concerning hygienic building construction as early 
as the 1880s.  
The construction codes used to enframe public space in Tokyo formed the 
juridical arsenal deployed to assert colonial control in Taipei and Seoul as Japanese 
engineers, architect, and planners moved from the metropole to the colonies to pursue 
new careers.  Following precedents seen in Tokyo, planners in Taiwan announced several 
laws concerning building construction starting in 1896 with the Taipei-specific Housing 
Construction Regulations (Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku).  This was followed by the colony-
wide 1900 Taiwan Housing Construction Regulations (Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku), 
and the companion 1900 Taiwan Housing Construction Regulations Enforcement By-
laws (Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku Shikō Saisoku), later revised in 1906 and 1907.  In 
Korea, meanwhile, building codes were streamlined with the single Urban Area 
Construction Control Codes (Shigaichi Kenchiku Torishimari Kisoku) issued in 1913.  
While each of these codes was based on the model of similar standards in Tokyo, all were 
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pragmatically adapted to respond to immediate concerns.  In Taipei this meant 
confronting hygienic and sanitary conditions, while in Seoul this meant both sanitary 
regulations and fireproofing.  For quick reference, Table 1 indexes common points 
between building codes in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul, including the year provisions were 
first enacted in each city.  As the table shows, Tokyo precedents informed regulations 
Taipei and Seoul in one dozen different categories: building materials, roof tiling, gutters, 
height, setbacks, plot coverage, foundations, crawlspaces, chimney structure, lighting and 
ventilation, kitchens, and toilets.   
 In Taiwan, building codes were an integral part of colonial engineers’ attempts to 
produce Japanese space within the city walls.  These efforts were shaped by local 
conditions in two ways.  First, only the northwestern corner of the area inside the city 
walls had seen much urban development.  While certainly not a tabula rasa, the large 
undeveloped urban spaces available gave Japanese planners a certain amount of freedom 
in shaping the built form of the city as it grew, rather than responding to an existing built 
environment.  Secondly, as a tropical city, Taipei was subject to a number of tropical 
diseases, especially malaria, unknown in mainland Japan, in addition to more familiar 
contagious afflictions, such as cholera, and dysentery.  As Caroline Ts’ai notes, Taiwan 
even suffered bubonic plague from 1896 to 1917.  Japanese military casualty figures 
confirm the toll that disease had on the Japanese population upon arriving to the island.  
According to Tsai, whereas only 164 Japanese soldiers died in battle during pacification 
campaigns, 4,642 soldiers died from disease and another 26,094 contracted some form of 
serious illness.167   
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Once Japanese planners identified the area inside the walls as the future “Japanese 
city,” they quickly issued building codes designed to produce a hygienic, sanitary, and 
aesthetically pleasing urban space.  Just over a year after Japan took control of the city, 
the first building codes were enacted in the prefecture of Taipei in November 1896.  In an 
effort to dramatically demonstrate the difference between sanitary, “civilized” Japanese 
life and unhygienic, “primitive” native dwellings, these first codes applied only to 
buildings constructed to house Japanese (naichijin)(Article 1).  Because these codes were 
meant to reproduce Japanese space in Taipei, they predictably resembled building 
regulations from Tokyo.  Standards for non-flammable building and roofing materials, 
provision of gutters and crawlspaces, and requirements for non-permeable construction of 
kitchen sinks, drains, and toilets (Article 2), all had precedents in regulations then in 
effect in Tokyo or proposed in the draft building codes.  These 1896 regulations were 
expanded with the 1900 Taiwan Building Construction Codes and companion Bylaws, 
which applied to cities throughout the colony.  Continuing the theme of hygienic and 
sanitary housing construction, these 1900 bylaws introduced requirements on sunlight 
access and room ventilation, building foundations, and detailed instructions for 
construction of toilets, cisterns, and septic tanks.  As with similar standards for kitchen 
construction, the primary concern was containment of contaminated wastewater.  As 
Article 10 stipulated, for instance, toilets were to be made of stone, brick, or concrete, 
joined with mortar, and lined with a non-permeable material.168  Finally, the 1900 codes 
gave the local governor extraordinary power to order the remodeling, repair, or removal 
                                                
168 TWH: Furei #81, “Taiwan Kaoku Kenchiku Kisoku Shikō Saisoku hidari no tōri 
sadamu” [The Taiwan building construction codes bylaws are determined as follows], in 
Fuhō #829, September 30, 1900. 
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of any existing structure that was deemed to be “dangerous,” “harmful to health,” or 
“necessary in the name of the public good,” (Article 3).  As Nishizawa Yasuhiko 
concludes, this stipulation was meant to give the local governor the power to preserve the 
beauty of the city by removing “shabby” houses.169  In other words, this provision 
effectively gave the local governor the legal right to remove “primitive” traditional 
houses in order to produce a modern, Japanese space. 
 Complicating colonial attempts to produce Japanese space in Taipei, the 
colonization of Taiwan presented one large new problem not seen in Tokyo.  This 
required pragmatic adaptation of building codes to adapt to local conditions – in this case, 
specifically to thwart the spread of bubonic plague.  Although Japanese engineers and 
architects were familiar with measures for combatting waterborne communicable 
diseases such as cholera and dysentery from the experience of Tokyo, bubonic plague 
required a much different response.  Rather than contaminated water, the main culprit in 
the spread of plague was rodents, particularly rats.  One method taken to control the 
spread of plague, Ts’ai describes, was rat extermination campaigns initiated by local 
governments from the early 1900s.  Not only would city offices pay an award of ¥0.05 
per rat killed, local governments would set rat quotas for each household in their 
jurisdiction and fine households ¥0.25 for every rat by which they missed the quota.  By 
August 1912, Tsai notes, the government-general reported through the Taiwan Daily 
News a total of 41,923,644 rats caught through these campaigns.170  Attempts to combat 
the spread of plague were also seen in new building construction codes.  Of the 25 
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articles in the updated codes issued in July 1907, 6 included requirements to prevent 
rodent infestation in retaining walls (Article 7), building foundations (Article 11), 
ceilings (Article 13), interior walls (Article 15), ceilings (Article 17), and crawlspaces 
and drainage pipes, etc. (Article 18).171  Thus, “rat prevention” (bōso) joined the more 
common “fire prevention” (bōka) and “disease prevention” (bōeki) as the three major 
themes of construction codes in Taiwan.   
  Building codes functioned much differently in Seoul.  Although the latest to be 
enacted, they nonetheless failed to include many of the restrictions seen in earlier codes 
in either Tokyo or Taipei.  In fact, with 21 provisions spread over 9 articles, construction 
regulations in Seoul were the shortest and least specific of any of the codes under review.  
Perhaps the most significant reason for this was that it was not until 1913 that the 
Government-General gained the legal authority to issue the Urban Area Construction 
Control Codes.  Prior to annexation in 1910, the Japanese Resident-General, while 
authorized to manage Korean foreign affairs, was legally restricted to advising the 
standing Korean government on domestic matters.  As a result, by the time the codes 
were issued, Japanese expatriate settlers in Seoul had been carrying out gradual street 
improvements to the Japanese settlement for nearly 20 years since 1895 with the financial 
assistance of the Japanese consulate.  Through these projects, Jun Uchida describes, 
Japanese agents in Seoul had already transformed the settlement “into a mini-Tokyo that 
they christened Honmachi,” or “Japantown.”172  Building codes in Korea were therefore 
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not as much about fostering Japanese space in the city, as had been the case in Taipei, as 
they were about making the city more pleasant for Japanese residents.   
The Seoul building codes enacted in 1913 gave only perfunctory attention to the 
issues of fireproofing and hygiene in the home, and were instead designed to improve the 
appearance of the city.  Although providing detailed instructions for fireproofing 
chimneys (Article 3), and requiring the installation of nonflammable roofing, and 
lightning rods for building over 50 feet tall (Article 4), the codes did not demand 
fireproof materials for building construction.  Rather, rowhouses (nagaya) constructed in 
wood were merely required to have firewalls every 120 feet (Article 4).  One possible 
explanation for this was that brick and stone were relatively cheap in Korea, so dwellings 
were most often already built in nonflammable materials.  Another reason is given in 
Article 3 of the codes.  Accordingly, chimneys were to be nonflammable in order to 
“prevent damage to neighboring residences and buildings.”  Sanitary restrictions were 
similarly directed outwards towards neighbors rather than inwards to living quarters.  
Five of the 21 provisions in the codes addressed sanitation, yet only two dealt with the 
interior of the house: requirements for “proper sewage and water systems” and toilets 
(Article 3).  Other hygiene related provisions mainly concerned the appearance and 
health of the neighborhood as a whole: stipulations that drinking wells must be separated 
from excrement pits, sewage pits, and ditches by at least 18 feet, that excrement pits must 
be constructed in non-permeable materials (Article 3), and that public toilets should not 
be installed on public roads unless enclosed by privacy walls (Article 4).173  Finally, 
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owners of large buildings were encouraged to take “all possible measures” to prevent rat 
infestation, and buildings that stored or handled goods that emitted “bad odors, noxious 
fumes, or dust” were not allowed to have any windows or doors facing public roads, 
buildings where large numbers of people would gather, or neighboring residences 
(Article 3).  Missing were standards for foundations, sunlight access, and ventilation for 
individual living quarters.   
  Sanitary restrictions intended to improve the appearance of the neighborhood 
were reinforced by two construction regulations designed to present an aesthetic 
streetscape.  First, building setbacks were implemented in an attempt to maintain building 
lines.  As in Tokyo, streets in Seoul were gradually narrowed through the familiar cycle 
of “building creep.”  Yet, rather than fires providing the impetus for restarting the cycle, 
in Seoul it was periodic progressions between royal palaces that led to government orders 
to widen streets to their original widths by tearing down commercial stalls impeding on 
the streets.  Again, as in Tokyo, planners attempted to break the cycle of “building creep” 
in the 1913 building codes by requiring building setbacks from public streets.  In Tokyo 
and Taipei, structures were required to be set back 3 feet from building lines, but were 
allowed to have awnings projecting a determined amount over building lines along streets 
of certain widths.  In contrast, in Seoul, where streets were decidedly narrower, setbacks 
were only required to be 1.5 feet.  The codes compensated for this reduced building 
setback by more strictly demanding that no eaves (nokisaki), gable rakes (keraba), pent 
roof awnings (hisashi), or modillions (mochiokuri) of any building, gate, or fence extend 
over the street (Article 3).  The second construction code enacted to improve the 
appearance of the neighborhood was the restriction that buildings cover no more than 
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8/10ths of building lots.  This meant that 1/5th of the plot was to be left as open space, just 
as proposed in the failed 1894 Tokyo Building Construction Ordinance.  As in Tokyo, 
open space requirements in Seoul were an attempt to improve sanitary conditions in the 
city by preventing the pestilence thought to spawn in overcrowded areas.  In Seoul, they 
had the added function of putting a clean face on the city.   
Japanese attempts to discipline the population did not stop at the front door; rather 
building codes went hand in hand with street use regulations in attempts to frame life and 
condition popular behavior both indoors and out.  The colonized populace was expected 
to conform to Japanese dictated frames of home life by self-reporting and making certain 
all new construction, remodeling, or additions were up to code, at the risk fines of up to 
¥200 in Taiwan or ¥100 in Korea for failure to report, lack of compliance, or for 
submitting false information.  And this, at a time when colonial laborers could expect 
wages of less than ¥1 per day in Taiwan, and ¥1.5 to ¥2 a day in Korea when the codes 
were issued.174  To make things worse, the colonized population was also required to 
comport itself according to Japanese prescriptions of “civilized” public behavior once 
they left the house.  This was especially true in Korea, where street use codes were issued 
as early as 1913.  As Todd Henry has argued, Japanese-led projects to sanitize Seoul and 
reform the public hygienic practices of the Korean population were major components of 
Japan’s strategy of colonial rule.  As Henry explains, the colonial government forced 
both Korean and Japanese residents to pay a monthly service fee to support the garbage 
collection, sewage disposal, and general urban sanitation efforts of the Japanese-founded 
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Seoul Sanitary Association.175  It should be added, however, that the colonial government 
attempted to discipline public behavior in the form of these regulations on street use.  In 
this way, colonial power extended not only to the built form of the house, but also to the 
body of the individual in the street. 
The application of street use codes beyond their nominal purpose of regulating 
street traffic for the policing of public life was not unknown in Tokyo.  After all, the 
Meiji government was only 10 years removed from the 1872 “customs regulations” 
(ishiki kaii jōrei) issued to cut down on “uncivilized” behaviors such as public urination 
and mixed bathing in order “to encourage the Japanese people to internalize new notions 
of civilization,” as David Howell has argued.176  Street use regulations can be seen as an 
extension of such efforts.  Tokyo Governor Yoshikawa Akimasa and then Police Chief 
Kabayama Sukenori (later, the first Governor-General of Taiwan) jointly issued the most 
comprehensive street use regulations in Tokyo with the 1882 Urban Street Control Codes 
(gairo torishimari kisoku).  These 1882 codes built on regulations issued by the 
metropolitan police bureau under the same name four years earlier in early 1878.  For the 
most part, the 17 articles of these 1878 codes were concerned with keeping city streets 
clear of impediments, such as store signs, banners, clothing (Article 1), storefront 
displays (Article 3), parked vehicles (Article 4), debris (Articles 10 and 11), children 
(Article 15), or non-vehicular traffic (Article 17).  Still, these earlier codes went beyond 
limiting street traffic in the name of facilitating urban transportation to granting the 
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municipal police a supervisory role over construction of streets (Article 6) and public 
toilets (Article 7; repealed in 1880).  Yet even the stipulation that the police were to be 
notified anytime streets would be blocked for any reason (Article 6) and the admonition 
not to erect storefront stalls or hold unapproved large gatherings (hitoyose)(Article 13) 
could still be seen as a measure to prevent unexpected traffic disruptions.177   
The updated and expanded 1882 codes, on the other hand, not only further 
extended police power over street use to public performance, but also introduced 
regulations governing public behavior.  In addition to retaining each of the requirements 
from the earlier codes, the 1882 regulations added stipulations that any stages (butai), 
performance tents (koyagake), or parades of portable shrines (mikoshi), festival floats 
(danjiri), or the installation of any dancing stalls (teodori) or food carts (yatai) in the 
streets must be approved beforehand by the police (Article 4).178  As urban historian 
Ishizuka Hiromichi argues, these restrictions on street use and public performance went 
together with “policing of civil customs” (fūzoku keisatsu) in Meiji government attempts 
to discipline and maintain order over the urban population of Tokyo, especially as 
impoverished farmers relocated from the countryside to look for work as the city 
industrialized over the late 19th century.179  “The gradual narrowing and decline of the 
areas where street performers (daidōgei) could practice their craft, making the streets 
‘open air theaters’ (ao-zora gekijō) where large numbers of spectators would gather,” 
Ishizuka notes, “was perhaps one part of the process of the ‘modernization’ of urban 
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space.”  “But, as restrictions were placed on street performance (daidōgei) and those 
activities were confined indoors, it was also the path down which the ‘free’ world of the 
Sakariba, where the people of the city could gather in urban space, was increasingly 
negated by power (kenryoku),” Ishizuka concludes.180  The power over urban space that 
concerns Ishizuka included disciplinary power over public behavior.  In the name of 
maintaining clean streets, for example, the codes assigned storeowners to maintenance of 
streets (Article 26) and gutters (Article 29) in front of their stores, prohibited the disposal 
of garbage or animal corpses in the gutters or streets (Article 34), and admonished 
residents and their children not to urinate in public (Article 35). 
Restrictions on public behavior were even more stringent in the colonies, where 
Japanese colonizers expected colonial subjects to comport themselves according to 
“modern” Japanese standards of hygiene and decency.  For the most part, regulations 
issued soon after the beginning of colonial rule in Taipei in 1896 (revised in 1918) and in 
Seoul in 1913 shared many similarities with earlier codes in Tokyo.  All three cities, for 
example, had requirements for police permission for all billboards, public performances, 
parades, and public gatherings.  Proscriptions on disposal of waste, garbage, or refuse in 
the gutters or streets, and warnings not to allow unaccompanied children – under 7 in 
Tokyo, or under 5 in Seoul and Taipei – to walk in the street were also common among 
all three cities.  But what set apart codes issued in the colonies was the attempt to regulate 
public behavior.  As part of colonial efforts to sanitize the city and improve urban 
appearance, the 1896 Street Control Codes (gairo torishimari kisoku) in Taiwan and the 
1913 Road Control Codes (dōro torishimari kisoku) in Korea added strict standards for 
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public decency and discipline.  Concerned about hygiene and public image, codes in both 
cities forbade letting cows or horses off-leash, outlawed dumping or scattering refuse, 
sewage, or nightsoil into the street, and prohibited the transportation of nightsoil 
containers without appropriate lids.  Other codes specifically targeted public indecency 
and disruptive behaviors.  The 1896 codes in Taiwan admonished residents not to remove 
their clothing, expose their genitals (Article 17), gamble (Article 18), or defecate in 
public on the street (Article 25).181  In Seoul, meanwhile, the display on or near the street 
of any advertisement or sign that “disturbs public safety or manners (kōan moshikuha 
fūzoku wo midari)” was strictly forbidden (Article 19).  Article 20, meanwhile, 
criminalized playing (yūgi) in the street, loud singing (hōka), or excessively loud voices 
(takagoe) after being ordered to stop by the police or military.  In both cities, anyone who 
failed to comply with these restrictions was subject to detention by the police or a fine.  
Modern streets, the colonial government seemed to be saying, required modern public 
behavior.  Of course, enactment of codes and regulations did not guarantee their efficacy.  
Without enforcement, the codes carried little weight.  Certainly, when out of eyesight or 
earshot of police patrols, residents in the streets were effectively beyond the law, and in a 
sense operating outside the reach of colonial power.   
One street use restriction, in particular, was more able than others to compel 
continual and universal compliance: the designation of street traffic direction.  The 1913 
street use codes in Korea codified the then-current practice of travelling on the right side 
of the street, stipulating that pedestrians should walk on the right edge, while oxen, 
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horses, and various vehicles were to travel on the right side of the central area (Article 7).  
In a dramatic change that had the potential to completely transform colonial life, the 
Government-General declared on October 25th, 1921, that from December 1st of that year, 
traffic directions would be reversed to match those in the metropole: traffic would now 
flow on the left side of the street rather than the right.182  Thereafter, even out of sight of 
police patrols, the population of Seoul would be compelled to submit to Japanese colonial 
law or else rush headlong into oncoming traffic.  Dictates on traffic direction were 
therefore more effective than other codes in compelling compliance through self- and 
mutual-enforcement.  Notably, this regulation on street traffic came following the 
adoption of policies of “Cultural Rule” enacted in response to the 1919 March 1st 
independence movement.  As Shin and Robinson argue, cultural rule was a “more 
effective strategy than naked repression” because it attempted to “‘colonize’ Korean 
culture and consciousness” through a strategy of “divide-and-rule.”  “Colonial hegemonic 
policy,” Shin and Robinson continue, “while trying to ‘colonize’ Korean culture and 
consciousness, provided ‘space’ for groups to reconstruct their own being – some took an 
oppositional stance, others reformed, still others supported colonial hegemony.”183  Put in 
this context, even as hegemonic “space” was opened, dictates on street traffic direction 
were concealed attempts to pervasively control public life. 
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Designing Imperial Space: Hegemonic Urban Planning in Colonial Seoul 
Seoul provides a particularly instructive case study of how the pan-imperial Japanese 
colonial public works bureaucracy resulted in similar strategies of projecting power 
beyond spaces of colonial difference across the empire through the production of imperial 
space.  Building regulations and street use codes had been issued in both Taipei and 
Seoul to protect Japanese enclaves within the city and foster the spread of modern space 
to outside areas.  Now, Japanese architects, public works bureaucrats, and civil engineers 
who had planned the re-creation of Taipei as the colonial capital of Taiwan would be put 
to work in Korea to do the same in Seoul.  Arriving in Korea, these operatives of empire 
would intentionally reroute Seoul’s axis and symbolically situate monumental Western-
style edifices at either end of a new axial boulevard in order to reconfigure the urban 
fabric of the capital.  Japanese colonial urban planning was hegemonic in this case not 
only because it was meant to produce power or to normalize Japanese conceptualizations 
of modernity, civilization, and urban space, but also because it co-opted earlier 
improvement efforts and flexibly adapted to the existing built environment.  It was 
through these pragmatic alterations that colonial planners were able to ensure the 
measured success of the project.  The space produced was therefore imperial, not only 
because it was designed to project the cultural hegemony of the Japanese empire, but also 
because it was deliberately charged with imperial symbolism.  In this way, Japanese 
colonial planners deployed a malleable frame of streets, architecture, and urban design in 
order to forge imperial space at the heart of the colonial capital. 
Scholars of Korean history have long recognized Japanese attempts to alter the 
urban space of Seoul through “modern” planning and improvement programs.  For many, 
390 
 
urban improvements were part of a Japanese scheme to destroy the Korean nation and 
people by disrupting p’ungsu, the geomantic principles on which Seoul, or Hanyang as it 
was then called, was founded in 1394.184  Tae Hwan Kwan, for example, argues, “At the 
beginning of the colonial period, Japan destroyed Seoul to demote its symbolic 
significance as the capital of the Choson Dynasty.”  “Japan established urban planning,” 
Kwan concludes, “to violate Confucian cosmic order and P’ungsu, therefore depriving 
the Choson Dynasty of legitimacy.185  Hae Un Rii agrees.  “The Japanese colonial 
authorities tried to eliminate the Korean spirit and Seoul’s traditional culture by 
destroying historic Korean buildings,” Rii explains, “making new buildings and roads, 
and blocking the essential geomantic principles underlying the city’s design.”186  As Rii 
continues, “the Japanese opened up the new road between the palaces in order to break 
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the geomantic basis of the area’s planning and block the traditional spirits (gi) which, 
according to Korean geomantic notions, flowed from Bukak (North Mountain), towards 
the south.”187   
To observers of Japanese colonialism in Korea, the rerouting of the central axis of 
Seoul and the placement of the Government-General Building constructed in 1926 at its 
head is often seen as the most egregious example of Japanese attempts to disrupt the 
geomantic spirits of the city and sever the spiritual ties said to link the Korean king to his 
people.  As historian Hyungmin Pai explains the placing of the Government-General 
building, “In 1924, Kwanghwamoon [Kwanghwa Gate] was moved to the east of the 
Kyongbok Palace, and a domed, proto-Renaissance building was erected in front of the 
main pavilion of the palace.”  “The idea was that the new building would break the 
original, spiritual axis of the city, so carefully laid out during its foundation.”188  “By 
placing the new building directly in front of Korea’s main royal palace,” adds Ronan 
Thomas, “…the Japanese revealed a sadistic understanding of Korean psychology and the 
optimum way to disrupt the natural lines of harmony associated with Korean geomancy.”  
“In opposing the concept of geomancy,” he continues, “…the site of the new building 
was calculated to emphasize Japanese domination and reduce Korean popular 
resistance.”189  Finally, the National Museum of Korea, which itself had been housed in 
the Government-General headquarters building from 1986 to 1995, concluded in a 1997 
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publication that the building was designed “to [sever] maek, the vital artery of Choson, 
and to extinguish chi, the vital energy of the Choson Dynasty.”190 
Undeniably, Japanese colonial planners designed this axial route as a space 
intended to project Japanese imperial power.  At one end of the boulevard sat the 
administrative offices of the Japanese colonial government, placed directly in front of the 
historical residence of the Korean king, Kyŏngbok Palace.  Although construction was 
not completed until 1926, the location for this building had been selected as early as 1912 
– the same year Phase 1 of the Keijō Urban Improvement programs was announced.191  
The boulevard was therefore clearly designed from the beginning with the Government-
General Building in mind.  At the other end of the boulevard, meanwhile, sat another 
monument of Japanese colonial control over Korea: Seoul Station.  For Japan, the 
boulevard connecting the Governor-General building and the Seoul railway station was a 
symbolic link between two icons of Japanese domination over Korea, the colonial 
administration and the railway network.  Because this new route replaced Namdaemun 
Road to the east as the main north-south route through the city and linked various 
symbols of Japanese colonial power, it is often regarded as the symbolic center of 
Japanese colonial power in Korea.  As Todd Henry argues, the “main north-south axis – 
beginning at the Kyongbok Palace grounds, passing by the entrances to Namsan’s 
Chosen Shrine and Seoul Train Station, and terminating at the military boom town of 
Yongsan – was thus aimed at consolidating Japanese control over the Korean 
neighborhood of Chongno and clearing the way for the efficient circulation of goods and 
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people necessary to facilitate the imperial development of the city and beyond.”192  
Upon closer examination, two important points stand out about even this most 
egregious example of Japanese colonial power mongering in the urban space of the 
colonial capital.  First, the axial boulevard was the product of a flexible colonial policy 
designed to adapt to local conditions.  Secondly, the imperial space framed by the axial 
boulevard, Keijō Station, and the Government-General Building was designed by public 
works operatives who had played important roles in the re-creation of Taipei as a colonial 
capital.  Rather than forcefully clearing whole neighborhoods to carve a brand new street 
through the existing built environment, Japanese colonial planners followed streets that 
already existed.  This can be charted in a series of period maps.  First, Figure 23 is 1896 
map depicting Japanese-initiated street improvements within the Settlement.  As the map 
details, a second large street leading to the Namdaemun already existed in 1896.  This 
street is also visible in a more detailed 1897 map of Japanese residences in the 
Settlement.  Finally, the route is seen in a detail of the 1:10,000 scale Complete Map of 
Keijō, Korea (Kankoku Keijō Zenzu) published by the Japanese-owned Keifu Railway 
Company in 1903.  As this map shows, the route of the future central axis is roughly 
discernible in the existing street pattern.  The only major deviation is the zigzag around 
the Kyŏun Palace (later renamed by the Toksu Palace), which served as the Royal Palace 
of King Kojong at the time (See Figure 24).  Figure 25 shows a detail of the 1:10,000 
scale map of Seoul published by the Government-General in 1917 based on a 1915 
survey by the Government-General Cartographical Department.   
Comparing these maps reveals how the axial T’aep’yŏng Boulevard emerged 
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from the existing built environment through a series of surgically executed projects.  
First, zooming in on the main southern entrance to the city, the Namdaemun, in Figure 
26, we can see that the city walls on either side of the gate have been torn down, leaving 
the gate itself standing alone at the center of a newly constructed rotary.  As described 
above, this project had been carried out in 1907.  Following the axis northwards from the 
Namdaemun Gate along T’aep’yŏng Boulevard Road (Figure 27), we see that the road 
was widened to a width of 15 ken (~90ft.) all the way to Hwangt’ohyŏn Plaza at the 
intersection with Chongno.  Moreover, the zigzagging pattern of the existing street was 
eliminated by carving out a portion of the Toksu palace – perhaps too conveniently razed 
by fire the previous decade – shaping the new Taehanmun Plaza from the confluence of 
the existing streets.  Carried out from 1911-1913, this project was planned by the Public 
Works Council as part of the Phase 1 Provincial Road Project (Dai-ikki Jidō Jigyō) in an 
attempt to tie Seoul more tightly into the peninsular transportation network.193  We can 
also see that a new reinforced-concrete bridge was erected over the Ch’ŏnggye River, and 
existing structures were removed to widen Hwangt’ohyŏn Plaza.  The widening of the 
plaza, in particular, was done at the surprisingly low cost of ¥1,600, as compared to over 
¥700,000 expended on just these 1911-1913 projects.194  The reason for this is unclear.  
One explanation may be drawn from earlier street widening projects that had carried out 
inside the Japanese Settlement in 1904, where “the cost of land and building purchasing 
was surprisingly only a small amount…naturally, it is said that police enforcement had a 
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lot to do with this.”195  Finally, Figure 28 is a detail of the Kwanghwamun processional 
way extending northwards from Hwangt’ohyŏn towards the Kyŏngbok Palace.  The 
width of this route, already the widest street in Seoul at 30 ken (~180 ft.), was preserved 
when repaved by the Keijō city government over the years 1930-1931 as a continuation 
of the Government-General Keijō Urban Improvement projects.196  As can be seen in this 
map, the historical Kwanghwamun Gate was removed, and the new Japanese 
Government-General Building was erected in its place directly in front of the former 
Kyŏngbok royal palace in 1926 (Figure 29).  
As the focus on the Government-General Building displays, architecture played 
an important role in Japanese efforts at designing imperial space.  Prior to annexation, the 
Japanese expatriate and consular community had paired street improvements with the 
construction of Western buildings in order to produce modern, Japanese spaces in the 
southern half of the city.  The center of the Japanese settlement around the intersection of 
Nihyŏn Road (renamed Honmachi Road during the colonial period) and Namdaemun 
Road saw the completion of a number of Japanese-owned Western-style buildings: the 
Japanese consulate, Keijō Post Office, and Bank of Chōsen, among other administration 
offices.197  Outside of this area, meanwhile, colonial leaders constructed various other 
official buildings such as the Court of Cassation, Tai-Han Hospital, Oriental 
Development Corporation Headquarters, the Communication Office, the Railway Office, 
Central Laboratory, Commercial Museum, and the Chosen Hotel, all in Western styles.  
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By the time the Chosen Hotel opened in 1914, Japan had already constructed 92 new 
buildings for either the Government-General or its affiliated offices.198  As Chon Uyong 
argues, “Because the large-scale buildings constructed by the early 1920s were generally 
government offices or the offices of semi-governmental companies and banks, the 
location and architectural design of these buildings clearly reflected the intent of the 
colonial power.”199  By concentrating modern architecture into the southern – Japanese – 
half of the city, moreover, Japan succeeded in “making this area the most modern in 
Keijō and in all of Chosen.”200  “As a result,” Chon states, “[the southern half of the city] 
became the spatial center of colonial Keijō, along with becoming the cultural center by 
which the culture of the rest of the colony was tuned…Moreover, the new buildings were 
all similarly constructed in the same authoritarian Renaissance style, visibly projecting 
the coerciveness of the colonial power.”201 
The adoption of Cultural Rule following the 1919 March First Movement caused 
a new emphasis on colonial architecture.  As the Government-General reported, prior to 
1920, 2 to ¥3 million had been spent annually to build new provincial offices, police 
stations, courts, and prisons to replace those offices “housed in old Korean buildings, 
which were found very inconvenient for the dispatch of business.”  After 1920, however, 
“on account of the introduction of a cultural policy,” the budget of building construction 
was raised to ¥9 million, with ¥700,000 annually designated for government offices 
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specifically.202  Not only did the new policies change the type and number of buildings 
constructed, they transformed how planners viewed the role of architecture in the colony.  
Engineer Nakamura Makoto reflected on this shift in a 1922 article calling for a new 
direction in the field in Chōsen to Kenchiku.  As Nakamura wrote, the first generation of 
buildings in the peninsula were all constructed in a “temporary” (ōkyū-teki) and 
“stopgap” (bihō-teki) manner, as could be seen in the “barrack style” of early government 
offices.  The second generation of architecture, however, Nakamura characterized as 
“modern urban architecture based on scientific perspectives.”  As examples of such 
architecture, Nakamura listed two buildings then under construction: the Government-
General Building – “the representative of government office architecture” – and Seoul 
Station – “the starting point of transportation facilities in the capital and the gateway to 
Keijō.”  But the completion of these buildings did not mean the job was done.  Instead, 
Nakamura argued, architects should thereafter focus their efforts on the construction of 
buildings “most intimately related to urban life.”  What he had in mind was the 
construction of a number of “cultural institutions characteristic of the modern city”: a 
library – “the center of modern education and acculturation of the populace (minshū 
kyōka)” – a museum, and scientific laboratories.203  While Nakamura’s calls for such 
installations went unheeded, the Government-General nonetheless constructed a number 
of buildings during the period of Cultural Rule that arguably fell within his idea of 
“cultural institutions.”  As the Government-General later listed, these buildings included 
the Government-General offices (1926), the Chōsen Shrine (1925), and Keijō Imperial 
                                                
202 Government-General of Chosen, Annual Report 1922-1923, 147. 
203 Nakamura Makoto, “Toshi Kenchiku no Bokkō wo Nozomu” [Envisioning the rise of 
urban architecture], Chōsen to Kenchiku 2, no. 1 (1923): 29-31. 
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University (1924).204  The adoption of Cultural Rule, then, magnified the role of 
architecture as a tool of asserting Japanese culture. 
With a redoubled focus on architecture as a tool of cultural hegemony, planning 
and construction commenced for the monumental buildings that would charge the new 
axial boulevard as imperial space.  The first to be completed was Keijō Station.  When 
opened in 1925, Keijō Station replaced the old Namdaemun Station built in 1900.  
Namdaemun Station had been relegated to a location outside the city walls, since 
purchasing land for the station within the walls was difficult as a result of the crowded 
conditions, and was called Namdaemun Station because of its proximity to the south gate 
(Namdaemun) of the city walls.  At that time, “Seoul Station” referred to the terminus of 
the Kei-Jin Line, the station later called Sŏdaemun Station because of its location near the 
West Gate (Sŏdaemun).205  The importance of Namdaemun Station increased rapidly, 
however, with the completion and opening of the Kei-Fu Line in 1905, and the Kei-Gi 
Line in 1908.  From this point on, Namdaemun Station came to be seen as the central 
station in Seoul.  When Sŏdaemun Station was finally closed in 1919, Namdaemun 
Station was officially renamed “Keijō Station” in 1921.  The small wood station building 
was considered inadequate for the colonial capital, however, and construction of a more 
fitting station building commenced the following year.206  To design the station, the 
Government-General turned to Tsukamoto Yasushi, member of the selection committee 
responsible for the design of the Taiwan Government-General Building in Taipei.  As a 
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student of Tatsuno Kingo, Tsukamoto designs for Keijō Station displayed several 
similarities to Tatsuno’s Tokyo Station.  Most noticeably, Tsukamoto borrowed the 
trademark “Tatsuno Style” appearance of white ornamentation and red brick construction 
seen in Tokyo Station.  As Nakamura Makoto wrote in an article in Korea and 
Architecture, “it is widely recognized that Keijō Station lives up to its role as the central 
station of Keijō.”207  The station was completed in September 1925, only three years after 
the beginning of construction, and commenced operations from October that year.  As the 
main station of the colonial capital, and the beginning of the main axis running through 
the city, Nishizawa Yasuhiko argues, Seoul Station “became the Gateway to the city.”208  
At the other end of this axial boulevard presided the Government-General 
Building.  Drawing a direct link between hegemonic urban design in Taipei and Seoul, 
this building was the product of the efforts of two more colonial public works bureaucrats 
who had previously worked together in Taiwan: Mochiji Rokusaburō and Nomura Ichirō.  
It was after Mochiji took control of the Public Works Bureau in 1912 that planning began 
for a new headquarters to replace the dilapidated structures then housing the colonial 
administration.209  As the Government-General reported in the Annual Report for 1913-
1914, the original offices of the colonial government were “those of the former 
Residency-General, built in 1907 as a temporary erection of wood.”  According to 
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Japanese colonial authorities, not only were these wooden structures “unsuited as offices 
of the Central Government in the Peninsula,” but they were also “located in an 
inconvenient place” in the southern half of the city.210  Under Mochiji’s direction, the 
bureau dispatched an engineer to conduct inspection tours of government buildings in 
Europe and the United States, and conducted surveys for an appropriate location for the 
building.  To design the building, the Government-General hired a German architect 
living in Tokyo, George de Lalande.  For the site of the of the building, meanwhile, the 
Government-General selected the former Kyŏngbok Palace, vacated by the Korean royal 
family in 1895 (after the assassination of Queen Min) and only recently acquired by the 
Government-General in 1912.   
Mochiji Rokusaburō was only the first of two engineers of empire in Taipei who 
had a hand in designing the imperial space around the Government-General Building in 
Seoul.  When German architect de Lalande died unexpectedly in 1914, the Government-
General turned to Nomura Ichirō to lead the project.  An 1895 architecture graduate of 
Tokyo Imperial University, Nomura had a long public works career in Taiwan between 
1900 and 1913 where he was involved with both architecture and urban planning in 
Taipei.  First, Nomura had been one of 7 members named to a committee charged with 
selecting the design for the Taiwan Government-General Building in 1907 after Gotō 
Shimpei announced a nationwide architectural design contest for the building.211  
Consisting of a number of distinguished architects and engineers – Tatsuno Kingo, 
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Nakamura Tatsutarō, Tsumaki Yorinaka, Nagao Hanpei, Tsukamoto Yasushi, Itō Chūta, 
and Nomura – the committee had awarded first prize to Tsukamoto’s classmate at Tokyo 
Imperial University, architect Nagano Uheiji.  Continuing the predominance of imperial 
university graduates in the colonial bureaucracy, seven of these 8 people, graduated from 
either Tokyo Imperial University or its predecessor, the Imperial College of Engineering 
(Kōbu Daigakkō).212  As head of the maintenance department of the Public Works 
Bureau, Nomura had been responsible for supervising construction of the building when 
work began in 1911.  Secondly, in addition to being involved with the Government-
General Building, Nomura also had a hand in the urban planning of Taipei when he and 
Mochiji were both named members of the Taiwan Urban Planning Committee in 1910.213  
Called on to pick up where de Lalande left off on the design of the Government-General 
Building in Seoul, Nomura put the finishing touches on a design that borrowed heavily 
from the Edwardian Neo-Baroque style popular at the time in England.  This produced an 
exterior style that, in the estimation of longtime colonial architect Iwai Chozaburō, was 
suited to the building’s role.  “Government office buildings,” Iwai wrote in an article 
describing the design of the Government-General Building, “must, to the utmost, project 
a gravity befitting their role as government offices.”214  The same idea went into 
designing the interior of the building.  While the stout ferroconcrete exterior projected 
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Japan’s firm colonial rule, the palatial marble interior ornamentation attempted to 
overwhelm visitors with Japan’s heightened culture and modernity (Figures 30-31).  
According to Iwai’s colleague in the public works department, Fujioka Jūichi, it was this 
consideration for appearances that led to the peculiar alignment of the building with 
respect to the Kyŏngbok Palace.  Rather than aligning the building with the slightly 
slanted layout of the original palace grounds, the building was symbolically situated 
perpendicular to the existing processional boulevard.  As Fujioka explained, the reason 
for the alignment was so that “down the beautiful modern road, one can gaze 
(nagameraruru) the majestic appearance (iyō) of the building.”215  A similar explanation 
was given by the Government-General: “aligning the location of the new Building to the 
center of the existing structures would be to deviate (hanaruru) from the center line of 
the street facing the building, and would prevent appreciation of the magnificence (iyō) of 
the building” (See Figure 32).216 
Built in this Western design, and placed at the end of an axial boulevard that 
linked to Keijō Station and the Japanese-controlled railway network beyond, the 
Government-General Building capped an imperial space in central Seoul linking the 
physical power of the railway station to the political power of the Government-General.  
As with the link between the imperial palace and Tokyo Station in the metropole, this 
axial boulevard in colonial Seoul united railways, architecture, and urban planning to 
project Japanese authority and imperial power.  As the main station of the colonial 
capital, Keijō Station was the focal point of the X-shaped Japanese-controlled railway 
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network cast over peninsula.  In this regard, the station symbolized the physical control 
and economic integration Japan sought to achieve over Korea through the construction of 
railways.  Linking Keijō Station and the Government-General Building, this axial 
boulevard frame a Japanese-constructed modern urban space running through the center 
of the colonial capital.  Charging this urban place as imperial space, the Government-
General Building contained an ornate throne room housing a portrait of the Japanese 
emperor (Figure 33). 
 
Conclusion: Environments of Empire – Public Works and Japanese Colonialism 
Governor-General of Korea Saitō Makoto was not far off when he spoke of the 
Government-General Building as the embodiment of Japanese colonial policy.  Although 
Saitō was referring specifically to policies the Japanese administration in Korea would 
adopt after 1919, the building was nevertheless the product of Japanese colonial public 
works strategies common to both Taiwan and Korea as early as 1895.  In colonies and 
other territories under Japanese rule, Japanese engineers carried out public works projects 
designed to render the colonial landscape legible, governable, and profitable.  This 
applied to both the natural and the built environments.  In rural areas, Japanese colonizers 
laid railways, improved rural highways, built dams, and constructed ports.  In urban 
areas, Japanese engineers paved streets, installed sidewalks, buried water and sewer 
pipes, and erected Western-style buildings.  All required immense manipulation of the 
environment.  Massive amounts of earth had to be dynamited, cleared, and removed to 
lay railways and rural roads; enormous amounts of stone and gravel had to be quarried 
for rail bed ballast and street surface paving; vast stores of timber, granite, marble, and 
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brick had to be harvested for the construction of monumental Western-style structures.  
Through these projects, Japanese colonizers hoped not only to assert cultivators’ rights to 
colonial territory but also to project Japanese power and modernity.  As a result, Japanese 
colonial rule was therefore built as much on domination of the colonial environment as it 
was on harsh control of the colonized population.   
In both Taipei and Seoul, Japanese colonizers attempted to rule through modern 
urban space.  This meant constructing “modern” Japanese cityscapes juxtaposed to 
“primitive” native urban areas, issuing building regulations to and street use codes to 
enforce “civilized” built forms and public behavior while criminalizing those considered 
“primitive” in Japanese eyes, and finally deploying urban design to produce spaces 
charged with imperial power.  Why did Japanese colonizers exert so much effort and 
spend so much money on colonial public works?  By one count Japan expended $8 
billion on public works over 36 years in Korea alone.217  In the minds of Japanese 
colonial engineers, such projects had material and conceptual goals.  From a material 
perspective, public works were meant to benefit Japanese colonialism in three ways.  
First, especially in the colonial countryside, improvements to roads, railways, ports, and 
rivers, along with cadastral surveys, were designed to make colonialism profitable by 
facilitating the exploitation of the colonial landscape to the benefit of the metropole as 
agricultural, industrial, and commercial goods were shipped back to Japan.  This was 
undoubtedly the case in Taiwan, where government investment in sugar, rice, and tea 
production, in addition to government monopolies in salt, camphor, and opium, led the 
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colony to become completely independent financially from Tokyo just over a decade 
after colonization.218  Secondly, transportation improvements had the added logistical 
advantage of expediting troop movements, both to pacify local insurrection and to 
dispatch armies in time of war.  Troops were necessary in both colonies as Japanese 
garrisons were frequently called on to suppress “bandit” (dohi) uprisings in the mountains 
of eastern Taiwan, and “Righteous Army” (Ŭibyŏng) guerillas in Korea, in the early 
years of colonial rule.  Thirdly, infrastructure and housing improvements in colonial 
cities were carried out first and foremost to make Japanese colonial officials and expat 
residents feel at home by re-creating “Japan Towns” within the colonial city, whether it 
was “Kyōmachi” in Taipei, or “Nihonmachi” in Seoul.  As a result, efforts to produce 
modern streetscapes – the paving of streets, the digging of gutters, the laying of water and 
sewer systems, the planting of trees, the installation of street lamps and sidewalks, the 
construction of fireproof housing and Western-style buildings – were primarily localized 
to areas of Japanese residence, forcing native property owners out in the process.   
While immediate material benefits were an important objective of colonial public 
works, Japanese colonizers executed extensive programs for a much more significant 
conceptual goal: legitimating Japanese colonialism.  Aside from the aforementioned 
commercial, logistical, and corporeal advantages, public works were expected to further 
Japanese colonial hegemony in three related ways.  First, as with development of the 
natural environment, Japanese colonizers saw improvement of the built environment as a 
means of validating Japanese claims to territorial ownership and affirming Japan’s right 
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to rule.  By cultivating land that earlier governors had failed to exploit, pacifying territory 
that the previous regime had been unable to rule, and sanitizing and ordering cities their 
predecessors had left unorganized, Japanese rulers thought they could build colonial 
authenticity.  It was for this reason that Japanese colonizers sought to construct tangible 
“modernity” in the colonies by introducing the built forms and public behaviors that 
characterized “civilized” life in Japan.  Secondly, the construction of “modernity” in 
Taiwan and Korea contributed to Japanese colonial rule by denoting the passing of the 
old regime and marking the arrival of the new.  In the eyes of Japanese colonial 
engineers, there was no better way to demonstrate this rupture than by constructing 
spaces of colonial difference.  This was not limited to the production of modern Japanese 
cityscapes by improving streets and erecting Western-style buildings, but also included 
the preservation of vernacular structures as historical artifacts exhibited to reify the 
difference between the “modern” Japanese colonizers and the “primitive” native 
colonized population.  At the same time, building regulations and street use codes were 
issued to reinforce Japanese spaces while also enforcing Japanese expectations of 
“civilized” public behavior throughout the entire city.  Finally, planners expected public 
works projects to legitimate colonialism by asserting Japanese cultural hegemony.  
Constructing modernity, reifying colonial difference – both were essentially means to this 
end.  This was done with two targets in mind.  On one hand, attempts to improve urban 
conditions and demarcate the arrival of the new regime were intended to impress the 
colonial population with the modernity, culture, and power of the Japanese empire, 
compel subservience, and encourage assimilation.  On the other hand, improvements 
were carried out to garner the recognition and acceptance of Japanese colonialism in the 
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eyes of the international audience.  It was for this reason that Japanese colonizers eagerly 
publicized their successes around the world with voluminous reports, statistics, and 
staged photographs. 
Public works, then, played a vital role in Japanese colonialism.  As Japanese 
imperialism spread to Taiwan and Korea, it was the Japanese civil engineers and 
architects who followed the flag overseas that made Japanese colonialism work.  It was 
these operatives of empire – armed with gravel, brick, and mortar – who laid the 
foundation of Japanese imperialism and concretized Japanese colonial power.  While the 
construction of cultural hegemony in built form was just one mechanism of Japanese 
colonial rule, it was a strategy that was common to cities around the Japanese empire, 
including Taipei and Seoul.  Despite extremely divergent trajectories and legacies, 
Japanese colonialism in both Taiwan and Korea nevertheless shared one common 




CONCLUSION: EMPIRES OF SPACE AND POSTCOLONIAL SPACES OF EMPIRE 
On August 15th, 1995, a large crowd gathered in the plaza in front of the Korea 
National Museum at the center of Seoul, South Korea.  The anxious crowd gave a defiant 
cheer as the steel finial was plucked from atop the roof and set on the ground beside the 
building.  The cheer built to a roar as wrecking balls crashed through the ferroconcrete 
walls of the imposing structure and proceeded to turn the building to rubble.1  For an 
observer unfamiliar with the building’s past, the scene would have been extremely odd: 
why were people cheering the destruction of a seemingly important national icon?  But 
what this observer would not have known is that the building in question – which then 
housed the Korea National Museum and had earlier been home to the Korean national 
assembly – was an iconic reminder of Korea’s colonial past.  To many, the imposing 
Western-style stone structure was the most egregious and appalling remnant of Japanese 
colonial oppression in Seoul, if not all of Korea.  When the Japanese constructed the 
building in 1926, it was to serve as the headquarters of an expanding colonial 
administration, the Government-General.  For many in the anxious crowd gathered in 
front of the building in 1995, the destruction of this offensive edifice in the heart of the 
capital – symbolically staged on the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the 
Japanese empire at the end of World War II, no less – was a long-awaited expurgation of 
Japanese imperial power.  The symbolic emancipation of this site, in particular, draws 
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attention to possibilities for postcolonial responses to spaces of empire and raises 
questions about the nature of power in space.   
The destruction of the Government-General Building in Seoul in 1995 is a fitting 
place to conclude a study charting Japanese assertions of power in space across the 
empire, from Tokyo to Taipei and finally to Seoul.  Following the Meiji Restoration of 
1868, the fledgling Meiji government faced a crisis of legitimacy on two fronts.  Western 
imperialist nations lay in wait to see how successfully the new regime could escape from 
the legacy of its Tokugawa predecessor and subdue pro-Tokugawa holdouts.  In the face 
of these international and domestic challenges, government leaders embraced Western 
“modernity.”  Not only would this hopefully assist in the revision of the “unequal 
treaties,” it would also distinguish the new Meiji government from the old Tokugawa 
Shogunate.  As many scholars have previously noted, Japan’s role as a late-developing 
nation and empire provided its leaders an opportunity to travel the world in search of 
state-of-the-art models to modernize all facets of Japanese society, from political 
organizations and government institutions, to industry, technology and the material goods 
of everyday life.  Through the dispatching of Japanese students overseas, the wholesale 
importation of model factories, and the hiring of foreign advisors, the Meiji government 
adopted and adapted aspects of Western culture to the Japanese case as they set to work 
on a process of national unification and political centralization.   
As part of this strategy, Meiji leaders assembled a “toolkit of modernity” filled 
with instruments of tangible modernity, such as railways, architecture, telegraphs, 
modern hygiene, and modern urban planning.  As these tools suggest, the manipulation of 
geographic space played a major part in Meiji efforts to physically and ideologically 
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integrate the far reaches of the archipelago.  Locomotives, for example, acted as engines 
of state-formation through centralization and standardization as the national railway 
network cast a net of central power over the periphery.  As conveyors of goods and 
symbols of progress, railways provided economical, industrial, and ideological 
advantages.2  Urban reform, meanwhile, revolutionized the built environment of the 
cities, affirming a break with the past and creating the modern spatial conditions 
necessary for the capitalist mode of production.   
As Part 1 of the dissertation describes, it was in this context of state-formation 
that the Meiji government undertook the re-creation of Tokyo as Teito, the “imperial 
capital,” starting with Ginza Bricktown in 1872 and continuing through the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Projects in the 1880s and 1890s.  Although Japan was never directly 
colonized by Western imperial powers, western urbanism and culture was nevertheless 
imported into the city by an exogenous regime – the new Meiji government.  
Refashioning the Shogun’s city of Edo into the Emperor’s capital of Tokyo from the 
early 1870s, Meiji leaders employed Western architects and engineers, and deployed 
knowledge gained through firsthand observation of European and American cities, in 
order to modernize the urban built environment of the capital from the ground up – 
namely, by laying railways, erecting Western-style architecture, and implementing 
modern urban planning.  No doubt, each of these individual improvements had practical 
benefits, especially for planners seeking to revive the commercial and economic 
prosperity lost as a result of the drastic population decline and concomitant economic 
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stagnation resulting from the suspension of the Tokugawa “alternate attendance” (sankin 
kōtai) system.  Urban railways, for example, fostered commerce and industry by 
connecting urban markets to productive rural regions.  Planners also hoped that 
“improved streets” (kaisei dōro) – that is, streets that had been widened, straightened, 
paved in the most up-to-date techniques, and for the most part outfitted with sidewalks to 
separate vehicular and pedestrian traffic – would invigorate the economic function of 
Tokyo by increasing urban mobility, thereby promoting efficient commercial shipping 
and transportation of goods.  Widened streets also acted as firebreaks, which together 
with nonflammable Western brick architecture, combated the frequent conflagrations in 
the city, demonstrating the permanence of the new capital and its economic potential.  
Nevertheless, this modernization of the built environment was done not only in 
anticipation of the commercial prosperity expected of modern capital cities, but also in an 
attempt to concretize in the built form of the city what Japanese planners saw as an 
advanced Japanese culture.   
Yet no social processes are unidirectional or carried out without being part of a 
dynamic dialectical interaction, whereby different actors and factors share in the final 
product.  This is no doubt also true for the framing of urban space.  Indeed, it was this 
consideration of, and adaptation to, local conditions that ultimately made urban 
improvements in Tokyo and Seoul more feasible.  The overriding lesson of the Ginza 
Bricktown for Japanese planners was that the forceful imposition of power from above 
would elicit an equally tenacious and hostile resistance from below.  In other words, 
planners learned that the imposition of a rigid frame of urban space was unlikely to 
succeed.  What was needed instead was a more plastic structure, malleable enough to 
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conform to the existing built environment.  Moving forward, therefore, Tokyo planners 
abandoned attempts to instantaneously transform the built environment, and instead more 
pragmatically focused on incremental transportation and infrastructure improvements, 
especially to urban streets, as the groundwork for producing imperial space.  Finally, it 
was the channeling of competing visions of Tokyo and the emergence of a popular 
realization of Tokyo as the symbolic center of the expanding Japanese empire that led to 
the production of imperial space at the heart of the imperial capital in the form of Tokyo 
Station. 
As Part 2 of the dissertation discusses, it was this strategy of manipulation of the 
natural and built environments that Japanese colonizers carried overseas in the 1890s as 
they sought to extend Japanese imperial influence to Korea and Taiwan.  Although no 
longer under direct threat of foreign colonization, Japan still viewed Western advances 
into East Asia with trepidation.  For Meiji leaders, such as Prime Minister Yamagata 
Aritomo (Prime Minister 1889-1891, and 1898-1900), Western intrusion in East Asia 
threatened Japanese national security by breaching its “line of interest” encircling Korea 
and encroaching on the “line of sovereignty” encompassing the home islands.  In the 
name of national security, Japan attempted to prevent Western colonization of Korea by 
exerting its own influence and military might on the peninsula.  Believing that cultivation 
and exploitation of the natural environment legitimated ownership of land, Japanese 
agents sought to secure Japanese rights to railway construction in the peninsula amidst 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.  In the minds of Japanese defense strategists, 
diplomats, and businessmen, not only would railways provide Japan with military 
logistical and trade benefits, ownership of railways would justify Japanese claims to 
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Korean territory in the event of a colonial land grab amongst the Western powers.  
Japanese agents felt the situation so dire that they tried to forcefully seize rights to secure 
a railway concession – even inciting a Japanese-led coup d’état in 1894 and assassinating 
the ruling Queen of Korea a year later.  In the end, laying the foundation of Japanese 
imperialism in Korea in the Seoul-Pusan Railway was not possible without the 
choreographed cooperation of Japanese diplomats and entrepreneurs, foreign diplomats 
and businessmen, and Korean courtiers and laborers.  In this way, manipulation of the 
natural environment was one way in which Japan attempted to assert power in the 
colonies. 
For Japanese colonizers, exploitation of the natural environment was only half of 
the equation of solidifying, legitimizing, and profiting from colonial rule.  At the same 
time as colonial engineers undertook public works projects across the colonial landscape, 
other engineers of empire were dispatched to colonial cities to initiate urban improvement 
projects.  Like the introduction of railways, rural highways, and river improvements in 
the countryside, the widening, straightening, and paving of urban streets, the laying of 
water and sewer pipes, the installation of sidewalks and roadside trees, and the 
construction of western-style buildings was all meant to justify Japanese colonial rule.  
As with the “enlightened exploitation” of the colonial countryside, improvement of the 
urban built environment served both material and conceptual benefits for Japanese 
colonialism.  On one hand, urban improvements were meant to increase the commercial 
function of the city by reducing traffic and congestion, and to make the city more sanitary 
and hygienic.  On the other hand, as the uneven distribution of improvements across the 
city attests, urban improvements were designed to construct “modern” Japanese spaces.  
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By marking a sharp contrast to “primitive” native spaces and customs, these “Japanese” 
spaces would demonstrate the modernity of the Japanese rulers and the superiority of 
Japanese culture.  In the minds of Japanese colonial planners, such spaces would not only 
encourage the subservience and assimilation of the colonial population, but they would 
also garner the recognition and acceptance of Japanese colonialism in the eyes of the 
Western imperial powers.  The Japanese empire, both as a nation-state and as a colonial 
empire, was therefore built on the production of imperial space through manipulation of 
the natural and built environments.  In other words, it was an empire of space. 
 But what happens to spaces of empire following decolonization?  The destruction 
of the Government-General Building in Seoul in 1995 discussed at the beginning of this 
conclusion represents one response to imperial space in the postcolonial context.  
Postcolonial Seoul in fact offers three illustrative case studies of the postcolonial spaces 
of empire: the Government-General Building, Seoul Station, and Seoul City Hall.  Each 
building was handled differently following the fall of the Japanese empire in 1945.  After 
1945, many of the Western-style buildings constructed in Seoul by Japanese colonizers 
were re-appropriated by the South Korean government.  The Government-General 
Building functioned as the National Assembly until 1975, and as the National Museum 
from 1985 until its destruction in 1995.  Other reminders of Japanese colonialism still 
remain in the city.  The Bank of Chosen, now the Bank of Korea, still fronts its plaza at 
the intersection of Namdaemun Road and Sogong-ro Road.  Likewise, Keijō Station, 
renamed Seoul Station in 1947, still stands today as it looked when opened in 1925, even 
as its colonial counterparts were destroyed to purge Seoul’s colonial legacy.  Finally, 
Keijō City Hall continued to serve as Seoul City Hall until 2008, when construction 
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started on a new building immediately behind the old Japanese structure.  The 
Government-General Building was certainly the largest and most imposing of all colonial 
structures, and was especially detested for blocking the Kyŏngbok Palace.  It was for this 
reason that the destruction of the building carried such symbolic weight.  As Chagmii 
Bae notes, “The demolition of the [building] signified the liquidation of Korea’s servile 
relationship with Japan and its rebirth as an advanced democratic nation.”3   
 The demolition of the Government-General Building contrasts sharply with two 
alternative postcolonial approaches to imperial space seen in Seoul.  As a final mediation 
on the nature of power in space, this conclusion will close by considering the cases of 
Seoul Station and the Keijō City Hall, two colonial-era buildings that have been retained 
but for very different purposes.  If demolition was one approach to the decolonization of 
imperial space, Seoul Station embodies a second: repurposing.  When opened in 1925, 
Keijō Station – as it was then called – was the symbolic gateway into the Japanese 
colonial capital of Seoul, and marked the entrance of an imperial space presided over by 
the Government-General Building at the far end of a Japanese-constructed axis bisecting 
the city.  After 1945, the station retained its role as the gateway to the city until 2004, 
when a new Seoul Station opened to service the KTX high-speed railway.  In 2009, the 
Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, and the Korea Crafts and Design 
Foundation initiated a project called “Culture Station, Seoul 284” to restore and 
repurpose the station.  After a 21.3 billion won (about $20 million) renovation, the station 
reopened to the public on August 9th, 2011, as a “cultural space” hosting “cultural events, 
                                                
3 Bae, “The Symbolic Landscape of National Identity,” 2. 
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exhibitions, performances as well as seminars and conferences.”4  While retaining its 
Japanese-constructed exterior, Seoul Station was thus repurposed as a space of Korean 
cultural performance.   
The treatment of the colonial-era Keijō City Hall, on the other hand, represents an 
even more dramatic re-articulation of Japanese imperial space.  Rather than destroying 
the offensive remnant of Japanese colonialism as in the Government-General Building, or 
repurposing the structure for Korean cultural purposes as in Seoul Station, the former 
Seoul City Hall building has been completed co-opted as part of a new city hall complex.  
The building was originally constructed in 1926 as the offices for the municipal Keijō 
government.  According to architectural historian Nishizawa Yasuhiko, the design and 
placement of the building reflected its purpose as a “civic center.”  Rather than 
imposingly presiding over the space city, as did the Government-General Building, the 
Keijō City Hall sat at the heart of the city among the people it was meant to serve, 
adjacent to a large urban plaza.  As Nishizawa explains, the architect of the building, 
Iwatsuki Yoshiyuki, was less concerned with creating an imposing appearance for the 
building than he was with ease of use.  Offices handling the affairs of residents, for 
example, were located on the ground floor in order to make them easily accessible.5  As 
Hong Kal explains, the building design also reflected the more subtle “strategy of 
colonial pacification” seen in the Japanese policies of Cultural Rule adopted after 1919.  
                                                
4 Claire Lee, “Old Seoul Station Restored as Culture Space,” The Korea Herald, July 14, 
2011, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20110714000766&mod=skb; and 
“Abandoned former Seoul Station to be revamped as exhibition and performance space,” 
CNN International, July 18, 2011, http://travel.cnn.com/seoul/visit/old-seoul-station-
change-269504.  
5 Nishizawa Yasuhiko, Nihon Shokuminchi Kenchikuron [Japanese colonial 
architecture](Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2008), 94-95. 
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“Compared to the Government General building that was constructed in the same year,” 
Kal writes, “the City Hall was lower in height, smaller in size, and simpler in design.”6  
As Kal relates, the question of whether or not to tear the building down in order to make 
way for a new city hall was heavily debated in the early 2000s by the Seoul municipal 
government and the South Korean central government’s Cultural Heritage Committee.7  
Ultimately, the original Japanese-constructed building was retained and repurposed as a 
library.  More significantly, a new city hall building was constructed immediately behind 
the older building at a cost of $256 million.8  The visible contrast between the two 
buildings could not be more striking.  Opposed to the squat, sturdy stone facade of the old 
Keijō city hall building, the new Seoul City Hall rises to 13 stories and forms a free-
flowing shape akin to a large wave.  The facade of blue-tinted glass only enhances the 
liquid appearance of the building.  It is this stark contrast between the two structures that 
makes such a powerful architectural statement.  By retaining the structure, if only to be 
symbolically inundated by a new projection of power in built form, South Korean 
planners were able to co-opt the power inherent in this Japanese-produced urban space 
far more effectively than if they had destroyed the building or merely renovated it for a 
new purpose.  Originally a monument of the Japanese strategy of colonial difference in 
built form, the Japanese-constructed Keijō City Hall building has now been inverted as a 
lasting space of postcolonial difference.
                                                
6 Hong Kal, “Seoul Spectacle: The City Hall, the Plaza and the Public,” in City Halls and 
Civic Materialism: Towards a Global History of Urban Public Space, ed. Swati 
Chattopadhyay and Jeremy White (New York: Routledge, 2014), 278. 
7 Kal, “Seoul Spectacle,” 286-287. 






Figure 1 – The Ginza district in 1871.  Notice the irregular grid pattern of the streets, 
with axes connecting major gates and bridges.  The image is a detail of the 1871 Meiji 4-
nen Tōkyō Dai-ezu Kanban, published by Yoshidaya Bunsaburō.  Source: TSS, vol. 52, 



















Figure 2 – Ginza Bricktown street layout plan, 1872.  The dotted red lines indicate the 
extent of the Ginza fire.  Notice the alignment of the new axes through the district.  
Whereas the earlier main East-West axis had connected the Yamashita Gate to the 
Hitotsunohashi Bridge, the new axis focuses on the Sukiyabashi gate leading to the 






























Figure 3 – Ginza in 1876.  Source: Meiji Tōkyō Zenzu  [Complete map of Tokyo in the 





Figure 4 – Ginza in 1878.  Source: Jissoku Tōkyō Zenzu [Survey map of Tokyo], 
surveyed in 1878 by the Home Ministry Geography Bureau, published in 1879.  Included 
in Jinbunsha, ed., Tōkyō Kindai Chizu Shūsei: Meiji Taishō Shōwa 1 (Tokyo: Jinbunsha, 
1981). 
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Figure 5 – Ginza Bricktown as of 1875.  As the color key indicates: the dark grey 
shading shows brick buildings already completed or currently under construction; lighter 
grey streets are roads that have undergone “complete improvements”; darker grey street 
shading indicates roads that have undergone only “provisional improvements”; and white 
denotes areas where housing construction and road improvements were cancelled.  












Figure 6 –Ginza in 1884.  The darker shading in the Ginza area – especially in block 
interiors – indicates traditional buildings.  The lighter shading denotes brick buildings.  
Source: Tōkyō-fu Musashi-koku Kyōbashi-ku Kobikichō Kinbō, in Nihon Chizu Senta-, 












Figure 7 – 1888 Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan.  Image: Tōkyō Shikukaisei Zenzu 
[Complete map of Tokyo urban improvements](1889).  Source: Fujimori Terunobu, ed., 


















Figure 8 – 1903 New Tokyo Urban Improvement Plan.  Image: Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Shin 
Sekkei [New Tokyo urban improvement plan map].  Source: Fujimori Terunobu, ed.  














Figure 9 – 1888 Azumabashi Bridgehead Project 
Eastern Portion of Class 1, Type 2 Route #9 (Old), #5 (New) 
Width: at least 15 ken (about 90 feet) 
Executed December 1888 with additional clearing in 1894. 
Source: Fujimori, ed., Tōkyō Shikukaisei Shiryō Shūsei 1, 
plates between p. 241-242. 
 
Figure 10 – 1888 Asakusa Tawaramachi 
Project 
Class 1, Type 2 Route #9 (Old), #5 (New) 
Width: at least 15 ken (about 90 feet) 
Executed November 1888 
Source: Fujimori, ed., Tōkyō Shikukaisei 





Figure 11 – 1911 
Wadakura Gate Road 
Widening Project.  Class 
1, Type 1, Route #10.  
Width: 40 ken (about 240 
ft.).  Planned 1908; 
Executed Dec. 1911.  
Source: Fujimori, ed., 
Tōkyō Shikukaisei Shiryō 
















Figure 12 – 1905 Taipei Urban 
Plan (Taihoku Shiku Keikaku).  
Taipei Prefectural Announcement 
(Kokuji) #200.  October 10, 1905.  
Source: Huang Wu Dar, Rizhi 
Shidai Taiwan Dushi Jihua 
Richeng Jiben Shiliao zhi Diaocha 



























Figure 13 – 1900 Taipei Inner City Urban Plan (Taihoku Jōnai Shiku Keikaku).  Taipei 
Prefectural Announcement (Kokuji) #64.  August 23, 1900.  Source:  Huang Wu Dar, 
Rizhi Shidai Taiwan Dushi Jihua Richeng Jiben Shiliao zhi Diaocha yu Yanjiu: Shiliao 











































Figure 14 – 1901 Taipei Outer City Southside Urban Plan (Taihoku Jōgai Nanpō Shiku 
Keikaku).  Taipei Prefectural Announcement (Kokuji) #90.  June 1, 1901.  Source:  
Huang Wu Dar, Rizhi Shidai Taiwan Dushi Jihua Richeng Jiben Shiliao zhi Diaocha yu 














































Figure 15 – 1895 Taipei Inner City. 
Source: Rikuchi Sōryokubu, Rinji 
Sokuzubu, 1:20,000 map of Taipei, 1895. 
Figure 16 – 1898 Taipei Inner City 
Source: Taipei Shigai Zenzu (Taipei: 
Okada Toyokichi, 1898). 
Figure 17 – 1905 Taipei Inner City. 
Source: Taihoku Shiku Kaisei Zu (Taiwan 
Sōtokufu Minseibu Dobokukyoku, 1905), 
1:5000 
Figure 18 – Schematic of Retained 
Roads in Taipei inner city.  Source: 
Gotō Yasushi, “Nihon Tōjika no 
Taihoku Jōnai no Gaiku Keisei ni 
























Figure 19 – 1912 Seoul Phase 
1 Street Improvement Map.  
Source: Government-General 
Notice (Kokuji) #78, date 
November 6, 1912, as 
reproduced in Kanpō #91, 
page 342, dated November 18, 
1912.  Accessed through the 




Figure 20 – 1919 











Figure 21 – Cover of 1913 New Guide to Seoul.  Source: KDL: Aoyagi Nanmei, Shinsen 





Figure 22 – Seoul street improvement comparison photos.  Japanese colonizers 
dramatically staged “before-and-after” photos such as these of Kwanghwamun 
Street in 1905 (above) and 1930 (below) to popularize urban improvements in 
Seoul around the world.  Source: Chōsen Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Keijō Doboku 
Jimusho, ed., Keijō Shikukaisei Jigyō: Kaiko Nijūnen [Keijō Urban Improvement 
Projects: 20 Years of Memories](Keijō: Chōsen Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Keijō 
Doboku Jimusho, 1930), 30-31. 
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Figure 23 – 1896 Detail of Street Improvements Inside Japanese Settlement in Seoul.  
Source: JACAR, Ref.#: B12083364500, “6. Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no gi Zai Keijō 
Uchida ryōji yori hōkoku no ken, Meiji nijūjyūnen ni-gatsu.” 
 
Figure 24 – Central Seoul, 1903.  Detail of 1903 Kankoku Keijō Zenzu [Complete Map 
of Keijō, Korea].  Source: KDL: Keifu Tetsudō Kabushikikaisha, Kankoku Keijō Zenzu 









Figure 25 – Central Seoul, 1917.  Detail of 1917 Government-General Map of Seoul.  
Source: Chōsen Sōtokufu, Ichiman-bun Ichi Chōsen Chikeizu Shūsei [1:10,000 





































































































Figure 29 – The Government-General Building and Kyŏngbok Palace.  Source: Chon 
Uyong, “Shokuminchi toshi ime-ji to Bunka Genshō – 1920 nendai to Keijo” [The image 
of the colonial city and cultural phenomena: Keijō in the 1920s], in Nikkan Rekishi 
Kyōdō Kenkyū Hōkokusho 3, jō-maki, ed. Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Iinkai (Tokyo: 
Nikkan Rekishi Kyōdō Kenkyū Iinkai, 2005), 220. 
 
Figure 30 – The Government-General of Korea Headquarters Building.  Source: Chosŏn 
Ch'ongdokpu ch'ŏngsa sinyŏngji [History of the reconstruction of the Government-






















Figure 31 – Interior of the Government-General Building.  Source: Chosŏn Ch'ongdokpu 
ch'ŏngsa sinyŏngji, 13, 15. 
Figure 32 – Detail of the Government-General Building Alignment.  Source: Gotō 
Yasushi, “‘Keijō’ no Gairo Kensetsu ni kansuru Rekishi-teki Kenkyū” [A Historical 
Study on the Construction of Street Network in “Keijō” (Seoul; at Present)], Dobokushi 





















Figure 33 – Throne Room in the Government-General Building.  Source: Chosŏn 
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Sangetsu Jūsannichi, Meiji yonjūichi-nen sainyū saishutsu sōyosan narabini Meiji 
yonjūichi-nendo kaku tokubetsu kaikei sainyū saishutsu yosan” [Original script signed by 
the Emperor, 1908, 1908 general budget of revenues and expenditures, and 1908 budget 
of special accounting revenues and expenditures].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A03020868800.  “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji Yonjūsan-nen, Chokurei 
Dai sanbyaku nanajūgo gō, Chōsen Sōtokufu Doboku Kaigi Kansei” [Original script 
signed by the Emperor, 1910, Imperial Edict #375, the Korea Goverment-General Public 
Works Council].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A03020913000.  “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji yonjūyon-nen, Chokurei 
dai nihyakuyonjūnana-gō, Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Iinkai Soshiki Kengen-jū kaisei” [Original 
script signed by the Emperor, 1911, Imperial Edict #247, revision of the Tokyo Urban 
Improvement Committee organization and jurisdiction].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A03020926900.  “Go-shomei Genpon, Meiji Yonjūgo nen, Chokurei 
Dai nijūsan gō, kenchiku, doboku oyobi zaisan chōsa no jimu ni jūji seshimuru tame 
Chōsen Sōtokufu ni Rinji Shokuin secchi” [Original script signed by the Emperor, 1912, 
Imperial Edict #23, appointment of temporary personnel to the Government-General to 
conduct examinations of public works and government-owned assets].  (Kokuritsu 
Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A03022953300.  “Rinji Kenchikukyoku sōsai Inoue Kaoru, dō fuku-
sōsai Mishima Michitsune kengi” [Proposal by Special Architecture Bureau chairperson 
Inoue Kaoru and vice-chairperson Mishima Michitsune].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
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JACAR.  Ref.#: A03023061500.  “Chōsenkoku nairan ni kan-shi heiin haken ni kan-suru 
hōshin no ken” [Policy regarding the dispatch of troops in response to the rebellion in 
Korea].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A03023063000.  “Manshū no Keiei ni tsuki hōkoku no ken” [Report 
concerning the administration of Manchuria].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A04010147700.  “Tōkanfu Gishi Iwata Satsukimaro hoka ni mei 
Kankoku Seifu no heiyō ni ōji, hōkyū sono hoka no kyūyo wo uke narabini zaishokusha 
ni kan-suru kitei tekiyō no ken” [Matters regarding salaries and other payments for 
Resident-General engineer Iwata Satsukimaro and two others requested by the Korean 
government, in addition to regulations applied to employed individuals].  (Kokuritsu 
Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A04010148300.  “Tōkanfu Shokikan Matsui Shigeru hoka, go mei 
Kankoku Seifu no heiyō ni ōji, hōkyū sono hoka no kyūyo wo uke narabini zaishokusha 
ni kan-suru kitei tekiyō no ken” [Matters regarding salaries and other payments for 
Resident-General secretary Matsui Shigeru and five others requested by the Korean 
government, in addition to regulations applied to employed individuals].  (Kokuritsu 
Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A06051176600.  “Yamagata Isaburō” [Yamagata Isaburō].  (Kokuritsu 
Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054279200.  “Shokuinroku Meiji go-nen roku-gatsu kan’in 
zenshokai (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personel directories; June 1872; all personnel directories 
revised].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054289500.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Kyū-nen Hachi-gatsu Shokuinroku 
Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; August 1876; revised personnel directory 
(Tokyo municipal government)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054292200.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Jū-nen Jū-gatsu Shokuinroku 
Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; October 1877; revised personnel directory 
(Tokyo municipal government)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054299200.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Jūichi-nen, Ichi, yon, nana, Jūni-
gatsu Shokuinroku (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; January, April, July, December 
1878; personnel directory (Tokyo municipal government)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054305400.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Jūni-nen Nana-gatsu Shokuinroku 
Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; July 1879; revised personnel directory 
(Tokyo municipal government)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
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JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054315000.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Jūsan-nen Hachi-gatsu 
Shokuinroku Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; August 1880; revised 
personnel directory (Tokyo municipal government)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054326400.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Jūyon-nen Ichi-gatsu Shokuinroku 
Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; January 1881; revised personnel directory 
(Tokyo municipal government)] (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054336800.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Jūgo-nen Jū-gatsu Shokuinroku 
Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; October 1885; revised personnel directory 
(Tokyo municipal government)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054345400.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Jūroku-nen Go-gatsu Shokuinroku 
Aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; May 1886; revised personnel directory 
(Tokyo municipal government)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054350400.  “Shokuinroku, Meiji Jū-nana nen ni, hachigatsu, 
shokuinroku (Naimusho) aratame” [Personnel directories; February, August 1884; 
revised personnel directory (Home Ministry)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: A09054357200.  “Shokuinroku Meiji Jūnana-nen Shi-gatsu Shokuinroku 
aratame (Tōkyō-fu)” [Personnel directories; April 1884; revised personnel directory 
(Tokyo municipal government)].  (Kokuritsu Kōbunshokan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B03050307700.  “Kankoku Naisei Kaikaku ni kan-suru Kōshō Zakken 
Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of miscellaneous documents relating to negotiations regarding 
the internal reorganization of Korea].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan).  This document is 
catalogued as MT 1.6.1.5 in the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives. 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B03050308100.  “1 Meiji 27-nen 6-gatsu yōka kara 1894 (Meiji 27) nen 
6-gatsu, 30-nichi” [June 8, 1894 to June 30, 1894].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B03050308200.  “2 Meiji 27-nen 6-gatsu hatsuka kara 1894 (Meiji 27) 
nen 7-gatsu, 12-nichi” [June 20, 1894 to July 12, 1894].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B03050308300.  “3 Meiji 27-nen 7-gatsu itsuka kara 1894 (Meiji 27) 
nen 7-gatsu, 17-nichi” [July 5, 1894 to July 17, 1894].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B03050308400.  “4 Meiji 27-nen 7-gatsu futsuka kara 1894 (Meiji 27) 
nen 7-gatsu, 23-nichi” [July 2, 1894 to July 23, 1894].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B03050308500.  “5 Meiji 27-nen 7-gatsu 18-nichi kara Meiji 27-nen 7-
gatsu 30-nichi” [July 18, 1894 to July 30, 1894].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
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JACAR.  Ref.#: B03050308600.  “6 Meiji 27-nen 8-gatsu tsuitachi kara Meiji 27-nen 8-
gatsu, 31-nichi” [August 1, 1894 to August 31, 1894].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B03050308700.  “7 Meiji 27-nen 9-gatsu tsuitachi kara Meiji 27-nen 10-
gatsu, 23-nichi” [September 1, 1894 to October 23, 1894].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010886800.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line] (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010886900.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887000.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887100.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887200.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ichi maki” [Volume 1 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887300.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ni maki” [Volume 2 of materials relating to the construction of the 
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Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887400.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ni maki” [Volume 2 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887500.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ni maki” [Volume 2 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887600.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ni maki” [Volume 2 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887700.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ni maki” [Volume 2 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010887800.  “Keifu Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken tsuki Keifu Tetsudō 
senro hogo no tame junsa jōha no ken, Keifu Tetsudō senro ni nozoi Waga riken fushoku 
keikaku no ken Dai-ni maki” [Volume 2 of materials relating to the construction of the 
Seoul-Pusan railway, materials regarding the dispatching of patrolmen to protect the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line, and materials concerning expanding our interests along the 
Seoul-Pusan railway line].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010922500.  “Keijō Jinsen-kan Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken Dai-ichi 
maki” [Volume 1 of matters relating to the laying of a railway between Seoul and 
Inchŏn].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
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JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010922900.  “Keijō Jinsen-kan Tetsudō Fusetsu Ikken Dai-ni maki” 
[Volume 2 of matters relating to the laying of a railway between Seoul and Inchŏn].    
(Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B07080193300.  “Nikkan Tokushu Yakujō Zakken” [Miscellaneous 
items relating to the Japan-Korea special agreement].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B04010942300.  “Chōsen Tetsudō Fusetsu Kankei Zakken”  
[Miscellaneous documents of railways in Korea].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B07080194300.  “Tetsudō Denshin sono hoka ni kan-suru Nikkan 
Jōyaku Teiketsuhō Kōshō Ikken” [Matters relating to negotiations regarding the 
conclusion of a Japanese-Korean treaty for railways and telegraphs among others].  
(Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B07080194700.  “Bunwari 1” [Partition 1], (Gaimushō Gaikō 
Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B12083363700.  “Kankoku jisho kaoku kankei zakken” [Miscellaneous 
documents relating to buildings and land plots in Korea].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B12083364100.  “2.  Keijō Kyoryūchi Honpōnin Shoyū no Tochi 
narabini Kyoryūjin no tame Shōrai toru beki no Hōshin ni tsuki zai Keijō Ryōji gushin no 
ken” [Detailed report from the consul in Seoul regarding future policy for land possessed 
by Japanese nationals in the Keijō settlement area and for the benefit of settlers]. 
(Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B12083364500.  “6.  Deiken Chihō Dōro Shūri no gi Zai Keijō Uchida 
ryōji yori hōkoku no ken, Meiji nijūjyūnen ni-gatsu” [6.  Consul Uchida’s report of 
Deiken area road improvements, February 1896].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#: B12083364600.  “7.  Keijō Nandaimon dōri hanro kaoku torikowasu 
kata chakuraku no tenmatsu guhō no ken, Meiji sanjūnen” [7.  Report relaying full details 
of arrangements regarding the tearing down of houses impeding Nandaimon Street in 
Keijō, January 1897].  (Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan). 
JACAR.  Ref.#:  C06061211800.  “11-gatsu tsuitachi, sanbō sōchō Taruhito Shinnō-
hatsu, rikugun daijin hakushaku Saigō Tsugumichi-ate, gishi kōfu Chōsen koku hahan ni 
tsuki kaku heitanbu he kunrei no gi” [November 1, Commander-in-chief Prince 
Arisugawa Taruhito to Army Minister Count Saigō Tsugumichi, orders to all 




National Archives of Japan (NAJ) Digital Archive: 
This section contains references to documents accessed through the National 
Archives of Japan Digital Archive (http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/).  Listings 
contain two elements: “document title” [and translation], and call number.  
Document numbers are included for individual documents in larger collections. 
NAJ.  “Kōbushō Kyōbashi i’nan shōshitsuseki sokuryō ni tsuki ruishō machimachi zanji 
kasaku wo tomu” [Temporary ban on housing construction in burnt neighborhoods for 
the purpose of Public Works Ministry survey of burnt areas south of Kyōbashi].  Call#: 
honkan-2A-009-00.tai00336100, Doc.#: 17. 
NAJ.  “Rengaishi wo motte kaoku kensetsu no gi wo kimesu” [Decision to construct 
houses in brick].  Call#: honkan-2A-009-00.tai00336100, Doc.#: 18.   
NAJ.  “Shōshitsu-ato Dōro no Ichi wo Sadamu, tsuki Dōchi Kai-age narabini Renga-ishi 
Kenchiku Hōhō” [Determination of road layouts and of land purchase and brick house 
construction methods for burnt areas].  Call#: honkan-2A-009-00.tai00336100.   
NAJ.  “Tetsudō Shōgichō Haraguchi Kaname Tōkyō-fu Goyō-gakari kenmu-chū doboku 
kōji wo kantoku shi shiku torishirabe iinchō to nari koto-ni Shinagawa chikkō ni jūji 
benrei ni tsuki irōhin wo kashi su” [Rewards to be bestowed upon assistant railway 
engineer Haraguchi Kaname for supervising public construction projects while appointed 
to the Tokyo municipal government and especially for diligent service concerning the 
Shingawa port as chairperson of the urban improvement board].  Call#: honkan-2A-011-
00; rui0025410, Doc.#: 15.   
NAJ.  “Rinji Kenchiku Kyoku no Shokunin wo Sadamu” [Special Architecture Bureau 
personnel named].  Call#: honkan-2A-011-00.rui00250100.   
NAJ.  “Naimu jikan Yoshikawa Akimasa Rinji Kenchikukyoku Jimu toriatsukai no ken” 
[Matters of Vice-Home Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa taking over the affairs of the 
Special Architecture Bureau].  Call#: honkan-2A-018-00.ninA00129100.   
NAJ.  “Rinji Kenchikukyoku Fuku Sōsai wo Oku” [Vice-chairperson placed in the 
Special Architecture Bureau].  Call#: honkan-2A-011-00.rui00249100.   
NAJ.  “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Suidō Sekkei wo Ninka su” [Tokyo urban improvement 
water system plans approved].  Call#: honkan-2A-011-00.rui00513100.   
NAJ.  “Tōkyō Shiku Kaisei Jigyō no uchi Suidō no Sekkei wo Sadamu” [Water system 
plans determined as part of the Tokyo urban improvement projects].  Call#: honkan-2A-
011-00.rui00513100.   
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Tokyo Metropolitan Archives Documents (TMA): 
The section contains referenced documents obtained from the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Archives (Tōkyō-to Kōbunshokan).    
Tokyo Metropolitan Archives.  Doc.#: 301.E4.9.  “Tōkyō Teishajō Kaijōshiki.  Kamio 
Katō ryōshōgun Kangeikai” [Tokyo Station opening celebration; welcoming ceremony of 
General Kamio and Admiral Katō]. 
Tokyo Metropolitan Archives.  Doc.#: 604.B2.04.  “Kyōbashi inan ruishō ikken 
(Jinsinnen Wadakura Shukka no setsu Kyakkan yori shukkin narabini gaikin shobunkata) 
[Matters relating to the burnt areas south of Kyōbashi (Regarding the contributions made 
by officials at the time of the Wadakura fire in 1872 and the disposition of those funds]. 
Tokyo Metropolitan Archives.  Doc.#: 604.B3.16.  “Kukaku Kaisei ni kan-suru 
Shitashirabe Shorui (Kukaku Kaisei Iin)” [Documents relating to urban district revision 
investigations (District Revision Committee)]. 
Tokyo Metropolitan Archives.  Doc.#: 610.B5.16.  “Jimu hiki-tsugi ruisho (Kusumoto 
Masataka yori, Matsuda Michiyuki ni tsugu, 1-gō yori 19-gō ni itaru) Meiji 12-nen 12-
gatsu” [Documents of continuing government business (Kusumoto Masataka followed by 
Matsuda Michiyuki, #1-19), December, 1879]. 
Tokyo Metropolitan Archives.  Doc.#: 614.C8.10.  “Rinshinroku, Shikukaisei narabini 
Chikkō (Shiku Kaisei Torishirabe Iinkyoku) Meiji 17-nen 11-gatsu okori” [Petition 
records, urban improvement and port construction (Urban Improvement Investigation 
Board), November 1884]. 
 
National Diet Library, Imperial Diet Transcripts Database  
(http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp/): 
This section contains digitized transcripts accessed through the Imperial Diet 
Transcripts Searchable Database (Teikoku Kaigi Kaigiroku Kensaku Shisutemu), 
maintained by the National Diet Library (Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan).   
Ninth Imperial Diet.  House of Representatives.  16th General Meeting.  January 31st, 
1896.  Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūrokugō.   
Ninth Imperial Diet.  House of Representatives.  19th General Meeting.  February 4th, 
1896.  Dai-kyūkai Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Giji sokkiroku Dai-jūkyūgō.   
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Ninth Imperial Diet.  House of Representatives Budget Appropriations Committee, 
Fourth (Communications) Subcommittee.  5th meeting.  January 17th 1896.  Dai-kyūkai 
Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai sokkiroku dai-yonka, dai-gogō. 
Ninth Imperial Diet.  House of Representatives Budget Appropriations Committee, 
Fourth (Communications) Subcommittee.  6th meeting.  January 20th 1896.  Dai-kyūkai 
Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai sokkiroku dai-yonka, dai-rokugō.    
Ninth Imperial Diet.  House of Representatives Budget Appropriations Committee, 
Fourth (Communications) Subcommittee.  7th meeting.  January 22th 1896.  Dai-kyūkai 
Teikoku Gikai, Shūgiin Yosan Iinkai sokkiroku dai-yonka, dai-nanagō.  
Fourteenth Imperial Diet.  House of Peers.  18th General Meeting.  February 7th, 1900.  
Dai-jūyonkai Teikoku Gikai, Kizokuin Giji sokkiroku, dai-jūhachigō. 
 
National Diet Library, Digital Library from the Meiji Era (KDL): 
This section contains reoucres accessed through the Digital Library from the 
Meiji Era (Kindai Dejitaru Raiburari)(http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/), maintained by the 
National Diet Library.  Listings contain: author, Title [translation], publication 
information, and URL. 
Aoyagi Nanmei.  Shinsen Keijō Annai [New guide to Seoul].  Keijō: Chōsen Kenkyūkai, 
1913.  http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/950750. 
Dajōkan, ed.  Dajōkan Nisshi, Meiji 5-nen, Dai 1-18 gō [Dajōkan journal, 1872, #1-18].  
Tokyo: Dajōkan, 1876.  http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/787660. 
Hanabusa Yoshitarō and Yamamoto Genta.  Nihon Hakushi Zenden [Catalogue of 
Japanese PhDs].  Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1892.  
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/992465. 
Iguchi Masayuki, ed.  Shibusawa Danshaku Jitsugyō Kōen [Lectures on business by 
Baron Shibusawa].  Vol. 1.  Tokyo: Teikoku Tosho Shuppan, 1913.  
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/951198. 
Keijō Kankō Kyōkai.  Keijō Kankō no Shiori [Keijō sightseeing guidebook].  Seoul: 
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Taiwan Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Dobokuka.  Taihoku Shiku Keikaku Sankō Shiryō [Taipei 
urban planning reference documents].  Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Naimukyoku Dobokuka, 
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